Toth Fights for Right to Build Kids’ Camps in Floodplains

8/21/25 – State Representative Steve Toth, who has announced his intention to run against U.S. Congressman Dan Crenshaw in the next election cycle, posted a video on Facebook today. In it, he says prohibiting the building of youth camps in floodplains is “ridiculous.” He also worries that it would “destroy camping in Texas.”

His comment about destroying camping is a slap in the face to the parents who lost children at Camp Mystic in the July disaster on the Guadalupe River. More than 135 people died in flash flooding, many of them young girls at Camp Mystic.

Toth Video

Below is the 48-second video that Toth posted.

Text of Toth Video

Because of background noise in the video, I’ve transcribed the text below.

Toth: “HB-1 sets up legislation to protect kids from the devastating floods that took so many lives at Camp Mystic. Only the amendment that the Democrats put on it basically restricts the building of any kind of sleeping quarters in floodways, not floodplains. The kids that were killed at Mystic were actually in a floodway.”

“This is going to basically close most of the youth camps in Texas. Twenty percent of Texas is in floodplains – not floodways – floodplains. And while, yes, we want to keep camps out of floodways … the idea of trying to say that you can’t build in a floodplain is ridiculous. This is going to destroy camping in the state of Texas.

Specifics of Bill and Amendments

HB-1 is the Youth CAMPER Act. CAMPER stands for youth Camp Alert, Mitigation, Preparedness and Emergency Response. The bill requires youth camps to develop emergency plans; train employees how to implement them; make the plans available to campers and their parents; and share them with emergency response personnel in the vicinity.

Here’s the full text of the bill as introduced, which Toth co-authored with dozens of his colleagues. For more on HB-1, see the House analysis.

Representative Donna Howard, a Democrat from Austin (another co-author of the bill) offered the amendment that Toth complained about. It says that a state license may not be issued or renewed “for a youth camp that operates one or more cabins located within a floodplain.” Elsewhere in her amendment, Howard defines “floodplain” as the FEMA 100-year floodplain.

Howard’s amendment passed 73 to 59. Toth voted against it, even though he later voted for the bill itself as amended. HB-1 passed in the House by 135 to 1. The engrossed (as amended) version now goes to the Senate.

Problems with Toth Claims

Toth makes several misleading statements in his video.

Implying All Victims in Floodway

Toth implies all fatalities occurred in cabins located in the floodway of the Guadalupe. However, news reports indicate that many of the victims were in cabins outside the floodway although I can’t find an official count at this time.

Implying It’s Safe to Build in Floodplains

Mr. Toth implies that if all the campers had slept in the floodplain instead of the floodway, they would have been safe. That’s like a drug company downplaying a dangerous side effect.

Almost six million people live in Texas floodplains. And according to USGS, Texas consistently leads the nation in flood-related fatalities. In fact, we have more than twice the number of the next nearest state. 

Serious Omissions

In Mr. Toth’s black-and-white view of flood risk (Floodway is bad; floodplain is safe), he fails to disclose the considerable uncertainty, politicking, and protesting that accompanies flood maps, largely because of the way they affect developers and flood insurance. Toth should know that if he’s running for Congress.

FEMA’s maps are based on statistical probabilities and often revised after major storms to reflect new knowledge. In the case of Camp Mystic, FEMA last revised that area’s flood maps in 2011, years before Hurricane Harvey and Atlas 14. Both the floodway and floodplains will expand based on newly acquired data. So, cabins shown outside the floodway are, in all likelihood, deep into it. That’s another potentially fatal misleading statement by Toth.

Camp Mystic in FEMA’s National Flood Hazard Layer Viewer. Cross-hatch = floodway. Aqua = 100-year floodplain. Tan = 500-year floodplain. Note small green type showing date of map: 2011. Great enlargement shows many of the cabins appear to be built in the aqua and tan areas in the upper right next to the floodway.
“Saying You Can’t Build in a Floodplain is Ridiculous”

Mr. Toth seems to be trying to legitimize building in floodplains. It’s true that many people do. In fact, about 20% of the people in Texas (5.9 million) live in 100- and 500-year floodplains. Toth seems to dismiss the risks, costs, deaths, and disruptions to the economy, like many before him.

Because of thinking like that, more people live in Texas floodplains than the populations of 30 states. And that comes at a tremendous cost to taxpayers, not just those who pay with their lives.

As a society, we spend trillions of dollars on flood mitigation, flood repairs, and flood insurance. The Joint Economic Committee (JEC) estimates that the total annual economic cost of flooding—covering infrastructure damage; lost productivity; home and commercial damage; ecosystem losses; and more—ranges between $179.8 billion and $496.0 billion in 2023 dollars.

That’s a pretty hefty share of the annual federal budget. But I guess Mr. Toth isn’t thinking that far ahead. That’s not good for a man who wants to represent you in Congress.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/21/2025

2914 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Need for Performance Audits To Ensure Timely Flood-Plan Implementation

8/20/25 – Everyone understands the need for financial audits; they prevent fraud. But what about performance audits? They can prevent waste. Yet how many government agencies routinely audit the implementation of plans they adopt?

Vermont Failed to Implement Half of Priorities in Emergency Plan

In Vermont last year, the state audited its performance in achieving its five-year hazard-mitigation plan. According to the Associated Press story, the plan is developed by Vermont Emergency Management every five years to identify natural hazards facing the state and take steps to reduce risk, including flooding risk.

But an audit released last year after a major flood found that only a third of the 96 actions, and half of the priority actions in the 2018 plan had been completed. Had flood-mitigation measures been completed in a timely manner, the audit says, communities affected by the floods would have been better able to withstand them.

