Last Day to Save Wetlands

1/4/26 – January 5, 2026 is the last day to file public comments on a proposed new definition of Waters of the U.S. (WOTUS). The new definition could eliminate federal protections for roughly 80% of the wetlands in the United States.

A regulatory impact analysis by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that approximately 70 – 75 million acres of wetlands would no longer be protected, including approximately three quarters of the 3.1 million acres of wetlands in Texas.

70 – 75 million acres represent an area roughly the size of Arizona, Nevada, or Colorado and almost twice the size of Florida. And it’s more than 175 times larger than Houston.

Under the new definition, only wetlands with a relatively permanent, continuous surface connection to navigable Waters of the U.S. would enjoy federal protection. That pretty much limits federal protection only to swamps that directly border major rivers and streams.

Texas does not have its own regulatory protection program for inland forested wetlands such as those common in the San Jacinto river basin.

How Wetlands Reduce Flooding

Wetlands reduce flood risk by storing, slowing, spreading, and dissipating floodwaters before those waters reach downstream channels, neighborhoods, and infrastructure. They act as natural detention basins, providing temporary storage during heavy rainfalls. They fill first, reducing the volume and rate of water entering streams.

Wetlands also contain dense vegetation that slows runoff, reduces erosion, and minimizes channel scouring downstream.

They spread floods laterally across wide areas. This directly reduces flood heights, velocities and structural damage.

Many wetlands disconnect runoff from channels; they intercept it before it ever reaches streams or bayous. But when developers fill in and pave over wetlands, runoff becomes directly connected. Floods peak higher and faster.

The loss of federal protection for wetlands will shift flood mitigation costs downstream from developers to the public, and from no-cost natural solutions to high-cost engineered solutions, such as regional detention basins, channel widening, lining channels with concrete, bridge widening, dikes, reservoirs, etc.

Flood control districts, reservoir operators, and watershed planners consistently view wetlands as critical flood-risk infrastructure, even when not labeled as such.

Bottom line:

Wetlands reduce flooding by doing four things simultaneously:

  1. Storing water
  2. Slowing flow
  3. Spreading out flood waters
  4. Delaying aggregation of floodwaters.

Lose enough wetlands in a watershed and floods become higher, faster, and more destructive, even if rainfall statistics stay the same.

How You Can Help Save Wetlands

Protest the proposed changes by cutting and pasting the text between the two lines below. Don’t forget to add your name and contact info at the end of the entry form. The deadline for filing a public comment is Monday, January 5, 2025.

Re: the proposed 2025 definition of “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) as it relates to wetlands the Lake Houston watershed.

This represents one of the most hydraulically and sediment-sensitive locations in Southeast Texas. The wetlands and floodplain features here perform essential functions that directly affect downstream flood risk, sediment transport, and the long-term storage capacity of Lake Houston. Narrowing federal jurisdiction over these wetlands would have costly consequences that the proposal does not adequately analyze.

1. Wetlands upstream function as critical flood-storage infrastructure

Wetlands upstream operate as distributed flood-storage and flow-attenuation systems. During ordinary wet-season events, these wetlands temporarily store runoff, slow overland flow, and desynchronize flood peaks arriving from multiple tributaries. This attenuation function is particularly important at confluences, where coincident peak flows dramatically increase flood stage and velocity.

Loss or fragmentation of these wetlands will not merely redistribute water locally; it will shift flood risk downstream into into the Lake Houston area. Engineered detention required at individual development sites does not replicate this basin-scale function and cannot offset cumulative wetland losses across multiple upstream parcels.

2. Wetland loss directly increases sediment delivery to Lake Houston

The wetlands upstream serve as sediment traps. During flood events, reduced velocities across wetland landscapes allow suspended sediment to settle before reaching the active channel network. This function is especially important for a lake losing storage capacity that supplies water for 2 million people.

When wetlands are filled, drained, or disconnected, sediment that was previously stored on the landscape is instead delivered downstream. The result is accelerated shoaling of channels and increased sediment deposition in Lake Houston, reducing conveyance, increasing flood stages for equivalent flows, and shortening the functional life of public infrastructure.

3. Loss of storage capacity in Lake Houston imposes real and recurring public costs

Sedimentation has already measurably reduced the effective storage and conveyance capacity of Lake Houston. Maintaining that capacity has required repeated large-scale dredging projects costing hundreds of millions of dollars, funded largely by federal and state appropriations.

Upstream wetland loss increases the frequency and scale of these dredging needs. Each acre of wetland lost upstream effectively shifts long-term sediment-management costs from private land conversion decisions to the public. The proposed WOTUS definition does not quantify or even acknowledge this cost transfer.

4. Federal withdrawal from jurisdiction coincides with a pullback in mitigation funding

As federal jurisdiction over wetlands contracts, so too does the availability of federal mitigation and restoration funding that historically offset unavoidable impacts. This includes reduced applicability of Clean Water Act Section 404 mitigation and fewer mitigation-bank credits.

The combined effect is a double loss: fewer protected wetlands and fewer resources to restore or compensate for their loss. This creates a structural funding gap that local governments cannot realistically fill.

5. The proposed definition fails to address cumulative watershed-scale impacts

The proposal’s emphasis on parcel-level “continuous surface connection” tests ignores cumulative impacts across sub-basins. In the Lake Houston area, hundreds of small wetland losses—each individually deemed non-jurisdictional—can collectively produce measurable increases in flood peaks, sediment loads, and public costs.

The agencies should evaluate jurisdiction and impacts at the basin scale rather than relying on binary, site-specific connectivity tests that are not representative of watershed hydrology.

Requested revisions

I respectfully request that the agencies revise the proposed definition to:

  1. Retain federal jurisdiction over wetlands that provide flood-storage and sediment-attenuation functions upstream of relatively permanent waters and reservoirs, even where surface connectivity is seasonal rather than continuous year-round.
  2. Treat wetlands upstream of dams and reservoirs as integral components of the same hydrologic system, rather than as disconnected features.
  3. Evaluate and disclose cumulative impacts to flood risk, sedimentation, reservoir capacity, and public dredging costs resulting from reduced wetland protection.
  4. Address the loss of federal mitigation and restoration funding that accompanies jurisdictional withdrawal and explain how watershed-scale impacts will be managed in its absence.

Absent these changes, the proposed definition risks increasing downstream flood damages, accelerating sedimentation in Lake Houston, and shifting long-term infrastructure costs from private development to the public.

Cut and paste the text between the lines above and submit it to:

Regulations.gov to Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2025-0322.

Please DO IT NOW. DON’T DELAY.

