Catastrophic Flash Flooding in Texas Hill Country

7/16/26 Update @ 11am (See earlier report below the update.) – Widespread catastrophic flooding is occurring on the:

  • Pedernales River
  • Frio River
  • Guadalupe River
  • Nueces River 
  • Leona River
  • Sabinal River

Flash Flood Emergencies have been announced for: 

  • Guadalupe River (Hunt to Bergheim)
  • Pedernales River (Fredericksburg to Johnson City)
  • Frio River (Leakey to Concan)
  • All Uvalde County
  • All Central and eastern Kerr County
Guadalupe River: 

An initial catastrophic flood wave is passing Comfort.

The river at Comfort crested 2 feet above July 2025 levels.

Jeff Lindner, Harris County Meteorologist

This flood wave is now moving into western Kendall County.

A second floodwave of 15-20 feet has been generated on the south Fork upstream of Hunt TX and is moving into Hunt. It will impact Ingram and Kerrville in a secondary rise on the river similar to levels experienced this morning.

This remains a life-threatening situation along the river from upstream of Hunt to downstream into Kendall County. Catastrophic damage has occurred and is occurring along the river. Numerous swift water and air asset rescues from trees and rooftops are ongoing.   

Frio River: 

Major to catastrophic flooding is ongoing from Leakey to Concan. River is approaching record levels at Leakey upstream of Concan. Disastrous flooding with up to 10 feet of flow inundating all camp grounds from Rio Frio into Concan and downstream toward Uvalde. Much of Garner State Park is flooded. All low water crossing are flooded and impassable.

Pedernales River: 

Major to catastrophic flooding from the headwaters into Fredericksburg downstream to Johnson City. Evacuations underway along the river. Considerable damage will occur near LBJ ranch.

From 8am Earlier Today

7/16/26 @ 9am – Jeff Lindner, Harris County’s meteorologist, reports that there is ongoing catastrophic flash flooding this morning across the Texas Hill Country.

Kerr County officials have declared a flash flood emergency for the Guadalupe River from Ingram to Comfort.

Ditto for Uvalde County where there is catastrophic flooding likely along the Frio, Leona, Sabinal, and Nueces Rivers.

8-10 Inches of Rainfall Overnight

Rainfall since midnight of 8-10 inches over Hunt and Ingram has resulted in a 20-30 foot rise in the Guadalupe River downstream of Hunt. Catastrophic life-threatening flooding is occurring. Numerous evacuations of camp grounds are in progress along the river and Johnson Creek.

Water levels in Ingram rose 25 feet in a few hours and peaked five feet below July 2025 levels. A destructive flood wave is moving down the Guadalupe River into Kerrville and toward Centerpoint and Comfort. The river has risen 32 ft in just four hours at Centerpoint, Texas, and is likely to reach July 2025 levels at this location.

The river at Comfort rose 16 feet in just 30 minutes this morning.

Rainfall of 15-30 inches has occurred over portions of Uvalde, Medina, and Real Counties in the last 48 hours.

Catastrophic flooding is ongoing across Uvalde County along the Frio, Leona, Sabinal, and Nueces Rivers.

The forecast crest on the Frio River at Concan will result in damaging flooding to camps along the river below Rio Frio into Concan. Rises along the Leona River will approach or equal levels seen yesterday resulting in widespread flooding in the City of Uvalde.  

Significant downstream moving flood waves are being generated on several of these rivers. They will continue into the weekend.


Defining Characteristics of Flash Flooding

The defining characteristic of flash flooding is speed. Unlike most other forms of flooding, flash floods develop rapidly — typically within 6 hours of the rainfall event, and often within 1 to 3 hours. That rapid onset leaves little time for warnings or evacuation.

Here’s how flash flooding differs from other common types of flooding, according to ChatGPT:

Flood TypeTypical OnsetPrimary CauseTypical DurationGreatest Hazard
Flash floodingMinutes to <6 hoursIntense rainfall, dam or levee failureHoursSudden rise, high velocity
River floodingDays to weeksProlonged rainfall, snowmeltDays to weeksLarge geographic extent
Coastal floodingHours to daysStorm surge, high tidesHours to daysSaltwater inundation
Urban floodingMinutes to hoursRainfall exceeds drainage capacityHoursStreets and buildings inundated
Pluvial (surface water) floodingHoursHeavy rainfall independent of riversHours to a dayPonding in low areas

What Makes a Flash Flood “Flash”?

Several conditions combine:

  • Very intense rainfall (for example, several inches per hour)
  • Small drainage basins that respond quickly
  • Steep terrain where water accelerates downhill
  • Impervious surfaces such as pavement and rooftops
  • Limited storage in soils, wetlands, or detention basins

The hydrograph of a flash flood has a very steep rising limb, meaning stream levels can increase several feet in minutes.

For More Information

The Hill Country Flooding has attracted the attention of media nationwide:

Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/16/2026 @ 9am

3243 Days since Hurricane Harvey

TWDB Publishing Nature-Based Solutions Guide

7/10/2026 – The Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) has published a Draft Nature-Based Solutions (NBS) Guide for Flood Resilience in Texas. It’s one of a number of documents in development for the next iteration of the State’s Flood Plan. And they are seeking stakeholder feedback.

The 314-page document is a 130 meg download, so don’t try to view it on your phone. But it is well researched, written, and illustrated. It seeks to equip local officials, engineers, community planners, and flood-related professionals with the knowledge they need to go beyond gray. Community activists may also find the Guide helpful in initiating discussions with those groups and pointing out opportunities.

