SJRA Update on Status of Four Flood-Mitigation Projects

1/11/2026 – At the end of 2025, the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) issued an update on the status of four flood-mitigation projects. During Hurricane Harvey and again in May 2024, SJRA came under withering criticism for releases from Lake Conroe exceeding 70,000 cubic feet per second that flooded downstream residents.

The four projects represent different ways to offset similar releases in the future and their adverse effects. They include:

Joint-Reservoir-Operations Study

The City of Houston is currently performing a project to add new spillway gates to increase the controlled release capacity of the Lake Houston dam. The goal of this Joint Reservoir Operations Study is to determine the most efficient and safe operation of Lake Conroe in series with Lake Houston once the new gates are installed.

The study will evaluate the feasibility of prereleases including impacts on water supply. The study will also develop a forecasting tool for Lake Houston and support development of the gate operations policy for the proposed Lake Houston dam gates.

Black & Veatch is handling the million-dollar study for SJRA, City of Houston, City of Humble and the Texas Water Development Board. The engineering company received a notice to proceed in August 2025 and expects to complete the project by December 2027.

Black & Veatch is also handling the engineering for the City of Houston on the project to add more flood gates to the Lake Houston Dam. The company has completed preliminary engineering. Mayor Whitmire expects them to finish detailed engineering by the end of this year.

For more on the Joint Reservoir Operations Study, see:

Flood Infrastructure Fund (FIF) Abridged Application
FIF Final Application
Joint Ops Project Benefit Area Map

Spring Creek Flood Control Dams Feasibility Study

This project explored multiple alternative sites for dams along Spring Creek with the potential to reduce flooding. The two most cost effective alternatives were on Birch and Walnut Creeks. SJRA released its draft report to the Texas Water Development Board in June 2025. Its final report is due next month.

For more on the Spring Creek Dams Site Study, see:

FIF Abridged Application
FIF Final Application
Spring Creek Project Benefit Area Map
www.SpringCreekStudy.com

Upper San Jacinto River Basin Regional Sedimentation Study

According to the Army Corps, conveyance of the San Jacinto West Fork between Humble and Kingwood was reduced 90% due to sedimentation. That exacerbated flooding. Since then, SJRA has evaluated sedimentation throughout the river basin to learn:

  • Where the most sediment comes from
  • How to prioritize watersheds for improvements
  • Conceptual solutions

The goal: reduce loss of floodway conveyance in the basin.

SJRA started the project in May 2022. It hopes to deliver a draft report to the TWDB by October 2026 and the final report by June 2027.

For more information, see:

sanjacintosedimentationstudy.com
FIF Abridged Application
FIF Final Application
Sedimentation Study Project Benefit Area Map

Sand-Trap Project

The sand trap project is one potential way to remove material from the river in order to improve conveyance and reduce the risk of flooding.

SJRA is working with HCFCD and City of Houston to plan, design, and construct one or more “sand traps” along the West Fork.

 A major component of the project is coordinating with Aggregate Production Operations (APOs) along the river. A public/private partnership would provide for operation and maintenance of the proposed sand trap(s). A conceptual design effort to select the most feasible site(s) for installation of sand trap(s) has been completed, and preliminary design is scheduled for completion in early 2026.

For more information, see:

Sand Trap Conceptual Design Report Comments Received
Sand Trap Summary Document for Stakeholders (11-08-22)
SJR and Tributaries Sediment Removal and Sand Trap Development Conceptual Design Report
Sediment Trap Pilot Project Preliminary Design Scope

The Studies are Only Step One

It’s important to recognize that more than eight years after Harvey, not one of these studies is complete yet. And the studies are just the first step in a multi-step process that includes final engineering, funding, land acquisition, and construction for most of these.

At this rate, it could take decades before we see actual flood-mitigation benefits. We really need to find ways to speed up this process.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/11/26

3057 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Frankenvines Meet Their Match: Median Madness Round 5 Report

1/10/26 – The impenetrable tangle of Frankenvines in front of Kingwood High School met its match today. Mayor John Whitmire joined Houston City Council Members Fred Flickinger and Twila Carter, City Parks Department workers, and an army of more than a hundred volunteers to tackle the thorny problem.

Young and old, men and women, they all teamed up for Median Madness Round 5. To help beautify the heart of Kingwood, improve traffic visibility … and have fun!

People Working Together to Improve Their Community

Today’s event focused on Kingwood Drive between Bens Branch and Valley Manor.

After a briefing in the KHS parking lot…

Council Member Flickinger with the poster delivered the “Safety Moment”

…the team members donned their work gloves, grabbed their lopping shears and got down to work. Within minutes, the group spread out and went into attack mode.

The activity stretched for blocks.

Brush piles reached shoulder height in practically no time.

Chris Bloch of Trees for Kingwood helped organize the event.

The pictures below show the energy and enthusiasm evident everywhere during the day.

Mayor Whitmire (center)
He traded his business suit and gavel for blue jeans and lopping shears, joking that this kept him “grounded.”
City Parks Department workers cut vines with chain saws on poles as volunteers pulled them down and piled them.
The Mayor and Council Member Carter (left) work with Bloch to pull down a major vine.
Fred Flickingers granddaughter joined Council Member Carter (center) and Danell Fields (right) to battle two mighty vines.
Council Member Carter with Council Member Flickinger’s granddaughter, Abigail Durham.