For More Info

If you wish to compose your own letter, say for other areas, the following resources may help:

Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/4/26

3050 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Results of Alleged TCEQ Investigation into Massive Sand-Mine Breach

1/2/26 – According a Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) investigation, a massive breach of an abandoned sand mine on the West Fork San Jacinto in August 2025 was “an unforeseen incident.” The report also says that the new owner of the property wants to use the pit as a “recreational pond for livestock management.”

That conjures up this image created by ChatGPT.

However, the breach was far from a laughing matter. On 8/24/25, I documented a massive breach that clogged the San Jacinto West Fork with sediment.

So what’s going on here?

Ultimately, TCEQ issued no citations or fines.

That much is certain.

TCEQ Report Sketchy on Details

I and three readers reported the breach to TCEQ, which has responsibility for supervising sand mines. Four months later, at noon on New Year’s Eve, we each received the official report of TCEQ’s alleged investigation. As with similar breaches downstream, TCEQ noted the incident, but took no action.

Here’s a brief summary:

  • TCEQ sent four investigators to the site on 8/25/25. They noted no active sand mining and they issued no violations, fines, or citations.
  • TCEQ consulted the Montgomery County Appraisal District database. They found that a company called AGS Unlimited Montgomery, LLC had purchased the property on August 1, 2025, only weeks before the breach.
  • TCEQ phoned a “managing member” of AGS, Mr. Andrew Shebay IV, on September 2, 2025. Mr. Shebay reportedly described the incident as “unforeseen” and said he had conversations with the Montgomery County Floodplain Administrator and Army Corps about “managing the situation.”
  • According to TCEQ, Shebay says he intends to use the pond “as a recreational pond for livestock management.” (That conjured up the comical image above, which I clearly intend as parody.)

To see TCEQ’s full report, click: https://reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2091112-Compl-Letter-4_Redacted.pdf.

This alleged investigation is consistent with other alleged TCEQ investigations into breaches of sand-mine dikes. Alleged TCEQ investigators observe problems, but rarely recommend fines or citations.

Owner Claims Breach was Accidental

The comical TCEQ claim – that a pond likely 60-90 feet deep – would be used as a livestock spa, made me want to investigate further. So I called the owner myself. He was cordial and open, and we talked for more than twenty minutes.

Here’s a picture of the breach as it was happening.

Breach in abandoned sand mine on San Jacinto West Fork on 8/24/25
Breach of sand mine dike near East River Road and Walker Road in August.

Mr. Shebay said a third-party contractor was trying to install a drain pipe and spillway to help prevent flooding of adjacent properties in the future. And in fact, I photographed both drain pipes and earthmoving equipment at the site on the day of the breach.

Breach in abandoned sand mine on San Jacinto West Fork on 8/24/25
Corrugated pipe photographed near earthmoving equipment on day of breach.
Breach in abandoned sand mine on San Jacinto West Fork on 8/24/25
Excavator near breach (upper right)

However, Shebay claims a third-party contractor failed to follow engineering plans, causing the breach. The breach was accidental, he says. Things just got out of control.

Breach in abandoned sand mine on San Jacinto West Fork on 8/24/25
Sand and sediment expelled through the breach clogged the West Fork.

New Owner’s Plans for Abandoned Mine Not Yet Clear

Shebay’s plans for the abandoned mine are not yet finalized. At various points in our conversation, he mentioned a boat launch, a kid’s camp, a recreational amenity for an adjacent residential community, and selling wetland-mitigation credits.

His ultimate use for the property depends on several things. Foremost among them is the routing of new high-tension electrical wires. He says Entergy will not finalize a route until the end of 2026. He also says that that has kept him from finalizing plans.

If Entergy chooses a route too near his pit, he says, that could rule out plans that involve children. He sees a safety issue.

Re: the wetland mitigation credits, an environmental expert I consulted said that the owner would need to create wetlands first before he could sell credits. That’s not likely to happen here. Why?

Wetlands are typically very shallow, i.e., swamps, bogs and marshes. However, previous owners took sand out of this pit for 20 years, sometimes with two dredges operating simultaneously. And other West Fork mine owners have told me they often dredge pits to 60-90 feet.

Yet this mine’s new owner claims he has no plans to fill the pond. So selling wetland-mitigation credits is unlikely.

Re: fixing the breach, Mr. Shebay says he’s looking for crushed concrete to help fill it and stabilize the pond wall. He also says that he’s made arrangements with a nearby residential development that’s digging a detention basin to take their clay for the same purpose.

Use of Word “Alleged”

You likely noticed my use of the world “alleged” in regard to the TCEQ investigation above. That’s out of frustration.

TCEQ used the adjective “alleged” five times in its report before the nouns “concern,” “incident,” “complaints” and “violation.” Using “alleged” before “violation” is valid; “Violation” assumes a conclusion not yet verified by investigators or a court.

However, the “complaints” are not alleged; they are real. So was the “incident”; I have photos and video to prove it, and TCEQ verified it. And to imply that someone’s “concerns” are alleged is just downright insulting.

The language in alleged TCEQ investigations insults anyone who seeks their help. No wonder the TCEQ has lost so much credibility.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/2/26

3048 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Top Flood-Related Stories of 2025: Part III – Mitigation Slowdown Becomes Election Issue

12/30/25 – Part III of the top flood-related stories of 2025 concerns a slowdown in flood-mitigation activity at Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) and how it is already becoming an issue in the election of a new Harris County Judge. Let’s look at the slowdown part first.

Spending Drops for Fifth Year

The graph below illustrates the slowdown.

HCFCD spending through Q3 2025
HCFCD 2018 Bond spending through Q3 2025. Approximately 60% of bond/partner funds remain unspent 8.5 years after Harvey. The bond was originally sold as a 10-year program.

That slowdown means people live with higher flood risk than necessary.

Potential Loss of $322 Million in Partner Funding At Stake

The slowdown also puts 11 grants totaling $322 million at risk.

That’s the total of Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Relief (CDBG-DR) to Harris County from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Texas General Land Office (GLO) administers those grants for HUD.

All have a firm deadline of 2/28/2027, according to the GLO. But most have not even been advertised for bids yet and won’t be until the first quarter of next year.

CDBG-DR projects highlighted in red have not yet been bid or bids have not yet been awarded. All must be completed by 2/28/27.

Only one CDBG-DR project so far is in construction: Arbor Oaks. Brookglen bidding has closed. Three others are still in bidding: Lauder, Greens Mid-Reach, and Keegans. Others highlighted above haven’t even started bidding yet.

It typically takes three to four months from advertising a project for bids until a winner is selected, Commissioners Court approves the award, contracts are signed and a notice to proceed is issued. That leaves less than a year for construction on most of these projects. And many could take longer than a year to build, if history is any guide.

T.C. Jester Project Illustrates Problem

For instance, HCFCD has issued a press release saying that construction of the T.C. Jester East Basin (partially funded by CDBG-DR dollars) will not finish until Q4 of 2028. HCFCD finished the preliminary engineering review in 2021.

