9/18/2026 – Steelwork has started on the Northpark Bridge over the UnionPacific Railroad tracks and Loop 494. When complete, the bridge will form a critical link in the first all-weather evacuation route for the 78,000 people of Kingwood.
See the pictures below.
Note steel I-beam bisecting frame from left to right.Wider shot shows progression of work. Note bar connecting three completed bridge supports in distance, additional supports in middle, and more supports under construction on left.Intricate rebar structures getting ready for concrete pours will eventually support crossbeams and road bed. They are built on columns sunk deep underground.
Elsewhere on Northpark
More noticeable progress is taking place elsewhere on Northpark.
New stoplights being activated at Russell Palmer Road and Northparkon 9/16/26Holes being drilled for stoplight poles at Loop 494, also on 9/16/26
The dirt crew will continue with clean-up and backfill sidewalks and pavement across the project.
Installation of the US59 pond liners is substantially complete at the north pond. After the liner is fused, crew will backfill dirt over the liner, and then do the same in the south pond. However, the liner needs to be completely dry in order to fuse the sections. As a result, rainfall has delayed completion.
The structures crew will continue working on streetlight “spread-footing” locations this week. When completed, they will demobilize from the project.
The column-structures crew will continue work on columns east of the railroad tracks and then move to the west side.
A separate structures crew will continue working on the bottom forms for the support-column caps. Last pour should happen during the last week of September.
The drill shaft crew continues to be on hold. They are waiting on an approved work plan for the drill shafts adjacent to the UPRR ROW. After UPRR approves the plan, they have approximately 10 days of work left on the project until completion.
Loop 494 Intersection to Remain Closed Longer than Planned
The Loop 494 intersection will remain closed for the time being because of the UPRR drill shaft issue mentioned above. Once completed, the heavy-duty cranes can be removed from the project. Then the intersection can be safely re-opened, according to project manager Ralph De Leon.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/18/26
3307 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/DSC_5819.jpg?fit=1100%2C733&ssl=17331100adminadmin2026-09-18 14:20:182026-09-18 15:27:49Steelwork Starts on Northpark Bridge
9/17/26 – Houston District E City Council Member Fred Flickinger will hold a town hall meeting on September 22 at the Kingwood Community Center from 5-8 PM. It will include an all-star lineup of speakers addressing their priorities and projects affecting District E – both current and future.
Fred Flickinger at KAWR Gala
Speaker Lineup
Speakers include:
Council Member Fred Flickinger
Houston Mayor John Whitmire
State Rep. Charles Cunningham
Council Member Twila Carter
Houston Airports Director Jim Szczesniak
Dan Huberty and Greg Olinger from the Coastal Water Authority plus Chris Mueller from Black and Veatch (Lake Houston Gates Project)
Larius Hassan, Houston Solid waste
Ryan Prillman, Houston Public Works
Tom Broad, Chairman TIRZ 10 (Northpark project)
HPD Executive Chief Thomas Hardin and Captain Rafael Flores
Schedule/Location
Doors will open at 5 PM. Visitors will have an hour to circulate among tables and talk with the various representatives.
The community center is at:
4102 Rustic Woods Dr.
Houston, TX 77345
The program will begin at 6 PM and go until 7:30 followed by Q&A.
You must submit questions beforehand via this link. They will be read aloud during the Town Hall. Your feedback is a vital part of the discussion and plays a key role in shaping the future of our community. Council Member Flickinger encourages all residents to actively participate. Your questions, concerns, and ideas are invaluable in guiding the decisions that impact our neighborhoods and quality of life.
For More Information
For more information, please contact the District E office at (832) 393-3008 or via email at districte@houstontx.gov.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/17/2026
3306 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/DSC_4749.jpg?fit=1100%2C616&ssl=16161100adminadmin2026-09-17 17:24:232026-09-17 17:32:03Save the Date: CoH District E Town Hall, September 22
9/16/2026 – In my previous post, I summarized causes of flooding. I grouped 83 contributing factors into three main categories: nature, things humans do, and things humans fail to do. In my continuing effort to summarize years of research, today, I would like to summarize major categories of flood-mitigation solutions.
Major Categories of Flood-Mitigation Solutions
Flood mitigation is fundamentally about managing water better and reducing human vulnerability as development expands throughout watersheds. Below, I have grouped solutions into several major categories to make them easier to comprehend and remember. Each category lists multiple specific solutions within it that I have previously posted about.
1. Reduce runoff at the source
Keep rainfall from quickly becoming runoff. Preserve forests and natural areas. Limit unnecessary impervious cover with green alternatives, such as permeable pavement, rain gardens, bio-swales, green roofs, soil restoration, infiltration practices, and development standards that control post-development runoff.
While particularly useful for moderate storms, during extreme events, soils and small-scale storage can easily become saturated. So, view them as one layer of protection.
2. Preserve natural storage
This is almost always cheaper than trying to recreate storage after development.
