Wasted Time, Money Could Have Built All Flood-Bond Projects in Seven Poorest Watersheds

11/19/26 – Time and money squandered by Harris County Flood Control under its previous director cost more than it would have taken to construct every flood-bond project in seven watersheds with the County’s highest percentages of Low-to-Moderate Income (LMI) residents.

Time Lost

Almost from the moment that the 2018 Harris County Flood Bond passed, it became mired in politics. Judge Ed Emmett subsequently lost his 2018 re-election bid. Lina Hidalgo won. Democrats gained a majority on Commissioners Court. They implemented a controversial “equity prioritization plan.” They also pushed out highly qualified professionals running the Flood Control District and brought in a new, ineffective executive director who slowed things to a crawl. The graph below shows spending by year up to the point she left in June 2026.

2018 Flood Bond CIP spending
As inflation soared, construction stalled. Source: HCFCD. 2022 was first year under new director.

Precinct 2 Commissioner Adrian Garcia defended the past executive director (whom he pushed for the job) long after other commissioners and Judge Lina Hidalgo lost confidence in her. She finally resigned under pressure in June 2026.

“Time is money” as the saying goes. The slowdown affected possibilities in several ways.

Losses Due to Inflation

We lost an estimated 30% of the purchasing power[1] of the flood bond due to inflation during the previous director’s tenure. Thirty percent of $4 billion[2] left in the bond and partnership funds when she assumed office is approximately $1.2 billion lost.

Losses Due to Bad Estimating

Taxpayers lost another $113 million due to bad estimating under the previous director. A report by the new director showed that the previous director inflated construction estimates when applying for federal grants. Actual construction bids came in far lower.

Had the estimating been more accurate, HCFCD could have done more projects with available grant money. At this point, it’s probably too late to get additional projects approved to use up that money.

Losses Due to Slowness

HCFCD’s new executive director has accelerated construction activity 6X. Regardless, he estimates HCFCD will lose another $207 million in federal funding due to projects that will finish after already extended deadlines.

Totaling the Losses and Their Impact

Altogether Harris County taxpayers have lost at least $1.52 billion in the original flood bond:

  • $1.2 billion lost due to inflation
  • $117 million lost due to bad estimating
  • $203 million lost due to missed deadlines

What We Could Have Bought with $1.52 Billion

The table below shows the total value of ALL projects in the flood bond by watershed.

It also shows those watersheds ranked by the percentage of Low-to-Moderate Income (LMI) residents within the total watershed population. The seven shaded watersheds have a grand total of $1.434 billion.

Watersheds ranked by percentage of LMI residents as of 2021.

The money we lost was enough to pay for every project in every one of the seven shaded watersheds above. Or a quarter of all projects in the entire bond.

If We Focus Only on Equity, We’re Focusing on the Wrong Question

This loss of purchasing power is reigniting debates over “equity” and “historical discrimination.” With almost half of the flood bond money already spent, other watersheds should be getting the attention they were promised. But some people are pushing to finish remaining projects in LMI watersheds first.

That will leave projects in other watersheds without funding. Thanks to Adrian Garcia.

Elon Musk took approximately five years to develop the system that catches rockets returning from space. The flood bond passed eight years ago. And it’s about digging holes in the ground.

Meanwhile, the San Jacinto watershed had the highest flooding in the county during Harvey. And yet it has received only 14% of the dollars promised.

And the Halls Bayou watershed, the poorest in the county, has received only 16% of the money promised to it.

Percent Spent Table Q3 2026
Right column shows percent of promised funds already spent in each Harris County watershed.

In my opinion, the debate should not be about equity. It should be about speed.

Posted by Bob Rehak

3370 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

[1] 30% inflation rate was estimated by Dr. Tina Petersen, previous head of the Flood Control District. It also coincides closely with the cumulative inflation rate estimated by TXDoT during Petersen’s time in office. TXDoT and HCFCD are both in the construction segment of the Texas economy and both deal with cement, dirt, trucks, diesel fuel, etc.

[2] Total dollars in the Flood Bond stand at $5.3 billion. When Petersen took office, $1.1 billion had already been expended. I obtained $1.3 billion lost to inflation by multiplying $4 billion by 30%. While the $4 billion is rounded down, it provides a conservative estimate.

$320 Million of CDBG Funds Still in Doubt Despite 6X Increase in Construction Activity and 1-Year Deadline Extension

11/13/26 – Despite a 6X increase in construction activity and a one-year extension of deadlines, Harris County Flood Control District (HCFC) may still lose $320 million of Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administered by the Texas General Land Office (GLO).

One week after mid-terms, Harris County residents finally got a peak at the presentation that Precinct 2 Commissioner Adrian Garcia kept them from seeing before the election. Garcia pulled discussion of Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) from the agenda on 10/15.

And it’s no wonder! The numbers likely would have shifted the tide in his re-election campaign.

Stuckett’s Presentation

The slides below come from a presentation that Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) Executive Director Marcus Stuckett gave to Commissioners Court on 11/12/27. The at-risk money falls into two categories:

  • $113 million of CDBG – DR grants (disaster recovery)
  • $207 million of CDBG – MIT grants (mitigation).

Excess Contingency for DR Projects Leaves $80 Million on Table

Stuckett said that the “$113 million … does not mean a loss in projects or benefits.” He explained that actual construction “bids came in low” due to “excess contingency.” Eighty million dollars low! The remainder of the $113 million is due to project scope changes.