State lawmakers said they were gravely concerned over the lack of progress. “The findings in this report are shocking and deeply troubling,” one said.

The director of the State’s Emergency Management Department called the plan “aspirational.”

But the audit focused on missed opportunities that could have lessened the severity of the floods, such as improved building codes, that would have helped communities recover faster. That sounds pretty practical to me.

Improved Harris County Building Codes Reduced Flood Damage 20X

A study by a former Harris County Engineer John Blount found subdivisions built to new, higher building codes before Hurricane Harvey experienced 20 times less damage than those that weren’t. Building codes are updated internationally every year, but Texas last updated its building codes in 2021.

New Floodplain Maps Years Past Due

Everyone agrees on the need for updated flood maps based on Atlas 14. But Harris County’s are years behind schedule. And some counties still base their flood maps on data acquired in the 1980s. In the meantime, people keep building and buying in floodplains based on outdated information. And one in every five Texans lives in a floodplain. Are we creating the conditions for future disasters?

Plans Without Financial Pathways

Why do we continually build plans that are not actionable? That are so long, no one can read or remember them?

  • We spent seven years building a state flood plan. It has a $54.5 billion price tag. But since 2019, the state legislature has allocated only $1.4 billion to the state’s Flood Infrastructure Fund.
  • Houston’s Resilience Plan? Just five years after its introduction, it’s now a maze of dead links and appears to have virtually disappeared from the web.
  • Harris County’s Flood Bond? Eight years into a ten year plan that’s 40% complete, HCFCD’s executive director claims they are $1.3 billion short already, but has been trying for months to explain why.
  • Ike Dike? Hurricane Ike struck Houston in 2008. Congress approved the project in 2022. The Corps estimated the cost at $57 billion in 2023. TWDB is still studying ways to break it down into bite sized chunks.
  • Flood Tunnels? In 2022, HCFCD produced a 1,860 page study projecting the cost for eight to be $30 billion. We’re still studying pilot projects on that one.
  • In the summer of 2020, the San Jacinto River Authority, City of Houston, Montgomery County and Harris County Flood Control District released a 3,600 page study about how to reduce flooding in the San Jacinto River Basin. At the time, it had a $3.3 billion price tag. So far, the partners have not constructed one recommendation.
Harvey Flood. Photo by Sally Geis.

We Need More of a Business Mentality in Government

In my opinion, we need less nonsense and more commonsense. Who would accept a position with a job description that’s 3,600 pages long? Or a monumental list of deliverables without any budget?

It’s good to dream. But we need government leaders who know how to produce results on a budget. Just like business leaders do.

I’d rather see one project in construction than a hundred sitting on a credenza.

Bob Rehak

Perhaps performance auditors can help us turn that around.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/20/25

2913 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 6183 since Ike

MoCo Water War Leaves Unintended Casualties

8/18/25 – The Montgomery County (MoCo) water war has produced a number of unintended casualties in the last decade. They include:

  • Water ratepayers
  • Flood victims
  • Conroe’s reputation as the fastest growing large city in America
  • Developers
  • Area infrastructure
  • Homeowners living near fault lines
  • Neighbors in Harris County
  • Groundwater storage capacity to help the area bridge droughts
  • Science

Unfortunately, those who profited from excessive groundwater withdrawals aren’t the ones paying the price.

Subsidence problems in southern Montgomery County – once thought to be solved by the San Jacinto River Authority’s (SJRA) Groundwater Reduction Plan (GRP) – have recurred. And despite settlement of a long running lawsuit on 8/14/25, there’s still plenty of hurt to go around.

How It All Started

To comply with the Lone Star Groundwater Conservation District‘s (LSGCD) rules to reduce groundwater pumping in Montgomery County, the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) introduced its Groundwater Reduction Plan (GRP) in 2009. The plan addressed the need to ensure adequate water supply for the county’s rapidly growing population using surface water from Lake Conroe

The LSGCD’s rules, adopted in 2006, mandated a 30% reduction in overall groundwater pumping. In 2010, LSGCD also capped groundwater use, starting in 2016, at 64,000 acre-feet per year.

That gave the SJRA time to sell bonds, complete a half-billion dollar surface-water-treatment plant at Lake Conroe, and build a 55-mile pipeline-distribution system.

Then, the water war erupted.

Defectors Undermine Success

When water rates went up to pay for surface water, the City of Conroe, City of Magnolia, Quadvest, and Woodlands Oaks sued to get out of their GRP contracts. That, in turn, led to:

  • Conroe’s nine-year legal battle that made several round trips to the Texas Supreme Court.
  • Rate increases on participants still in the plan to make up for shortfalls created by those who left it.
  • Legal and fiscal uncertainty that burdened other GRP participants left covering shortfalls caused by the non-paying entities.
  • Uncertainty about the ability to service debt on bonds.
  • Significant legal fees affecting both sides, including water ratepayers.

Subsidence: Briefly Halted

Ironically, all this happened as the groundwater reduction plan started to reduce subsidence. Areas in The Woodlands that had subsided consistently for years saw subsidence virtually level off. But the success was brief.

Subsidence in The Woodlands at the monitoring station with the longest history. When surface water became available, subsidence virtually plateaued…until political changes at the LSGCD.

The leveling off lasted between three and four years. Then subsidence accelerated again. The trigger this time: politics.

A movement to make the LSGCD board elected rather than appointed opened the door for privately held groundwater providers. They backed a slate of candidates that favored pumping cheaper groundwater. And the groundwater pumpers won. Soon thereafter, unrestricted groundwater pumping resumed.