Protect floodplains, wetlands, natural depressions, riparian corridors and other areas where water can temporarily spread without causing substantial damage.
The fundamental principle is:
Don’t eliminate storage you will later have to replace with expensive engineered storage.
3. Detain or retain excess runoff
Where development has already increased runoff, temporarily store the excess.
Solutions include detention basins, regional detention facilities, retention ponds, wetlands, underground storage and flood-control reservoirs. But don’t evaluate storage solely by acre-feet. Its location, outlet capacity and release timing also matter. A detention basin that releases water at the wrong time can contribute to downstream peaks.
4. Improve conveyance
Once water enters the drainage network, there must be enough capacity to move it safely.
Rustling Elms Bridge over Taylor Gully during peak of May 7, 2019, flood.
Moving water faster isn’t necessarily flood mitigation if the receiving system cannot handle it.
Improving conveyance upstream without considering downstream capacity can simply transfer the flood problem downstream.
5. Remove bottlenecks
The weakest link in a drainage system limits the entire system’s effectiveness.
A watershed may have ample channel capacity except for one undersized bridge, culvert, railroad crossing, utility crossing, sediment deposit or other constriction. This is especially important in an area, such as Houston, with flat terrain.
Sand deposited by Hurricane Harvey blocked San Jacinto West Fork by 90% according to Army Corps.
6. Manage sediment
Sediment management is especially relevant to the San Jacinto/Lake Houston system.
Possible mitigation measures include erosion prevention, construction-site BMP enforcement, stream-bank stabilization, better sand-mining practices, setbacks from channels, protection against pit capture, sediment traps where appropriate, dredging, and maintaining critical channel and tributary-mouth conveyance.
The objective: prevent excessive human-caused sedimentation from reducing critical conveyance or storage.
7. Manage flood peaks better
When water arrives affects flood peaks as much as how much arrives.
Potential solutions include coordinated reservoir operations, coordinated detention releases, strategically located regional detention, watershed-scale hydrologic modeling, real-time rainfall/stream monitoring, forecast-informed operations and—in some circumstances—pre-releases.
The goal: to avoid peaks from multiple tributaries, detention systems and reservoirs arriving at the same location at approximately the same time and stacking on each other.
8. Protect structures
Where development already exists in locations that have become hazardous, take steps to protect structures.
Examples include home elevation, floodproofing, floodwalls, levees, berms, gates, pumps, backflow prevention, elevated utilities and protection of critical facilities.
These measures generally reduce damage rather than eliminate flooding. But understand that a levee or floodwall, like the one at Kingwood High School, can reduce risk without making the protected area flood-proof.
9. Remove development from and/or stop developing in the highest-risk locations
Sometimes the most durable flood-control is simply to stop putting valuable things where water wants to go repeatedly.
Measures include voluntary buyouts, property acquisition, conversion of repetitive-loss areas to open space, preventing redevelopment of acquired properties, stricter floodway development restrictions, and avoiding new critical facilities in flood-prone areas.
Maintenance is one of the least glamorous and most important mitigation strategies.
Maintain channels, storm sewers, inlets, culverts, detention basins, pumps, gates and outfalls; remove debris and problematic sediment; repair erosion; inspect infrastructure; and preserve the designed storage and conveyance capacity.
A drainage system’s capacity should not be considered fixed at the capacity it had when constructed.
Without maintenance, design capacity deteriorates and flood risk increases.
11. Enforce the rules already on the books
New regulations accomplish little if existing ones aren’t enforced.
That includes floodplain/floodway restrictions, detention requirements, no-net-fill requirements, construction BMPs, stormwater permits, wetland requirements, mining permits, drainage easements and development conditions.
Flood infrastructure often lasts many decades. Designing only for today’s watershed can lock in future problems.
Planning should consider growth of impervious cover, upstream development, updated rainfall probabilities, subsidence, land-use change, downstream constraints and reasonably foreseeable changes in watershed hydrology.
This means building in generous safety margins. Development projects should do more than meet minimum requirements. They should still keep residents safe as the watershed develops.
13. Coordinate across the river basin
Floodwaters don’t recognize municipal or county boundaries. Effective mitigation therefore requires shared rainfall assumptions, compatible design standards, watershed-wide models, coordinated detention, reservoir operations, development assumptions, sediment management and capital planning.
It also requires a single accountable authority to “own” problems. Otherwise one jurisdiction’s successful drainage project can become another jurisdiction’s increased inflow.
14. Improve forecasting, warning and preparedness
These actions don’t prevent flooding. But they can dramatically reduce its consequences…as we learned in the Hill Country flooding at Camp Mystic.
Better rainfall forecasts, stream gauges, reservoir gauges, inundation forecasts, warning systems, evacuation planning, emergency communications and public education can save lives and property.