T.C. Jester project area on Cypress Creek. The small basin (r) will expand to cover most of the forested area in center.

It’s all part of a bigger story about the slowdown and complacency. Collectively…

“We have lost the sense of urgency that once fueled our flood mitigation crusade after Hurricane Harvey.”

Bob Rehak

According to an HCFCD press release, $20 million HUD CDBG-DR dollars are at risk for one of the three detention basin compartments that will be built on the site above. But the project also involves funding from other sources. State Rep Sam Harless secured $12 million for the project through the Texas Water Development Board.

If the HUD funding falls through, what will happen to the state money? There likely wouldn’t be enough money to complete the project.

Screen capture from HCFCD Press Release Dated 12/5/25. Expected completion is at least 1.5 years after HUD deadline.

Two additional stormwater detention basin compartments on the east side of TC Jester have longer deadlines, but are scheduled to finish earlier in 2028 – ten years after the flood bond and eleven years after Harvey! They involve funding from FEMA (via Congressman Dan Crenshaw).

Any time you get two departments of the federal government (each with their own rules), the state government (with its own rules), and county government (with its rules), things get complicated. And the current leadership in Harris County has added bureaucracy that has contributed to the slowdown.

Lancton Makes Slowdown an Election Issue

The potential loss of funding has already become a campaign issue in the Harris County Judge election year.

Candidate Marty Lancton, now endorsed by Governor Abbott, has jumped on it. He issued this statement.

“The implementation of CDBG funds has taken an unacceptably long amount of time. As County Judge, I will ensure that every Harris County department is thoroughly evaluated to identify and implement process improvements. The Harris County Flood Control District will be among the first departments reviewed.”

Lancton continued, “In developing the current funding priorities, three commissioners and the current County Judge established a project list that did not adequately prioritize initiatives with the greatest potential impact, nor did it sufficiently account for whether projects could realistically be completed within the required timelines.

“As County Judge, I will ensure that taxpayer dollars are invested responsibly and that funding priorities are established based on effectiveness, feasibility, and measurable benefit to Harris County residents. Finally, I will work closely with HUD and the Texas General Land Office to improve coordination and accelerate the implementation of projects that protect and serve the people of Harris County.”

Lancton is a long time leader of first responders and is extremely aware of flood risk.

In major storms, Cypress Creek is usually one of the hardest hit areas in the County. For people who live in that area as well as downstream areas, such as Lake Houston, flood-risk reduction can’t come fast enough.

In the last 125 years, we’ve been hit with major floods 48 times. We were lucky this year. But it’s only a matter of time before one strikes again. We must be prepared.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/30/2025

3045 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Top Flood-Related Stories of 2025: Part II – Regs and Funding

12/28/2025 – This is the second part of a three part series on the top flood-related stories of 2025. Part I covered the major disasters of the year. Part II will cover the government response in terms of regulations and funding for flood mitigation efforts. And Part III will cover the progress of mitigation.

Government Response to Camp Mystic/Guadalupe Tragedy

Hearings on the Camp Mystic disaster last July identified a failure of warning signs (weather reports, alarm systems, etc.) as one of the primary causes. Investigations also discovered that the camp’s operators lobbied for changes to flood maps so that they could build in floodplains. And then they evidently expanded the camp before regulators became aware. Finally, evacuation plans were evidently not well communicated or understood.

In response, the Texas Legislature passed the Heaven’s 27 Camp Safety Act (a reference to the number of young girls who died at Camp Mystic). The act bars camp cabins in high risk areas. It also requires camps to have state-approved emergency plans, regular evacuation drills and disaster alert systems.

Lawmakers approved nearly $300 million “to boost flood preparedness, including $200 million to match federal disaster aid, $50 million for local grants to purchase flood warning equipment and $28 million to improve weather forecasting.” A companion bill also expanded government oversight of youth camps.

FEMA Cancels BRIC Program

In April, FEMA announced that it is ending the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program and canceling all BRIC applications from Fiscal Years 2020-2023.

It also canceled the fiscal year 2024 notice of funding opportunity (NOFO), involving $750 million for grants. 

BRIC was FEMA’s largest pre-disaster mitigation program. Congress established it through the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018. Its purpose: to fundamentally shift federal-disaster spending from post-disaster recovery to pre-disaster risk reduction. In other words, to encourage a shift from “Repair” to “Resilience.”

BRIC aimed to prevent disasters by helping communities build to higher standards. Flood-risk reduction grants typically helped finance projects such as:

  • Regional detention and retention basins
  • Flood diversion channels
  • Levee and floodwall construction or upgrades
  • Drainage improvements exceeding minimum code standards
  • Nature-based solutions (wetlands, floodplain restoration)
  • Elevation or floodproofing of critical facilities (hospitals, EOCs, fire stations)

A press release that accompanied the cancellation of the BRIC program called it a “wasteful, politicized grant program.” However, investments in hazard mitigation programs are the opposite of “wasteful,” according to the Association of State Flood Plain Managers. They point to studies showing flood-hazard mitigation investments return up to $8 in benefits for every $1 spent. 

States sued to prevent the cancellation. The lawsuits are still locked up in courts.

Prevention is always cheaper than correction. After Harvey, a Harris County engineering study found 20 times less damage in subdivisions using newer, more stringent building codes compared to those built under older codes.

FEMA Slowdown

Meanwhile, approvals for other types of FEMA grants have slowed. According to The Hill, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Christy Noem has adopted a policy of personally approving all major expenditures that cost $100,000 or more. The Hill article reported $900 million in grants and loans reportedly awaiting Noem’s review.

Separately, in other FEMA news, according to the Washington Post, hundreds of residents signed up for FEMA buyouts after Cat 4 Hurricane Helene devastated the southeast in 2024. Not one has yet been approved. 

HUD/GLO Finish Rebuilding Program

On a more positive note, the Texas General Land Office (GLO) administers U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) flood-mitigation/disaster-relief programs in Texas. The GLO recently announced completion of the rebuilding of more than 9600 homes across the state under its Homeowner Assistance Program (HAP). That total includes mostly homes from its Hurricane Harvey disaster recovery mission. But it also includes homes impacted by Imelda, Laura, and repetitive flooding events in the Rio Grande Valley.

GLO poster celebrating program completion.

Status of Other GLO/HUD Programs

The GLO continued advancing long-term recovery and resilience by administering more than $1 billion in Community Development Block Grant for Disaster Recovery and Mitigation Projects. Additionally, HUD approved the GLO’s plan for $555 million to help communities impacted by 2024 Disasters.