All projects in the DR group will get done and their flood-mitigation benefits will be realized. But better estimating by Stuckett’s predecessor, former HCFCD Executive Director Dr. Tina Petersen, could have built more projects. Actual construction bids came in far under Petersen’s estimates. How much? $80 million is a quarter of the $322 million originally approved for DR projects by HUD and the GLO.

Garcia defended Petersen for more than a year after other commissioners raised questions about her performance. Regardless, unless HCFCD can quickly come up with another way to use that money quickly, it will still be left on the table.

In that regard, Stuckett suggested two possibilities:

If possible, those might eliminate or at least narrow the loss of DR funds.

Preserving MIT Money Will Require Yet More Deadline Extensions

“The $207 million is a little bit of a different story,” added Stuckett. “Some of those projects are still in design and development, and a one-year extension does not give us enough time to complete some of those projects.”

Stuckett next showed how additional time could reduce the amount of money left on the MIT side of the table.

  • An additional year could reduce the funding lost to $48 million.
  • Two additional years could reduce the loss to $0.

Against that backdrop, Stuckett explained how HCFCD wasn’t just asking for deadline extensions.

6X Increase in Rate of Completion Saves DR Projects

HCFCD is also focused on accelerating projects to beat deadlines. The focus has paid off. The rate of work being completed has increased 6X since he took office at the end of June. And he expects that rate to continue to increase.

It makes you wonder why Garcia defended Petersen’s performance for so long. Stuckett predicts that all eleven CDBG-DR projects will finish before their deadlines even though HCFCD will have to hustle up on two: the Genoa Red Bluff and Dinner Creek Stormwater Detention Basins. See below.

Red line shows old deadline. Black shows new deadline with one-year extension.

MIT Projects Will Require More Time

Stuckett next showed exactly which MIT projects will need more time and where they are. Six project in Precincts 1 and 2, and eight projects in Precincts 3 and 4 will finish past their deadlines.

Options Being Considered to Narrow Losses

Stuckett then discussed possible moves to narrow losses. He showed examples of projects that could benefit from additional time to restore components previously eliminated to meet the tight deadlines.

He also talked about simply cutting losses by eliminating two projects with environmental or land-acquisition hurdles. That would also potentially allow increases in the scope on other projects that had been trimmed back previously. See below. It’s like a complex puzzle.

With that, Stuckett concluded by reprising his first slide that showed $320 million at risk.

Overall, Stuckett’s presentation provided a remarkable degree of candor and detail that commissioners will need to make difficult decisions. It’s a vast improvement over his predecessor’s updates that provided false hope as projects slipped further and further behind.

Each of the Commissioners and the County Judge thanked Stuckett and his team for their work.

Garcia Motions and Probability of More Time

In the discussion that followed, Adrian Garcia proposed two motions. They both passed unanimously.

  • To establish a working group to find elevate pathways for additional spending of existing Cdbg funding and return to Commissioners Court by February 11th, 2027 with recommendations on a proposed path forward using the county’s Equity Prioritization Framework
  • To draft a letter to Senator Elect Talarico re: Harris County’s CDBG allocations.

Garcia claimed that unnamed sources in Washington “repeatedly” told him that “this money had no timeline.” He then backpedaled and said, “Um, and so, uh, but there was some conversations I had heard that there was a potential of, okay, no timelines.”

That assertion contradicts written contracts between HCFCD, the GLO and HUD. The GLO explained that grants made after Hurricane Ike in 2008 had no deadlines. As a consequence, some of the money is still unused and has recently been moved into a Disaster Recovery Reallocation Program.

HUD imposed the deadlines after Harvey specifically to avoid the Ike scenario, i.e., money going unused that could have mitigated flooding elsewhere in a more timely way.

Commissioners Ramsey, Briones and Ellis then discussed finding a path forward on 20 or so projects that had been cancelled. Judge Lina Hidalgo cautioned against raising false hopes.

For More Information

For additional detail, here is:

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/13/26

3363 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Will New Political Leaders Prioritize Flood Mitigation?

11/9/26 – The 2026 mid-term elections have the potential to hit the reset button on flood-mitigation priorities. Governor Abbott, GLO commissioner Dawn Buckingham, State Representative Charles Cunningham, Harris County Judge Lina Hidalgo, and Congressman Dan Crenshaw are all being replaced by newcomers.

Democrats now have a majority of the House in Austin, and both the House and Senate in Washington. We had a “regime change” in the mid-term election. And with change comes uncertainty.

New, incoming leaders may not share the priorities of their predecessors. Nor will they have the background and the understanding of local needs that their predecessors developed in the nine years since Hurricane Harvey. Therefore, all of us must speak up.

We must inform new leaders about local flood-mitigation needs, so we don’t squander any progress made after Hurricane Harvey.

Overview of Lake Houston Area Needs

The Lake Houston Area Task Force, started by the late Humble ISD leader Guy Sconzo after Harvey, identified three main needs to mitigate flooding in the Lake Houston Area:

  • Less In. Upstream retention to decrease the amount of inbound water
  • More Through. Dredging to eliminate blockages and increase conveyance to get more water through the area faster
  • Faster Out. Additional gates on the Lake Houston Dam to get more water out faster, especially before major storms to create more floodwater storage volume in our lakes.

Outgoing leaders advanced many efforts that supported those goals. They include:

Flood Mitigation Should Be Non-Partisan

I pray that new leaders continue to advance these efforts. We should never forget how unexpected floods can upend the lives of hundreds of thousands of families overnight. Disrupt education. And destroy infrastructure.

