Army Corps of Engineers Awards Dredging Bid on West Fork Emergency Project

The Lake Houston area is one step closer to removing some of those giant sandbars deposited on the West Fork during Harvey. Today, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) awarded the bid for its Emergency Dredging Project on the San Jacinto to Great Lakes Dredge and Dock, an international company headquartered in the Chicago area with more than 125 years of experience.

Bid Phase Comes to a Close

The Corps opened three bids for the project on June, 12, 2018. The wide variation in the bid amounts triggered a mandatory review to ensure each bidder met the bid specs. Based on submittals, the apparent low bidder at that time was RLB Contracting from Port Lavaca, TX. However, during the review RLB was judged “non-responsive.”

By law, the Army Corps must then examine the next highest bidder to ensure that they meet specs and can deliver the project for the price in their proposal. In this case, the next lowest bidder was Great Lakes at $69,814,060.

The corps will meet with Great Lakes next week to discuss details of the project. According to bid specifications, work on the project should begin within 5 days of the award. Specs also state that the winning bidder should staff the project to complete it within 270 days.

Example of equipment used by Great Lakes when dredging rivers.

Volume to be Removed Expanded during Bidding

Originally, the Corps specified 180 days. However, the amount of sand and sediment to be removed more than doubled from 780,000 cubic yards to 1.8 million. The change happened before bids were submitted as all three potential vendors went over specs with a fine tooth comb and submitted questions.

According to one vendor, during this back-and-forth phase of the project, bidders discovered that the river had changed so dramatically from the benchmark study, that some of the dredging “profiles” had to be adjusted.

The profiles are representative cross sections of the river at regular intervals between the western and eastern limits of dredging. They show the current and desired depth and width.

Despite the increase in volume to be removed, the Corps still expects at this time that the two disposal sites will accommodate the volume. The disposal sites are sand pits that will be regraded when filled to match contours of the surrounding area. One disposal area is just north of Townsen Blvd. and North Houston Road in Humble. The other is on the Kingwood side of the river off Sorters/McClellan Road just south of Kingwood College.

Prep Work Finishing

While the Corps has been sorting through dredging bids, the City of Houston has been hard at work removing debris from the shores of the lake and tributaries. Crews have finished removing dead trees from the dam and West Fork. This week they worked their way up the East Fork to East End Park. Today, fishermen spotted them working north of the FM1960 bridge.

Dead tree removal before dredging on Lake Houston is nearly complete.

Even though the current dredging project will not include the East Fork or Lake Houston, the removal of dead trees will help improve safety in the event of another flood. The deadfall could get caught up in the FM1960 bridge and create an artificial dam that would back water up into residential areas.

For more detail about Great Lakes, see their brochure on their river and lake expertise.

For more about the U.S. Army Corps, visit www.swg.usace.army.mil, www.facebook.com/GalvestonDistrict or www.twitter.com/USACEgalveston.

The USACE Galveston District was established in 1880 as the first engineer district in Texas to oversee river and harbor improvements. The district is directly responsible for maintaining more than 1,000 miles of channel, including 250 miles of deep draft and 750 miles of shallow draft as well as the Colorado River Locks and Brazos River Floodgates.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/6/2018

311 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Mother Nature Does Not Respect Political Boundaries

Harris County Flood Warning System rainfall totals while this post was being written.

Someone asked me yesterday, with considerable frustration, why flood mitigation took so long.

On their way to the Lake Houston Area, floodwaters cross more political and departmental boundaries than I have fingers and toes to count on. (That’s especially true if you consider funding to address flooding, rule-making bodies that affect flooding, groups that predict flooding, and departments that respond to flooding). The short list includes:

  1. Houston
  2. Houston Public Works
  3. Houston Planning and Development
  4. Houston City Council
  5. Houston Emergency Management
  6. Houston Police Department
  7. Houston Fire Department
  8. 911
  9. TransStar
  10. Humble
  11. Porter
  12. Spring
  13. Woodlock
  14. New Caney
  15. Splendora
  16. Conroe
  17. The Woodlands Township
  18. Harris County
  19. Harris County Flood Control
  20. Harris County Emergency Management
  21. Harris County Sheriffs’ Department
  22. Montgomery County
  23. Waller County
  24. San Jacinto County
  25. Walker County
  26. San Jacinto River Authority
  27. State of Texas
  28. Governor of the State of Texas
  29. Texas House
  30. Texas Senate
  31. Texas Department of Public Safety
  32. Texas Division of Emergency Management
  33. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
  34. Texas Parks and Wildlife
  35. United States of America
  36. Department of Defense
  37. U.S. Army
  38. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
  39. Homeland Security
  40. FEMA
  41. Housing and Urban Development
  42. Environmental Protection Agency
  43. NOAA
  44. National Weather Service
  45. National Hurricane Center
  46. U.S. Geological Service
  47. U.S. House of Representatives
  48. U.S. Senate
  49. U.S. President
  50. Cajun Navy

My apologies if I left anyone out. I could have drilled down into each one of these – the way I did for the City of Houston. But the Cajun Navy didn’t have an org chart. I also ran out of places on my calculator.