The GLO completed reviews and approvals of all remaining project applications under the Regional Mitigation Program (RMP), providing funding for critical infrastructure improvements including drainage systems and flood-prevention measures. In total, the GLO has approved more than 200 RMP projects for more than $1.1 billion.

The GLO also approved more than $135 million in applications through the Disaster Recovery Reallocation Program (DRRP). It utilizes unspent disaster recovery funds from older disasters to help communities with outstanding unmet needs. These investments will reduce risk related to hurricanes, tropical storms, flooding, and other hazards.  

The agency also announced it will be closing applications at the end of the year for both the Local Hazard Mitigation Plans Program (LHMPP) and the Resilient Communities Program (RCP). Both are part of the GLO’s long-term strategy to help communities strengthen local planning efforts, modernize codes, and protect life and property from future disasters.

Montgomery County Updates Flood Regulations

Eight years after Harvey, Montgomery County finally adopted new subdivision, floodplain, and drainage regulations.

The county adopted its new subdivision (development) regulations on March 4, then amended them on May 27 and October 14. MoCo also issued subdivision guidelines and recommendations on November 4.

Commissioners adopted a new Drainage Criteria Manual on August 26. And new Floodplain Management Regulations became effective on October 1, 2025.

While MoCo regs don’t perfectly reflect the Minimum Drainage Standards recommended by Harris County for other counties draining into it, they are a great improvement.

Competing Forces at Work

Flood safety is a constant struggle between competing forces that increase or reduce flood risk. There are so many, the public can hardly know whether it’s winning or losing.

Just because the government appropriates money, doesn’t mean it’s enough or will be spent promptly.

Even if it is, will it actually reduce risk in the face of offsetting factors such as legislative loopholes, grandfather clauses, willful blindness, the profit motive, shifting political winds, and insufficiently mitigated upstream development?

And maybe that’s THE Top Flood-Related Story of 2025. More on that tomorrow.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/28/2025

3043 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Top Flood-Related Stories of 2025: Part I – The Storms

12/27/25 – There was so much flood news this year that I’m splitting the Top Flood-Related Stories of 2025 up into three parts. Part I will cover the storms. Part II will cover funding and government regulations. And Part III will cover the progress of mitigation efforts.

Cyclones Ravage Indian Ocean

On the other side of the world, tropical cyclones ravaged Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Thailand. Approximately 200,000 people died altogether. The cyclones also destroyed hundreds of thousands of homes.

Cyclone Senyar

According to Wikipedia, Cyclone Senyar caused heavy flooding and landslides across central and southern Thailand, Peninsular Malaysia, and Sumatra, Indonesia, killing at least 1,400 people and causing US$19.8 billion in damages.

At least 1,138 deaths, more than 7,000 injuries, and 163 missing persons were reported in Indonesia.

Thailand also recorded at least 297 fatalities and 102 injuries, including 229 deaths, although local sources claim a much higher figure. Malaysia reported 3 deaths. Senyar is listed as one of the deadliest tropical cyclones in this century.

Cyclone Ditwah

Around the same time, Cyclone Ditwah, dumped heavy rains on Sri Lanka off the southeastern coast of India. The storm caused heavy flooding and landslides that killed more than 600 people and caused more than US$1.6 billion dollars of damage.

Sri Lanka had experienced extreme weather before, but decades of ignoring scientific warnings magnified Ditwah’s impact.

For example, the country’s National Building Research Organisation, for years, produced detailed landslide-hazard maps identifying unstable terrain. Yet many of the landslides triggered by the cyclone occurred squarely within long-designated high-risk zones.

“When a mapped hazard zone collapses, it is not just a natural disaster—it is also a governance failure,” says Rohan Cooray, an disaster-risk management specialist.

“The maps are clear. But land approvals and construction often proceed as though these risks do not exist.”

Rohan Cooray

No Hurricanes Strike U.S. Coastline

While a hurricane-free U.S. season is uncommon, it’s not rare. It happens about once every 4-5 years on average. Recent examples include 2009, 2010, 2013, 2015, and 2025, thanks to storms often turning away from the coast.

2025 Hurricane season
2025 Named-Storm Tracks

The 2025 season saw no hurricane landfalls on mainland U.S. soil. Many powerful storms formed, but recurved out to sea.

That doesn’t mean the season had no threats. Three Category 5 hurricanes formed, the second-most on record in the Atlantic basin. The only other season that saw more was 2005 with four.

Guadalupe Tragedy

In Texas, by far the worst flooding tragedy this year was on the Guadalupe River in the Hill Country. The July 2025 tragedy on the Guadalupe was caused by:

  • The remnants of an extremely slow moving, moisture-rich storm system (remnants of Tropical Storm Barry) stalling over the region.
  • It dumped more than 20 inches of rain in places onto soil that couldn’t absorb it.
  • Peak rainfall reached 2-3 inches per hour.
  • The massive influx of water where the north and south forks of the Guadalupe converge caused the river to rise 29 feet in 45 minutes near Hunt, TX.

This sent a “pitch black wall of death” rushing through areas like Camp Mystic, causing 27 deaths and disappearances. 

The flood was the deadliest inland flooding event in the United States since the 1976 Big Thompson River flood, surpassing even flooding from Hurricane Helene in 2024.

Kerr County did not have a dedicated flood warning system, despite prior proposals from local officials citing the area’s high flood risk.

The highest death toll occurred at Camp Mystic, a Christian girls’ summer camp. It was in a special flood hazard area. However, following various appeals by the camp, several buildings were removed from the hazard area, as the camp continued to operate and expanded in and around the flood plain.

Camp Mystic flood hazards
Flood zones near Camp Mystic. Cross-hatched = floodway, aqua = 100-year floodplain, brown = 500-year.

States throughout the midwest and Gulf Coast deployed search and rescue teams to assist. Altogether, 137 people died (the count as of September 24, 2025).

The tragedy spurred the 2025 Texas Legislature to pass urgent camp safety reforms, including House Bill 1 and Senate Bill 1 (Heaven’s 27 Act), mandating stricter emergency plans, improved warning systems, and prohibiting cabins in floodplains, signed into law by Governor Abbott to prevent future disasters.

Victim’s families testified that the tragedy was preventable, highlighting failures in planning and complacency regarding flood risk.

Texas Tribune

Top Flood-Related Stories of 2025 Illustrate Lessons of History

Together, these stories illustrate how tragedies happen. They usually come down to a lack of preparation. Best-case scenarios lull people into a false sense of security. So, they aren’t ready for the worst-case when it happens.

We see this over and over again. After the Harvey tragedy, people demanded change to floodplain regulations and building codes and voted to tax themselves billions for flood mitigation. But as years slipped by, our collective sense of urgency waned.

As a result, 65,000 homes have been built in Houston-area floodplains since Harvey. This is how the cycle repeats itself.