The newly elected board was sworn in during November, 2018, shortly before the graph above turned down again.

Groundwater Levels Decline with Changes in Groundwater Regulations

The newly elected LSGCD board removed conservation rules from their regulatory plan, leading to a rejection of the plan by the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB). This introduced uncertainty regarding the regulatory framework for groundwater management and the GRP’s role within it. 

The protracted legal battles, settled last Thursday, centered on the validity and enforceability of GRP contracts and the fees charged for surface water. 

Several cities disputed the SJRA’s ability to raise rates for surface water. Conroe initially refused to pay a rate increase implemented in 2016, and Magnolia followed suit. The SJRA responded by suing the cities for breach of contract. 

These legal challenges created significant financial strain for the SJRA and its other customers. Unpaid fees caused shortfalls that had to be covered by other GRP plan participants. The recent settlement has resolved the dispute between SJRA and Conroe. But legal battles may still continue with others.

Meanwhile, southern Montgomery County has experienced the steepest well declines in the entire region.

From Page 23 of the Harris-Galveston Subsidence District 2024 Annual Groundwater Report

From 1977 to 2025, maximum water level decline in the Chicot-Evangeline (undifferentiated) aquifer occurred in The Woodlands where water levels fell more than 400 feet. Likewise, water levels in the Jasper aquifer declined more than 250 feet near The Woodlands during the same time period.

Every water well drilled into those aquifers that USGS monitors in Montgomery County with the exception of two experienced significant water-level declines since the LSGCD board became elected. See below.

From USGS 2024 report on groundwater level changes. See Figure 7. Virtually all MoCo wells drilled into the Chicot and Evangeline aquifers declined between 20 and 50 feet from 2019 to 2024.
From USGS 2024 report on groundwater level changes. See Figure 11. All MoCo wells drilled in the Jasper aquifer declined between 20 and 50 feet from 2019 to 2024.

Clearly, the trend is not sustainable.

Flooding Worsened

As subsidence worsened, so did flooding in many parts of The Woodlands, especially those near streams whose gradients changed and those who lived near down-thrust faults that created bowls in the landscape.

Water Capacity Crunch Led to Development Moratorium

The U.S. Census Bureau rated Conroe the fastest‑growing large city in America for the period from July 1, 2015, to July 1, 2016. However, within several years, Conroe experienced a water-capacity shortfall and imposed a development moratorium (Aug 29, 2024).

TCEQ later approved a temporary reduction in the required water-supply allocation per connection—from 0.60 to 0.46 gpm—so projects could restart under tighter per-lot assumptions. For a year, that pause reportedly stalled plats, permits, and site work citywide

It even affected large commercial projects. The Conroe Courier reported that Kelsey-Seybold was considering pulling a $24 million medical facility. Construction could not move forward because of concerns about water infrastructure capability.

With the settlement announced last Friday, Conroe has ended the development moratorium for now, but projects must use the TCEQ-approved 0.46 gpm through Feb. 2029. But the City’s plan reviewers will reportedly press for conservation fixtures/phasing until new supply is online.

The Greater Houston Homebuilders Association said the moratorium had had “detrimental effects on every facet of our industry from concrete to roofers, to pools to developers and builders.”

Under the terms of last week’s settlement, SJRA will provide additional water to Conroe. Heather Ramsey of the SJRA said that, “The additional surface water should keep them from using additional groundwater to accommodate their growth.” But in the meantime…

Homes Near Fault Lines Damaged

Deregulation of aquifer groundwater withdrawal in Montgomery County by the LSGCD led to declines in area water wells.

As Conroe and surrounding areas pumped more and more groundwater, subsidence continued. That triggered geologic faults in The Woodlands, which damaged homes.

Home split by subsidence
Woodlands home split in half when groundwater extraction led to subsidence that activated a fault-line.
Steps in front of same house dropped so far, they had to be replaced and are now twice their original height.

It also damaged infrastructure.

Subsidence induced by groundwater pumping
Faulting damage exacerbated by subsidence due to excessive groundwater extraction at The Woodlands High School.

Two subsidence experts in The Woodlands gave me a tour of three fault lines. Street after street showed dips, cracks, and storm sewer damage aligned precisely with the fault lines. Some of the repairs reportedly cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Many Paid the Price

Excessive groundwater withdrawals are also tilting Lake Houston. The area near the dam is subsiding much slower than the area in the headwaters of the Lake near the Montgomery County Line.

I listed science as the last victim in the water war. At some point during this skirmish, subsidence deniers started trotting out their own studies claiming huge volumes of water from the aquifers above could be produced without adverse consequences.

The loss of groundwater storage capacity due to subsidence will also leave Montgomery County more vulnerable to future droughts. Groundwater backs up surface water supplies. And now there will be less groundwater storage volume.

Someday, this will become a cautionary case study for other areas that think of groundwater as an unlimited resource.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/19/25

2912 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Houston-Region Groundwater, Subsidence Studies Reveal Stunning Facts

8/17/2025 – Three scientists have summarized more than 100 years of studies about the relationship of groundwater and land subsidence in the Houston region. The study’s title: “A Century (1906-2024) of Groundwater and Land Subsidence Studies in Greater Houston Region: A Review.” The review revealed some stunning facts about past groundwater management practices in the Houston area and their implications for the future.

About the Study

The comprehensive 25-page review of scientific literature is essential reading for anyone interested in understanding the history of geologic subsidence in southeast Texas. The review examines its causes, impacts, regulatory remedies, and how it’s measured.