Seriously, flood mitigation has waaaay more moving parts than an aircraft carrier. But that’s a somewhat unfair analogy, because an aircraft carrier has a captain who knows where he wants to go and how to get there.

No wonder this stuff takes so long.

Can you imagine? Someone is breaking into your house. You call the police, but the 911 operator tells you to hang tight while the governor and president declare an emergency; Congress appropriates funds; Emergency Management devises a response plan; FEMA reviews your claim; three other agencies hire consultants who conduct an area-wide threat survey; TDEM prioritizes your needs; the Army Corps of Engineers studies bids; and the City works out an inter-local agreement with the County to raise matching funds, so that HUD can provide the money to buy out your house … when you’re dead and buried.

Who would tolerate an emergency response system that responds that way? 325 million Americans. That’s who.

If only Mother Nature respected political boundaries the way we do!

Happy Independence Day!

Posted July 4, 2018 by Bob Rehak

309 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Lake Houston Chamber Launches Plea for DDG

The Lake Houston Chamber has launched its latest campaign in a series of flood mitigation efforts. Called the “Plea for DDG,” it is designed to:

  • Help educate residents and business owners about three key proposals that could address the root causes of flooding in the Lake Houston Area
  • Help turn out a crowd at Harris County’s flood bond meeting on July 10, 6 p.m., at Kingwood Park High School.

Purpose of Flood Bond Meeting

The purpose of the flood bond meeting is to solicit input from residents on the things that they believe will best help the largest numbers of people.

DDG: More Detention, Dredging and Gates

DDG stands for more Detention, Dredging and Gates, three proposals that will reduce flooding here.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is NOT addressing this giant sand bar in its dredging project – a big reason why we need to get the County to address additional dredging in its flood bond package. 

Harvey taught us that we had vulnerabilities. We had more water coming downstream than the San Jacinto’s current channel and the Lake Houston Dam could handle in a timely way. We need to fix those problems so residents know that a 1% storm will leave a home above the 100-year flood plain high and dry. Likewise for a 500-year flood. To do that:

Less input. More throughput. Faster output.

It’s simple. Logical. Achievable. And should restore drainage to original design assumptions.

Now we just need to get enough people to show up and request these things at the bond meeting for the county to include them in the bond package.

Drag your friends, relatives and neighbors to this meeting…especially the ones that didn’t flood.

Remind them that the flood affected this entire community. Tell them why more detention, dredging and gates are so important.

Get them to request more dredging, detention and gates from the County. These three measures could help virtually everyone who lives in the area.

DDG: A two step process

We have to make sure we get the right measures into the bond package. Then we have to get people to vote for it.

Right now, nothing is more important to the future of this area.

This bond package will be used to:

  • Pay for capital projects outright
  • Qualify us for federal matching grants that could triple the amount of dollars available to us (beyond the amount voters approve).
  • Free up money in the Flood Control District’s current capital budget so that the Distict can step up maintenance on ditches (which we also desperately need).

So tell everyone you know to “Plea for DDG” – more detention, dredging and gates – at the bond meeting on July 10, 2018, 6-8 p.m., at Kingwood Park High School.

For more information about the Chamber’s campaign, see recoverLakeHouston.com.

Posted 7/2/2018 by Bob Rehak

308 days since Hurricane Harvey

A Model for the Future of the San Jacinto

The rapid growth of sand mining along the San Jacinto has contributed to an increasing rate of sedimentation of the river and Lake Houston.

Consequences of Increased Sedimentation

Sediment has contributed to:

  • Flooding that cost residents and businesses billions of dollars in damages during Harvey.
  • Forcing taxpayers to spend tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars in dredging costs to restore the river’s carrying capacity and reduce flood risk.
  • Decreasing the capacity of Lake Houston at a time when the City is about to add 1.5 million users to it’s main water system.
  • Increasing the City’s water purification costs, which are passed along to customers.
  • Impairing fish populations and recreational opportunities

Ignoring Best Management Practices for Buffer Zones

Following best management practices that are common in other states – especially those that mandate buffer zones between mines and rivers – might have prevented or reduced many of these problems. But those practices were not followed here; miners mine so close to the San Jacinto that dikes are broken repeatedly. When caught, miners pay fines averaging $800.

The Lone Exception In Texas

With one exception, Texas has shown little desire to force miners to follow best management practice for setbacks in flood prone areas. That exception is the John Graves Scenic Riverway, a pilot project on a small portion of the Brazos River near Mineral Wells, about 40 miles west of Fort Worth.