But more on that in the next two parts of this series.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/27/25

3042 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Photo Essay: Northpark Expansion Progress from 2024 to 2025

12/26/2025 – A comparison of drone photos from December 2024 and December 2025 shows considerable progress with the Northpark Expansion project in the last year. There’s still a long way to go, but we’re much closer to the end of Phase 1 now than we were a year ago.

Photos taken today show that the major missing pieces of the puzzle include:

  • Bridge over the Union Pacific Railroad Tracks and Loop 494
  • Surface roads over the tracks
  • Gaps in eastbound surface lanes
  • Sidewalks in several places
  • Ponds at entries
  • A few hundred feet of Loop 494 both north and south of Northpark

Let’s start with today’s shots. 2024’s will follow for comparison.

Pictures Taken 12/26/2025

Going from east to west from the Kingwood Diversion Ditch toward US59, I took the following pictures today.

Phase One starts roughly where the road bends in front of the new Chevron station (r). Note the new lanes coming toward camera on left and going away from camera on right. Gone is the old center ditch, replaced by giant, buried culverts.
Slightly farther west, you can see that all but a few driveways are completed. Outbound sidewalks still need a lot of work, but inbound sidewalks are close to done in this part of the project.
Still looking toward US59 from over Russell Palmer Road.
Farther west, the view from in front of Warren’s Nursery
For several blocks on either side of the entrance to Kings Mill (center left) inbound lanes remain incomplete (left).
Farther west, that black spot in the center is where the bridge will start rising.
This is where a six lane bridge will carry traffic over the tracks and Loop 494. Equipment for drilling the piers has already arrived (center foreground).
However, to make way for the bridge, contractors must first complete four surface lanes over the tracks.

So what’s the holdup with the surface lanes?

Contractors have been waiting for UPRR to move its signals and reroute the electricity that powers them.
This is the general area where the bridge will come crest and start to come down. Outbound surface lanes (right) are already complete. But inbound surface lanes (left) still need work.
The bridge will reach grade level in this general area near PNC bank.
Both entry ponds at US59 still need liners and final landscaping.
One of the two turn lanes on to Northpark was re-opened last week in response to readers’ requests.
Looking south along 494. Drainage east of the tracks has been completed. But drainage under 494 still needs to be tied in before 494 can be completed.

Photos Taken 12/19/2024

A year ago…

In- and outbound traffic was still using the original lanes while contractors paved over culverts that replaced the old center ditch.
All of the work focused on the center lanes in preparation for traffic switches to crews could demolish and repave the outer lanes.
Major demolition, driveway and drainage projects were just starting on the outbound side (right).
Contractors had to replace both center drainage and lateral drainage to businesses.
West of Loop 494, traffic virtually no work had started on the inbound side (left) yet, and most of the outbound side was still being reconstructed.
At the end of 2024, the old northbound lanes of Loop 494 carried both directions of traffic temporarily while crews finished the new southbound lanes.

2025 was a year filled with both frustration mostly due to utility and railroad conflicts. But it was also filled with hope for improved safety and commute times for Northpark Drive commuters. Engineers predict Phase One of Northpark expansion should finish this time next year given favorable weather and the cooperation of UPRR.

Unfortunately to date, UPRR has been less predictable than the weather.

For More Information about Northpark Expansion

For more information about the Northpark Expansion project, see the Lake Houston Redevelopment Authority/TIRZ 10 website.

Alternatively, search this website for “Northpark” to see a list of more than 200 posts on the Northpark expansion project, the first all-weather evacuation route from Kingwood during extreme events.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/26/2025

3041 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Colony Ridge Attempting to Settle Lawsuits, Avoid Trial

12/24/25 – The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas posted notice on 12/19/25 about an agreement in principle to settle pending lawsuits between several Colony Ridge entities, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).

Parties Working Out Final Details

The parties requested until 12/31/25 to work out all the details, but the judge gave them until 1/6/26. The lawsuit began in 2023. CFPB alleged that Colony Ridge operated a “foreclosure mill” with predatory lending practices. Separately, the Department of Justice (DOJ) alleged that defendants violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) by targeting consumers of Hispanic origin with a predatory loan product.

DOJ and CFPB contend that the defendants operated an illegal land sales scheme that targeted tens of thousands of Hispanic borrowers with false statements and predatory loans.

Colony Ridge advertised property in Spanish, but allegedly provided closing documents in English to under-qualified or unqualified buyers who didn’t understand them.

The joint DOJ/CFPB press release said that Colony Ridge “sells unsuspecting families flood-prone land without water, sewer, or electrical infrastructure, and that the company sets borrowers up to fail with loans they cannot afford. Roughly 1-in-4 Colony Ridge loans ends in foreclosure, after which the company repurchases the properties and sells them to new borrowers.” It amounted, say the plaintiffs, to a “set-up-to-fail scheme that has led thousands of families to lose their dreams of homeownership.”

According to the press release at the time…

“Colony Ridge accounted for more than 92% of all foreclosures recorded in Liberty County between 2017 and 2022.”

Merry Christmas from Colony Ridge
Merry Christmas from Colony Ridge. Photo taken on Christmas Eve of 2020.
Colony Ridge Drainage
Example of Drainage in Colony Ridge. Photo taken New Year’s Day of 2021.

Flood Connection

The DOJ/CFPB complaints alleged that Colony Ridge employees fail to inform borrowers of flood risk when lots have repeatedly flooded in the past, or falsely tell them the lots have not flooded. In fact, in parts of the subdivision, rain causes significant flooding, causing raw sewage to run through or around borrowers’ property, and damaging their personal belongings. To see the original lawsuit, click here.

A separate lawsuit filed by Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton may also reportedly be close to settlement.

Together, the lawsuits affect potentially tens of thousands of people.

Why Litigants Often Settle

In general, a settlement that avoids a trial offers a set of well-recognized advantages including:

  1. Cost Control and Predictability
    • Reduces legal fees and expenses
    • Limits financial exposure at a known amount
    • Avoids open-ended risk of adverse verdicts with interest, creates budget certainty.
  2. Risk Reduction
    • Eliminates uncertain outcomes from juries, judges, evidentiary rulings, and witness credibility
    • Replaces a win/lose outcome with a negotiated result
    • Avoids catastrophic downside, such as runaway verdicts, punitive damages, injunctive relief
    • Limits worst-case scenarios.
  3. Time and Resource Efficiency
    • Faster resolution
    • Trials in state and federal courts can run on for years, including appeals
    • Lets organizations reallocate resources to core activities.
  4. Confidentiality and Information Control
    • Settlements can include confidentiality provisions, whereas trials produce public records, testimony, and findings
    • Protects sensitive information
    • Avoids public disclosure of internal documents, financial data, trade secrets, or politically sensitive communications.
  5. Control Over the Outcome
    • Lets parties shape result rather than delegating the outcome to a judge or jury
    • Can include operational changes, phased payments, land transfers, policy adjustments, or cooperative frameworks that courts may lack authority to impose.
  6. Relationship Preservation
    • Reduces adversarial escalation
    • Facilitates future cooperation.
  7. Reputational and Political Benefits
    • Lower public exposure; less media coverage and political attention
    • Resolves disputes quietly
    • Avoids adverse precedent or findings.
  8. Finality
    • Reduced appeal risk
    • Releases and waivers reduce likelihood of prolonged appeals
    • Closure; parties can move forward without lingering legal uncertainty.
  9. Strategic
    • Avoids creating case law that could constrain future actions or invite copy-cat litigation.