Thank You!

Thanks go to Mayor Whitmire, Council Member Flickinger, Council Member Carter, the Kingwood Young Men’s Service League, Trees for Kingwood, the Houston Parks and Recreation Department, Greenbelt Guardians and a host of individual volunteers. You all came together on a blustery Saturday morning to make a huge difference for your community.

You exemplify the best of Kingwood, Houston, and Texas. Thank you!

Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/10/26

3056 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Ramsey Sounds Alarm Over Deadline That Could Cost County $250 Million

1/9/2026 – On 1/8/2026, Precinct 3 Commissioner Tom Ramsey put Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) on notice that he is concerned about HCFCD’s ability to meet state and federal grant deadlines for an estimated quarter billion dollars of flood control projects. Missing the deadlines could possibly result in the loss of funding.

Ramsey cautioned the court, “If we don’t meet the deadline, $250 million is at risk.” 

Ramsey said he plans to discuss the progress of the projects in every Commissioners Court meeting between now and the February 28, 2027, deadline.

The projects are being funded by Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Relief (CDBG-DR). The grants originate from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), but are administered by the Texas General Land Office. Project deadlines have already been extended twice and HCFCD has been warned in writing not to ask for more extensions.

The eleven CDBG-DR projects include:

Status from HCFCD as of 1/9/26. Estimated grant values from GLO as of 10/25. SWDB means stormwater detention basin. CCI means channel conveyance improvements, i.e., widening, deepening and/or lining with concrete.

Ramsey’s estimate of $250 million at risk differs from the total grant value of $322 million. He must conservatively assume that at least some of the projects can be completed and are therefore not at risk. However, he didn’t say which he thought were safe.

Typical Timetables

It typically takes 3-4 months to advertise a project for bids, approve the winning bidder, and sign the contract. Once the contractor mobilizes for the job, it can easily take another year or more to complete it. For example, the Mercer Basin on Cypress Creek was started in 2022 on an expedited basis. It was expected to take a year. But it was not yet complete at the end of 2025. So you can see Ramsey’s concern.

In contrast, most of these projects will have less than a year for construction unless HUD grants another extension. In the past, Commissioners have expressed reservations about starting projects they may not have money to complete.

Flood Control’s Reaction to Concerns

Regardless, Flood Control District Executive Director Tina Petersen expressed confidence that she could make the February 2027 deadline.

She thanked Commissioner Adrian Garcia for the recognition that HCFCD is getting seven projects amended into the GLO’s Action Plan. But those are CDBG-Mitigation projects, not CDBG-Disaster Relief projects, which have a much tighter deadline.

Without distinguishing the difference, she then segued to Disaster Relief. She thanked Garcia again for recognizing that the Brookglen bid had just been approved. Brookglen IS a DR project.

She then addressed Ramsey’s concern. “We do have a plan for moving forward with the remainder of the projects,” said Petersen without offering specifics. “Right now, we have four projects out for bid that were originally supposed to be going out this month, but we were successful in expediting the schedule and pushing fast and pushing hard with the cooperation of our purchasing director to get those out in December.”

Petersen continued, “So, we are moving ahead of schedule right now. We have an additional, I believe, five projects left to get out in Quarter One. And right now, we are on track to do so.”

Dr. Tina Petersen, Executive Director of HCFCD, addressing Commissioners Court on deadline issue.

Petersen Points to Process Improvements

Petersen then shifted the discussion to process improvements. “We are working closely to identify places where we’re having challenges and then working collaboratively to make sure that we chase those issues down.” 

She specifically mentioned how she was working with the county’s purchasing department to speed up the bidding and approval process and pointed to Item 132 on the agenda. It gives authority to the purchasing agent to award construction contracts to the lowest responsible bidder for 29 CDBG-DR and -MIT projects.

“Every day, every week that we can save in this process makes a difference,” said Petersen. “We think that … will save us between 2 and 6 weeks, and that will matter to us.” 

“Every Single Day Could Make a Difference”

Garcia put a finer point on it. He said, “Every single day could make a difference.”

Precinct 4 Commissioner Lesley Briones thanked Petersen for her efforts, but also said, “Every time I see you, Doctor Petersen, I feel like there’s a clock ticking in my head.”

This is the best drama in town.

During the meeting yesterday, it became clear that Ramsey was frustrated with the operation and efficiency of many county departments. He wants no more excuses or finger pointing. And he’s doing whatever he can to keep the county from losing that CDBG-DR money.

In a separate phone call Ramsey said, “Don’t tell me what you’re going to do. Tell me what you’ve done. Bid the jobs!”

HCFCD started working on these projects in 2022. But only one is now under construction. With only 13 months left to move millions of cubic yards of dirt, Petersen claims HCFCD is “ahead of schedule,” Incredibly, 9 of 11 projects have still not been awarded to contractors.

To see video of this discussion in Commissioners Court, go to https://harriscountytx.new.swagit.com/videos/371451. Then click on Emergency Supplemental Items, Part 2 of 2 and scroll to 1:44:30 for the start of the discussion.

Part of a Broader Slowdown

The Flood Control District listed only thirteen items on its part of the agenda for the January 8 meeting.