Legislation Addressed Water-Quality Impacts from Sand Mining

The legislation that created the Riverway forms a precedent for imposing stricter regulations on sand mining in the Houston region. The name “Scenic” belies the major purpose of the legislation, which was to address water-quality impacts from rock, and sand and gravel mining operations.

Perhaps there’s an opportunity to create a protected area much like that one here.

Statewide Survey Found Widespread Noncompliance

The TCEQ conducted a statewide survey of 316 quarries in 62 counties, beginning in April, 2004. It revealed that noncompliance with permits was a statewide problem. It also revealed that noncompliance sometimes resulted in significant detrimental effects to water quality. One such area was the one that eventually became the John Graves Scenic Riverway area, where best management practices were not being followed.

Key Elements of Legislation Protecting Water

Legislation that formed the area focused on stormwater discharges and their effect on water quality. Key provisions included:

  • Stricter erosion controls and effluent limits
  • Reclamation of quarries and financial provisions to ensure reclamation
  • Restoration of receiving waters in the event of an unauthorized discharge
  • Prohibition of mining within two hundred feet of the river and the hundred-year flood plain
  • Prohibitions against locating quarries in areas subject to frequent flooding.

Brazos River Authority photo shows setback of mines from the Brazos River in the John Graves Scenic Area, one of the main requirements of legislation.

Contrast the previous photo with this one. On the San Jacinto, mines operate within the floodway with as little as 40 feet of separation from the river. One mine (lower right) operated with a broken dike for more than 3 years. Dikes in this area have been broken and breached at least six times since 2015. 

Model For San Jacinto

The Brazos River protection plan could benefit not only the Lake Houston Area, but Houston itself and other upstream communities, such as Porter as well.

The San Jacinto River, one of the main sources of the area’s drinking water, flows through, not around, sand mines on a regular basis. The mines are not only located within the 100-year flood plain, many are located within the FLOODWAY! This means they are in the main flow of the river during floods and experience higher velocities. Approximately 150,000 cubic feet of water per second flowed through these mines during the peak of Harvey, washing out roads and dikes.

USGS Maps Show Mining in Floodway

Twenty-square miles of exposed sand and sediment exist within these mines between I-69 and I-45. This screen capture below is just upstream from I-69.

Some West Fork mining operations are not only in the floodplain, they are in the FLOODWAY! The Red/Aqua cross-hatched areas above show the floodway, while the Aqua shows the 100-year flood plain.

Other sand mines farther upstream are in the 100-year flood plain as well. Some are also in the floodway. See for yourself.

Photos Contradict TACA Claims

TACA, the Texas Aggregate and Concrete Association, claims that water “backs into mines during floods,” but quite the opposite is true; it roars through them, ruptures roads and dikes, and carries exposed sand downstream.

Other tributaries contribute sediment to Lake Houston and the West Fork. However, other tributaries do not have 20 square miles of exposed, unprotected surface on their banks in the form of sand mines. And other tributaries are not flushed with an additional 80,000 cubic feet of water per second when Lake Conroe opens its flood gates as it did during Harvey.

Mines Contribute to Loss of River and Lake Capacity

Lake Houston is losing capacity at a rate of increase that parallels the rate of growth in sand mining.

Houston City Council Member Dave Martin says that the San Jacinto River and Lake Houston will soon supply drinking water to more than two million people, including residents of Houston, Humble, Bellaire, Jersey Village and other cities.

However, Lake Houston is rapidly losing capacity because of sedimentation at a time when demand for its water is increasing exponentially.

The capacity of Lake Houston is decreasing at an increasing rate. By 2011, the Lake had already lost 25% of its capacity. Results of the sedimentation survey done this year have not yet been released.

Mines Contribute to Turbidity, Increasing Water Treatment Costs

When the State protected the Brazos in the early 2000’s, sand mining was not nearly the problem on the San Jacinto that it is today.

Every time it rains, turbidity in the water increases the City’s water treatment costs, by 20% to 100%, according to Houston City Council Member Dave Martin. “We also see significantly more challenges in capturing and removing the solids through the plants dewatering facilities.”

USGS shows how the clarity of Lake Houston changes before and after every major storm.

Add Dredging Costs to the Damage Assessment

Dredging a tiny 2.1 mile stretch of the West Fork of the San Jacinto is likely to cost taxpayers up to $70 million – and that does not even include the giant bar at the mouth of the West Fork that is backing water up,  contributing to flooding, rerouting the river through neighborhoods and threatening infrastructure.

That estimated $70 million is just the tip of the iceberg. Maintenance dredging that returns the river and lake to their original design capacities could cost far more.