9/14/2026 – “Causes of flooding summarized” is part of my continuing effort to boil down more than 2 million words in 3100 posts since Hurricane Harvey into short summaries of key topics. I’ve seen the 83 causes of flooding listed below happen over and over again in different places in different combinations at different times. With the help of ChatGPT, I’ve organized them into three main groupings: Nature, What Humans Do, and What We Fail to Do.
The Three Large Groupings
1. NATURE — Conditions We Largely Cannot Control
These establish the underlying hydrologic and hydraulic setting.
Factor
Principal effect
Extreme rainfall intensity
Overwhelms infiltration and drainage capacity
Extreme rainfall duration
Produces large runoff volumes and sustained high flows
Tropical storms and hurricanes
Can produce both extreme rainfall and surge
Training/stalled thunderstorms
Repeatedly dumps rain over the same watershed
Antecedent rainfall
Saturated soils produce much greater runoff
Naturally low infiltration soils
Converts a larger percentage of rainfall to runoff
Flat terrain/low gradients
Slows drainage and increases backwater sensitivity
Watershed size and shape
Controls concentration and timing of runoff
Tributary geometry
Can cause flood peaks to arrive simultaneously
Coincident tributary peaks
Produces unusually high flows at confluences
High downstream water levels
Creates backwater and reduces drainage efficiency
Tides and storm surge
Can impede discharge from coastal watersheds
Natural sediment transport
Gradually changes channel and reservoir capacity
Natural channel migration/erosion
Alters conveyance and can threaten development
Naturally high groundwater
Reduces infiltration and drainage capacity
For Houston, flat terrain deserves special emphasis. A relatively small change in downstream water level, sediment accumulation, subsidence, obstruction, or discharge can propagate upstream as backwater because there isn’t much gravitational head available to overcome it.
2. WHAT WE DO — Human Actions that Increase Flood Risk
These can be divided into five mechanisms: more runoff, less storage, less conveyance, altered timing, and greater exposure.
Human action
Primary mechanism
Add impervious cover
↑ Runoff volume and peak
Clear vegetation
↑/accelerates runoff
Compact soils during development
↓ Infiltration
Install efficient storm sewers
Accelerates concentration
Drain natural depressions
↓ Storage
Destroy/fill wetlands
↓ Storage/infiltration
Fill floodplains
↓ Flood storage
Build in floodways
↓ Conveyance
Encroach on channels
↓ Conveyance
Undersize culverts
Creates bottlenecks/backwater
Undersize bridges/openings
Creates bottlenecks/backwater
Elevate roads with inadequate cross-drainage
Creates barriers to overland flow
Channelize/straighten streams
Accelerates downstream flow
Construct levees
Redistributes floodwater/removes storage
Build inadequate detention
↑ Downstream runoff
Release detention at unfavorable times
Causes peak stacking
Make reservoir releases during downstream peaks
Adds to downstream peak
Operate reservoirs independently
Can synchronize peaks
Withdraw excessive groundwater
Causes subsidence
Mine sand in active floodplains/floodways
Can alter channels, erosion and sediment movement
Allow excessive construction erosion
↑ Sediment load
Discharge sediment into waterways
↓ Conveyance/storage
Dump debris into drainage systems
↓ Conveyance
Build in flood-prone areas
↑ Exposure
Put critical infrastructure in flood-prone areas
↑ Consequences
Continue development upstream of constrained channels
↑ Runoff delivered to existing bottlenecks
This category contains an important concept. A project can make flooding worse by changing where the water goes, how fast it gets there, when it arrives, or how much room is available for it when it gets there.
3. WHAT WE FAIL TO DO — Human Omissions that Allow Flood Risk to Increase
This category captures institutional and cumulative failure, not simply engineering mistakes.
Failure to understand changing risk
Failure
Consequence
Fail to update rainfall criteria
Infrastructure designed for obsolete rainfall assumptions
Don’t enforce construction Best Management Practices
Sediment enters waterways
Don’t inspect permitted facilities
Problems remain undetected
Don’t correct known violations
Violations become effectively permanent
Grant repeated variances/exceptions
Standards gradually lose effectiveness
Failure to mitigate known problems
Failure
Consequence
Don’t fix known bottlenecks
Predictable flooding continues
Don’t enlarge undersized crossings
Backwater persists
Don’t preserve floodplain
Natural storage disappears
Don’t preserve wetlands
Natural attenuation disappears
Don’t acquire repeatedly flooded properties
Known exposure continues
Don’t complete mitigation projects
Residents remain exposed
Don’t fund maintenance
Infrastructure deteriorates
Don’t fund mitigation proactively
Recovery substitutes for prevention
Don’t adapt infrastructure after major floods
Previous vulnerabilities remain
Failure to coordinate
Failure
Consequence
Jurisdictions plan independently
Upstream actions impose downstream consequences
Reservoirs operate independently
Releases can stack
Counties use different standards
Watershed protection becomes inconsistent
Cities/counties regulate only within boundaries
Hydrology ignores political boundaries
Agencies optimize individual projects
Basin-wide impacts can be overlooked
No watershed-wide authority
Nobody owns the cumulative problem
Conclusion
That last point deserves special attention in the San Jacinto Basin. Some political leaders have actually fought against creating a river-basin-wide flood authority.