  • Three had to do with interlocal agreements
  • Three dealt with CenterPoint agreements
  • Two dealt with contract modifications
  • Three dealt with buyouts of individual properties
  • One had to do with safety
  • One delegated authority to Harris County Purchasing to award construction contracts to the lowest responsible bidder for 29 CDBG-DR and CDBG-MIT projects (Item 132 mentioned above).

After passage of the flood bond in 2018, HCFCD routinely had 80+ items on the agenda. But then in 2021, the Democratic majority on Commissioners Court made a management change. And the rate of project execution has slowed ever since.

From https://www.hcfcd.org/Activity. Data goes through end of 2025. Current rate is less than half of peak.

Now is the time for Dr. Petersen to show that she’s worth her $434,000 annual salary. Can she save a quarter billion dollars? Only time will tell. Now comes the real heavy lifting.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/9/26

3055 Days since Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Median Madness Round 5 Set for This Saturday

1/8/2026 – City of Houston Council Member Fred Flickinger has announced that the fifth round of Median Madness will happen this Saturday, January 10, 2026. The event begins at 8:30 AM and will go to noon. The rally point will be at the Kingwood High School parking lot at 2701 Kingwood Drive.

Co-sponsors for this event include:

  • The Young Men’s Service League: Kingwood
  • Trees for Kingwood
  • Houston Parks and Recreation Department

Past Median Madness events have been great fun. They represent a chance to rub shoulders with neighbors, beautify the community, work out your frustrations on vines, and improve traffic safety.

Mayor Coming

And as a bonus, you’ll get a chance to meet Mayor John Whitmire in person. He plans to be there.

Weather Prediction/What to Bring

Weather for Saturday morning should be 51 degrees at 9 AM, headed for a high of 57, with light winds. There is a 10% chance of light showers, with humidity around 70%. Expect light winds up to 14 mph.

Council Member Flickinger reminds people to wear closed-toed shoes, and to bring water and gloves. All ages are welcome, but anyone under 16 should be accompanied by an adult.

For More Information

Visit www.houstontx.gov/council/e/ or call 832-393-3008. Hope to see you there!

Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/8/2026

3054 Days since Hurricane Harvey

We Must Make Addressing “Worst Flooding First” a Campaign Issue

1/7/26 – The final Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) spending numbers are in for 2025. And they show a disturbing story of deception that calls for political change. The latest numbers show that HCFCD is fixing the worst flooding last, not first, as promised. See the two graphs below.

Compare Spending to Flood Height

The first shows flood height. The San Jacinto watershed had the worst flooding in Harris County.

Why vote? Worst flooding in the county.
San Jacinto had worst flooding in county. From Harris County Flood Warning System historical data.

Yet when you look at where the money goes, the San Jacinto ranks nearly last.

HCFCD cumulative spending for each watershed since flood bond as percent of projected expenditures in 2018.

The San Jacinto Watershed has only received 13% of the money allocated to it in the flood bond. Yet almost half of the flood-related deaths in Harris County during Harvey occurred in the San Jacinto Watershed – 15 out of 36. Most of those were elderly.

Why the huge disparity between these two graphs? Unfortunately and unbelievably…

The Democratic majority on commissioners court removed flood-risk reduction as a factor in prioritizing mitigation projects in 2022.

To Change Priorities, Change Leaders

But you can change that at the ballot box this year.

In that regard, I’ve had the pleasure of meeting one of the front runners for county judge this year, Marty Lancton. As a leader of first responders, he has experienced the terrible human toll of flooding as few others have. And he has made flood mitigation one of his top priorities. Most importantly…

Lancton believes in restoring flood-risk reduction as a factor in prioritizing projects.

It’s time we put the worst flooding first, not last. We must improve fairness to restore faith in government.

The Raw Data

Live in another watershed and wonder whether you got shortchanged, too? Here’s where HCFCD spent your money to date.

Projected vs. actual spending by HCFCD since start of flood bond for each watershed. Total includes bond plus partner dollars.

Eight watersheds exceed the average percent spent, while fifteen fall below it. This isn’t accidental. It’s deliberate. And this is the year to fix that.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/7/26

3053 Days since Hurricane Harvey

GLO Transparency Claim Leaves Supporters Scratching Heads

1/6/2026 – The Texas General Land Office (GLO) which manages more than $14 billion of flood mitigation funds has invested in the development of flood-prone land. But it won’t explain why, even as the agency proclaims “transparency above everything.”

Partnership with Developer of Flood-Prone Land

Since 2020, I have posted more than 40 articles about the 5,000+ flood-prone acres west of Kingwood, virtually all of it in the floodways and floodplains of Spring and Cypress Creeks where they join the San Jacinto West Fork. For many years, the property was owned by a Syrian developer called Ryko and its sister company, Pacific Indio Properties. They wanted to build 7,000 homes on it.

However, they ran into repeated physical and political development challenges having to do with floodplains, floodways, streams, wetlands, emergency access and more. On August 18, 2025, they quietly sold the property to a Dallas-based developer named Scarborough and one of its sister companies, San Jacinto Preserve, LP.

What wasn’t clear at the time was that the Texas General Land Office (GLO) and a state board it oversees, the School Land Board (SLB), partnered with the buyers to purchase the flood-prone land and develop it. That’s significant because the GLO also administers more than $14 billion of flood-mitigation funds for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) – an apparent conflict of interest.