$70 million covers dredging only from River Grove Park to a few hundred yards past the West Lake Houston Parkway Bridge. It does not include the East Fork, the West Fork between Fosters Mill and the Lake, the giant mouth bar at the junction of the West Fork and the Lake, Lake Houston above the FM1960 Bridge, or West Fork upstream from River Grove.

That’s an additional 13+ miles. And keep in mind that the U.S. Army Corps is only dredging to pre-Harvey depths. Returning the lake and river channel to their original 100-year flood design capacity would require deeper dredging. That would cost more per mile than the current project between River Grove and Kings Harbor.

Make Mines Part of the Solution, Not the Problem

Prohibiting mining within the 100-year flood plain will create a natural buffer between mines and the river that can trap sand before it becomes a problem.

As mines play out in the area between I-69 and I-45, they can help solve our sedimentation and flooding problems by being:

  • Restored as wetlands
  • Refilled to their natural grades with the spoils from dredging
  • Turned into detention ponds.

Previously, some miners have remediated sand pits after they played out, but many others have not. This pit, for instance, one block north of Townsen next to North Houston Ave. in Humble has been left unfenced, ungraded and unplanted for years. It currently poses a danger to children who play in it and businesses building around it.

Defunct Humble sand pit on North Houston Road just north of Townsend Blvd. Note steep, unvegetated slopes, lack of berms, lack of fencing, and proximity to back of new bank building on adjacent property – all violations of best practices in most states. 

Fortunately, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers plans to use this pit and one other as a placement site for the spoils from its current emergency dredging project.

Let’s create a protected waterway on the San Jacinto, much like the John Graves area on the Brazos.

Posted July 1, 2018 by Bob Rehak

306 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Researching Sand-Mining Best Management Practices, or Lack Thereof, In Texas

“Say what?”

House Bill 571 became the law of Texas in 2011. It requires sand miners to register with the state and follow “applicable environmental laws and rules.” So I put on my Sherlock Holmes hat and tried to determine what those were. After weeks of searching, I had my first clue as to why sand mines on the San Jacinto don’t follow guidelines that are common in other states.

The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) website is bewildering. TCEQ documents posted online contain:

Simply googling “Texas sand mining best management practices (BMPs)” does not hit the mother lode. So you keep on searching, not knowing whether the information doesn’t exist or you’re just searching the wrong way. You keep thinking, “With a state as business-friendly as Texas, there must be a clear, simple articulation of guidelines somewhere!”

I finally gave up and asked someone at TCEQ to just send me environmental rules, regulations and BMPs for sand mining. It took three tries, but yesterday, I finally got usable information. And the answer is…! THERE ARE NONE FOR THIS PART OF TEXAS … with the exception of  a few EPA guidelines about refueling trucks within sand mines, some elements of the Clean Water Act, and a couple pages in a 133 page application.

The person helping me at TCEQ said that there appear to be:

  • No rules that include a setback distance between a sand mine and the San Jacinto River.
  • No restrictions on TCEQ permitting of sand mines in flood prone areas.

Texas does have guidelines for sand mining along the Brazos River in the John Graves scenic area of the Edwards Aquifer. However, they don’t apply to the San Jacinto River. And they have huge loopholes. For instance, see section 2.5 Stream Crossings and Buffers on Page 8. “Haul-road crossings through the buffer zones should be constructed ONLY WHEN NECESSARY [emphasis added].” 

The closest we come to articulating BMPs for sand mining along the San Jacinto: two pages within a PERMIT APPLICATION (see pages 62 and 63 of 166) to operate a sand mine. There are also some attachments to a letter from the TCEQ to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers about the nationwide permitting process in Texas (see image at top of page). Neither of these are intuitive places to search for BMPs.

The experience of researching Best Management Practices for sand mining in Texas reminded me of filling out an IRS tax form – minus all the clarity in the IRS forms.

This lack of clarity is a big part of our problem in my opinion.

So what is a burly, cigar-chomping sand miner wearing a Caterpillar gimme cap on a bulldozer supposed to do? Put the dozer in gear and make money, of course. End of rant.

Posted on June 28, 2018 by Bob Rehak

303 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Flood Bond Meeting Changes Location; Make Sure You Submit Your Recommendations

To learn more about the bond program, go to: https://www.hcfcd.org/bond-program/community-engagement-meetings/

The Harris County Flood Bond Meeting originally scheduled for July 10, 6pm at the Kingwood Community Center is changing location. The meeting will now be held at Kingwood Park High School on the same date and at the same time. The purpose for the change in venue is to provide additional seating and parking. The address is:

Kingwood Park High School
4015 Woodland Hills Drive
Kingwood, TX 77339

The purpose of the meeting itself is to solicit public input on things that people in this this area need to remediate flooding. Without your input, the risk is that we get generic solutions that don’t really address the root causes of flooding in the San Jacinto watershed. See my summary of what we need and why we need it below as well as my previous post on flooding causes and solutions in the Lake Houston area.