The authors are Michael J, Turco and Ashley Greuter of the Harris-Galveston Subsidence District, and Dr. Guoquan Wang of the University of Houston’s Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences. They published their copyrighted article in the July/August 2025 issue of Groundwater on behalf of the National Groundwater Association.

Stunning Facts

In the study, the authors relate some fascinating facts about subsidence in the Houston region. For instance:

  • Subsidence has impacted approximately 12,000 square kilometers, encompassing nearly all of Harris and Galveston Counties as well as parts of surrounding counties.
  • This led to the irreversible loss of 12 cubic kilometers of groundwater storage – equivalent to 60 times the volume of Lake Houston.
  • That equals 8 years worth of water usage for all of Harris and Galveston Counties (at 2023 consumption rates).

That’s significant because groundwater is our backup for surface water during droughts. And who can forget the three-year drought from 2011 to 2013 when you could virtually walk from one side of Lake Houston to the other in many places.

Due to groundwater regulations, the extent of subsidence rates has decreased significantly since 1990. By the early 2020s, the areas seeing subsidence of greater than 1 cm per year had shrunk to one twentieth of the Houston region (1500 square kilometers). And only 50 square kilometers have rates higher than 2 cm/year.

Today, most of the remaining subsidence exists in the fast growing areas to the region’s north and west, which were the last to be regulated.

History of Subsidence in Region

According to Turco et. al., the earliest documented instance of subsidence happened in Baytown’s Goose Creek Oil Field during the 1920s.

From the late 1940s to the mid-1970s, rapid subsidence, occurring at rates of up to a decimeter per year, became increasingly pronounced in the southeastern parts of Houston

Declining groundwater levels (GWLs), driven by rapid industrial expansion, resulted in over 2 meters of subsidence in the area along the Houston Ship Channel from the 1940s to the mid-1970s.  By 1979, as much as 3 meters of subsidence had been documented in the Baytown area.

Since the 1990s, as Houston’s population expanded to the north and northwest groundwater pumping triggered subsidence. Areas around Katy, Jersey Village, and The Woodlands experienced subsidence rates of 1 to 3 cm per year as of the early 2020s.

Striking a balance between groundwater resource management, subsidence, urban development, and environmental sustainability is central to the Houston region’s future. The paper explores how regulatory initiatives have influenced current practices and policies as leaders seek to reduce and prevent subsidence.

Evolution of Regulatory Agencies

A large part of the paper deals with how regulatory entities have expanded their geographic scope to keep pace with population growth. The paper includes discussions of:

  • The Harris-Galveston Subsidence District (HGSD) in 1975
  • Updates to its groundwater regulatory plan in 1985, 1992, 1999, and 2013
  • Different regulatory areas within the Houston region
  • Fort Bend Subsidence District (FBSD) in 1989
  • Seven additional groundwater conservation districts covering most of the counties in the region.

Evolution of Monitoring Technology

Technology aficionados will appreciate the discussion of techniques used to monitor both groundwater levels and surface subsidence.

HGSD, in cooperation with the U.S. Geological Survey, monitors water levels and pumping rates in 650 wells throughout the region. HCSD also annually monitors groundwater pumpage from all permitted wells within the District (about 7500 wells in 2024).

As more water is extracted, clay layers in the soil become compacted. A former leader of the subsidence district once described it as “squashing a brownie.” Once compacted, it will not return to its former state.

The effects of subsidence are most notable closest to sea level. We can see them in the loss of highways, subdivisions, wetlands, vulnerability to storm surge, and more.

However, even areas a 100 feet or more above sea level can feel the impacts. Differential subsidence can trigger faults, disrupt pipelines, alter the gradient of streams, and create bowls in the landscape that increase flood risk.

Prior to the 1990s, subsidence was tracked through repeated spirit-leveling surveys and extensometers. However, since then, GPS has emerged as the dominant tool for measuring subsidence. It offers greater precision and more efficiency than conventional methods.

HGSD and FBSD operate approximately 114 subsidence measuring stations that use GPS. And they continuously add new stations to areas of interest.

They also use Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar (InSAR) to create detailed displacement maps over time. InSAR is especially good at filling in the gaps between the GPS measuring stations to create contour maps.

The scientists also use tidal gages and borehole extensometers to cross-reference data and extend the historical record of subsidence.

Major Discoveries

According to the authors, “Before the 1960s, the connection between groundwater extraction and subsidence was not immediately evident. Other factors, such as oil and gas extraction and local fault activity, were also considered significant contributors.”

They continue, “However, as evidence from ground-water-level measurements grew, and subsidence increasingly led to infrastructure damage and altered drainage patterns, it became clear that groundwater withdrawal was the primary driver of land subsidence.” 

Oil and gas extraction and fault movement were also considered serious contributors at one time. “However, as evidence from groundwater level measurements grew, and subsidence increasingly led to infrastructure damage and altered drainage patterns, it became clear that groundwater withdrawal was the primary driver of land subsidence,” say the authors.

Another major discovery was that subsidence-induced compaction of the soil has led to the loss of groundwater storage capacity.

“The volume of total land subsidence directly correlates with the loss of groundwater storage capacity,” says the paper. “Groundwater is a crucial backup supply for maintaining water security in large cities, and with decreased storage, the risk of water shortages grows, potentially impacting agricultural productivity, industrial operations, and daily life for residents.”

New Focus on Sustainability

In conclusion, the authors state, “As Houston’s population continues to grow, the increasing demand for water underscores the urgent need for sustainable water sources that extend beyond the current groundwater and surface water capacities. To address this, HGSD, FBSD, and GCDs are intensifying efforts in water conservation and exploring alternative water solutions, actively engaging local stakeholders.”