As word leaked out, the GLO stonewalled public-information requests. They appealed Freedom of Information Act requests to Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s office. Paxton’s office upheld the GLO’s right to conceal the nature and extent of the GLO/SLB involvement.

I could find no mention of the State Land Board partnership with Scarborough in meeting minutes or agendas posted online. However, I did find one reference in an unaudited financial report. It said…

“Scarborough Lane Development and the School Land Board entered into a partnership in August 2025 for the development of a master planned community. The partnership acquired approximately 5,317 acres in Montgomery County.”

Page 71 of unaudited GLO Financial Annual Report dated August 31, 2025, two weeks after the purchase.

That’s it…32 words about an investment reportedly totaling close to $140 million.

So, I started digging. I wanted to know how the GLO reconciled the apparent conflict between:

  • Managing more than $14 billion of federal and state flood-mitigation dollars
  • Investing in the development of flood-prone properties.

But the deeper I dug, the deeper the GLO seemed to dig in.

Initial Response

On 12/19/25, the GLO issued this statement.

“This investment was approved by the School Land Board (SLB) pursuant to Chapter 51 of the Texas Natural Resources Code (TNRC). The GLO’s investment in this project through the SLB as a limited partner was contingent upon Montgomery County’s approval of the drainage study, which was successfully completed in July 2025. As Land Commissioner, I am committed to preventing future flooding. We are meeting with stakeholders and have heard the local concerns regarding this project. Our agency is dedicated to serving the best interests of the community.” Commissioner Dawn Buckingham, MD

However, I learned via FOIA requests to Montgomery County that the county did NOT actually approve a full drainage study in July 2025. The county engineer’s letter listed three pages of things Ryko would have to do to get approval. At the time, the new owners were relying on a preliminary drainage study provided by the previous owners.

It had gaps, to say the least. Either no one at the SLB read the letter or they didn’t know I had it. So, I sent them the letter and asked how they could call that “successfully completed.” They never directly answered that concern.

Nor did they explain why they invested in the project! When I asked…

Second Response

On 12/30/25, I received a second statement from the GLO. It read:

“Recognizing how important Montgomery County is to Texas, the School Land Board (SLB) wanted to bring economic development and opportunity to the area with this project. The board was confident we could mitigate flooding risks. However, we have heard and want to be sensitive to the public’s concern over flooding. At this time, we have decided not to move forward with the development as planned.” — Commissioner Dawn Buckingham, MD 

So…we went from “successfully completed” a drainage study (past tense) to “confident we COULD mitigate flooding risks” (future conditional tense).

But there’s another problem. The response seemed to conclude on a positive note. “We have decided not to move forward with the development…” Then I noticed “as planned.”

So, I asked what Buckingham meant by “as planned.” I specifically asked whether the GLO was pulling out of the development or modifying it to find a compromise between economic development and flood mitigation. So I asked.

Third Response

The GLO press office next emailed a statement on 1/5/26. Their legal counsel said this:

“As a limited partner, the GLO cannot halt this project altogether. The agency is in discussions with our partners to evaluate all available future options for this tract to address the raised concerns.” – Nameless GLO lawyer

Three problems:

  • Note the “S” on partner, making it plural. From this, I deduce that the GLO is now discussing options with Scarborough and at least one other partner. Who? Montgomery County? HUD? The Texas Water Development Board? Texas Parks & Wildlife? Someone else?
  • Whose concerns? The unnamed partners’ concerns? Or the public’s?
  • It’s unclear what kind of options are on the table.

However, it is clear the project has not been cancelled yet as the previous statement implied.

Transparency Issue

At this point, we know that a state agency charged with administering billions of dollars in flood mitigation funds has helped purchase flood-prone land for the purposes of development.

But, there’s a huge transparency issue. We still don’t know:

  • Whose money they used to help purchase the land
  • How much they invested
  • Why
  • What commitments the GLO made
  • What the plans are
  • What happens to the investment if the project fails?

Yet the GLO’s website proudly proclaims “transparency above everything”.

Ignoring issues like these undermines trust in government. If this is such a good deal, why isn’t Commissioner Dawn Buckingham holding a press conference about it?

Why the Fuss?

I talked to one retired, highly respected developer who looked at this land decades ago. He said “development just doesn’t make economic sense.” The area is one of the most flood-prone in the region.

Ryko and its sister company, Pacific Indio Properties, tried to develop the property below for years without luck.

Ryko drainage impact study illustration showing outline and floodplains.
Within the red outline, only dark gray areas are elevated above floodplains. But blue and lighter gray areas are in floodplains or floodways.

Those floodplains and floodways will expand significantly – likely by 50% to100% – when FEMA adopts new maps based on Atlas-14 data. See FEMA’s old map below.

From FEMA’s Flood Hazard Layer Viewer. Map dated 2014. Scarborough land in center. Brown = 500-year floodplain, Aqua = 100-year, Cross-hatched = Floodway.

In addition to floodplain and floodway issues, the property has wetland issues.

From the National Wetlands Inventory. Note solid green areas – the wetlands – as well as numerous ponds and streams within the property. All raise development uncertainty and costs.

“Like Aiming a Firehose at Kingwood and Humble”

One of the most respected hydrologists in the region said that “if this property ever got developed, it would be like aiming a firehose at Kingwood and Humble.”