Meeting Format

According to Matt Zeve of Harris County Flood Control, the meeting will essentially consist of two parts: County officials explaining the bond process and citizens volunteering input about projects for their area. There will be no open microphone. County employees will be set up around the room for one-on-one discussions. Residents will also be able to submit ideas through workstations that will be set up around the room.

County Judge Ed Emmett, who used to live in Bear Branch and represented this area in the state legislature for many years, will personally attend the meeting.

All of Us are Smarter than Each of Us

Similar meetings are being held in each watershed throughout the county. Currently ten watersheds have completed their meetings. Thirteen meetings remain.

The idea is to involve residents to the maximum degree possible so that the County’s flood control professionals can listen and design solutions that best address the unique needs of each area.

This represents a great opportunity for all of the geotechnical professionals and others in the Humble/Kingwood/Huffman area, especially those who flooded, to volunteer their experience. The county is actively soliciting input.

I already volunteered my ideas online, but will also attend the meeting. If you have other ideas, of course, you should volunteer them.

Recommendations: More Dredging, Detention and Gates

My recommendations were a combination of three things. To restore our area to the original design assumptions, i.e., above the 100-year flood plain, we need:

  • Additional Dredging
  • Additional Detention
  • Additional Gates

More DREDGING to restore the original carrying capacity of the river, streams and ditches.
More DETENTION to reduce the amount of water and sand coming downstream during floods.
More FLOOD GATES on Lake Houston’s dam so it can discharge water faster during a flood.

More dredging, detention and gates will help reduce flood risk for EVERYONE who lives or works on or near Lake Houston.

Currently Under Consideration for Flood Bond

To see the CURRENTLY proposed flood reduction projects for the San Jacinto River Watershed, please follow this link. If you are unable to attend the meetings you may also submit your comments online to HCFCD. The meetings will conclude August 1, allowing time for county officials to finalize the bond package for voters.

Background on Flood Bond

On June 12, Harris County Commissioners Court approved placing the $2.5 billion flood bond issue on the August 25 ballot, asking voters to finance a 10 to 15 year program of flood mitigation projects that include drainage improvements, upgraded warning systems, infrastructure repairs, home buyouts, and construction of more detention basins.

For more information, please contact the Harris County Flood Control District Bond Program Hotline at 713-684-4107.This could be the most important referendum in the county’s history. It is a defining moment. How we respond to Harvey will determine our collective future. This will help far more than people who flooded. Harvey affected almost everyone in the county. Through friends, families, rescue efforts, rebuilding, employers, transportation, schools and more. Vote to restore your community to way it was.The money in the bond package could more than double through matching funds. So a no vote is like throwing away at least $2.5 billion.

Posted 6/27/2018 by Bob Rehak
 
302 Days since Hurricane Harvey
 

Find It Faster: Search Function Added to ReduceFlooding.com

Now at right of menu.

My goal for this website was to create a central repository of information related to flooding in the San Jacinto watershed, especially in the Lake Houston area. But as the volume of information grew, it took much longer to find things. Therefore, I’ve added a search function. Actually, my good friend Stephen McFarland did. He’s a programming wizard. You can thank him.

It’s at the right-hand side of the menu bar on each page. Just click on the magnifying glass to find something quickly.

 

 

Lake Houston Area’s Most Pressing Needs for Flood Bond Referendum

On August 25, Harris County residents will vote on a historic flood bond proposal. Everyone asks, “Will the bond include projects that help this area?”

That of course, raises the question, “What does the Lake Houston Area need?”

We Must Address Root Causes of Flooding HERE

Several factors make flooding here different from other parts of the region. Since Harvey, I’ve corresponded almost daily with experts in geology, hydrology, sedimentation, meteorology, city planning, engineering, mining, and disaster relief. The goal: to identify root causes of flooding in THIS area. They fall into three main “buckets”:

  • Sedimentation. Sand and silt clog the San Jacinto everywhere. The Army Corps’ emergency dredging project will remove only part of the sand from a 2.1 mile stretch of the West Fork, and not even touch the East Fork. One of the largest blockages at the mouth of the West Fork will remain. And the Corps will only restore the areas it dredges to pre-Harvey conditions, not pre-1994 conditions.
  • Releases from the dam at Lake Conroe can increase the volume of water flowing between Humble and Kingwood by ONE-THIRD. Of the roughly 240,000 cubic feet per second flowing down the west fork, 80,000 cubic feet of water per second came from the Lake Conroe dam. Many Lake Houston area residents say the onset of flooding coincided with release from Lake Conroe.
  • We have a bottleneck at Lake Houston. In a flood, much more water converges on Lake Houston than Lake Conroe. At the peak of Harvey, Lake Houston took in 492,000 cubic feet per second whileLake Conroe took in only 130,000 CFS. Seven different watersheds converge on Lake Houston. Yet until water reaches the spillway of the dam, our floodgates have one-tenth the discharge capacity of Lake Conroe’s. This effectively eliminates pre-release as a mitigation strategy.