Practical Step-By-Step Guide

The draft guide presents a clear framework for planning, implementing, and maintaining NBS as part of comprehensive flood resilience strategies. It includes solutions at both the watershed-scale and neighborhood scale. It is a practical step-by-step framework for:

  • Initiating
  • Planning
  • Implementing projects.

The guide contains 13 chapters in those three broad categories:

  • Laying the groundwork for NBS
  • Introducing NBS for flood resilience
  • Embracing guiding principles for NBS
  • Assessing ordinances incentives and Regulations
  • Establishing funding strategies
  • Integrating NBS into planning processes
  • Understanding flood risk and identifying flood-risk opportunities
  • Evaluating NBS feasibility and alternatives
  • Designing and building NBS
  • Applying watershed NBS design and construction considerations
  • Applying neighborhood NBS design and construction considerations
  • Applying coastal NBS design and construction considerations
  • Maintaining and adaptively managing NBS

The concepts are not theoretical. They are being successfully implemented across Texas – from floodplain buyouts to stormwater parks, regional watershed planning, and living shoreline projects. And the attractive illustrations from around the state encourage readers to dig in and explore.

Photo of Fort Work Stormwater Park courtesy of Freese and Nichols, Inc.

From Planning to Identifying Opportunities and Construction

As I was browsing through it, two chapters forced me to dig down immediately: Chapter 6 on Planning and Chapter 7 on understanding flood risk and identifying NBS opportunities.

A table in Chapter 6 mentioned examples of needs in the San Jacinto watershed including “Preserve and restore … river floodplains to improve … natural storage, and resilience to compound flooding.”

It was exactly what I have been advocating for the Scarborough property and San Jacinto West Fork sand-mining gauntlet. Then the chapter discussed ways to identify and reach out to stakeholder groups.

Chapter 7 includes sections on determining flood risks and identifying flood risk hot spots. It also included an “Opportunity Matrix Tool” to help convert “Needs” to “Solutions.”

Subsequent chapters include the nuts and bolts of how to do that. The work is broken up into quick, readable sections with charts, tables, graphs, photos and illustrations that help readers grasp concepts at a glance.

How Green and Gray Can Work Together

All in all, for those threatened by flooding and those who represent them, this guide presents a step-by-step framework for implementing nature-based solutions, either alone or in combination with other flood mitigation projects. The emphasis is on how green and gray solutions can work together. And that’s refreshing.

Click here to download the document. Warning 130 Megs.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/10/26

3237 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The Complexity of Accurately Estimating Current Flood Risk

7/9/2026 – A young couple that is considering buying a home in my neighborhood asked me a simple question yesterday? “What is the current flood risk?” The home they were considering flooded during Hurricane Harvey. But that was an extreme event. And they wondered whether mitigation activities since then would prevent it from flooding again.

I tried to explain the various mitigation efforts since then and the current status of each. However, I quickly realized that the scale, complexity, relative impact and timing of the efforts make the task of estimating “current” flood risk virtually impossible. They are all at different stages. And few are complete.

Kingwood Flooding
Flooding neighborhood near Kingwood Country Club in May 2024, a less-than-Harvey event, but which still saw one of the largest releases ever from Lake Conroe.

What Goes into Calculating Flood Risk?

Flood risk is not static. Estimates change constantly. Predicting what will fall from the sky and where once every 100 or 500 years is only part of the battle. To name just a few things, we also need to understand:

  • How the landscape is changing
  • Where people are building
  • How they are building, i.e., elevated structures vs. slab on grade
  • What they are doing to offset increased runoff
  • Soil types and rates of infiltration
  • Changes in land-use patterns, i.e., forestry vs. retail development
  • Reservoir operations
  • Sediment accumulations, such as deltas, that can reduce channel conveyance
  • Bridges that can create backwater effects
  • Subsidence that can alter channel gradients
  • Flood-mitigation efforts and their impacts
  • Timing effects, such as the “stacking effect” at confluences, can erode margins of safety
  • Changes in regulations in and across different parts of a watershed

Impacts of Uncertainty and Misunderstanding on Estimates

Understanding the impact of those factors on uncertainty may require a graduate degree in statistics. Every flood risk estimate contains uncertainty arising from:

  • Rainfall estimates
  • Future land development
  • Climate variability
  • Hydraulic model assumptions
  • Terrain (LiDAR) accuracy
  • Roughness coefficients
  • Reservoir operations
  • Future sedimentation
  • Infrastructure changes

Then, layer on semantic confusion. To most people, a “100-year flood” sounds like one that happens once a century. But it actually has a 1% annual chance of occurring in any given year. Theoretically, you could have back-to-back-to-back 100-year floods, as we did in 2015, 2016 and 2017.

A 1% chance is no guarantee that a flood of that magnitude will only occur once every 100 years.

In fact, a 1% annual chance flood has a 26% chance (about 1 in 4) of occurring during the life of a 30-year mortgage. And that assumes nothing changes in the watershed. This often surprises people. Here’s how to calculate it.

And here’s how the probabilities break down for various return periods.

Annual ChanceReturn PeriodChance Over 30 Years
10%10-year flood95.8%
4%25-year flood70.6%
2%50-year flood45.5%
1%100-year flood26.0%
0.2%500-year flood5.8%

Interaction of Factors Can Amplify Risk

Many of the issues above interact in ways that can amplify risk. For example:

  • Rapid urbanization increases impervious cover and runoff
  • Sedimentation and subsidence reduce channel conveyance
  • Reservoir operations influence the timing and magnitude of downstream flows
  • Political fragmentation can make watershed-wide coordination more difficult.