You would think that would be a concern for an area where floodwaters rose 27 feet and killed 15 people. But unlike officials in neighboring areas, the GLO has never publicly discouraged development of this land. Instead, they’re investing in the development of it!

Concerns Expressed by Neighboring Officials

In addition to the physical challenges, Scarborough and the GLO face many political challenges.

  • The Houston Planning Commission has not approved the developer’s general plan or plats.
  • Harris County unanimously approved a resolution urging Montgomery County to apply stricter Harris County floodplain standards to the development.
  • Houston City Council unanimously approved a strongly worded resolution OPPOSING the Scarborough Development.
  • Precinct 3 Commissioner Ritch Wheeler took an extension of Townsen Blvd off the 2025 Montgomery County Road Bond to make development more difficult.
  • The Montgomery County Engineer is demanding an alternative evacuation route.
  • Harris County will not permit a bridge across Spring Creek that the developer needs as an alternative evacuation route.

Even people who normally support Commissioner Dawn Buckingham are scratching their heads over this deal and the GLO’s concealment of information that should be public.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/6/2026

3052 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Last Day to Save Wetlands

1/4/26 – January 5, 2026 is the last day to file public comments on a proposed new definition of Waters of the U.S. (WOTUS). The new definition could eliminate federal protections for roughly 80% of the wetlands in the United States.

A regulatory impact analysis by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that approximately 70 – 75 million acres of wetlands would no longer be protected, including approximately three quarters of the 3.1 million acres of wetlands in Texas.

70 – 75 million acres represent an area roughly the size of Arizona, Nevada, or Colorado and almost twice the size of Florida. And it’s more than 175 times larger than Houston.

Under the new definition, only wetlands with a relatively permanent, continuous surface connection to navigable Waters of the U.S. would enjoy federal protection. That pretty much limits federal protection only to swamps that directly border major rivers and streams.

Texas does not have its own regulatory protection program for inland forested wetlands such as those common in the San Jacinto river basin.

How Wetlands Reduce Flooding

Wetlands reduce flood risk by storing, slowing, spreading, and dissipating floodwaters before those waters reach downstream channels, neighborhoods, and infrastructure. They act as natural detention basins, providing temporary storage during heavy rainfalls. They fill first, reducing the volume and rate of water entering streams.

Wetlands also contain dense vegetation that slows runoff, reduces erosion, and minimizes channel scouring downstream.

They spread floods laterally across wide areas. This directly reduces flood heights, velocities and structural damage.

Many wetlands disconnect runoff from channels; they intercept it before it ever reaches streams or bayous. But when developers fill in and pave over wetlands, runoff becomes directly connected. Floods peak higher and faster.

The loss of federal protection for wetlands will shift flood mitigation costs downstream from developers to the public, and from no-cost natural solutions to high-cost engineered solutions, such as regional detention basins, channel widening, lining channels with concrete, bridge widening, dikes, reservoirs, etc.

Flood control districts, reservoir operators, and watershed planners consistently view wetlands as critical flood-risk infrastructure, even when not labeled as such.

Bottom line:

Wetlands reduce flooding by doing four things simultaneously:

  1. Storing water
  2. Slowing flow
  3. Spreading out flood waters
  4. Delaying aggregation of floodwaters.

Lose enough wetlands in a watershed and floods become higher, faster, and more destructive, even if rainfall statistics stay the same.

How You Can Help Save Wetlands

Protest the proposed changes by cutting and pasting the text between the two lines below. Don’t forget to add your name and contact info at the end of the entry form. The deadline for filing a public comment is Monday, January 5, 2025.


Re: the proposed 2025 definition of “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) as it relates to wetlands the Lake Houston watershed.

This represents one of the most hydraulically and sediment-sensitive locations in Southeast Texas. The wetlands and floodplain features here perform essential functions that directly affect downstream flood risk, sediment transport, and the long-term storage capacity of Lake Houston. Narrowing federal jurisdiction over these wetlands would have costly consequences that the proposal does not adequately analyze.

1. Wetlands upstream function as critical flood-storage infrastructure

Wetlands upstream operate as distributed flood-storage and flow-attenuation systems. During ordinary wet-season events, these wetlands temporarily store runoff, slow overland flow, and desynchronize flood peaks arriving from multiple tributaries. This attenuation function is particularly important at confluences, where coincident peak flows dramatically increase flood stage and velocity.

Loss or fragmentation of these wetlands will not merely redistribute water locally; it will shift flood risk downstream into into the Lake Houston area. Engineered detention required at individual development sites does not replicate this basin-scale function and cannot offset cumulative wetland losses across multiple upstream parcels.

2. Wetland loss directly increases sediment delivery to Lake Houston

The wetlands upstream serve as sediment traps. During flood events, reduced velocities across wetland landscapes allow suspended sediment to settle before reaching the active channel network. This function is especially important for a lake losing storage capacity that supplies water for 2 million people.

When wetlands are filled, drained, or disconnected, sediment that was previously stored on the landscape is instead delivered downstream. The result is accelerated shoaling of channels and increased sediment deposition in Lake Houston, reducing conveyance, increasing flood stages for equivalent flows, and shortening the functional life of public infrastructure.