Flooding is a public safety issue. And public safety, in my opinion, should be non-partisan.

27% of people in the San Jacinto River Basin live or work in floodplains.

Calculation from 2024 State Flood Plan

And that percentage is probably even higher in Harris County

New leaders should not abandon the work on this issue that their predecessors started. They should continue to push these projects and priorities across the finish line. And turn study recommendations into flood-mitigation improvements on the ground.

There may be no more important public safety issue in this area than flooding. And it affects as many Democrats as Republicans…if not more.

Posted By Bob Rehak on 11/9/2026

3359 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Models vs. Reality: Critical Omissions in SJRA Planning

11/7/26 – Computer models, if accurate, can aid in planning. But what happens if their assumptions are flawed.

On 11/5/26, some of the brightest engineers in the region trotted out a presentation that showed the impact of releasing water before floods from both Lake Conroe and Lake Houston. They used computer models to calculate how much the extra storage capacity in the lakes could reduce flooding under various conditions and assumptions.

The work was brilliant in many ways, except for several critical omissions They didn’t model:

  • Current conditions, i.e., they assumed new floodgates for the Lake Houston dam had already been built.
  • Impacts of pre-release on the area SJRA directly controls between the dams where most damage and deaths occurred.
  • Actual rainfall from Harvey and soil conditions before the storm. They only used half the actual rainfall where most damage and deaths occurred, and they assumed a drought before the storm. So, model inputs were vastly inaccurate.

Recommended Next Step

SJRA has three additional model runs that it can make under its current contract with the engineers. I suggest they need to examine what would happen to the West Fork watershed if no additional floodgates are installed on Lake Houston.

At the very least, that knowledge could help determine optimal operational procedures to help protect people who live downstream from the dam. Right now. Before additional gates. If additional gates ever get built. That project currently faces a funding shortfall approaching $200 million in a time of political upheaval and uncertainty. Why?

Illusion

Engineers and computer experts often become seduced by the illusion of precision that underlies computer modeling. But they and we should all realize that the illusion is just that.

Frequently, model results fail to predict reality. Case in point: Take the bar graph below. It compares actual temperature observations to predictions of climate warming trends produced by 36 different climate models between 1973 and 2022.

The U.S. Dept. of Energy produced the graph for a 2025 report called, “A Critical Review of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on U.S. Climate.” The actual “observed conditions” are shown by the tiny blue bar on the far right.

Page 43 from U.S. Dept. of Energy’s “A Critical Review of Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on U.S. Climate” 2025

Computer models are useful for planning the future and predicting results, given certain assumptions. But if those assumptions are unreal, the results are worthless, potentially misleading, expensive and dangerous. In less elevated language, “Garbage in, garbage out.”

My point? The measure of a model should be its ability to predict the future accurately. Failing that, models are little more than a magic show.

What Next?

So, what should the SJRA do at this point? The engineers made a big point of saying that they wanted input from the audience on three additional scenarios to explore.

I suggest they explore the impact of pre-release on:

  • The one area they already control, the San Jacinto West Fork
  • Given: CURRENT conditions, i.e., NO additional floodgates; a flowage easement on Lake Conroe to 207 feet above mean sea level; and various release rates in storms ranging from 10 years to 500 years in magnitude.
  • Objective: Optimize gate operations to minimize upstream AND downstream flood damage.

My Gripe about SJRA

SJRA constantly complains about how little they control. It comes across as if they’re still fighting a PR battle to win post-Harvey lawsuits. In public meetings, they go out of their way to dramatize how much they don’t control. It makes them look powerless and defensive. Worse, it doesn’t mitigate flooding.

SJRA Pre-release meeting in Conroe
Poster from SJRA Pre-release Meeting in Conroe. SJRA controls only the top gray area. But that affects the bottom gray and yellow areas.

Harvey and other floods dramatized two critical gaps:

  • Need for Pre-Release Strategy Before More Gates. Despite computer models and gages galore, the person operating floodgates at Lake Conroe during a flood needs better knowledge about how their actions will impact lives and property.
  • Better Coordination with Lake Houston Operators. That person also needs to coordinate with Lake Houston Dam operators, who may be/will likely be constrained by their own lack of pre-release capacity. They need to act as one team.

Let’s plug those gaps. It’s nice to use computer models to design a safer world in the future; we need that. But until funding becomes available, let’s all live in reality. And try to make the best of it.

Let’s use those three remaining scenarios to help us NOW…before floodgates that may never be built.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/7/2026

3358 says since Hurricane Harvey

Floodplains: A Shifting Target and a Political Swamp

10/26/26 – Few people understand that floodplains are a shifting target. They are determined by LIDAR accurate to within a centimeter, certified by professional engineers, and enshrined in government regulations. At the end of that process, residents borrow billions of dollars for mortgages, often based on where a professional surveyor determines a line should appear on a map.

How could they all be wrong? They aren’t. They’re right for a period of time. But those floodplains shift based on:

Shifting-Target Horror Story

How fast can things change? In the early eighties, I bought a house in the Dallas area on Spring Creek downstream from Plano. The engineer, survey, and developer certified that it was two feet above the hundred year floodplain. But Plano was the fastest growing city in America at the time. Within two years, floodwater entered our house after a minor rain.