In combination, these factors mean that flood risk is not static. It evolves as the watershed, the built environment, regulations, and flood mitigation activities change…at different rates…across dozens of jurisdictions.

Complexity, Timing Make Current Risk Virtually Unknowable

The scale, complexity, interaction and timing of these factors makes accurate assessment of current flood risk virtually impossible eight years after data for the new flood maps was collected in 2018.

Since then, Montgomery County has been one of the fastest growing counties in America. Yet it didn’t update its floodplain regulations until 2025. And there’s no way to quantify how vigorously it has enforced its regulations.

During that time, Harris County and City of Houston have engaged in many mitigation activities, i.e., dredging. But since the dredging, sediment from sand mines and natural erosion has built back in somewhat. But how much?

Confluence of West Fork and Spring Creek.
Confluence of Spring Creek and West Fork showing sediment pollution coming from West Fork and its sand mines.

There are no current surveys of water depth that I know of.

Advice for Homebuyers

Given all the uncertainty, experts recommend that homebuyers:

  • Look beyond FEMA flood maps. They are valuable, but have limitations and may be outdated.
  • Research the property’s actual flood history. Don’t rely solely on the seller’s disclosure. Talk with neighbors—they often know the area’s history better than anyone.
  • Study the topography, local drainage, storm sewers, elevation, nearby creeks, and ditches
  • Consider how the area is changing. Runoff can increase over time in a rapidly urbanizing watershed
  • Don’t assume “never flooded” means “never will.” 
  • Understand the residual risk behind flood-control infrastructure. Levees, reservoirs, detention basins, and drainage projects reduce risk in smaller floods, but increase it in larger ones by creating a false sense of security that encourages people to build in risky areas
  • Evaluate flood insurance – even if it’s not required. 
  • Think long term. Ask how conditions could change in 10, 20 or 30 years
  • Be cautious with unusually attractive prices. Sometimes a lower purchase price reflects higher flood risk. That doesn’t automatically make it a bad purchase, but you should weigh the discount against higher insurance costs, potential repair costs, and resale challenges.
  • Ask yourself “If this home flooded, could I recover financially and emotionally?” If the answer is no, that should weigh heavily in your decision to buy the property.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/9/2026

3236 Days since Hurricane Harvey

LSGCD Proposes Pumping Groundwater 3X Faster Than It’s Being Replenished

7/8/2026 – The Conroe City Council will consider at its July 9 meeting a motion by the Lone Star Groundwater Conservation District (LSGCD) that would double the rate of groundwater pumping which already exceeds the natural recharge rate of the aquifer. If approved, the new maximum pumping rate would exceed the recharge rate by 3X.

This isn’t the first time LSGCD has made such requests. Back in 2021, they fought the other members of Groundwater Management Area 14 for the right to ignore subsidence, one of the consequences of excessive groundwater withdrawal.

Earlier that year, LSGCD voted to double groundwater pumping and treat subsidence as a PR problem.

Back then, LSGCD fought any mention of subsidence in its desired future conditions (DFCs). And as a consequence, southern Montgomery County is sinking at one of the fastest rates in the region. See below.

Subsidence Map Insar from 2025 Report
Harris-Galveston Subsidence District Map from 2025 Groundwater Report. Compiled using Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar (InSAR).

Consequences of Excessive Groundwater Pumping

Subsidence can trigger geologic faults, crack pavement, foundations, walls, pipelines, storm sewers and more, leaving residents/taxpayers as unintended casualties of a water war where the private companies that pump groundwater always seem to get their way.

Differential subsidence also contributes to flooding by forming bowls in the landscape and reducing the gradient of rivers and streams. It can also reduce the safety margin between foundations and floodplains.

Last but not least, excessive groundwater pumping mortgages the area’s future. Subsidence is irreversible. Once the water is withdrawn and the ground above it has collapsed, the storage capacity is reduced considerably.

Communities that grow dependent on groundwater may not find it there to accommodate future growth or generations.

One of the region’s leading hydrologists told me, “They are going to pump themselves into a problem that they can’t fix. This has already been demonstrated all over Harris County. Some people are willingly turning a blind eye … for what? To save a little bit of money?”

He continued, “It is shortsighted and puts a burden on future generations. Water isn’t free or cheap. We have just been lucky for a long time, but there are too many people here now and it is time to be smart.”

Montgomery County Concerned Citizens

According to Paul Cote, a MUD president in MoCO for more than ten years and a leader of Montgomery County Concerned Citizens, the July 9 meeting of Conroe’s City Council is a crucial moment for Conroe’s water future.

He urges people to attend and protest the increase in groundwater pumping rates.

He suggests:

  • Respectfully oppose the LSGCD’s request for support regarding the proposed DFC increase.
  • Advocate for the City of Conroe to abandon the proposed GRP Global Amendment.
  • Urge the Council to promote with State Leadership the need for a Countywide Unified Water Authority to promote a Regional Water Plan. 

Meeting Details

The meeting will be held at Conroe City Hall, 300 W. Davis, Conroe, on Thursday, July 9, 2026, at 6:00 p.m. Arriving early is important to sign up for public comment.

Poster by Montgomery County Concerned Citizens

There are serious questions in my mind about whether LSGCD’s proposal is sustainable. Water infrastructure projects can take decades to build. The time to start was decades ago. In my opinion, we can’t continue kicking this can down the road.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/8/26

3235 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

New HCFCD Executive Director Shares His Top Three Priorities

7/7/26 – Two weeks ago, I reached out to Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) about the priorities of new, incoming Executive Director, Marcus Stuckett.