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/17/25

2910 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Southeast Texas Flood Control District Could Dissolve on Monday

August 16, 2025 – At its August 18, 2025 meeting, the Board of Directors of the Southeast Texas Flood Control District will discuss dissolving the District and taking all action necessary, through legal counsel, to formally close out all banking accounts and to satisfy any outstanding debts. See the agenda here.

District Formed After Imelda

The Southeast Texas Flood Control District, LGC is a local government corporation of Hardin, Jefferson, Orange, Chambers, Liberty, Newton, Jasper and Tyler Counties. They created it to coordinate flood-control efforts among the sponsoring counties and regional drainage districts, conservation districts, municipalities and other regional entities and communities.

The counties adopted the resolution approving the district in 2020. That was shortly after Tropical Storm Imelda dumped as much as 43 inches of rain over parts of Southeast Texas from Galveston to Beaumont in 2019.

Imelda
Tropical Storm Imelda in 2019 dumped more than 40″ of rain near Beaumont. NASA photo.

Hurricane Harvey had created even more devastation throughout the same areas just two years earlier.

Original Purpose of District Now Duplicated

The hope articulated in the articles of incorporation was that the District could protect residents, infrastructure, industry, businesses and housing against flooding by improving, enlarging and integrating damage-reduction systems.

This PowerPoint presentation explains more about the background, purpose, and origins of the group.

When asked why the group was considering dissolving, Fred Jackson, Executive Director of the District, said that the need had not gone away but the group’s efforts were duplicated by other groups that had also sprung up.

I could find no website for the Southeast Texas Flood Control District. Several flood control experts in Harris County had never even heard of it. So, it appears the vision may not have come together quite the way the founders hoped.

Need for Flood-Mitigation Simplification to Facilitate Cross-Jurisdictional Solutions

The fate of the Southeast Texas Flood Control District underscores the difficulty of coordinating multiple government agencies from municipal to federal across wide areas. Rural areas may find it especially hard to navigate the jurisdictional labyrinth. That’s why the bipartisan bill to streamline FEMA recently introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives by the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee is so important.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/16/2025

2909 Days since Hurricane Harvey

SJRA, Conroe Settle Lawsuit after Nine Years

8/15/25 – The San Jacinto River Authority and City of Conroe issued a joint press release about the settlement this morning of their nine-year legal battle over water rates. This press release just came in. I’ve added subheads to help highlight key points. Otherwise, the text between the lines is verbatim:


SJRA Directors Unanimously Approve

Conroe, Texas—Today the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) Board of Directors unanimously approved the execution of a Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement with the City of Conroe to end current litigation related to the SJRA Groundwater Reduction Plan (GRP). The City of Conroe considered and approved the Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement at a City Council meeting on Thursday.

End to Legal Squabbles is Mutually Beneficial

SJRA General Manager, Aubrey Spear, said “We appreciate the City of Conroe’s efforts in working with SJRA in reaching this settlement agreement. Putting this litigation behind us is best for all GRP participants and their rate payers. With Conroe’s payment and savings on legal fees, the wholesale water rates will go down. Ending the litigation also strengthens our partnership with Conroe to continue supplying water to its growing population.” 

Conroe City Administrator, Gary Scott, said “After months of negotiations, I am pleased with an outcome that is truly beneficial to both parties. Securing additional water is critical to Conroe’s economic growth and long-term vitality. We recognize and appreciate the efforts of the San Jacinto River Authority in working with us. This agreement represents a shared commitment to the betterment of us all. This is a historic decision that sets Conroe on the path to the future.”  

The agreement settles legal disputes between the parties dating back to 2016 when the City of Conroe disputed increases in wholesale water rates related to SJRA’s 2010 Groundwater Reduction Plan contract. 

Conroe Agrees to Pay Full Amount

In the settlement, the City of Conroe agrees to pay the full amount that it has short-paid SJRA since 2017 to the present that it has been holding in escrow. Conroe also agrees to begin paying the current rate for treated surface water from Lake Conroe and the groundwater pumpage fee going forward. 

SJRA Agrees to Provide More Surface Water and More

On the other hand, SJRA agrees to provide Conroe with additional surface water, reduce the term of Conroe’s GRP contract from 80 years to 40 years, forgive penalties and fees on past due amounts, and clarify in the contract that there is no obligation by the City of Conroe to participate in future GRP phases or expansion of the GRP water treatment plant.

Documents Not Yet Available 

Agreement documents are in the process of being fully executed.


 Reliance on Groundwater Has Contributed to Subsidence

This is good news for both parties. It will reduce the amount they spend on legal fees that rate- and taxpayers have funded.

However, the press release did not address how it will affect the amount of groundwater that Conroe pumps aside from saying that SJRA will provide Conroe with “additional surface water.”

Subsidence in southern Montgomery County including Conroe and the Woodlands is among the most severe in the region. SJRA’s Water Treatment Plant and the Groundwater Reduction Plan were at the heart of the lawsuit. Both were intended to reduce subsidence. And they did briefly when the plant first came online in 2015. Then the Lone Star Groundwater Conservation District (LSGCD) started pumping huge amounts of groundwater, claiming there was no connection between the loss of groundwater and subsidence.

LSGCD says on their Resources Page under the subsidence tab that, “…the rate at which [their] compaction occurs is 10 times (10x) slower than the rate at which compaction occurs in Harris County.”

Regardless, a huge area is still sinking 8 to 12 millimeters per year. And most of Montgomery County is sinking at least 6 according to this subsidence map recently published by the Harris-Galveston Subsidence District.