We Need Specific Solutions, Not Generic

True solutions to flooding in the Lake Houston area must address these unique challenges. Generic solutions, such as buyouts with bond money  will help, but won’t affect many people. Pushing new development further away from rivers will help, but will not restore the carrying capacity of the San Jacinto, increase the discharge rate of the Lake Houston dam, or offset discharges from Lake Conroe.

We Need: Dredging, Detention, More Gates

The objective of the Lake Houston Area’s flood mitigation efforts should be, in my opinion and the opinion of many engineers, to restore our drainage systems to their original design capacity. Homes located outside of the 1% (100-year) risk area should not flood until we get a 1% flood. The same goes for the .02% level (500-year flood).

Experts generally focus on three categories of solutions that will help achieve those objectives: dredging, detention and greater discharge capacity for the dam, i.e., adding more gates. We need all three. No one solution will do the job by itself.

Additional DREDGING can remove sediment, restore carrying capacity, eliminate water backing up, and get us back to level of the original design assumptions.

Additional  DETENTION on the West Fork will help offset discharges from the Lake Conroe dam, which affected the heavily populated area between Humble and Kingwood, where the worst and most damage took place.

Additional GATES on Lake Houston will help relieve the bottleneck created by the different discharge rates between Lake Conroe and Lake Houston.

Here’s a diagram that shows what we need in the flood bond, where we need it, and why.

Reduce flooding in the Lake Houston Area with additional dredging, detention and drainage.

Of the three types of projects, dredging is the easiest and fastest to implement. It can buy us time while we build additional dams and gates. That could take years.

More Explanation to Follow

I will elaborate on each of these in coming days.

Harris County Commissioners and executives from the Flood Control District will hold a meeting in Kingwood on July 10 to solicit input from the community on the flood bond.

Hopefully, this series of posts will help focus discussion on the things that will do the most good for the largest number of people at the lowest cost.

Mark Your Calendars for July 10

In the meantime, mark your calendars for July 10. The County wants your input. Get your friends and neighbors to do the same. If you want peace of mind, we need to restore our ditches, rivers, and drainage systems to their original design capacity.

The location of the bond meeting may change because of the expected turnout and need for parking. So check back often.

Posted June 26, 2018, by Bob Rehak, 14 days before the flood bond meeting and…

301 days since Hurricane Harvey.

Do Local Sand Mines Follow Best Management Practices?

Note: This is the first article in a series on sand mine best management practices. It focuses on insufficient natural buffers between the mines and the San Jacinto river. Subsequent posts will focus on land clearing, site reclamation practices, and more.

A comparison of sand mining actual and best management practices found that performance shortfalls in local mines exacerbate sedimentation in the San Jacinto River, contrary to assertions by the Texas Aggregate and Concrete Association (TACA) that sand mining has environmental benefits.

Proximity of mines to San Jacinto River in non-flood conditions.

TACA claims that when a river floods, the current is so weak that sand and sediment are deposited inside of mines. An analysis of satellite and aerial photos shows, though, that the current is strong enough to break dikes, destroy roads, re-route the river through mines, and carry sediment downstream.

TACA sounds eerily reminiscent of Richard Pryor when his wife caught him in bed with another woman. “Who you going to believe? Me or your lyin’ eyes?”

In at least one case, a broken dike has gone unrepaired for years while pollution continues to escape into the San Jacinto, the main source of water for Lake Houston and millions of people.

Dangers of Sand Mining

Numerous states and countries acknowledge the following risks of sand mining. Most impose regulations on the industry because sand and silt washed downstream from mines can:

  • Impair water quality
  • Increase water treatment costs
  • Impair wildlife and fish habitat
  • Reduce carrying capacity of rivers and streams
  • Reduce the volume of lakes
  • Block drainage ditches
  • Contribute to flooding
  • Impose dredging expenses on taxpayers
  • Ruin recreation

Louisiana: Leader in Communicating Best Practices

The Louisiana Best Management Practices Guide to sand mining is one of the most concise, candid and clearly written guides in the world. Government and industry developed it together. The refreshingly honest introduction states:

  • “Sand and gravel mining operations can potentially cause off-site impacts to water quality if site planning and BMPs are not factored into every aspect of the mining operation.”
  • “…BMPs … should be utilized … to prevent pollutants from leaving the mining operation.”
  • “Siltation is considered the highest nonpoint source priority of concern in wetland areas and the second highest priority affecting lakes (1992 Report to Congress).”
  • “Mining related activities have been estimated to cause 7 percent of the nation’s nonpoint source impacts to lakes and 17 percent to coastal waters.”