When I didn’t hear back immediately, I asked other people what they thought his priorities should be and published those in an editorial yesterday titled “Getting HCFCD Back on Track.”

However – just minutes after publishing the editorial – I opened an email from HCFCD. It was about Stuckett’s priorities. I am glad to say…

There was a remarkable degree of consistency between what he said and what others said.

Stuckett’s Top Three Priorities

According to an HCFCD spokesperson, Stuckett’s immediate focus will be on:

  • CDBG Program (HUD Community Development Block Grant projects)
  • Transparency/Reporting
  • Responsiveness/Project Delivery.

How They Work Together

His top priority is executing the CDBG plan approved by Commissioners Court in June of 2026. That includes system and agreement updates, revised project schedules, and budget adjustments needed to put the plan into action.

The plan, approved by both Commissioners Court and the Texas General Land Office (which administers HUD grants in Texas), is designed to save $322 million in federal funding with a deadline of 2/28/27.

That involves bundling and billing all of the County’s CDBG work together for both Mitigation and Disaster Relief Grants and both HCFCD and Harris County Housing and Community Development Department (HCHCD). The totals will all then be applied against the $322 million with the rapidly approaching deadline.

The table below summarizes the starting point for Stuckett. Figures are current as of 7/6/2026.

Even with the new “bundle plan,” Harris County is only one third of its way to the goal. But that’s far better than before when HCFCD’s Disaster Relief (DR) program had its own budget and deadline.

HCFCD before Stuckett managed to bill only 4.35% of its Disaster Relief allocation in about 80% of the time allowed.

To see the latest project-by-project status report, click here.

33% is much better than 4%. But Stuckett still assumes office with a huge hurdle to overcome. He must move quickly to adjust tracking and accounting systems as he pushes contractors to accelerate.

For example, Woodridge is a CDBG-MIT program. But Woodridge billing can now be applied to CDBG-DR. So it makes sense to hurry that up if possible.

Stuckett assumed office on 6/29/26. Excavation of the Woodridge Detention Basin in Kingwood was already kicking into high gear on 7/2/26 when I photographed five trucks lined up to load.

Addressing Remaining Data Gaps

Supporting Stuckett’s effort is a push to strengthen reporting and transparency, addressing any remaining data gaps that could affect HCFCD’s ability to track and communicate progress.

Responsiveness is the third pillar of Stuckett’s focus. With many systems and initiatives in motion, Stuckett says he is working to shorten processing times and move approvals more efficiently – both internally and externally.

“Together, these priorities reflect a broader commitment to transparency and delivery that will carry the organization into its next phase,” said HCFCD.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/7/2026

3234 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Editorial: Getting HCFCD Back on Track

7/6/2026 – Last month, Dr. Tina Petersen, former head of Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD), resigned under pressure. For this post, I’d like to focus on what HCFCD needs to do to get back on track. Toward that end, I interviewed more than a dozen people knowledgeable about HCFCD and its operations. Many spoke on the condition of anonymity.

The Petersen controversy had to do with the potential loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funding because of project delays.

HCFCD now has a new head: Marcus Stuckett, formerly Director of Engineering at HCFCD. Stuckett worked his way up through the organization, then left for several years while Petersen headed the department and is now returning. Here is what many would advise.

Refocus on Core Mission

One said, “Tina Pearson was running public relations campaigns and trying to play politics. The Flood Control District is a planning, engineering and construction organization. And that’s it. Period. We need to refocus on execution and delivering results.”

Other sources echoed this sentiment but phrased it as “Getting back to basics.”

For example, one source mentioned Taylor Gully in Kingwood. Five years and two months ago, the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) approved $10.1 million to widen and deepen Taylor Gully.

But according to Amy Crouser, an HCFCD spokesperson, the District is still waiting for “TWDB to approve the channel work.” Then she added, “City of Houston is working on getting this approval.”

Fill Gaps in the Org Chart

One source told me that there are still many highly qualified and motivated people at HCFCD. However, others bemoaned the brain drain that has reportedly created gaps in org charts. The gaps disrupt or delay decision making. They also cost institutional knowledge and project continuity.

For instance, one group head has been scheduled to retire for a long time. But reportedly, Petersen did not seek a replacement. A lack of overlap will make it harder for a new hire to get up to speed.

Re-Instill Sense of Urgency and Ownership

Virtually everyone I talked to mentioned the need to re-instill a sense of urgency and project ownership. Delays under the previous director cost some projects years. For instance, the Preliminary Engineering Report for the Kingwood Diversion Ditch project was scheduled to take 300 days, but took more than 1,400.

Design work for the project will finally go on the Commissioner’s Court agenda for August this year, exactly nine years after 13 people died along Bens Branch. (The Diversion Ditch takes water out of Bens Branch, hence its name.)

Empower Employees to Make Decisions

“Empower folks to make decisions,” said one source. “Project managers and the people doing the day to day are trying very, very hard to push projects forward. The biggest issue sometimes is HCFCD’s own processes where, “Okay, we finished this stage. Now it has to go up to leadership for review and approval.”

But getting to the next stage was often problematic. Many cited Petersen’s penchant for perfectionism, consensus-style management, risk avoidance, and indecisiveness. That combination delayed projects, sometimes for years. Said another way, the organization had a bad case of paralysis through analysis.

Such managers can prefer “delays over decisions.” Stuckett must ask, “How can we make this work?” Not, “Why might this be a problem?”

Address Delays Caused by Other County Departments

Numerous sources cited delays caused by other county departments, namely Purchasing and the Department of Economic Equity and Opportunity (DEEO).

Precinct 3 Commissioner Tom Ramsey, PE admitted that DEEO had issues. He mentioned that that department head was also replaced.