So, the Army Corps resurveyed the creek. They determined that we were ten feet below the 100-year floodplain, not two feet above it. That was an expensive lesson for young homeowners. After making repairs, we sold the house at a huge loss.

We then moved to Houston, but on much higher ground relative to the floodplain at the time. We bought a home a mile beyond the 500-year floodplain. Now, however, new flood maps show the 500-floodplain reaches within 50 feet of my house.

Do Maps Really Reflect Everything Going on Around You?

As a result, I have learned all over again that floodplains are a shifting target.

shifting floodplain
“Now, where is that floodplain?” Illustration by ChatGPT.

If you came across a bear in the woods, you would immediately sense a threat and turn around. But when searching for a new home, you may not feel an immediate threat from flooding. So, many people let their guards down.

Even if you wanted to learn what a new home’s flood risk is, how would you?

The new flood maps posted on MAAPnext.org are not yet official. And even if they were, Harris County Flood Control based them on data it started acquiring in 2019. Since then, Montgomery County has become the third-fastest growing county in America – a game changer.

FEMA is now reviewing protests by home and business owners who fear their property values could plummet re: the extent of floodplains.

Plus, nine years after Harvey:

  • The SJRA still hasn’t finalized its Joint Reservoir Operations Study.
  • The Lake Conroe Association has commissioned its own study that attacks the one of the main premises of the SJRA study – the value of pre-release.
  • Engineering for additional gates for the Lake Houston Dam has not yet finished. But we know we will need more funding that could potentially torpedo the benefit/cost requirement.
  • No additional upstream detention projects have yet started.
  • The Lake Houston Dredging and Maintenance District is scrambling to put together a business plan.
  • The 2018 Flood Bond is still only half spent.
  • Only 14% of the money designated for the San Jacinto River Basin in the bond has been spent.

Yep. You would think widening a channel or digging a detention basin would be a relatively simple task. But we seem to have designed a flood-control system inspired by Rube Goldberg. Read this ironic post I wrote 3000 days ago.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/26/26

3345 Days since Hurricane Harvey

GLO Commissioner Announces Launch of $92 Million Mitigation-Reallocation Program

10/25/26 – Texas General Land Office (GLO) Commissioner Dawn Buckingham M.D. has announced the launch of a $92 million program to reallocate flood mitigation funding along with a call for projects in eligible Texas communities until November 18th.

A 10/20/26 GLO press release says that Buckingham launched a Mitigation Reallocation Program (MRP). The effort will help ensure $92 million in available funding reaches Texas communities that need dollars for flood-mitigation projects.

The funding can be used for mitigation needs such as flood and drainage improvements, water-system improvements, wastewater improvements, street improvements and permanently affixed emergency communications equipment. In short, anything that reduces the impacts of future hurricanes, storms and flooding. The deadline for applications: Nov. 18, 2026, at 5 p.m. (Central Time).

Beating the Federal Clock

“The GLO is setting a record pace in administering mitigation funds across several disasters,” said Commissioner Dawn Buckingham, M.D. The mitigation funding comes from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

It is a one-time opportunity to accomplish resilience infrastructure priorities in Texas communities frequently impacted by disasters. However, these funds must be used expeditiously before the federal clock runs out.

“The MRP reinforces the GLO’s commitment to helping Texas communities prepare, withstand, and recover from disasters with stronger, more resilient systems in place,” said Buckingham.

The MRP utilizes de-obligated and un-utilized Community Development Block Grant funds for Mitigation (CDBG-MIT) from HUD. Currently, the GLO has identified $92 million in funding available for the MRP. That total may increase as GLO identifies additional funds.

Who is Eligible and Where?

Eligible entities include units of local government (cities and counties), Indian Tribes and special purpose districts in counties eligible for CDBG-MIT grants. Each may submit up to three (3) projects.

GLO will consider projects based on the criteria identified in the action plan. Projects must cost between $2.5 million and $10 million. Because of their emphasis on preventing future flooding, they do not need to a tie-back to a particular disaster, such as Hurricane Harvey.

Eligible counties include the dark-shaded areas.

Webinar Explains Application Process for Community Officials

The GLO hosted a webinar for community officials in eligible counties regarding the call for projects process including federal eligibility requirements, scoring criteria, and key deadlines. The webinar was recorded and is available on the MRP website.

From the date of contract execution, sub-recipients will have a maximum of three years to complete the project. Entities must carefully consider the timeline provided in their submission. Each project contract will have a specific timeline and milestones. They will vary based on the execution date and the project submission details.

No Deadline Extensions; Recapture of Funds Possible

The Mitigation Reallocation Program cannot allow extensions on these grants due to the federally imposed deadline for using the funds.

HUD has set deadlines for the expenditure and closeout of the CDBG-MIT grant. Failure to complete projects and finalize HUD’s closeout process will result in “HUD initiating the recapture process” said the GLO. That means any funds used towards incomplete projects must be repaid to HUD.

Due to the gravity of the deadlines, the GLO will only consider projects that can be completed in enough time to allow for the close-out process.

How Communities Can Apply

Eligible entities must submit projects through the Texas Integrated Grant Reporting (TIGR) system. Entities that require TIGR access will need to submit a TIGR access form by Wednesday, Nov. 11 at 5 p.m., to allow time for processing.

For more information or to submit projects, visit recovery.texas.gov/mrp. You can find the mitigation action plan scoring criteria at https://recovery.texas.gov/action-plans.