Comparing Texas Practices to Other Areas’

Texas does not make it clear what the state’s best management practices (BMPs) for sand mines are. So how do sand mines along the San Jacinto measure up to other states’ and countries’ guidelines? Not well.

One focus of their BMPs is the use of buffer zones, setbacks and strips of vegetation to reduce erosion and control sedimentation. The minimum distance between mine and river in most cases is 100 feet. Some specify more.

  • Alaska, for instance, discourages mines from locating within 1000 feet of a public water source, i.e., the San Jacinto which feeds Lake Houston, the main drinking water source for millions of people. The minimum near other bodies of water in Alaska is 200 feet.
  • Malaysia specifies a 50 meter setback (164 feet) from all river channels.
  • Australia prohibits sand mining in sensitive areas altogether.

In Texas along the San Jacinto, miners often excavate to within 40-50 feet of rivers, and remove vegetation to build dirt roads on the remaining narrow strip between the mine and the river. These thin, sandy barriers provide little defense against floods. They have been repeatedly breached, as you will see below. The river often runs right through mines, carrying sand and sediment downstream.

Types of Barriers against Sedimentation

Louisiana mandates a minimum 100-foot buffer adjacent to perennial streams. The state recommends a dual defense against sedimentation: vegetation and structural measures. Their best practices guide states, “Vegetation is an inexpensive and effective way to protect soil from erosion. It also decreases erosion from flowing water by reducing its velocity. Roots hold soil and increase infiltration. Topsoil should be added where existing soils are not suitable for adequate vegetative growth.”

Vegetative controls include:

  • Maintaining buffer zones between mine and river
  • Sod stabilization techniques. Sodding can be more than 99 percent effective in reducing erosion.
  • Protection of trees involves preserving and protecting selected trees that exist on the site prior to development.
  • Temporary and permanent seeding

Structural controls include:

  • Diversion ridges, berms or channels of stabilized soil
  • Silt fences
  • Sediment basins with banks sloped at 2:1 or less
  • Dikes – Must be well compacted and vegetated, with an outlet pipe or coarse aggregate spillway
  • Riprap protection – at the outlet end of culverts or channels to reduce the depth, velocity and energy of water so that the flow will not erode the receiving stream.
  • Check dams – Small dams less than 2 feet high constructed across swales or drainage ditches to reduce flow velocity and erosion.
  • Aggregate stabilized site entrances – at least 50 feet long to reduce sediment tracked onto public roads. Tire washing may also be needed.
  • Good housekeeping practices for fuel, debris, sediment from unstabilized areas, etc.
  • Post-construction stormwater management measures
  • Retention ponds
  • Vegetated swales and natural depressions that filter sediments from runoff with side slopes of 4:1 or less.

A Visual Comparison

Note the images below. The first represents the ideal; it is taken from the Louisiana BMP guide. The rest are from the West Fork of the San Jacinto in the last three years.

Image of ideal stream bank from Louisiana Sand Mining Best Practices Guide. Note vegetation, grass, gradual slope and aquatic plants.

West Fork Sand Mine,  9/14/2018. During Harvey, 150,000 cubic feet per second came rushing down this narrow channel and flooded 20 square miles of exposed sand in more than a dozen different mines.

Consequences of NOT Following BMPs

The image above and the following images all come from a small area of investigation shown below.

2.1 miles from Northpark Drive and US59, and 3.1 miles upstream from the US59 bridge.

The following images demonstrate what happens when miners work too close to the river. Numbers on the first image correspond to close-ups that follow.

Inundation of sand mines during Harvey on 8/30/17. Numbers correspond to close-ups below.  All photos courtesy of Google Earth.

1 – Rapids within sand mine.

2 – Water rushing into mine, creating turbulence.

3 – Water takes a shortcut across meander through mine.

4 – Washed out road INSIDE sand mine during Harvey. 

5 -Sand bars within sand mine in conjunction with ruptured dikes prove sand was carried downstream. Photo taken on 10/28/2017 (after Harvey).

In a white paper circulated among Texas state legislators called The Societal and Environmental Benefits of Sand MiningTACA insists, “When [water invades a sand mine during a flood], the velocity of the water slows significantly, losing its ability to keep sediments in suspension and the stream or river begins to deposit its sediment load. When flood waters back into an area where a sand and gravel pit is located, the pit becomes a sediment trap for the flood waters and their sediments.” This series of photos directly refute TACA’s claims.

Why do we allow sand mines to operate in areas that flood repeatedly and violently, so near the drinking water source for millions of people?

Un-repaired Dike Still Leaks Sediment after 3 Years

Are the mines following Best Management Practices? The dike on the right in the images below ruptured in 2015 and still has not been repaired. Note sediment streaming into the West Fork.