“If Purchasing or DEEO are impacting our ability to get something done, we need to know about it. Then, we can work together to eliminate delays,” said Ramsey.

Return to a Metrics-Driven Approach

After Petersen took office in 2022, Bond Updates became less frequent as project progress slowed. The lack of reliable metrics made it more difficult for Commissioners, funding partners and the public to gauge progress.

When Commissioner Ramsey, the Commissioners Court, and the Texas GLO finally demanded metrics that showed the true status of projects, the depth of HCFCD’s problems became all too apparent.

“Work the Details”

Commissioner Ramsey, a veteran engineer, said, “There’s no magic formula. We have to work the details – daily – on where each project is. Some are far along. And some are just about to get started. Are we working the schedule? Is there anything we can do to mitigate problems associated with it?”

Ramsey advised, “Federal paperwork is necessary and complicated. So, be sure that you’re working the paperwork, too. All of these issues are manageable. We just have to get organized.”

Focus on CDBG

With $322 million of US Department of Housing and Urban Development CDBG Grants (Community Development Block Grants) projects facing a deadline of 2/28/27 – less than eight months away – obviously the immediate focus needs to be on those.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/6/2026

3233 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

How Flood Protection Can Increase Consequences of Large Floods

Academic research into flooding suggests that “Flood protection tends to reduce small floods, but increases the consequences of rare, large floods.” This is one of the central ideas in modern flood-risk management.

It does not mean that flood-control projects are bad. Rather, it describes an unintended sociological feedback loop that can emerge over the long term, if structural protection is not paired with prudent land-use planning.

The concept traces back to the work of Gilbert F. White in 1945 and has been expanded by researchers such as Raymond J. Burby, Gilberto Di Baldassarre, and others. It is commonly referred to as the levee effect or the safe-development paradox. Simply stated, flood-risk-reduction projects can lull people into a false sense of security.

The Basic Mechanism

The process unfolds over decades rather than years. It follows these steps:

  1. Flood protection is built…
  2. Frequent flooding declines…
  3. Confidence increases…
  4. More homes, businesses and infrastructure are built…
  5. Property values rise…
  6. A flood larger than the “design event” (i.e., the 100-year flood) occurs…
  7. Communities experience much greater losses than would have occurred decades earlier.

Structural flood protection often reduces flood frequency. However, it encourages much more development behind the protection, so exposure increases dramatically. Then, when an event exceeds the design capacity, total losses can be much larger than before.

Why This Happens

Here’s an example. Imagine an area that floods every five years.

Initially, only 100 homes might occupy the area because of flood frequency.

  • A moderate flood might damage 50 homes.
  • Then, a levee is built to withstand the 100-year flood.

For the next 30 years:

  • No floods occur.
  • Confidence grows.
  • The area now contains:
    • 5,000 homes
    • Schools
    • Hospitals
    • Shopping centers
    • Utilities.

Then a 500-year flood overtops the levee.

The levee did exactly what it was designed to do for decades. But because so much development accumulated behind it, the rare failure produces vastly greater losses than would have occurred before the levee existed.

That is the paradox.

Example: New Orleans and Katrina

Perhaps the world’s best-known example is New Orleans during Katrina.

For decades, extensive levees reduced frequent flooding. Large areas below sea level became heavily urbanized. And population and infrastructure expanded behind the levee system.

When Hurricane Katrina exceeded parts of the system’s design, multiple levees failed. Approximately 80% of New Orleans flooded. More than 1,800 people died. Economic losses exceeded $100 billion.

Researchers argue that the levees enabled much greater development in areas that remained vulnerable to catastrophic flooding if protection was exceeded.

The Implication for Houston and the San Jacinto Basin

This idea has direct relevance to the Lake Houston Area and the San Jacinto River Basin.

Suppose all the projects proposed after Harvey (additional upstream detention, optimized gate operations on Lake Conroe, channel conveyance improvements, more floodgates for Lake Houston, etc.) are implemented and reduce the probability of flooding from moderate storms.

However, they could create a widespread perception that “This land is now safe.” And that perception could lead to substantial new development in flood-prone portions of the basin over several decades such as the 5,300 acre Scarborough property at the confluence of the West Fork and Spring Creek.

Scarborough wetlands
Wetlands on Scarborough property

Exposure increases. Property values increase. Infrastructure becomes more concentrated.

Then, when an event exceeds the protection system — just as Harvey exceeded many historical design assumptions — the total losses may be larger than they otherwise would have been.

This is precisely why many modern flood-risk experts argue that structural protection must be paired with land-use management rather than viewed as a substitute for it. But “land use management” is fightin’ words in Houston.

Breaking the Cycle

The encouraging news is that the research also points to ways to avoid the paradox. The most commonly recommended strategies are:

  • Preserve portions of the natural floodplain instead of developing every protected acre.
  • Use regional detention and natural storage to reduce flood peaks.
  • Educate home buyers about the limits of flood protection.
  • Require resilient construction (elevated structures, floodproofing) even behind levees or reservoirs.
  • Manage development at the watershed scale, not just parcel by parcel.

Why This is Especially Relevant to the San Jacinto

This concept is particularly important for the San Jacinto basin because it reframes the objective of the SJRA’s Joint Reservoir Operations Study.

The study’s success should not be measured solely by whether it lowers flood stages by a few inches. It should also include:

  • Strong warnings about the safe development paradox
  • Education about design assumptions for flooding, i.e., the height of foundations above the 100-year flood level.