Subsidence Has Triggered Faults

The subsidence has triggered faults in the area. That in turn has damaged homes, streets and drainage infrastructure. I spent a whole day last week taking a fault tour of the Woodlands with area residents. Below are three of dozens of pictures I took at day.

Fault line under the foundation cracked this Woodland’s home’s slab and walls.
Front steps are now twice their original height because the front yard sank relative to the front door.
Faulting damage in parking lot of Woodland’s High School.

Millimeters may not sound like much. But 12 millimeters per year is half an inch per year. During the life of a 30-year mortgage, that’s 15 inches…plus a lot of home and street repairs, and a lot of foundation leveling.

Inland subsidence has also been linked to flooding. It can change the gradient of streams and rivers, so water moves more slowly and builds higher during floods.

And differential subsidence (between two areas) can reduce the height of structures above floodplains. For instance, the subsidence rate in Conroe is far higher than subsidence at the Lake Houston Dam. That means homes north of the dam have less freeboard (height above expected floods). Said another way, it’s like tilting Lake Houston toward the homes north of the dam.

SJRA has not yet responded to questions about how the settlement will affect Conroe’s groundwater pumping.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/15/25

2908 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Triple PG Sand-Mine Lawsuit Slides to Year 7 as Problems Get Worse

8/14/25 – A State of Texas lawsuit against the Triple PG sand mine that began in 2019 will now be tried, at the earliest, in 2026. Meanwhile problems at the mine have gotten worse. Breaches in their dikes that triggered the lawsuit have recurred. And five pipelines carrying highly volatile liquids (HVL) are now exposed and suspended over another breach.

Trial Date Set for Feb. 2026

According to the fourth revised scheduling order issued by a Travis County district court, the lawsuit brought by the State of Texas against the Triple PG sand mine in Porter will now go to a jury no earlier than February 2026.

The State first sued Triple PG in 2019 for mining sand in a pit whose dikes had been breached in at least two places. White Oak Creek was flowing through an area being actively mined and then out through Caney Creek into the headwaters of Lake Houston, which supplies drinking water for more than 2 million people.

Triple PG breach into Caney Creek in September 17, 2019.

Shell Game and Other Early Delays

The judge quickly issued an injunction against the mine’s owner. Mining briefly stopped while miners repaired the dikes. But the dikes failed again. And the mine briefly became an issue in a Houston mayoral election when Tony Buzbee visited the breach for a photo op in May 2019.

Tony Buzbee (plaid shirt) visited Triple PG breach into Caney Creek with camera crew in May 2019 during mayoral campaign.

The judge then ordered the miners to develop an engineered solution that permanently sealed off the pit. However, the dikes failed yet again last year and have remained open for more than a year.

Between breaches they pumped water over their dikes onto adjoining properties.

Meanwhile, other hazards developed at the mine. The miners have exposed pipelines carrying natural gas and highly volatile liquids by mining near a utility easement.

On the legal front, the mine’s owner, a cardiologist from Nacogdoches, named Prabhakar R. Guniganti, transferred ownership of the mine through a series of shell companies and trust funds that he and his family controlled. This forced the attorney general’s office to sue one entity after another and name the cardiologist individually as a defendant.

Fourth Scheduling Order

Meanwhile, hundreds of miles away, the case lumbers along. See the full FOURTH Amended Scheduling Order here.

If this sticks…

  • In August and September this year, the parties will designate their expert witnesses.
  • During October and November, they will complete discovery.
  • In December, they will challenge each other’s expert witnesses and file remaining unheard motions.
  • In January, they will exchange witness and exhibit lists.
  • And the Jury Trial will begin on February 9, 2026.

However, the possibility exists that this could slip again as it has at least twice before. The judge originally scheduled this case for trial on October 10, 2023, and October 28, 2024.

General Reasons for Delays

Aside from specific legal maneuverings in this case, lawsuits in general can drag on for years. Many moving parts must align. And each step can take months or even longer. The main causes include:

1. Pre-trial Procedures Can Be Slow

  • Discovery – Both sides gather and exchange evidence, which can involve reviewing thousands of documents, deposing witnesses, and fighting over what’s admissible.
  • Motions and Hearings – Lawyers may file motions to dismiss, suppress evidence, or get summary judgment. Each motion needs time for responses and court rulings.
  • Scheduling Conflicts – Courts juggle many cases, and attorneys may have other trials or deadlines.

2. Complexity of the Case

  • Many Issues – Multi-defendant cases or lawsuits involving technical subjects (e.g., environmental law, patents) require more experts, more evidence, and more coordination.
  • Specialized Evidence – Expert reports, forensic analysis, or financial audits can take months to produce.

3. Negotiation and Settlement Efforts

  • Even if both sides want to settle, negotiations can stall while parties evaluate risk, await rulings on key motions, or try mediation.

4. Appeals and Interlocutory Delays

  • If a court rules on an important issue before trial, one side might appeal immediately. This “pause” can last a year or more before the trial even resumes.

5. Strategic Delays

  • Parties may deliberately slow the process to pressure the other side—by increasing costs, waiting for evidence to weaken, or banking on a change in law or circumstance.

6. Court Backlogs

  • In busy jurisdictions, there can be long waits simply for your turn on the docket—especially after events like the COVID-19 pandemic, which created major case backlogs.

Dikes Open and Pipelines Exposed

In July, mining continued with the dikes wide open again.

triple pg breach into Caney Creek
Triple PG dike breach in July 2025
sand-pit capture between White Oak and Caney Creeks
Same breach on August 16, 2024

Dike Regulations

The Triple PG mine received 15 citations in two years from the Mine Safety and Health Administration before the TCEQ filed its lawsuit through the Texas Attorney General. See the MSHA site for a key to the citations.