Dike ruptured during flood in 2015 (see image below). It continues to spew sediment into the river.

Geologists say that once a river “captures” a sand mine, it repeatedly tries to take that same route in subsequent floods. This is a direct consequence of mining too close to the river. 

Cautionary Advice from India

Sustainable Sand Mining Management Guidelines from India state, “Floodplain Extraction should be set back from the Main Channel. In a dynamic alluvial system, it is not uncommon for meanders to migrate across a floodplain. In areas where sand and gravel occurs on floodplains or terraces, there is a potential for the river channel to migrate toward the pit. If the river erodes through the area left between the excavated pit and the river, there is a potential for “river capture,” a situation where the low-flow channel is diverted though the pit. In order to avoid river capture, excavation pits should be set back from the river to provide a buffer, and should be designed to withstand the 100-year flood… Adequate buffer widths and reduced pit slope gradients are preferred over engineered structures which require maintenance in perpetuity.”

Sand Miners Externalize Costs

Because these West Fork sand mines did not consider violent floods in their design and construction criteria, taxpayers downstream bear the cost of remediation. Dredging of the West Fork will cost tens of millions of dollars – for the initial 2.1 mile phase alone! That doesn’t even include recurring and unnecessarily high costs of water treatment because of turbidity.

Posted 6/24/18 by Bob Rehak

299 days since Hurricane Harvey

 

The Case for Dredging the “Mouth Bar”

A “mouth bar” is a sandbar that builds up at the mouth of a river where it meets a standing body of water, such as Lake Houston. The West Fork of the San Jacinto has a world-class whopper of a mouth bar.

How and Why Mouth Bars Form

A mouth bar forms when water in the river slows down as it spreads out in a standing body of water. The lower velocity of the river can no longer suspend particles of sediment. According to academic and petroleum geologists I talked to, this phenomenon exists in rivers everywhere. In fact, mouth bars are an essential element of delta formation.

Sequence of Events in Formation

As a mouth bar grows in height and emerges from the river, it backs water up and slows it down. This causes the river upstream of the mouth bar to gradually fill with sediment, ultimately choking the river and forcing it to seek a new path. At this point, the higher pressure created by the backwater forces the river to seek new channels. At this point, typically the river splits into two (bifurcates). This accounts for the branching structures found in most deltas.

That is exactly what’s happening where the West Fork of the San Jacinto meets Lake Houston as this series of time-lapse images shows. Note the growth of the mouth bar in areas highlighted in white below.

2011 image of the mouth bar where the West Fork of the San Jacinto meets Lake Houston. Note how bar has formed at tip of main channel.

 

By 2013, the mouth bar had taken on a triangular shape where it was starting to split the main flow of the river.

 

Image taken on the last day of 2016. The mouth bar grew considerably in the Tax Day and Memorial Day floods in 2015 and 2016, primarily by extending its length. 

 

October 2017. During Hurricane Harvey, the mouth bar doubled in size. It definitely splits the flow of the river now. 

On 9/14/17, the bar looked like this from a helicopter.

Approximately two-thirds of the homes damaged by flooding in the upper Lake Houston area were between this bar and where the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will stop dredging.

Historical Context: A Lesson in Geomorphology

The growth of this mouth bar was predictable. Brown & Root said in 2000 that it would emerge exactly where it did. What will happen in the future if we don’t dredge it? That, too, is predictable. See this presentation by William Dupré, professor of geosciences at the University of Houston. Professor Dupré’s presentation, given at  the Houston Geological Society April conference on flooding, contains excellent illustrations of how rivers migrate laterally over time.

Consequences of Not Dredging

A retired chief geologist for a leading oil company (who specialized in sedimentation) tells me that if this bar is not dredged, we could expect the following consequences. It will, he says:

  • Continue to grow in height, width and length.
  • Slow down and back up water behind it.
  • Force increased sedimentation upstream (including areas soon to be dredged)
  • Likely also increase the frequency and magnitude of overbank flooding upstream of the mouth bar
  • Jeopardize homes, bridges, pipelines and other infrastructure on both sides of the river as it branches.

Two Options for Dredging

The contract that the Army Corps of Engineers expects to sign with a dredging vendor does NOT currently include this bar in its scope. I wish it did for all the reasons listed above.

The proposed contract includes a clause that allows expansion of scope if both the Corps and Contractor agree on it. That would be the most cost efficient way to address this problem. Dredges will already be on the river. Millions of dollars of mobilization costs for second dredging project could be avoided and the issue could be addressed sooner.

However, if expanding the scope of the Corps project is not possible, I believe residents of the Lake Houston area should insist that the County covers it in the upcoming flood bond referendum.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/23/2018

298 Days since Hurricane Harvey