But water follows topography, not jurisdictional boundaries. A watershed fragmented among cities, counties, drainage districts, flood-control districts, groundwater districts, river authorities, state agencies and federal agencies creates opportunities for individually defensible decisions to produce collectively undesirable outcomes.
Flood disasters rarely have a single cause. They are usually the product of natural extremes interacting with decades of accumulated human actions and omissions.
And that distinction matters enormously when discussing responsibility. We cannot prevent extreme rainfall. But rainfall alone does not determine how high the water gets, where it goes, how many people are exposed, or how much damage results.
When floods happen, the sheer length of this list encourages finger pointing by those wishing to evade their own responsibility.
9/13/2026 – Today is the 18th anniversary of Hurricane Ike, whose eye passed directly over Kingwood.
It got me wondering. How many storms have caused significant flooding somewhere in the seven-county Houston/Galveston Region since 2008? Short answer – 24, including 14 tropical and 10 non-tropical. For details and implications, read on.
Caveats on Search
ChatGPT helped. It reviewed a dozen websites, including the National Weather Service, NOAA, FEMA, Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD), and news sites such as ReduceFlooding, ABC13, Click2Houston, Houston Chronicle, and Rice University’s Baker Institute.
The tropical category had a clear threshold, but non-tropical events were more judgment-dependent. If you included every storm known to have flooded at least a few homes, the count would rise. But 10 is defensible if the threshold is “significant flood damage.”
Tropical Events Affecting Houston Region Since 2008
Of the 14 tropical events, five were especially consequential: Ike, Harvey, Imelda, Nicholas, and Beryl. See the entire list below.
Year
Dates
Storm
Classification
Principal Houston Area Affected
2008
Aug. 5
Edouard
Tropical Storm
Landfall near McFaddin Wildlife Refuge; wind and rain across the Houston–Galveston region
2008
Sept. 12–13
Ike
Hurricane, Category 2
Landfall near Galveston; destructive wind, surge, widespread flooding
2015
June 16–17
Bill
Tropical Storm
Coastal flooding, storm surge, rainfall; minor flooding in portions of Harris and Galveston
2017
June 21–22
Cindy
Tropical Storm
Minor coastal flooding on Galveston and Bolivar Peninsula; rain in eastern portions of region
2017
Aug. 25–30
Harvey
Hurricane, Category 4 at initial Texas landfall
Catastrophic rainfall and river, bayou and reservoir flooding throughout metropolitan Houston
2019
Sept. 17–19
Imelda
Tropical Storm
Extreme rainfall, flooding, especially NE Harris, SE Montgomery, Liberty and Chambers counties
2020
June 6–8
Cristobal
Tropical Storm
Elevated tides, high surf and coastal flooding along Upper Texas Coast
2020
July 24–26
Hanna
Hurricane, Category 1
Outer rainbands, gusty winds, high surf and coastal effects
2020
Aug. 26–27
Laura
Hurricane, Category 4
Wind, surge, coastal effects, principally in Chambers and far eastern Liberty counties
2020
Sept. 20–23
Beta
Tropical Storm
Prolonged rainfall, street and coastal flooding, particularly south and southeast of Houston
2021
Sept. 13–14
Nicholas
Hurricane, Category 1
Landfall near Sargent; strong winds, heavy rain, coastal flooding, wide power outages
2024
June 18–20
Alberto
Tropical Storm
High surf, elevated tides and coastal flooding along Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula
2024
46211
Beryl
Hurricane, Category 1
Direct passage across metro area; damaging winds, flooding, tornadoes, extensive power outages
2024
Sept. 10–11
Francine
Hurricane, Category 2 at Louisiana landfall
High surf, elevated tides and relatively minor coastal effects on the Upper Texas Coast
Non-Tropical Events Affecting Houston Region Since 2008
Significant non-tropical events included:
Year
Date(s)
Event
Principal Area and Effects
2009
April 27–28
West Houston flood
Extreme short-duration rainfall; hundreds of homes flooded along Brays Bayou, Buffalo Bayou and Langham Creek; serious road flooding
2012
January 9
January severe-storm flood
Intense rain flooded homes and roads around Mission Bend, southwest Houston, Pearland and portions of Brazoria County; accompanied by tornadoes
2012
July 9–10
North Harris County flood
Slow-moving thunderstorms flooded more than 70 structures and numerous roads, especially in northern Harris County
2015
May 13–14
Clear Lake/Pre-Memorial Day flood
Homes and roads flooded in Clear Lake, Pasadena, Friendswood and southeastern Harris County; at least one death
2015
May 25–26
Memorial Day Flood
Approximately 6,000 homes flooded in Harris County; severe flooding along Brays, Buffalo and White Oak bayous; seven flood-related deaths
2015
October 30–31
Halloween Flood
Several hundred homes damaged or flooded across the Houston region; major road flooding and fatalities
2016
April 17–18
Tax Day Flood
More than 7,000 homes and roughly 2,700 apartment units flooded; extreme rainfall in western and northwestern Harris County; nine deaths
2016
May 26–June 3
Memorial Day/Brazos River Flood
Major river flooding in Fort Bend, Brazoria, Waller and Montgomery counties; hundreds of homes affected, evacuations and fatalities
2019
May 7–9
Kingwood–Elm Grove flood
Approximately 200 homes flooded in Elm Grove and North Kingwood Forest; widespread street and drainage flooding elsewhere
2024
April 28–May 5
San Jacinto–Trinity River flood
Repeated thunderstorms produced major flooding along the East and West Forks of the San Jacinto; hundreds rescued, homes inundated and communities evacuated
Key Conclusions
The central takeaway: Houston’s flooding is not solely a hurricane problem. It is a a heavy rainfall and drainage problem that hurricanes sometimes magnify.