Bottom Line

A settlement that avoids trial primarily delivers:

  • Lower cost
  • Lower risk
  • Greater certainty
  • Faster resolution
  • Greater control
  • Reduced public exposure

These advantages explain why the vast majority of civil disputes—reportedly well over 90%—resolve through settlement rather than trial, even when one side believes it has a strong legal case.

Bottom Line for Colony Ridge Activist

Maria Acevedo, a Colony Ridge land purchaser who has struggled for years to draw attention to the development’s sales and development issues, is happy about the potential settlement.

But not because of any money she might get. She said, “This settlement acknowledges the legitimacy of claims that go back years.” Acevedo sees it as vindication. “But it can never fix the damages,” she says. “No amount of money can ever replace the quality of life that was lost.”

While a final settlement has not yet been reached, thousands of Colony Ridge victims will likely see the settlement in a similar light – as a bittersweet Christmas present.

Colony Ridge ditch erosion
Unprotected Colony Ridge ditch eroding into homeowners’ yards. Picture taken in 2023
FM 1010
FM1010 washout caused by excessive, uncontrolled runoff from ditch above has not been fixed since Hurricane Harvey. The loss of this major north/south artery has caused major delays for Colony Ridge and surrounding residents for years.

For More Information

For more information about life and loss in Colony Ridge, see a post I wrote called History of Heartbreak. It contains links to more than 75 posts about Colony Ridge. Those posts contain hundreds of photos showing conditions there.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/24/25

3039 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

State Agency Responsible for Flood Mitigation Invests in Flood-Prone Development

12/22/25 – The Texas General Land Office (GLO), which manages state and federal money for flood mitigation, has invested an undisclosed sum of money in a flood-prone development at the confluence of Spring Creek, Cypress Creek and the San Jacinto West Fork. See below.

From FEMA’s Flood Hazard Layer Viewer. Brown = 500-year floodplain, Aqua = 100-year, Cross-hatched = Floodway. Map dated 2014. Floodplains will likely expand 50-100% in updated maps based on Atlas 14.

On the surface, the GLO investment appears to be a conflict of interest. Dig deeper and two separate mandates for the GLO emerge that are not reconciled in state law:

  • To mitigate flooding
  • To help fund public schools.

The GLO home page trumpets how it manages $14.3 billion in disaster recovery and flood mitigation funds.

Simultaneously, the GLO’s website stresses how it manages $60 billion dollars in public school funds. But the investment funds strategic plan makes no mention of flooding. It does, however, say they seek “exceptional returns.” Developments in floodplains can provide those.

I gave multiple people in the GLO Press Office a chance to comment on this post before I published it. Not one replied.

Amount at Stake Could Be as High as $140 Million

A company called Ryko sold the 5,000+ acres in question to Scarborough Houston/San Jacinto Preserve earlier this year.

State Representative Steve Toth claimed in a press release on December 11, 2025, that he was working to revoke the state’s “$140 million investment” in the project by the GLO’s School Land Board.

However, Ryan Burkhardt, the president of Scarborough, told ReduceFlooding that Scarborough itself had close to $140 million invested in the project. He admitted the state was his partner, but refused to say how much the state invested.

Subsequent efforts to verify the GLO involvement in this project revealed that the School Land Board, a group within the GLO, invested in the property. However, the GLO refused to reveal the amount of the investment (and did not say that the investment had been revoked as Toth’s press release claimed).

GLO Statement Admits Involvement, But Sheds Little Light

The terse GLO statement below raises more questions than it answers.

“This investment was approved by the School Land Board (SLB) pursuant to Chapter 51 of the Texas Natural Resources Code (TNRC). The GLO’s investment in this project through the SLB as a limited partner was contingent upon Montgomery County’s approval of the drainage study, which was successfully completed in July 2025. As Land Commissioner, I am committed to preventing future flooding. We are meeting with stakeholders and have heard the local concerns regarding this project. Our agency is dedicated to serving the best interests of the community.” Commissioner Dawn Buckingham, M.D.

Conflicting Mandates

More exploration revealed that the GLO wears two hats. It simultaneously manages flood-mitigation programs and invests School Land Board capital – sometimes in flood-prone land – under conflicting statutory obligations and fiduciary standards.

Those functions report to the same elected official – Dawn Buckingham, M.D. They are:

Flood-Mitigation

Under various statutes and federal requirements, the GLO:

  • Administers U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Community Development Block Grant funds for Disaster Relief and Flood Mitigation (HUD CDBG-DR and CDBG-MIT)
  • Manages large-scale flood mitigation and buyout programs
  • Works with local entities such as Harris County Flood Control District, to reduce flooding
  • Evaluates flood risk, vulnerability, and benefit-cost ratios.

In this role, the GLO must:

  • Reduce flood risk
  • Avoid repetitive loss
  • Comply with federal mitigation standards
  • Justify investments of tax dollars based on public safety and resilience.

School Finance

Separately, under the Texas Constitution and Natural Resources Code Chapter 51, the GLO (through the School Land Board) must:

  • Manage land and money as a trust
  • Maximize long-term returns
  • Avoid sacrificing value for unrelated policy goals.

The real conflict here may be competing, internal statutory silos.

Texas law reportedly does not require the GLO’s flood-mitigation knowledge, data, or policy goals to constrain its school-investment decisions.

There seems to be NO:

  • Statutory cross-check
  • Internal requirement preventing such conflict
  • Duty to reconcile flood-risk mitigation goals with land monetization.

The same agency can therefore:

  • Fund buyouts downstream while…
  • Profiting upstream from development pressure that increases downstream risk…

…without violating any explicit statute.

Three Potential Conflicts

From a governance perspective, this arrangement creates at least three tensions:

First, the GLO:

  • Possesses detailed flood-risk data in its mitigation role.
  • But it is not legally required to make investment decisions that consider that data.

Second, the State can:

  1. Invest capital in flood-prone land at a discount
  2. Benefit from development-driven appreciation
  3. Later deploy flood-mitigation grants funded by taxpayers to address resulting impacts.