3. Loss of storage capacity in Lake Houston imposes real and recurring public costs

Sedimentation has already measurably reduced the effective storage and conveyance capacity of Lake Houston. Maintaining that capacity has required repeated large-scale dredging projects costing hundreds of millions of dollars, funded largely by federal and state appropriations.

Upstream wetland loss increases the frequency and scale of these dredging needs. Each acre of wetland lost upstream effectively shifts long-term sediment-management costs from private land conversion decisions to the public. The proposed WOTUS definition does not quantify or even acknowledge this cost transfer.

4. Federal withdrawal from jurisdiction coincides with a pullback in mitigation funding

As federal jurisdiction over wetlands contracts, so too does the availability of federal mitigation and restoration funding that historically offset unavoidable impacts. This includes reduced applicability of Clean Water Act Section 404 mitigation and fewer mitigation-bank credits.

The combined effect is a double loss: fewer protected wetlands and fewer resources to restore or compensate for their loss. This creates a structural funding gap that local governments cannot realistically fill.

5. The proposed definition fails to address cumulative watershed-scale impacts

The proposal’s emphasis on parcel-level “continuous surface connection” tests ignores cumulative impacts across sub-basins. In the Lake Houston area, hundreds of small wetland losses—each individually deemed non-jurisdictional—can collectively produce measurable increases in flood peaks, sediment loads, and public costs.

The agencies should evaluate jurisdiction and impacts at the basin scale rather than relying on binary, site-specific connectivity tests that are not representative of watershed hydrology.

Requested revisions

I respectfully request that the agencies revise the proposed definition to:

  1. Retain federal jurisdiction over wetlands that provide flood-storage and sediment-attenuation functions upstream of relatively permanent waters and reservoirs, even where surface connectivity is seasonal rather than continuous year-round.
  2. Treat wetlands upstream of dams and reservoirs as integral components of the same hydrologic system, rather than as disconnected features.
  3. Evaluate and disclose cumulative impacts to flood risk, sedimentation, reservoir capacity, and public dredging costs resulting from reduced wetland protection.
  4. Address the loss of federal mitigation and restoration funding that accompanies jurisdictional withdrawal and explain how watershed-scale impacts will be managed in its absence.

Absent these changes, the proposed definition risks increasing downstream flood damages, accelerating sedimentation in Lake Houston, and shifting long-term infrastructure costs from private development to the public.


Cut and paste the text between the lines above and submit it to:

Regulations.gov to Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2025-0322.

Please DO IT NOW. DON’T DELAY.

For More Info

If you wish to compose your own letter, say for other areas, the following resources may help:

Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/4/26

3050 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Results of Alleged TCEQ Investigation into Massive Sand-Mine Breach

1/2/25 – According a Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) investigation, a massive breach of an abandoned sand mine on the West Fork San Jacinto in August 2025 was “an unforeseen incident.” The report also says that the new owner of the property wants to use the pit as a “recreational pond for livestock management.”

That conjures up this image created by ChatGPT.

However, the breach was far from a laughing matter. On 8/24/25, I documented a massive breach that clogged the San Jacinto West Fork with sediment.

So what’s going on here?

Ultimately, TCEQ issued no citations or fines.

That much is certain.

TCEQ Report Sketchy on Details

I and three readers reported the breach to TCEQ, which has responsibility for supervising sand mines. Four months later, at noon on New Year’s Eve, we each received the official report of TCEQ’s alleged investigation. As with similar breaches downstream, TCEQ noted the incident, but took no action.

Here’s a brief summary:

  • TCEQ sent four investigators to the site on 8/25/25. They noted no active sand mining and they issued no violations, fines, or citations.
  • TCEQ consulted the Montgomery County Appraisal District database. They found that a company called AGS Unlimited Montgomery, LLC had purchased the property on August 1, 2025, only weeks before the breach.
  • TCEQ phoned a “managing member” of AGS, Mr. Andrew Shebay IV, on September 2, 2025. Mr. Shebay reportedly described the incident as “unforeseen” and said he had conversations with the Montgomery County Floodplain Administrator and Army Corps about “managing the situation.”
  • According to TCEQ, Shebay says he intends to use the pond “as a recreational pond for livestock management.” (That conjured up the comical image above, which I clearly intend as parody.)

To see TCEQ’s full report, click: https://reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2091112-Compl-Letter-4_Redacted.pdf.

This alleged investigation is consistent with other alleged TCEQ investigations into breaches of sand-mine dikes. Alleged TCEQ investigators observe problems, but rarely recommend fines or citations.

Owner Claims Breach was Accidental

The comical TCEQ claim – that a pond likely 60-90 feet deep – would be used as a livestock spa, made me want to investigate further. So I called the owner myself. He was cordial and open, and we talked for more than twenty minutes.

Here’s a picture of the breach as it was happening.

Breach in abandoned sand mine on San Jacinto West Fork on 8/24/25
Breach of sand mine dike near East River Road and Walker Road in August.

Mr. Shebay said a third-party contractor was trying to install a drain pipe and spillway to help prevent flooding of adjacent properties in the future. And in fact, I photographed both drain pipes and earthmoving equipment at the site on the day of the breach.