A few other conclusions stand out:
Non-tropical storms matter as much as named storms. They occur approximately every other year.
Houston can flood in almost any month — not just during hurricane season. Flood preparedness and drainage maintenance must be year-round activities.
Ordinary-looking thunderstorms can become extraordinary disasters. Memorial Day and Tax Day floods demonstrate that a stalled line of thunderstorms can flood thousands of structures.
Floods cluster rather than arrive at orderly intervals. The phrase “100-year flood” does not mean residents receive 99 safe years between events.
Rainfall intensity, location and timing often matter more than the regional total. San Jacinto headwaters can cause devastating local damage while much of the metropolitan area remains relatively unaffected.
Different mechanisms produce different floods: street flooding, bayou/river overflow, reservoir flooding, storm surge and runoff from adjacent development. No single project or agency can address all of them.
Homes can flood even when relatively little rain falls directly over them. Rainfall in Montgomery, Liberty, Waller or other upstream counties can arrive later as riverine flooding.
Development decisions can convert a localized storm into a neighborhood disaster as the May 2019 Elm Grove flood illustrates.
The absence of a recent catastrophic floods does not demonstrate that the system has been fixed. Since Harvey, Houston has still experienced Imelda, Beta, Nicholas, the May 2019 flood, the 2024 San Jacinto flood and Beryl.
Each type of flooding exploits a different weakness in a fragmented regional system.
What the Region Needs
The region needs coordinated watershed governance, conservative development standards, adequate detention, drainage maintenance, updated rainfall assumptions, floodplain preservation, warning systems and projects designed around cumulative river basin behavior.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/13/2026
3302 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 18 years since Ike
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/20240503-20240503_164539.jpg?fit=1100%2C508&ssl=15081100adminadmin2026-09-13 22:10:262026-09-13 22:29:23How Many Storms Caused Significant Houston Flooding Since Ike?
9/12/26 – On 9./18/26, Montgomery County (MoCo) Commissioners Court will consider changes to its Drainage Criteria and Development Regulations. See Item 12A on the agenda.
Just last year, Montgomery County adopted a new drainage criteria manual. It was the first major update in decades. The new manual was first proposed in early 2024. That followed a minor update in 2019 from the county’s old 1988 drainage criteria manual in effect at the time of Harvey.
It adopted many, but not all of the minimum drainage criteria proposed by Harris County for other counties draining into Harris. MoCo allows fill in the 500-year floodplain, but Harris doesn’t. And Harris requires homes to be built at the 500-year flood elevation, whereas MoCo requires only the 100-year.
Making the manual easier to understand and use. For instance, it clarifies the meaning of many terms
Improving navigation in the document by adding hyperlinks to the table of contents in the PDF version
Expanding the scope of approved modeling software
Clarifying the County’s position on:
Nonproprietary (Primary) Modeling Software
Proprietary Modeling Software
Advanced Modeling
Spreadsheet Calculations
Secondary (Check) Analysis
Adding a section on “TAILWATER.” Tailwater is the downstream water level that controls or influences how easily upstream water can get out. The following items are described in this new section: free outfall, normal depth, fixed elevation, rating curve, regulatory, dynamic, conservative maximum, and required documentation.
Modifying content discussing “MINIMUM DETENTION RATE” for clarity and better alignment with FEMA and County floodplain requirements.
Adding to “DETENTION STRUCTURE DESIGN” to better explain the concept of “Hydraulically Connected Detention Ponds”
Creating a new section called “BASE LEVEL ENGINEERING,” explaining what BLE is and how to use BLE in proposed designs submitted to the County for permitting.
Clarifying requirements for “Drainage Submittals” and deliverables.
Adding new definitions for numerous concepts.
By and large, these changes seem focused on clarifying the County’s requirements so that developers and the County’s Engineering Department can minimize “back-and-forth” changes/requests.