Said another way, the study should discourage development that eventually erases any gains – one of the central themes in contemporary flood-risk research.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/5/2026

3232 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

10 Ways Political Fragmentation Can Increase Flood Risk

7/2/26 – Political fragmentation can increase flood risk many ways. It is one of the least appreciated, but most significant factors in flooding – particularly in rapidly urbanizing watersheds like the San Jacinto River Basin.

Floodwater doesn’t respect jurisdictional boundaries. When many different jurisdictions make drainage decisions independently, it rarely, if ever, optimizes results. Here are 10 reasons why.

1. Upstream Communities Often Don’t Bear Downstream Costs They Create

A city or county may approve new development because it receives the tax revenue while the flood impacts occur miles away. For example:

  • Community A approves thousands of acres of development.
  • Runoff increases.
  • The additional water flows into Community B.
  • Community B pays for larger channels, detention basins, buyouts, and disaster recovery.

The economic incentives are misaligned. Individual interest trumps wider interest.

2. Different Regulations Create Weak Links

When designing flood infrastructure, one county may require:

  • Atlas 14 rainfall
  • Generous detention
  • “No net fill” in floodplains
  • Stricter erosion controls.

But a neighboring county may require much less.

Developers naturally gravitate toward the least restrictive jurisdiction.

The result is that runoff is generated where regulation is weakest. But that affects everyone downstream.

This has long been an issue between portions of rapidly growing counties surrounding Houston, where drainage criteria have historically differed.

3. Development is Approved One Project at a Time

Each subdivision may demonstrate “No adverse impact from this development.” And that may be technically true for that individual project. But no one evaluates:

Thousands of individually compliant projects can collectively overwhelm streams.

This is sometimes called the “Death by a Thousand Cuts” problem.

4. Transportation Agencies Optimize Roads – Not Watersheds

Road departments may prioritize:

  • Minimizing bridge costs
  • Minimizing culvert costs
  • Reducing construction expenses.

Flood managers may want:

  • Larger openings under bridges
  • Fewer hydraulic bottlenecks
  • Preservation of natural floodways.

If transportation and flood agencies are not coordinated, roads can become unintended dams during major floods.

East Fork Floods
FM2090 at East Fork on May 1, 2024. The opening for the bridge is in the trees on the upper right.

5. Reservoir Operators May Have Different Missions

Sub-watersheds often include reservoirs managed by different organizations and/or for different purposes. For instance, one reservoir may prioritize water supply while another prioritizes flood control or recreation.

Without coordinated operating plans, releases can unintentionally compound downstream flooding. This has been discussed extensively regarding operations of Lake Conroe and Lake Houston, where coordinated releases can substantially influence downstream flood peaks.

Lake Houston Dam during Harvey
The 400,000 CFS going over the Lake Houston Dam during Harvey included 80,000 CFS from Lake Conroe. It created a wall of water 11 feet high. The volume was five times more than the amount of water going over Niagra Falls on an average day.

6. Funding Responsibilities are Fragmented

One agency may pay for channel improvements, while others pay for maintenance, detention, environmental mitigation, and/or emergency response.

Projects that benefit everyone may stall because no single organization is responsible for paying for them. Coordination among agencies with different staffing, funding, and priorities can delay projects years. Economists call this a “collective action problem.”

For instance, according to Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD), only half of the Taylor Gully/Woodridge project has started because the Texas Water Development Board has reportedly not yet approved the Taylor Gully portion.

Meanwhile, a critical HUD funding deadline is fast approaching that may cost Harris County hundreds of millions of dollars. It’s an HCFCD project. But City of Houston bridges are involved.

Taylor Gully Flooding May 7 2019
School bus trying to go over Taylor Gully on the Rustling Elms bridge on May 7, 2019.

Aligning all these dominos takes years, especially when they involve grants from multiple agencies.

7. Floodplain Mapping Evolves at Different Speeds

One jurisdiction may adopt updated flood maps quickly while a neighboring jurisdiction may continue using older maps.

This means development can continue under outdated assumptions upstream while downstream communities build to newer, more conservative standards.

Again, the Taylor Gully/Woodridge project provides an excellent example. HCFCD contractors are now excavating dirt for a Woodridge Detention Basin. Some of that dirt is being hauled to a new development along Dry Creek at FM1485 in Montgomery County.

Technically, the dirt is being deposited outside the 100-year floodplain at that location, per HCFCD standards. But the Montgomery County floodplain map is still based on pre-Harvey (2014) data.

Where Woodridge dirt is going. Map last updated in 2014 before Harvey. From FEMA Flood Hazard Layer Viewer.
Placement area for a portion of dirt excavated from Woodridge, shown in red circle above near Dry Creek.

Are we paying to solve a flood problem…or to relocate it?

8. Data are Often Not Shared

As we saw above, jurisdictions frequently use different:

  • Hydraulic models
  • Rainfall assumptions
  • LiDAR vintages
  • Land-use projections
  • Software platforms

When models don’t align across jurisdictional boundaries, flood analyses can become inconsistent.

9. Maintenance Responsibilities are Divided

Who:

  • Removes sediment?
  • Clears fallen trees?
  • Maintains detention ponds?
  • Repairs eroded channels?

If responsibility changes repeatedly across political boundaries, maintenance gaps develop that reduce channel capacity.

10. Emergency Response Becomes Harder

During large floods:

  • Counties
  • Cities
  • Drainage districts
  • River authorities
  • State agencies
  • Federal agencies

…must all coordinate their activities.

If communication is poor, evacuations, road closures, reservoir operations, and recovery efforts become less efficient.

The Cumulative Effect

Political fragmentation doesn’t usually create flooding by itself. Instead, it gradually amplifies flood risk by allowing many small decisions to accumulate or be deferred.