Breach in abandoned sand mine on San Jacinto West Fork on 8/24/25
Corrugated pipe photographed near earthmoving equipment on day of breach.
Breach in abandoned sand mine on San Jacinto West Fork on 8/24/25
Excavator near breach (upper right)

However, Shebay claims a third-party contractor failed to follow engineering plans, causing the breach. The breach was accidental, he says. Things just got out of control.

Breach in abandoned sand mine on San Jacinto West Fork on 8/24/25
Sand and sediment expelled through the breach clogged the West Fork.

New Owner’s Plans for Abandoned Mine Not Yet Clear

Shebay’s plans for the abandoned mine are not yet finalized. At various points in our conversation, he mentioned a boat launch, a kid’s camp, a recreational amenity for an adjacent residential community, and selling wetland-mitigation credits.

His ultimate use for the property depends on several things. Foremost among them is the routing of new high-tension electrical wires. He says Entergy will not finalize a route until the end of 2026. He also says that that has kept him from finalizing plans.

If Entergy chooses a route too near his pit, he says, that could rule out plans that involve children. He sees a safety issue.

Re: the wetland mitigation credits, an environmental expert I consulted said that the owner would need to create wetlands first before he could sell credits. That’s not likely to happen here. Why?

Wetlands are typically very shallow, i.e., swamps, bogs and marshes. However, previous owners took sand out of this pit for 20 years, sometimes with two dredges operating simultaneously. And other West Fork mine owners have told me they often dredge pits to 60-90 feet.

Yet this mine’s new owner claims he has no plans to fill the pond. So selling wetland-mitigation credits is unlikely.

Re: fixing the breach, Mr. Shebay says he’s looking for crushed concrete to help fill it and stabilize the pond wall. He also says that he’s made arrangements with a nearby residential development that’s digging a detention basin to take their clay for the same purpose.

Use of Word “Alleged”

You likely noticed my use of the world “alleged” in regard to the TCEQ investigation above. That’s out of frustration.

TCEQ used the adjective “alleged” five times in its report before the nouns “concern,” “incident,” “complaints” and “violation.” Using “alleged” before “violation” is valid; “Violation” assumes a conclusion not yet verified by investigators or a court.

However, the “complaints” are not alleged; they are real. So was the “incident”; I have photos and video to prove it, and TCEQ verified it. And to imply that someone’s “concerns” are alleged is just downright insulting.

The language in alleged TCEQ investigations insults anyone who seeks their help. No wonder the TCEQ has lost so much credibility.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/2/25

3048 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Top Flood-Related Stories of 2025: Part III – Mitigation Slowdown Becomes Election Issue

12/30/25 – Part III of the top flood-related stories of 2025 concerns a slowdown in flood-mitigation activity at Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) and how it is already becoming an issue in the election of a new Harris County Judge. Let’s look at the slowdown part first.

Spending Drops for Fifth Year

The graph below illustrates the slowdown.

HCFCD spending through Q3 2025
HCFCD 2018 Bond spending through Q3 2025. Approximately 60% of bond/partner funds remain unspent 8.5 years after Harvey. The bond was originally sold as a 10-year program.

That slowdown means people live with higher flood risk than necessary.

Potential Loss of $322 Million in Partner Funding At Stake

The slowdown also puts 11 grants totaling $322 million at risk.

That’s the total of Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Relief (CDBG-DR) to Harris County from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Texas General Land Office (GLO) administers those grants for HUD.

All have a firm deadline of 2/28/2027, according to the GLO. But most have not even been advertised for bids yet and won’t be until the first quarter of next year.

CDBG-DR projects highlighted in red have not yet been bid or bids have not yet been awarded. All must be completed by 2/28/27.

Only one CDBG-DR project so far is in construction: Arbor Oaks. Brookglen bidding has closed. Three others are still in bidding: Lauder, Greens Mid-Reach, and Keegans. Others highlighted above haven’t even started bidding yet.

It typically takes three to four months from advertising a project for bids until a winner is selected, Commissioners Court approves the award, contracts are signed and a notice to proceed is issued. That leaves less than a year for construction on most of these projects. And many could take longer than a year to build, if history is any guide.

T.C. Jester Project Illustrates Problem

For instance, HCFCD has issued a press release saying that construction of the T.C. Jester East Basin (partially funded by CDBG-DR dollars) will not finish until Q4 of 2028. HCFCD finished the preliminary engineering review in 2021.

T.C. Jester project area on Cypress Creek. The small basin (r) will expand to cover most of the forested area in center.

It’s all part of a bigger story about the slowdown and complacency. Collectively…

“We have lost the sense of urgency that once fueled our flood mitigation crusade after Hurricane Harvey.”

Bob Rehak

According to an HCFCD press release, $20 million HUD CDBG-DR dollars are at risk for one of the three detention basin compartments that will be built on the site above. But the project also involves funding from other sources. State Rep Sam Harless secured $12 million for the project through the Texas Water Development Board.

If the HUD funding falls through, what will happen to the state money? There likely wouldn’t be enough money to complete the project.

Screen capture from HCFCD Press Release Dated 12/5/25. Expected completion is at least 1.5 years after HUD deadline.

Two additional stormwater detention basin compartments on the east side of TC Jester have longer deadlines, but are scheduled to finish earlier in 2028 – ten years after the flood bond and eleven years after Harvey! They involve funding from FEMA (via Congressman Dan Crenshaw).