How will “tailwater” affect the outfall from this storm drain? When water in the ditch gets high, will it back water up into streets and neighborhoods? New MoCo Drainage Criteria proposal would require engineers to answer those questions and more.
MoCo regulations require developers to submit plans to commissioners before submitting them to the engineering department for final approval.
On the plus side, the amendment will help ensure timely processing and improve government efficiency.
But this change also comes with a potential downside, in my opinion. Two weeks doesn’t allow much time for public input or protest. It usually takes that long to get copies of documents via FOIA or Public Information Requests, assuming the requests don’t get appealed to the attorney general. So the two week requirement effectively excludes the public from the process…at least with the commissioner who directly represents him/her.
Since these are infrastructure decisions that could affect communities for a hundred years or more, is it wise to rush them? The language in the proposed amendment reads like a sharp elbow to the gut of commissioners. It basically says, “If you can’t do your job, get out of the way. The Engineering Department will do it for you.”
Gee, what if the commissioner’s staff member is on vacation?
9/11/2026 – The Harris County Community Resilience Flood Task Force (CFRTF) has passed a resolution opposing the 5300+ acre proposed Scarborough/San Jacinto Preserve development near the confluence of the San Jacinto West Fork with Spring, Cypress and Turkey Creeks.
In doing so, it joins Harris County Commissioners Court and the Houston City Council which passed unanimous resolutions opposing the development. More than 9,300 residents of Harris and Montgomery Counties have also signed a Change.org petition opposing it.
Below is the text of the resolution. I have redacted the officers’ signatures to protect their privacy.
Text of Resolution
RESOLUTION BY THE COMMUNITY FLOOD RESILIENCE TASK FORCE OPPOSING PROPOSED SCARBOROUGH DEVELOPMENT (“SAN JACINTO PRESERVE”)
The Community Flood Resilience Task Force (CFRTF) was established by Harris County Commissioners Court to serve in an advisory capacity on flood resilience planning that accounts for community needs and priorities, including flood risk that originates upstream of the county line. Consistent with that mission, the CFRTF adopts the following position regarding the proposed Scarborough development, known as the ‘San Jacinto Preserve.’
The CFRTF shares the conclusion Houston City Council reached in its December 17, 2025 resolution: that catastrophic flooding renders this property unfit for residential development, and its highest and best use would instead be for flood mtigation and as a public park. The CFRTF opposes residential development of this property and supports its preservation as open space.
The proposed development would place approximately 5,300 acres, at the confluence of Spring Creek, Cypress Creek, Turkey Creek, and the West Fork of the San Jacinto River, west of Kingwood, into residential use. This property consists predominantly of active floodways, floodplains, and wetlands that currently function as a natural sponge, slowing and absorbing stormwater while filtering the water that ultimately flows into Lake Houston. Clearing and filling these wetlands to elevate the property for development would increase the speed and volume of stormwater runoff, placing downstream communities at greater risk of flooding, while undermining regional flood mitigation efforts already underway.
Beyond flood risk, this property sits within one of the most environmentally sensitive parts of the Lake Houston watershed, which serves as the primary drinking water source for approximately 2.4 million people across the Greater Houston area. Development of this tract therefore raises concerns not only for downstream flooding, but also for the water quality relied upon by a substantial share of the region’s population.
The CFRTF believes this property is better preserved as natural floodplain and green space than developed for residential use, given the severity of flood risk in this watershed and the role this land plays in protecting downstream communities and drinking water quality.
ADOPTED on August 28, 2026, by the Harris County Community Flood Resilience Task Force.
(Signed) Dr. Pamela Hernandez, Chair
Mary Anne Piacentini, Vice Chair
Chris Valdez, Secretary
For a PDF of the full document on letterhead, but with signatures redacted for privacy reasons, click here.
About the CFRTF
The Harris County Community Resilience Flood Task Force consists of ordinary citizens who represent communities and watersheds across Harris County. The 17 volunteer members are flood survivors, community organizers, engineers, advocates, and technical experts, working together to reduce flood risk for all Harris County communities.
Location of proposed development outlined in screen capture from FEMA Flood Hazard Layer Viewer. Cross-hatch = floodway. Aqua = 100 year floodplain. Brown = 500 year floodplain. Note: this is a pre-Atlas 14 flood map. Montgomery County has not yet updated its flood maps.
To learn more, go to the search bar of ReduceFlooding.com and search on Scarborough or Ryko (the previous owner of this land).
And I highly recommend this post that contains an original song, Scarborough Bottom.
Please sign the petition today and forward this post to all your friends and family. Help put the petition over 10,000 signatures.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/11/2026
3300 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/20250417-Ryko-property-copy-1.jpg?fit=1100%2C659&ssl=16591100adminadmin2026-09-11 17:33:112026-09-11 18:02:53Harris County Flood Resilience Task Force Opposes Scarborough Development
9/10/26 – Looking back at the last 100 years, today is the statistical peak of hurricane season in the Atlantic Basin. However, this year will also set a record for the latest “first hurricane” in recorded history…if we get one.