Rehak’s Take

I read this announcement (and its timing in the middle of an election) as a shot across the bow of Harris County. Said another way, it’s a warning to speed up so that Harris County CDBG-MIT funds don’t get recycled to another county.

According to a GLO spokesperson, other counties are eager to get their hands on this money and put it to work. One former Harris County insider suspected that Buckingham’s announcement “will be met with applause outside of Harris County.”

Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/25/26

3344 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Harris County Could Lose $113 Million in CDBG Funds Despite 1-Year Extension

10/19/26 – Update includes several changes to text to clarify origin and status of $113 million. See GLO clarification at bottom of post.

10/16/26 – GLO Commissioner Dawn Buckingham says she is moving $133 Million of Community Development Block Grant funds for Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) designated for Harris County to another county. [GLO disputes this. See clarification below.]

Here’s how the story unfolded.

Garcia Pulls CDBG Update from Commissioners Court Agenda

Agenda Item 93 for the 10/15/26 Harris County Commissioners Court Meeting concerned an update on $322 million of HUD CDBG-DR funds that were at risk because of an imminent 2/28/27 deadline.

Two weeks ago, a one-year extension from the Texas General Land Office (GLO) gave Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) more breathing room. However, it was not clear whether HCFCD could expend all the money … even with the extension.

But yesterday, before Marcus Stuckett, the new executive director of HCFCD, could answer that question, Precinct 2 Commissioner Adrian Garcia pulled Item 93 from the agenda. It will now be considered on November 12 – AFTER the upcoming election. Hmmmm. That made me curious!

No one with Harris County or HCFCD could or would tell me why it was pulled from the agenda. And the County refused my Public Information Request for Stuckett’s presentation … within minutes. They said the presentation didn’t exist. Never a good sign! See below.

Record request denial. Red box added to redact my phone number and address.

So, I sent my request for information to the GLO. They immediately supplied two letters that explain what happened and what will happen.

Letter #1: Stuckett Request to GLO

On 10/2/26, Stuckett sent a letter to GLO Deputy Director Heather Lagrone. In it, he thanks the GLO for the one year extension, and says that it will give HCFCD time to finish the CDBG-DR projects.

But he also explains that $113 million of the $322 million – more than a third of the total – will not be expended before the extended deadline. The reason: Actual project bids compiled under his predecessor came in lower than initial estimates used for grant applications. Stuckett also references “scope changes” as a reason for the lower-than-expected billing.

To make up the $113 million, Stuckett proposed shifting several Subdivision Drainage Projects and/or CDBG-Mitigation Projects to the CDBG-DR budget. Some were already completed.

Letter #2: GLO Reply to Stuckett

GLO Commissioner Dawn Buckingham replied to Stuckett in a terse, three-paragraph letter dated 10/14/26.

The first paragraph says she is pleased that the extension will give HCFCD time to complete the CDBG-DR projects.

But Paragraph #2 says “Harris County” failed to provide information that it promised “months ago” about swapping projects from the MIT category to DR – a proposal initiated by Stuckett’s predecessor, Dr. Tina Petersen. Stuckett has been in his new job for only about three months.

In addition to the vague timing reference, the generic “Harris County” reference also stood out. Harris County Housing & Community Development and Harris County Engineering also manage CDBG grants. Buckingham did not specify whether HCFCD, one of the others, or all of the above failed to comply.

Paragraph #3 explains that Buckingham will reallocate the Harris County funds to another county because she fears Harris County will eventually fail to complete the projects. [GLO disputes this. See clarification below.]

Buckingham does not acknowledge that several of the projects that Stuckett proposed moving from MIT to DR were already completed.

One thing is clear, however. Harris County will lose $113 million of flood mitigation funds … at a time when Harris County just raised taxes by a record amount.

Image created by ChatGPT

How We Got Here

It’s important to remember that we would not even be in this position if it weren’t for Precinct 2 Commissioner Adrian Garcia. He pushed to remove exceptional HCFCD leaders who sold the 2018 Flood Bond and were delivering projects at a record pace through 2022. After pushing those leaders out, he replaced them with an inexperienced, unqualified leader he could control.

As her performance slipped, Precinct 3 Commissioner Tom Ramsey warned other commissioners and the county judge. But Garcia kept defending her poor performance.

And boom. Here we are today. $113 million. Gone. Precinct 2 residents should remember that when early voting starts.

To read the full text of Stuckett’s letter to the GLO, click here.

And to read the full text of the GLO’s response to Stuckett, click here.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/16/2026

3335 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.


GLO Clarification

We would like to clarify Commissioner Buckingham’s intent with regards to the $322 million in CDBG-DR funding currently being administered by HCFCD.

In your story you state, “GLO Commissioner Dawn Buckingham says she is moving $113 Million of Community Development Block Grant funds for Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) designated for Harris County to another county.” That is not accurate. Commissioner Buckingham has not identified any amount of funding to be removed from the $322 million in CDBG-DR (disaster recovery funding) that she secured for Harris County projects. All Commissioner Buckingham has said specifically relating to reducing the funding was in her 9/28/2026 letter to Judge Hidalgo in which she states, “But in this contract, failure to meet each benchmark will result in the unused balance being reclaimed and reallocated to other shovel-ready projects not managed by HCFCD.”

To be very clear, Commissioner Buckingham’s intention since taking office has been for this funding to benefit Harris County area residents. Who administers the funding and for what projects has rested with Harris County for more than 3.5 years. HCFCD has the contract, but the Harris County Commissioners Court has had authority over HCFCD the whole time.