Third, the conflict creates the appearance of policy incoherence. The State appears to be:

  • Subsidizing flood risk on one side of the balance sheet
  • Funding mitigation on the other.

Why This Remains Legal

According to ChatGPT, this dual role persists because “the Texas Constitution elevates school-fund fiduciary duties to near-absolute status.”

Absent a statute saying, “School fund investments shall be consistent with state flood-mitigation objectives,” the GLO operates in parallel lanes and pursues investments with the highest rates of return.

Sadly, in this case, that includes property in floodplains undervalued upfront because of flood risk.

Where This Leaves the Scarborough/San Jacinto Preserve Issue

The school-fund investment side of the GLO may not even understand the flood risk or recognize the political sensitivity. It likely focuses only on evaluating the land primarily as an undervalued trust asset.

This case makes a powerful example of conflicts of interest. However, I have another concern: transparency. Two state legislators and multiple residents have requested information about the state’s involvement with little luck.

Both Toth and State Representative Charles Cunningham have reached out to the GLO on behalf of downstream constituents. But so far, neither legislator has received an explanation.

Even worse, residents’ FOIA requests (going back to October) have been denied and appealed to the State Attorney General’s office, which denied them also. Three months of inquiry have resulted only in the one terse statement printed above.

This is an absolute PR disaster fraught with multiple potential conflicts of interest. The GLO is creating the appearance of a coverup even if none exists.

Bob Rehak

Need for Full Disclosure Now

The State and GLO should insist on full disclosure now. That includes any political contributions made by the land owners or sellers (directly, or indirectly through family members, employees or PACs) to state officials, especially those connected to the School Land Board.

According to the Texas Water Development Board’s most recent state flood plan, the number of Texans living in floodplains exceeds the population of 30 states. This investment illustrates one of the reasons.

We also need to verify whether the developer really received approval of its drainage impact analysis in July of 2025, as claimed in the GLO statement above. The so-called “approval” letter I have from the Montgomery County engineer dated July 2025 (when Ryko still owned the land) is best characterized as preliminary. It says, “Here are three pages of issues you need to address to get approval.” It does NOT give full, final approval.

One issue MoCo raises is adequate emergency access during 500-year, Atlas-14 flood events. But a Townsend Blvd. extension across Spring Creek was taken off Montgomery County’s 2025 road bond to help deter development of Scarborough’s property.

At this point, Montgomery County Precinct 3 Commissioner Ritch Wheeler, Harris County, State Representative Steve Toth, and City of Houston have all come out against this project because of the flood risk. But I have seen no official announcements from the Governor’s Office or the GLO about cancelling their support.

In my opinion, the only good investment in this land would be to turn it into a state park.

To continue backing this Scarborough deal may make better financial sense than public policy. As one public official told me, “Typical government…trying to fix problems it creates!”

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/22/25

3037 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Home Buyers Beware: Will that Green Space Behind You Remain Green?

12/20/2025 – People pay a premium to live near green space. But will the promises made during a sale be kept? Will that green space remain green, or will it be gobbled up by more development in the future? Here’s a guide to language that should raise red flags when looking at development plans, sales contracts, and public documents. Words can imply one thing, but not be legally binding. So, buyer beware.

The Proximity Premium that Vanishes

Many developers who build in or near floodplains promise early buyers that the green space around them will be “designated as” parks and is “intended for” recreational use.

A review of 33 studies found that properties near green space command a premium of 8–10%. Another study suggests the “proximity premium” may be as high as 20%.

But developers’ plans can change. And the home buyer’s beautiful view disappears. And remember, wetlands may no longer guarantee that land cannot be developed.

Why Developers May Leave Green Space Initially

There are also several regulator reasons why developers may leave large swaths of green space in their original plans. They communicate:

  • The project provides regional flood storage
  • Downstream impacts are minimized
  • Remaining land functions as mitigation, not loss.

Framing plans this way also:

  • Reduces perceived flood risk
  • Reduces organized opposition
  • Narrows legal exposure
  • Makes the project sound less aggressive.

This is standard practice on controversial floodplain projects according to flood experts I have interviewed.

But Will Green Space Remain Forever?

Many developers promise green space. But will it remain green forever?

Scarborough in MoCo

A Dallas-based developer named Scarborough recently purchased 5000+ acres west of Kingwood through a subsidiary called San Jacinto Preserve. Most of it is in floodplains and floodways. Their president, Ryan Burkhardt says they only “plan” to develop 38% of the land. He repeatedly emphasized that more than half of his land will be used as green space.

Ryko drainage impact study illustration showing outline and floodplains.
Ryko sold its property outlined in red to Scarborough earlier this year.

But he ALSO does not plan to put a conservation easement on the green space. Nor is he donating the green space to the City, County or State. This is typical.

I don’t care to cast aspersions on Burkhardt’s integrity. He was brave in returning my phone call and seemed quite candid. But to me, those are red flags. It follows a recurring pattern. For instance…

Signorelli in Commons of Lake Houston

In Huffman, Signorelli reportedly promised buyers in The Commons of Lake Houston that the floodplain land around them would remain green space for community recreational purposes, such as hiking and horseback riding. But now, the company is trying to turn a large part of that floodplain land into more homesites. Signorelli has fought the City of Houston for ten years all the way to the Texas Supreme Court for the right to do so.

Crossing at the Commons of Lake Houston Floodplains and General Plan
Signorelli’s proposed “Crossing at the Commons of Lake Houston” opposite East Fork from Kingwood’s East End Park. Dotted lines snaking through and around the home sites represent the 100- and 500-year floodplains.
Holley in Royal Shores

Also on the East Fork, on the Kingwood side of the river, Friendswood sat on land in Royal Shores that people used for hiking for more than 30 years. Then they sold it to developer Ron Holley earlier this year. One hundred percent of the land is in floodplains.

Royal Shores Wetlands
See large aqua colored area in center.

Wetlands occupy much of it. Wetlands used to deter development, but those rules could soon change.

Royal Shores wetlands
Holley land is in center and is criss-crossed by wetlands. From National Wetlands Inventory.

Friendswood tried to develop this land for years before selling it to Holley. Here’s what the land just north of there looks like.

East End Park
A natural wonderland for wildlife and humans

Friendswood gave East End Park to the Kingwood Service Association in 1988 to preserve it for the community. It is NOT in danger of being developed. However, Friendswood retained control of their Royal Shores green space until they sold it to Holley. And now nearby residents may lose their recreational area.