Since 1950, the record for the latest first hurricane was set in 2002 by Gustav and later tied in 2013 by Humberto. Both formed on September 11, according to AccuWeather.
“If no hurricane forms by Friday (Sept. 11), the 2026 Atlantic season will mark the latest point in the satellite era without an Atlantic hurricane,” they said.
Hurricane Climatology
So far this year, the season looks like a rarity. How much so? Check out the charts below taken from the National Hurricane Center’s (NHC) Climatology page. All represent data for the Atlantic Basin.
The first shows the number of hurricanes observed from May through December in the last hundred years. The historical peak happens today, September 10.
But the screen capture below, shows no tropical cyclone activity in the Atlantic. And NONE expected for the next seven days.
Screen capture from National Hurricane Center’s Tropical Outlook page on September 10, 2026
So, 2026 will go down in the record books as a late bloomer. And if the wind sheer induced by the current El Niño continues, who knows? We could tie 1914.
Defining Normal
Weather forecasters nationwide are cherry picking their own frames of reference. Some say this will be the latest start since 1950…a nice round number. Others are saying, this will be the latest start since 1963…the start of the satellite era, which helped improve our global acuity.
NHC’s climatology page shows what happens when in a normal year…defined as the average in a recent 30 year period.
“Normally” by now, we would have had eight named storms, three of which were hurricanes and one of which was a major hurricane.
The chart below shows where those storms start during the first ten days of September.
Converting that into a heat map that illustrates the relative risk of a cyclone striking you shows that the Houston area (green) lies in the middle of pack. The Mississippi delta region and the East Coast from Miami to Virginia have all had more cyclones strike them in the last hundred years during September.
Finally, looking back to 1851, the number of cyclones in the Atlantic Basin seems to be increasing. However, advances in technology, such as satellites, may skew the numbers. Still, you can clearly see immense variation within relatively short periods.
For instance, reviewing the table associated with the bar graph above shows that in 2014, the Atlantic had just eight named storms. In 2020, we had 30.
The data also shows only two years since 1851 without any hurricanes…1907 and 1914. Both occurred more than a hundred years ago.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/10/2026 based on NHC data.
3299 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-2026-09-10-at-10.42.01-AM-scaled.png?fit=2560%2C1387&ssl=113872560adminadmin2026-09-10 12:52:292026-09-10 12:53:46At Peak of Hurricane Season, No Hurricanes. How Unusual is That?
9/8/2026 – Since starting this blog, I’ve published the equivalent of more than two full length novels about Northpark. That’s daunting for even the most avid readers. So, in a nutshell, here is a brief summary of what the Northpark project is all about and its benefits.
Northpark in a Nutshell
Major Problems:
During major floods, Kingwood exits can all go underwater. In Hurricane Harvey, Hamblen, Kingwood Drive, Mills Branch, Northpark, US59, West Lake Houston Parkway and Woodland Hills were all cut off by flood water that rose in the middle of the night…without warning.
US59 during Harvey. Photo by Melinda Ray.Kings Harbor resident being rescued during HarveyHamblen Road during Harvey. Photo by Jim Balcom.
The UnionPacific Railroad Bridge was also knocked out.
Repair work underway after Harvey on the Union Pacific Railroad Bridge that parallels US59.
Power and cellular communication were knocked out. Many people became stranded by rising water. It turned neighborhoods into islands with no way to learn whether there were any ways out.
Kingwood High School flooded to second floor.
Every business in Kingwood Town Center and Kings Harbor also flooded. Altogether, 15 people died in Kingwood – almost half the total in all of Harris County.
Northpark Drive is the highest artery and the one farthest from San Jacinto East and West Forks. However, it frequently floods between Bens Branch and the Kingwood Diversion Ditch. I know this because it affected my business on Glade Valley opposite Kingwood Park High School almost every year.
Plus, Northpark has three other problems:
Long UPRR trains can block Northpark if there is a problem at Kingwood Drive or the West Fork. So even if people could get past the part of Northpark that now floods, they might not be able to get out of Kingwood.
In an emergency, the old two outbound lanes on Northpark couldn’t handle all the traffic that would normally flows through all the other exits.
In the event of a train derailment during a flood, 78,000 people could be trapped with no way out.
The Solution: Improve Northpark
The Lake Houston Redevelopment Authority/TIRZ 10 is:
Widening Northpark from 4 lanes to 6 from Woodland Hills to US 59 in two phases
Building a bridge over UPRR railroad tracks and Loop 494
Installing new streetlights all the way to 59 (previously parts were unlit)
Improving drainage, stormwater detention
Building entry ponds at 59 that provide both aesthetic and flood reduction benefits
Constructing a large, new detention basin where Northpark currently floods between Bens Branch and the Kingwood Diversion Ditch.