The $113 million figure has only been mentioned by HCFCD Executive Director Marcus Stuckett. In his letter to the GLO, Mr. Stuckett stated that HCFCD “now anticipates approximately $113 million in CDBG-DR funds will remain unallocated.” HCFCD has not provided any data or documentation to support that figure or claim. The only basis for the $113 million amount is his mention of it. In fact, Mr. Stuckett’s team has failed to provide the specific documentation the GLO has requested to properly identify the current status of the budget or plans for how to spend the remaining allocations. In the past six months, HCFCD has only provided vague ideas and undefined concepts. That is not how the HUD funding process works. Subrecipients cannot piecemeal projects and Frankenstein together proposals. HUD demands specifics about complete projects that result in a defined benefit to a defined population by a defined deadline.

As we discussed, the GLO has an obligation to ensure the entirety of the $5.676 billion entrusted to the State of Texas specifically for Hurricane Harvey disaster recovery is expended in full compliance with federal regulations and within HUD’s mandatory deadlines for the full grant process. Who administers the funding and for what projects continues to be adjusted based on what can be accomplished within the deadline.

Since taking office in 2023, Commissioner Buckingham has taken every action within her authority to ensure funding is provided to benefit Harris County residents. Harris County promised “shovel ready” projects and the GLO has continued to provide technical support to facilitate federal compliance in effectively administering the funds.

Commissioner Buckingham’s intent continues to be for the full $322 million to be spent on projects to benefit the people who call Harris County home. However, if HCFCD cannot complete promised projects that can benefit residents within HUD’s mandatory process before the federal deadline, we may have to find alternative means to spend the money before time runs out. It won’t automatically go to projects outside of Harris County, but there are countless federally eligible projects in need of funding, and the clock is running out. 

Emailed on October 18, 2026, by Brittany Eck, GLO Director of Communications for Disaster Recovery


Harris County Considers $327 Million 2027 Budget Increase

8/17/2026 – Daniel Ramos, Executive Director of Harris County’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB), presented a detailed general fund budget for Fiscal Year 2027 this morning to a special meeting of Harris County Commissioners Court. The budget contained an estimated $327 million/12% increase over the 2026 budget. That increase could raise the average homeowner’s Harris County property tax bill next year to approximately $1,350. But if your house is worth more, that number could go far higher.

Here is Ramos’ “overview” presentation. And here is a 112-page explanation posted to the (OMB) website.

The county has two ways to raise property taxes: through your home’s valuation and the tax rate applied to it. But in 2026, total valuations throughout the county rose by only 0.8%. That means in order to pay for 12% increased costs, the tax rates themselves must increase.

Programs Vs. Priorities

Finalizing a budget requires debating priorities. And the presentation Ramos made today mapped proposed expenses to the priorities adopted earlier by the county. The 112-page explanation contains illuminating information about the county’s growth and demographics that drive the proposed increase.

Current Level of Service and Spending

One of the key terms used in the budget is “CLS/S.” It stands for Current Level of Service and Spending. Growth in law enforcement pay parity (with City of Houston), employee health care and benefits, CLS/S requests by departments, pay equity and other changes account for most of the projected $327 increase.

The first three categories alone account for more than two-thirds of the total increase. CLS/S includes the costs of maintaining the same level of service year over year. For instance, it includes $61 million of such things as facility maintenance, fleet operations, utilities, cost-of-living adjustments, changes in state law, and unplanned budget adjustments.

The $61 million also includes $14 million for ARPA programs which would otherwise go away at the end of this year when ARPA funding expires. So those aren’t purely inflationary costs.

The 12% increase is not principally a story about Harris County launching a huge collection of new programs. Approximately half is employee compensation and healthcare.

From Ramos presentation to Commissioners Court on 8/17/2026

And using OMB’s own accounting framework, approximately $287 million of the $327 million year-over-year increase was already embedded in the cost of maintaining existing services and spending commitments. That’s 88% not classified as expansion of services.

Existing recurring commitments are growing faster than sustainable recurring revenue.

And that points to a recurring, structural problem.

It’s important to distinguish between “unavoidable” versus “already committed.”  CLS/S does not mean unavoidable. It means current level of service and spending. Some items — healthcare inflation or statutory mandates — may be difficult to avoid.

Other items — pay-parity commitments, continuing ARPA programs, staffing levels, compensation policies — are the consequences of earlier policy decisions that Commissioners Court could theoretically change.

It’s also important to realize that the General Fund numbers cited above do NOT cover Flood Control, Port of Houston, or Public Health which have their own budgets (to be discussed at a later date).

Impact on Typical Homeowner’s Property Tax Bill

At the proposed maximum rate increase allowable without an election – and taking into account homestead exemptions and new construction growth – the average residential homestead would pay $1,350 in County property taxes vs. $1,202 last year, a 12.3% increase. See Page 40 of budget discussion.

The discussion of strategic objectives and their budget impact begins on Page 67 of the PDF. The budget is VERY complex and difficult to follow. However, several appendices may help.

  • Proposed department budgets on page 99
  • Glossary of terms on page 103
  • Which funds pay which departments on page 109
  • Salary increases of elected officials on page 111
  • Proposed benefit rates, also on 111

All pages refer to the PDF numbering system, not the numbers listed at the bottom of pages. That makes it easier to fast-forward within the document.