The U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration regulation §56.20010 regarding retaining dams specifies that “If failure of a water or silt retaining dam will create a hazard, it shall be of substantial construction and inspected at regular intervals.” 

TCEQ also has requirements for constructing dikes and levees. Note the paragraph on page 2 about structural integrity. “Construction must be based upon sound engineering principles. Structural integrity must withstand any waters which the levee or other improvement is intended to restrain or carry, considering all topographic features, including existing levees.”

Pipeline Issues Now Added to Complaint

Breaches aren’t the only issue at the Triple PG mine (now operated under the name Texas Fracsand). The daredevils operating the mine have exposed five pipelines carrying highly volatile liquids.

exposed HVL pipelines
Triple PG Breaches and Exposed Pipelines on July 24, 2025

I alerted the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality after discovering this, but have not yet heard of the outcome of their investigation.

When went back today to see if the operator had addressed either the breaches or the pipeline issues, I found no changes.

The breeches were still wide open and the pipelines unprotected.

Pray that we don’t see any more delays in the jury trial.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/14/25

2907 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

SJRA Calls Special Board Meeting to Discuss Settlement of 9-Year-Old Lawsuit

8/12/2025 – The San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) will hold a special meeting of its board of directors on Friday, August 15, 2025, at 10 AM. It will be held at the SJRA’s Administration building at 1577 Dam Site Road, Conroe, TX.

Directors will consider one item in executive session – settlement of its lawsuit against the City of Conroe. The dispute concerns Conroe’s Groundwater Reduction Plan contract with the SJRA.

To provide public comment, you must appear in person. However, you can still watch the meeting via the Internet here.

Case Began in 2016

The case began nine years ago in 2016.

Several years earlier, SJRA developed a Groundwater Reduction Plan to reduce the demands on the Gulf Coast Aquifer system made by a fast growing population in Montgomery County. Growth was depleting aquifers and lowering water levels in wells faster than water was being replaced.

So, SJRA signed contracts with a number of municipalities to help migrate them to surface water. But that required SJRA to build a surface water treatment plant at Lake Conroe. To do that, the SJRA sold bonds totaling $550 million, which it is now trying to repay.

But Conroe and other municipalities balked at the price of SJRA water. And they began pumping cheaper groundwater while disputing evidence of subsidence.

SJRA water treatment plant at Lake Conroe, key to reducing subsidence in Montgomery County.
Half-billion dollar SJRA water treatment plant at Lake Conroe Dam

It’s hard to track developments in this case because it has moved back and forth from Montgomery County District Court to the Ninth Judicial Court of Appeals in Beaumont and the Texas Supreme Court several times.

Many of the appeals are on limited aspects of the case. In 2020, the Supreme Court of Texas ruled that Conroe could not invoke governmental immunity against the SJRA. Their ruling provides a good summary of the issues in the case at that time.

Case Still Not Decided in Second Trip to Supreme Court

The litigants later went into mediation. That didn’t produce a settlement, so the parties started appealing various aspects of the arbitration. Eventually, the case circled back around to the Supreme Court of Texas in 2024.

Justice Busby delivered the opinion of the court at that time. In the first paragraph, he signaled judicial impatience. As if speaking to a third party about the SJRA and Conroe, Busby wrote “So far, their taxpayers and ratepayers have been funding only procedural and jurisdictional skirmishes distantly related to the merits of the dispute.”

The Supreme Court sided with SJRA on several limited issues and remanded the case back to the trial court for additional deliberations. Again.

In 2022, various parties owed the SJRA close to $30 million. This is one of those cases where neither side can afford to lose and the lawyers have every incentive to keep it going.

Subsidence Continues as Case Continues

It will be interesting to see what happens Friday.

In the meantime, I’ve spoken to more residents of the Woodlands whose homes and lives are being undermined by subsidence-related faulting. But more on that in a future post.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/12/2025

2905 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Correlation Between Flood Damage, Mitigation Spending Keeps Dropping

8/11/25 – The correlation between flood damage and flood-mitigation spending by Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) keeps dropping, indicating an increasing influence of other factors, such as race, on spending.

  • At the end of 2021, the coefficient of correlation between flood-mitigation spending and flood damage was .84. Statisticians consider that a strong correlation.
  • By the end of Q1 2024, it had dropped to .67, a positive but moderate correlation.
  • By the end of Q2 2025, it had dropped further to .64.

What is Coefficient of Correlation?

Coefficient of correlation measures the strength of association between two variables, for instance hours spent studying and exam scores.

Statisticians consider a correlation of 1.0 extremely strong. It is the highest possible and means that for every unit of change in one variable, there is a corresponding unit of change in another. As the coefficient decreases, the strength of the relationship also decreases.

  • Values close to +1 or -1 (e.g., 0.7 to 0.9 or -0.7 to -0.9) indicate a strong relationship. 
  • Values between 0.3 and 0.7 (or -0.3 and -0.7) suggest a moderate relationship. 
  • Values below 0.3 (or -0.3) indicate a weak relationship.

Less than Half of HCFCD Spending Today Explained by Flood Damage

Squaring the coefficient of correlation yields the coefficient of determination. That tells you the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that’s explained by the independent variable.

Squaring .64 yields 41%. So, flood damage today accounts for less than half of Harris County’s flood-mitigation spending.