Elevation of the roadway and bridges where Northpark frequently floods.
Expanding the ditch that runs north of Northpark
Ditch One runs east to west north of Northpark and empties into the Diversion Ditch (center) and Bens Branch (r).
Who’s Paying
Anyone who spends money within the boundaries of the TIRZ through a sales-tax increment.
Timing
Phase I (US59 to Russell Palmer) should be complete by early 2027
Phase II (Russell Palmer to Woodland Hills) by 2032.
Benefits
Faster commutes for half of Kingwood
First all-weather evacuation route for 78,000 people
Reduced flood risk
Improved public safety
One Part of a Larger Jigsaw Puzzle
Northpark will solve an evacuation problem during extreme flood events. It will also handle larger traffic loads faster as Kingwood continues to grow. However, it will not solve all flooding issues in Kingwood by itself. We must also consider other flood-mitigation initiatives such as:
Upstream detention – Only 15% of the 2500 square miles upstream from Lake Houston are currently controlled by an SJRA dam (Lake Conroe). We need more upstream detention to help reduce peak loads when the SJRA opens Conroe’s gates.
Ongoing dredging – Lake Houston now has a dredging and maintenance district, but it’s just getting organizing. Meanwhile, it’s been years since the Army Corps’ emergency dredging program and sediment is filling back in.
Additional flood gates on Lake Houston – The release rate on Lake Conroe is 15 times greater than Lake Houston, effectively negating pre-release as a strategy to lower the lake and create more floodwater storage.
Development and Sand Mining Regulations Upstream – These need to be harmonized so that improvements downstream aren’t immediately offset by issues upstream.
Subsidence – Because subsidence is happening faster at the Harris/Montgomery County line than at the Lake Houston Dam, reducing the safety margin (feet above floodplain) for property owners in the Humble/Kingwood/Huffman/Atascocita areas.
I could go on, but I’ll cover these in future summaries, such as this one.
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/DJI_20260511124341_0030_D.jpg?fit=1100%2C619&ssl=16191100adminadmin2026-09-08 19:28:312026-09-09 06:57:31Northpark in a Nutshell: Overview of the Expansion Project and Its Benefits
9/7/2026 – A fisherman out on the San Jacinto West Fork during the Labor Day weekend reports that the river depth is a mere 2.4 feet adjacent to the giant Hallett Mine in Porter. Normally, he says, the river is 8-10 feet deep at that location. However, that’s not the only problem.
Area where river depth has been reduced. See pics below.
Hundreds of nearby trees are dying where Hallett’s settling pond leaked pollution for more than a year before the TCEQ investigated the problem. Ultimately, TCEQ issued no fines but required Hallett to fix leakage around the perimeter of its settling pond.
River One-Quarter Its Normal Depth
The pictures below show the loose sediment that Hallett used to build up the dike around the western portion of its settling pond in March of this year.
Dirt dumped into river from Hallett Mine in March 2026More dirt spilling into river slightly upstream at same dike in same mine.
The result?
The river that was 8-10 feet deep before the repairs is now 2.4 feet deep.
Local fisherman
The dirt has eroded into the river. See depth-finder screen below.
Fisherman’s depth finder adjacent to dirt shown aboveTheHallett sediment extended approximately 50 feet into the river back in March of 2026.
Rains since March have eroded some of the dirt shown above down into the river, decreasing the river’s depth. However, additional sediment may have also come from other sources. For instance, just upstream, the West Fork has migrated through a Hallett pit and flowed through it since at least April of 2024.
Trees Dying by Year-Long Hallett Leak
At the eastern edge of the same settling pond, sediment was escaping across a perimeter road for more than full year.
Route of leaking sludge carried it through trees between homeowners and Hallett’s settling pond.
For a better view, see this YouTube video linked below.
According to a nearby resident, hundreds of the trees shown above are now dying. “Waste water from the settling pond is killing all the pine trees,” he said. “Over half are dead already and the other half are dying. It’s killing them all.
Contributing to Problem but Not Solution
As the Lake Houston Dredging and Maintenance District begins its planning, the board may want to work with Montgomery County Authorities and the State to closely monitor mines such as Hallett. As photos above show, they certainly contribute to the problem, but they pay nothing to help clean it up.
Why is this important? When rivers become clogged with sediment, they lose their conveyance capacity. Then, when floods come along, stormwater winds up in living rooms instead of staying where it should.
At the very least, the State should require larger setbacks from rivers for sand mines. Other states require setbacks ranging from 100 feet to more than a 1000. But not Texas. We let miners operate right up to the edge of rivers and streams…so they can profit and you can pay for the cleanup.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/7/26
3296 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/IMG_8814.jpg?fit=1100%2C882&ssl=18821100adminadmin2026-09-07 16:33:172026-09-08 08:37:28West Fork Only 2.4 Feet Deep at Hallett Mine, Nearby Trees Dying From Pollution