Fragmented decisionWatershed consequence
Different detention rulesMore runoff
Different floodplain rulesMore development in hazardous areas
Independent land-use decisionsHigher peak flows
Separate infrastructure planningHydraulic bottlenecks
Different maintenance standardsReduced conveyance
Independent reservoir operationsPoorer timing of releases
Separate fundingDelayed mitigation projects

Each individual decision may appear reasonable within one jurisdiction. Collectively, they can increase both the frequency and severity of flooding across the river basin.

Why This Matters in the San Jacinto River Basin

The San Jacinto River watershed illustrates many of these challenges. It spans multiple counties and municipalities with varying drainage standards, development regulations, and infrastructure priorities.

Rapid upstream growth can alter runoff patterns that affect downstream communities, such as the Lake Houston Area. Indeed, it affects all of Houston and Harris County.

At the same time, reservoir operations, floodplain management, and mitigation investments are divided among numerous local, regional, state, and federal entities. Coordinating those decisions across jurisdictional boundaries is often as challenging as the engineering itself.

Many watershed professionals therefore advocate managing flood risk at the “watershed scale” rather than at the city or county scale.

That approach emphasizes common hydrologic assumptions, coordinated land-use planning, cumulative-impact analysis, shared data and models, aligned reservoir operations (where feasible), and funding mechanisms that reflect both where runoff is generated and where flood damages occur.

It does not eliminate flooding, but it can substantially reduce the extent to which fragmented governance makes floods worse.

In the 2025 Texas legislature, Representatives Paul, Cunningham, DeAyala, and Swanson authored a bill (HB2068) to expand HCFCD gradually throughout the river basin. However it was left pending in committee after HCFCD Executive Director Tina Petersen and Precinct 2 Commissioner Adrian Garcia testified against it. Let’s hope it can go farther next year with new leaders.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/3/2026 with the help of ChatGPT for research.

3230 Days since Hurricane Harvey

First in a Series: How Development Lifecycles Affect Flood Risk

7/1/2026 – Urban development lifecycles follow predictable stages. Those stages help explain why and when flood risk increases. A better understanding of development lifecycles also helps inform efforts to decrease flood risk.

The Urban Land Institute (ULI) bills itself as world’s oldest and largest global network of cross-disciplinary real estate and land-use experts. They do a tremendous amount of research and education, and are widely regarded as thought leaders in their field. I asked ChatGPT to help research their reports, models and market analyses. I pulled the information below from that Chat.

High-Level Development Lifecycle Stages

ULI often describes communities – especially metro submarkets and master-planned communities – as evolving through five stages.

StageDescriptionTypical Characteristics
1. Pioneer (or Emerging)The earliest phase when development first begins in a previously undeveloped or underutilized area.Raw land or agricultural land transitioning to development; infrastructure just beginning; first subdivisions or projects; high perceived risk but high long-term upside.
2. Growth (or Expansion)Rapid development and population increase as the area gains market traction.Strong housing absorption, new commercial development, schools and services appearing, infrastructure expanding, rising land values.
3. Maturity (or Stabilization)The community reaches build-out or near build-out; growth slows and the market stabilizes.Established neighborhoods, stable population, full services and retail, limited vacant land, slower appreciation.
4. Decline (or Obsolescence)Physical or economic aging begins to affect the area; investment slows and competitiveness declines.Aging infrastructure and housing stock, reduced investment, shifting demographics, declining property values or occupancy.
5. Reinvestment / Redevelopment (or Renewal)New capital and planning initiatives revitalize the area, beginning another cycle.Redevelopment projects, adaptive reuse, infill development, infrastructure upgrades, demographic shifts attracting new residents.

Houston-Area Examples

A rough application of this development lifecycle model to the Houston metro area might look like:

  • Pioneer: far-exurban land along new highways such as the Grand Parkway, e.g., early Colony Ridge years.
  • Growth: areas like The Woodlands and Kingwood in the 1990s–2000s or Bridgeland in the 2010s.
  • Maturity: The Woodlands and Kingwood today — largely built out with stable demographics.
  • Decline: older first-ring suburbs with aging retail strips.
  • Redevelopment: Midtown Houston, East Downtown, or repurposed mall sites.

Seven-Stage Model for Evaluating Land Holdings

ULI and many master-planned community developers also use a more granular seven-stage model when evaluating large land holdings. This framework focuses less on sociology and more on capital deployment, entitlements, and absorption of lots/homes.

StageNameWhat HappensKey Indicators
1. Land Banking / AssemblyA developer or investor quietly accumulates large tracts of land years before development begins.Agricultural or timber land; minimal infrastructure; low carrying costs.Large contiguous acreage; speculation on future growth corridors.
2. Entitlement / PlanningRegulatory approvals are obtained. Master plans are designed.Zoning changes, drainage plans, environmental studies, plats, utility agreements.Engineering studies, infrastructure phasing plans, public hearings.
3. Horizontal DevelopmentMajor infrastructure is constructed.Roads, drainage channels, detention ponds, utilities, grading, flood mitigation.High capital expenditure; land converted into finished lots.
4. Builder Entry / Lot SalesHomebuilders begin purchasing lots from the developer.Model homes, marketing campaigns, early home construction.First residential permits; rising lot absorption rates.
5. Absorption / ExpansionRapid population growth and retail follow rooftops.Schools, retail centers, churches, medical offices, parks.Peak lot sales; fastest population growth.
6. Build-Out / StabilizationMost developable land is used; growth slows.Established neighborhoods, full infrastructure, mature landscaping.Stable property values; fewer new phases.
7. Repositioning / RedevelopmentThe community begins a new cycle through infill or redevelopment.Commercial redevelopment, higher density housing, mixed-use projects.Demographic shifts; reinvestment in aging areas.