Harris County Commissioner Rodney Ellis’ has relentlessly pushed various prioritization formulas that rely increasingly on race while de-emphasizing damage and flood risk. In fact, his formula now totally ignores flood risk.

The major changes in his formula coincide with the drop in the correlation between flood damage and flood-mitigation spending. The 2022 Prioritization Framework marked the beginning of the huge drop in the correlation.

But in fairness, also understand that special circumstances may apply to investments, such as HCFCD’s Frontier Program. It buys land in developing watersheds for huge, regional detention basins, then sells capacity back to developers. Still…

Notice how the lines in the graph below diverge for some watersheds. Some have proportionally more dollars than damage and vice versa for others. Clearly, politics have skewed spending.

A higher correlation would show the two lines more closely matching each other. Also note that the damage figures include five major floods since 2001. They are extracted from HCFCD Federal Reports.

The watersheds where the two variables most greatly diverge reduce the coefficient of correlation.

Where does your watershed stand in the dollar derby? Do you think you’re getting your fair share?

Here are the actual dollars and damaged structures in a table format. The last column shows the dollars per damaged structure.

Coefficient based on Spending and Damage Columns.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/11/2025

2904 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Guadalupe Flood Tragedy: How Could It NOT Happen?

8/10/25 – A reader asked me, “How could the July 4 Guadalupe flood tragedy happen?”

He sent me an article that quoted an associate professor from Syracuse University who studied FEMA’s flood maps. The professor said that people knew Camp Mystic buildings were in the 100-year floodplain. Then she said, “It’s a mystery to me why they weren’t taking proactive steps to move structures away from the risk…”

The good professor obviously doesn’t live in Texas. In the endless news coverage of the tragedy, some little known statistics have gone undiscussed. They put the Guadalupe tragedy in a larger context.

Residential bldgs in Texas 1 % floodplains from state flood plan.
The State Flood Plan identified 878,100 buildings within 1% annual chance (100-year) floodplains. They’re everywhere.

We also have 6,258 hospitals, emergency medical services, fire stations, police stations and schools in 1% annual chance floodplains. Camp Mystic is hardly alone.

One in Five Texans Lives in a Floodplain

The Texas State Flood Plan shows that 5,884,100 people live in Texas floodplains (100- and 500-year). The last full census shows that 29,145,505 people live in Texas. That means 20% of the state’s population lives in a floodplain. One in five people!

To put that number in perspective:

More people live in Texas floodplains than live in 30 states.

According to 2020 US Census

And 5,884,100 is more people than live in any American city except New York City. Not even Los Angeles or Chicago has more residents than Texas floodplains.

Only 2% of the people living in the Guadalupe River Basin live in floodplains. But 42% of all the people living in the San Jacinto watershed live in a floodplain.

floodplain populations of Texas watersheds
Column 3 shows people living in 100-year floodplain (1% annual chance) and Column 4 shows the number in the 500-year (.2% annual chance) floodplain. The last column shows percentages of 5,884,100 that totals in the 100+500 column comprise.

And don’t forget, those numbers are all based on pre-Atlas 14 maps. Reportedly, Atlas-14 maps will show floodplains growing 50-100%. And Atlas-15 maps are already in the works. So, the numbers above understate the real dimensions of the problem.

In my opinion, the real question is not “How could the tragedy happen?” It’s “How could it NOT happen?”

Still, the professor raises a valid question.

Problems Don’t Get This Big By Accident

Why do so many Texans live in floodplains? A combination of things has created this perfect storm. Since starting this blog, I’ve written 2,876 articles about flooding. And I see certain recurrent themes:

  • Texans like to live near water. In fact, we pay a premium for homes near flood sources.
  • We idolize risk takers. It’s part of our DNA, our ethos, and our heritage.
  • Texans value independence. No one tells a Texan how to live. Or where not to live.
  • We fight all the way to the Supreme Court for the right to build in floodplains.
  • Property rights rule in Texas. People do with their land what they damn well please.
  • The state’s population has doubled since 1980, but many areas are still using flood maps from the same era.
  • Rapid growth has created higher flood peaks that rise faster due to faster runoff upstream that’s insufficiently mitigated.
  • Areas eager to grow use lax enforcement to attract developers.
  • Some just don’t adopt adequate regulations or they leave loopholes that raise flood risk.
  • Collectively, we have a bad case of willful blindness. Regulations don’t keep pace with reality. For instance, Montgomery County still hasn’t adopted updated drainage regulations which have been on the table for years.
  • Giving tax breaks to sand-mining companies that reduce the conveyance of rivers.
  • People make bad home building and home buying decisions because of antiquated flood maps.
  • Flooding happens just infrequently enough that when something goes wrong, people can blame it on climate change or God.

Not all of these may apply to the Guadalupe river basin. But I’ve documented them multiple times in the San Jacinto basin. They form a starting point for investigation into the Guadalupe tragedy.

A Problem Too Big To Solve

At this point, in my opinion, the State’s flooding problem is too big to solve. The state flood plan comes with a $54 billion price tag. But we don’t have a dedicated source of funding to address the problems in it.

Worse, collectively we:

  • Keep kicking the can down the road by making endless plans to solve flooding, but rarely implementing them.
  • Wait until people forget and move on with their lives, then lose a sense of urgency.
  • Are united in disasters, but divided by recovery. When we do tax ourselves to address flooding, people battle each other to have their flooding fixed first.

Don’t assume others will protect you. Protect yourself. Start by demanding accurate estimates of risk that we paid for a long time ago. That would at least make people aware of the flood risk they truly face. Then they can decide whether to take that risk.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/10/2025

2903 Days since Hurricane Harvey