Recognize the Red Flags that Could Undermine Your Home Value

How can you be certain green space around you will remain green and not be developed in the future? Some hints:

  1. Ask for legal guarantees in the form of conservation easements or deeds donating the land to a City, County or State as public parkland. If they don’t exist, be wary.
  2. Be wary of what advertisers call “weasel words.” If a developer says he “plans on” leaving land as green space, that gives him a legal out if plans change. Same with “intends to.”
  3. Look for designations on maps with words like “Buffer,” “Reserve,” “Future Phase,” “Drainage Reserve,” or “Open Space.” Such words have no legal or regulatory definitions.
  4. If the land is dedicated to an HOA or POA, who controls the entity? The developer? If so, he can dedicate it for something else when he’s ready to develop the land.
  5. Do you see maps from Commissioners Court saying things like “subject to future engineering review”?
  6. Does the appraisal district classify any of the land as “livable” or “usable”?
  7. Is there a binding commitment to Commissioners Court ensuring permanent floodplain storage or a conservation function?
  8. Do deed restrictions explicitly prohibit future fill or structures?
  9. Are there special appraisals on the land such as “timber” or “wildlife” that minimize the developer’s carrying costs?

Here are two checklists with even more warning signs to look for:

Use them to make sure someone doesn’t try to turn “your” promised green space into greenbacks.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/20/25

3035 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

The Profit in Floodplain Development Explained

12/19/25 – Despite substantial hurdles, floodplain development can be very profitable for patient developers with deep pockets, even if only a small percentage of their land is developed.

For instance, Scarborough Lane Development/San Jacinto Preserve LP has purchased more than 5,000 acres of land in floodplains and floodways near the confluence of four waterways. They include the San Jacinto West Fork, Spring Creek, Cypress Creek, and Turkey Creek.

Floodplains Streams from Ryko Drainage Study
Base map from seller’s preliminary drainage analysis. Scarborough/San Jacinto Preserve property outlined in red. Shades of blue represent floodways and floodplains on property.

Buyer Says It Paid $140 Million for Property Appraised at Less Than $1 Million

Scarborough claims it paid close to $140 million for the property – 8X higher than the Montgomery County Appraisal District (MCAD) places the market value of the land and 175X higher than the appraised value. See below.

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is Scarborough-Appraised-Value-1024x518.png
Source: MCAD-TX.org. Timber exemptions account for low appraised value. Size = acres

Even more stunning, Ryko, the company that sold the property to Scarborough/SJP, produced a preliminary engineering study that suggested only 38% of the land was developable because it has such high flood risk.

So, in what galaxy does this make economic sense?

Actually, it makes perfect sense – if you understand how the game is played.

Spread Makes Bread

Said another way, buy low; sell high.

The exceedingly low appraised value of floodplain land helps developers acquire and hold the land, sometimes for decades – at a very low tax cost while they work out regulatory issues. And when they do, the step change in value is so great, that if only 20% of the land is developable, they likely still make money.

This is according to ChatGPT, which costed out details of several development scenarios for me. One was even profitable with only 10% developable land.

A wide spread between acquisition costs and potential land sales after all permits and mitigation costs are accounted for is one of the main reasons why developers target floodplain land.

The dynamic is well understood in land economics and is particularly visible in fast-growing regions like Montgomery County.

Floodplain land often sells at a steep discount relative to nearby uplands because of:

  • Regulatory limits (floodway vs. floodplain)
  • Engineering costs (fill, detention, bridges)
  • Uncertainty (permitting, litigation, political risk)
  • Time value (increased holding costs because of longer periods before land becomes salable).

With steep, discounted prices in mind, even modest success—e.g., making 20–30% of a tract buildable — can make the entire investment profitable. Anything above that is gravy.

Why Floodplain Land Produces Unusually Large Spreads

Floodplain land tends to be priced as “mostly unusable.” Once permits are secured, the buildable portion prices like normal land. But the remainder can still be monetized as detention, mitigation, or open space.

Better yet for the developer, some of the land designated as green space may even be developed years later as the pain of flooding dims and political winds shift.

This can create huge “step” changes in land value.

Factors that Amplify Spread

In Texas, several factors amplify this spread. Consider, for instance:

Timber Exemptions that Lower Carrying Costs:

Developers pay only a few dollars in taxes per acre per year. On the five parcels above, taxes average $148 per acre per year. That makes patience very cheap. A well capitalized developer can afford to wait years while working out permitting issues.

Timber exemptions also mask speculative intent. On paper, the land looks like a passive forestry holding, not a development play.

Reliance on Post-Development Mitigation at Public Expense:

Some developers shift part of their mitigation costs onto the public. For example, some developers in Montgomery County have avoided building detention basins by using questionable flood routing studies. Even the former Montgomery County engineer criticized the practice. As flood peaks build over time, downstream residents clamor for mitigation. But it comes at public expense. So the developer has effectively externalized some of its costs.

Permissive Local Drainage Rules and Lax Enforcement:

This is especially true in counties that surround fast growing metropolitan areas. Some counties around Houston still use drainage criteria from the 1980s to help attract development.

Sometimes gaps in regulations cause flooding as Elm Grove discovered twice in 2019. Many floodplain developers tend to exploit such gaps in regulations and then claim they are complying with all applicable regulations.

Montgomery County recently upgraded its drainage criteria manual and adopted Atlas 14 rainfall probability standards. But willful blindness among regulators can still create a permissive environment to the detriment of people living downstream.

Risk/Reward Ratio Attracts Only Certain Types of Developers

Floodplain land tends to attract well-capitalized, patient developers with a 10–20 year horizon. For those with deep pockets and powerful partners, economics may work even if 90% of the land never becomes buildable.

This is not accidental; it is a rational, well-understood land-banking strategy.

However, the spread only turns into profit if risk converts to permission. It collapses if floodway limits are strictly enforced, mitigation costs surge, public opposition blocks approvals, or political sentiment hardens after major floods.

In such cases, floodplain land can become a capital trap, not a bargain. But still…

The large spread between low purchase cost and high potential value is a major magnet for developers.

And that’s how the Houston region got 65,000 homes built in floodplains since Hurricane Harvey, as investigative reporter Yilun Cheng discovered for the Houston Chronicle.

Courageous reporting, such as hers, makes flood risk highly visible and politically salient. And that makes the spread harder to monetize. Witness recent resolutions by Harris County Precinct 3 and the City of Houston. It will be interesting to see Scarborough’s next moves.

Next Up

I am working on a series of posts about floodplain development. Next, I’ll examine the seductive promise of green space. Floodplain developers often promote abundant, recreational green space to early buyers in a development.

But just as often, they try to monetize that green space during the latter stages of a development – green space they promised early buyers would remain green forever. Check out the warning-sign checklists in my next post before you buy property to see if your green space could someday vanish.

Scarborough property near US59 bridge west of Kingwood. San Jacinto West Fork on right. During Harvey, water was 27 feet above the level you see here.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/19/2025

3034 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.