Make Your Feelings Known

Commissioners will vote on the final 2027 budget on September 8, 2026. Unfortunately, that’s before the November elections. So, if you’d like to limit that 12% increase in your property taxes, the time to start mailing, phoning and protesting is now.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/17/2026

3275 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Why Flood Mitigation Takes So Long

8/14/26 – Yesterday, someone asked me why flood mitigation takes so long. It’s a simple question that ultimately demands another question. How can we speed it up? Let me outline what I’ve learned about the “why so long” issue before wading into whether we can speed it up.

The process isn’t always linear. Surprises in one step may require adjustments in another. And there are many steps.

Flood-mitigation-process diagram produced by ChatGPT.

Overview of Key Steps in Mitigation Process

Cities and counties generally have the responsibility for flood prevention and mitigation. But they rarely have the money. Unless you live in a place like Harris County, flooding happens infrequently enough that officials generally don’t budget for disasters. They have other urgent needs and limited cash. Even in Harris, needs outstrip available funding.

So when disasters do happen, local governments look for financial assistance. That assistance could come from state or federal sources. But states and the federal government don’t just hand over piles of cash and say, “Go to it.”

Note: the steps below are not necessarily in chronological order depending on findings in other stages.

Feasibility Studies

First, local authorities must prove that they have a valid, constructible solution to a recurring problem. They start with a feasibility study. This usually involves establishing the magnitude of the problem and looking at alternative solutions to see if any are a) effective and b) affordable before investing more time and money.

Proving “No Adverse Impact”

Next, comes engineering and design. Local authorities must move a project far enough along to prove that the proposed solution does not create an adverse impact downstream. Simply getting rid of the water faster upstream, for instance, may create higher flood peaks downstream.

Finding the Local-Match Money

State and federal authorities almost always demand that cities and counties have “skin in the game.” So, the local authorities must put up a “local match,” usually 30% of estimated grant costs. Raising that 30% may require selling bonds. Which may require a bond referendum/election like Harris County had in 2018.

Benefit/Cost Analysis

Assuming local authorities can scrape up enough money for the local match, they must then actually apply for the grants. This will likely require a deeper level of engineering than the high-level feasibility study had. It will also require a BCA (benefit/cost analysis) to ensure the benefits exceed the costs. And that may require actual design.

Grant Applications

Applying for grants can be quite costly and time-consuming. The local authorities must first determine where a request is most likely to succeed (FEMA, HUD, EPA, etc.). To complicate matters, such agencies usually have multiple programs geared to different needs.

Environmental Studies

But that’s not all. Local authorities must also conduct environmental studies. An environmental study evaluates how a proposed flood-mitigation project could affect natural and human resources such as: wetlands, waterways, wildlife, water quality, cultural resources, and nearby communities. It also identifies regulatory requirements and measures to avoid, minimize, or mitigate adverse impacts.

Regulatory Approval/Permitting

Then come the regulatory approvals. If the solution impacts “waters of the U.S.”, for instance, it will need to be approved by the Army Corps of Engineers.

Congressional Appropriations and Rules

After a disaster, Congress must appropriate money for disaster relief and flood mitigation. But the money doesn’t go directly to cities and counties. It goes to states…after FEMA and HUD write rules for how the money can be used.

State-Level Administration

State authorities, such as the Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM) and Texas General Land Office (GLO), then review grant applications and determine whether projects comply with all relevant rules attached to funding.

If they do, the state agency then contracts with cities or counties which are considered sub-recipients. The state may have more applications than funding. So, it must prioritize projects, just like cities and counties do. This process requires:

  • An application period long enough for all interested parties to develop and submit requests
  • A review period to establish compliance with federal rules for the money
  • Time for public comments
  • Ranking of applications received
  • Coordination with federal authorities.
Bidding and Construction

Once state and federal authorities approve a project, local authorities must actually build it. This can take several years. Groups, such as Houston Public Works or the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD):

  • Determine specs for the project
  • Get approval to proceed from their oversight bodies such as Houston City Council or Harris County Commissioners Court
  • Seek qualified bidders
  • Give them time to compile and submit bids
  • Evaluate the bids and determine the winning bidder
  • Negotiate the contract
  • Get the contract approved by the relevant oversight body
  • Receive “authorization to use government funds” (AUGF) by TDEM or GLO
  • Build the project.
Aligning Dominos

Getting all the dominos aligned with all the supporting studies and documentation can take years. The money involved can be hundreds of millions…or even billions. So, the rules are both rigorous and onerous. And there are multiple audits along the way designed to prevent fraud.

But nobody has deeper pockets than the federal government. Typically, FEMA pays for 70% of each project. HUD ranges up to 90-100%. So, that makes the wait worthwhile.

Can We Speed Things Up?

As a former business owner, if I were looking for ways to speed up this convoluted process and reduce overall administration costs, I would examine two areas:

  • Reducing the number of layers or steps where possible
  • Improving efficiency within each step.

It would be difficult to reduce the number of layers and steps.

  • If you tried to cut out state agencies, you would lose local expertise and reduce local control. That might not be politically palatable. You would also likely just wind up transferring state costs to the federal level.
  • Reducing steps, such as “bidding” would likely be an invitation to fraud – also not politically palatable.
The Need to Spread Risk

The multi-level system we have spreads risk, much like an insurance company would. So, cutting out the federal government and funding everything locally or at the state level would also be difficult.