The highest financial risk occurs during land banking and entitlement (Phases 1 and 2). And the highest profitability occurs during absorption (Phase 5), when land values accelerate.

Development often expands outward from a city center in concentric rings or waves as new highways are built.

Why Development Lifecycles Matter for Floodplain Development

In river basins like the San Jacinto, the newest development wave often occurs:

  • Upstream of existing urbanized areas
  • On cheaper land with more floodplain acreage
  • Before flood infrastructure is fully planned.

That timing mismatch is one reason ULI and hydrologists often warn that:

Exurban development can amplify downstream flooding if watershed-scale planning is absent.

Floodplain Discount Curve

Several ULI case studies reference a recurring phenomenon sometimes referred to as the “floodplain discount curve.” It’s not a formula as much as a market pattern observed when developers acquire large tracts in floodplains.

The idea: land value rises dramatically as uncertainty about development constraints is removed.

Conceptually, it looks like this:

StageLand StatusTypical BuyerRelative Value
1. Raw Floodplain LandAgricultural land, wetlands, sand pits, or timberland; flood risk uncertain.Speculators, long-horizon developers, timber investors.Lowest value
2. Regulatory ClarityFEMA mapping, drainage rules, wetlands delineation clarified.Land funds, institutional investors.Value increases modestly.
3. Entitlements (i.e., Permits) ApprovedDrainage plan accepted; mitigation strategy defined; plats approved.Large developers.Value rises significantly.
4. Infrastructure InstalledRoads, utilities, detention basins built.Homebuilders purchasing finished lots.Major jump in value.
5. Rooftops ArriveHouses, schools, retail appear.Retail developers and long-term investors.Peak land value

A single tract can experience 20×–100× appreciation over the full lifecycle.

Developers often deliberately acquire floodplain property because it carries a risk discount that sophisticated engineering can sometimes overcome. Risks include:

  • Evolving FEMA, HUD and EPA regulations
  • Fill restrictions
  • Wetlands permitting
  • Insurance concerns
  • Political winds

When these risks are resolved, value re-prices rapidly. The biggest value increase usually occurs at the moment regulatory risk disappears, not when the first house is built. Developers sometimes describe this as:

“Entitlements create more value than construction.”

The Scarborough Example

This explains why developers often land bank floodplain property for 10–30 years waiting for infrastructure or regulations to change. The Scarborough land at the confluence of Spring Creek and the San Jacinto West Fork is a good example.

It also explains why turning the Scarborough land into a state park is the best way to protect it from future development.

In future posts, I will explore specifics of how these concepts have affected growth and flood risk in the Lake Houston and surrounding areas.

For the convenience of those reading this on a small screen, here is a printable PDF of the tables above.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/1/2026 with grateful appreciation for ULI and ChatGPT

3228 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Excavation Rate of Woodridge Detention Basin Suddenly Increases

6/30/26 – Two days after posting about the slow rate of progress on Harris County Flood Control District’s (HCFCD) Woodridge Detention Basin, the rate suddenly increased. And dramatically! But, will it be enough?

The sudden increase coincided with the start date for HCFCD’s new Executive Director Marcus Stuckett who is under pressure to accelerate operations. Stuckett must beat tight federal deadlines on a number of projects to avoid losing up to $322 million in federal funding.

New Week, New Vibe

When I visited the Woodridge site around 1PM yesterday (Monday, 6/29/26), I saw six dump trucks leaving the site within a half hour. Today, I returned twice. At 9AM, I saw five leave within a half hour. Ditto when I returned around 11. So, the rate has increased to an average of five or six loads per half hour. That’s good news.

Photos Taken 6/30/26

I’m not sure why the rate increased when it did; Stuckett’s starting day may have just been coincidence. Regardless, I’m glad the contractor finally got construction moving. See photos taken this morning.

Woodridge Construction
Woodridge Construction as of 9:19AM on 6/30/26. Note excavator working on new area (middle left).
Woodridge Construction
Loading one of the long-bed trucks takes about three or four minutes. Only one excavator is working.

A truck would pull up to the excavator about every five minutes. At one point, I even witnessed a traffic jam at the site entrance on Woodland Hills.

Woodridge Construction
Traffic jam at site entrance.
Woodridge Construction
Then the dance of heavy equipment continued.

More Improvement Needed…Even with New Rate

Given sampling error, traffic delays related to Loop 494 closure at Northpark, overtime, weather, etc., it’s still not certain whether the new rate of excavation will beat the contractual deadline. Let’s rerun the numbers using this type of dump truck to see if they’re close.

One of these trucks can carry an average of 22 cubic yards per load; that’s more than the type of truck I previously thought they were going to use.

  • The contractor must move a million cubic yards of dirt.
  • 1,000,000 cubic yards ÷ 22 cubic yards/load = 45,455 truckloads.
  • Contract specifies 552 calendar days. But contractor is working only six days per week and 90 days have elapsed already. That leaves 383 work days.
  • 45,455 truckloads ÷ 383 = approximately 120 truckloads per 8-hour day or 15 per hour.

So far this week, I’ve seen them moving 10-12 loads per hour. So they may still come up short.

And I still haven’t seen any activity on the Taylor Gully portion of the project yet; it has the same deadline. And HCFCD construction docs specify that they expect the contractor to work on both phases simultaneously.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/30/26

3227 Days since Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.