The National Hazard Mitigation Association points out that inland riverine flooding has affected 99% of U.S. counties in the past 20 years. Such flooding has also caused more than $45 billion of damage since 1980. 

Flooding happens sporadically. Years can roll by without a disaster. Then suddenly you get a Hurricane Harvey. That’s when you need help from neighbors. And almost every community will need help sooner or later.

Prevention Easier, Less Expensive Than Correction

There may be room to improve efficiency within each step. However, that could only be determined on a case-by-case, location-by-location basis, as we saw recently with HCFCD.

Only one thing is certain. Prevention is far less expensive and less time-consuming than correction. Preventing floods through measures such as better building codes and floodplain preservation is always a more cost-effective solution than correcting flooding after the fact.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/14/2026

3272 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Largest Tax Hike in Harris County History Raises Efficiency Question

8/7/26 – Yesterday, Harris County Commissioners discussed the largest tax hike in Harris County history. Before raising taxes a penny, they should examine the efficiency of the departments they oversee.

CC Meeting 08 06 2026
Harris County Commissioners discuss budget proposals on 8.06.26

To see why, review the recent history of the Harris County Housing & Community Development (HCD) Department and Flood Control District (HCFCD). Together, they manage more than a billion dollars of Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) projects for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) via the Texas General Land Office (GLO).

Since 2022, I have posted about slowdowns in Harris County flood-mitigation projects as one deadline after another slipped. It started with wholesale management changes made by the Democratic majority on Commissioners Court.

The slowdowns became so serious in the case of HCFCD that the department head recently resigned under pressure. As statistics below show, she left her successor, Marcus Stuckett, with huge challenges.

The problems at HCD have not yet received the attention that HCFCD received. But they are also serious.

Both groups must use grant money by strict deadlines or lose it. And both are far behind schedule.

They raise the questions, “Will tax increases continue to fund inefficiency? And if so, are increases really necessary?”

CDBG Projects Bring Efficiency Issues into Sharp Focus

At HCFCD, the potential loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds brought the former Executive Director’s efficiency into sharp focus. She failed to advance projects in a timely manner. And that is jeopardizing hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funding. Harris County taxpayers backstop those funds.

Precinct 3 Commissioner Tom Ramsey, PE fought to expose HCFCD’s problems, even as Precinct 2 Commissioner Adrian Garcia fought to keep in place the very people covering the problems up.

So, where exactly do things stand? How bad is the problem?

To answer those questions, I relied on data supplied by the GLO in Austin.

Housing and Community Development Projects

GLO awarded HCD $204 million dollars on 8/31/2022. To date, HCD has expended $69 million (34%). They must expend the remaining two thirds by August 31, 2027. So…

HCD has expended only 34% of the funds in 80% of available time.

Their $204 million includes 10 neighborhood drainage infrastructure projects valued at $168 million. Of the 10:

  • Construction is complete on one
  • Six are in various stages of construction (46-89% complete)
  • One is being advertised for bids
  • Two are still in design.

GLO also awarded HCD $37.5 million for 30 planning studies. Of those:

  • One was withdrawn
  • One is complete
  • The remainder are just starting or in various stages of completion ranging from 1% to 50%.

These also have deadlines of August 31, 2027.

HCFCD CDBG Mitigation Grants

HCFCD received an allocation of $546 million in CDBG Mitigation (MIT) funds in 2023. To date, it has expended only $25 million. HCFCD must complete construction and GLO must receive final billing by 3/31/28 – only 20 months away. Thus, under Dr. Tina Petersen…

HCFCD managed to spend 5% of its MIT money in 64% of available time.

HCFCD CDBG – DR Grants

GLO also approved an HCFCD allocation for $322 million in CDBG-Disaster Relief (DR) funds on 11/27/23. Almost 34 months later, HCFCD has expended only $15.6 million. So…

HCFCD has spent less than 5% of DR funds in 84% of available time.

Summary Table

This table summarizes the status of CDBG projects.

Compiled from GLO 7/23/2026 Report. Amount = $ committed, not spent.

According to the GLO, only seven of 29 HCFCD DR and MIT projects are actually in construction.

HCFCD’s report submitted to Commissioners Court this week shows 12 “in construction.” However, only seven of the 12 have any work billed against them. Delays in contractor mobilization may account for the difference.

So, where do we go from here?

The Bundle Jumble

Before Dr. Tina Petersen resigned, she tried to cobble together a plan that would get HCFCD past the $322 million DR hurdle.

She reached agreement in principle* with both the GLO and Harris County Commissioners Court to apply work billed to date in all four categories above against the $322 million DR obligation. That would give the county a little more breathing room.

In a best-case scenario, the county might bill enough to meet the entire $322 million obligation and lose nothing. In a less-than-best-case scenario, the county would narrow its losses.

Will It Work?

To date, the county has spent only $109 million in all four programs together. That covers only about a third of the $322 million.

What happens if HCFCD’s new management and HCD can’t spend another $213 million in the next six months? Potentially, HUD could start clawing back money from the GLO and the GLO could start clawing it back from the County.

But Harris County has already encumbered money for its suppliers. So, the buck stops with Harris County taxpayers.

Remember as you follow the county’s budget debate in coming weeks to ask whether you’re paying for additional services you want or simply funding inefficiency.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/7/2026

3265 Days since Hurricane Harvey

*When I asked the GLO for the wording of the agreement, a spokesperson said, “It has not been finalized yet. We are still getting details we need to write the amendment.”