Any time you get two departments of the federal government (each with their own rules), the state government (with its own rules), and county government (with its rules), things get complicated. And the current leadership in Harris County has added bureaucracy that has contributed to the slowdown.

Lancton Makes Slowdown an Election Issue

The potential loss of funding has already become a campaign issue in the Harris County Judge election year.

Candidate Marty Lancton, now endorsed by Governor Abbott, has jumped on it. He issued this statement.

“The implementation of CDBG funds has taken an unacceptably long amount of time. As County Judge, I will ensure that every Harris County department is thoroughly evaluated to identify and implement process improvements. The Harris County Flood Control District will be among the first departments reviewed.”

Lancton continued, “In developing the current funding priorities, three commissioners and the current County Judge established a project list that did not adequately prioritize initiatives with the greatest potential impact, nor did it sufficiently account for whether projects could realistically be completed within the required timelines.

“As County Judge, I will ensure that taxpayer dollars are invested responsibly and that funding priorities are established based on effectiveness, feasibility, and measurable benefit to Harris County residents. Finally, I will work closely with HUD and the Texas General Land Office to improve coordination and accelerate the implementation of projects that protect and serve the people of Harris County.”

Lancton is a long time leader of first responders and is extremely aware of flood risk.

In major storms, Cypress Creek is usually one of the hardest hit areas in the County. For people who live in that area as well as downstream areas, such as Lake Houston, flood-risk reduction can’t come fast enough.

In the last 125 years, we’ve been hit with major floods 48 times. We were lucky this year. But it’s only a matter of time before one strikes again. We must be prepared.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/30/2025

3045 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Top Flood-Related Stories of 2025: Part II – Regs and Funding

12/28/2025 – This is the second part of a three part series on the top flood-related stories of 2025. Part I covered the major disasters of the year. Part II will cover the government response in terms of regulations and funding for flood mitigation efforts. And Part III will cover the progress of mitigation.

Government Response to Camp Mystic/Guadalupe Tragedy

Hearings on the Camp Mystic disaster last July identified a failure of warning signs (weather reports, alarm systems, etc.) as one of the primary causes. Investigations also discovered that the camp’s operators lobbied for changes to flood maps so that they could build in floodplains. And then they evidently expanded the camp before regulators became aware. Finally, evacuation plans were evidently not well communicated or understood.

In response, the Texas Legislature passed the Heaven’s 27 Camp Safety Act (a reference to the number of young girls who died at Camp Mystic). The act bars camp cabins in high risk areas. It also requires camps to have state-approved emergency plans, regular evacuation drills and disaster alert systems.

Lawmakers approved nearly $300 million “to boost flood preparedness, including $200 million to match federal disaster aid, $50 million for local grants to purchase flood warning equipment and $28 million to improve weather forecasting.” A companion bill also expanded government oversight of youth camps.

FEMA Cancels BRIC Program

In April, FEMA announced that it is ending the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program and canceling all BRIC applications from Fiscal Years 2020-2023.

It also canceled the fiscal year 2024 notice of funding opportunity (NOFO), involving $750 million for grants. 

BRIC was FEMA’s largest pre-disaster mitigation program. Congress established it through the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018. Its purpose: to fundamentally shift federal-disaster spending from post-disaster recovery to pre-disaster risk reduction. In other words, to encourage a shift from “Repair” to “Resilience.”

BRIC aimed to prevent disasters by helping communities build to higher standards. Flood-risk reduction grants typically helped finance projects such as:

  • Regional detention and retention basins
  • Flood diversion channels
  • Levee and floodwall construction or upgrades
  • Drainage improvements exceeding minimum code standards
  • Nature-based solutions (wetlands, floodplain restoration)
  • Elevation or floodproofing of critical facilities (hospitals, EOCs, fire stations)

A press release that accompanied the cancellation of the BRIC program called it a “wasteful, politicized grant program.” However, investments in hazard mitigation programs are the opposite of “wasteful,” according to the Association of State Flood Plain Managers. They point to studies showing flood-hazard mitigation investments return up to $8 in benefits for every $1 spent. 

States sued to prevent the cancellation. The lawsuits are still locked up in courts.

Prevention is always cheaper than correction. After Harvey, a Harris County engineering study found 20 times less damage in subdivisions using newer, more stringent building codes compared to those built under older codes.

FEMA Slowdown

Meanwhile, approvals for other types of FEMA grants have slowed. According to The Hill, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Christy Noem has adopted a policy of personally approving all major expenditures that cost $100,000 or more. The Hill article reported $900 million in grants and loans reportedly awaiting Noem’s review.

Separately, in other FEMA news, according to the Washington Post, hundreds of residents signed up for FEMA buyouts after Cat 4 Hurricane Helene devastated the southeast in 2024. Not one has yet been approved. 

HUD/GLO Finish Rebuilding Program

On a more positive note, the Texas General Land Office (GLO) administers U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) flood-mitigation/disaster-relief programs in Texas. The GLO recently announced completion of the rebuilding of more than 9600 homes across the state under its Homeowner Assistance Program (HAP). That total includes mostly homes from its Hurricane Harvey disaster recovery mission. But it also includes homes impacted by Imelda, Laura, and repetitive flooding events in the Rio Grande Valley.

GLO poster celebrating program completion.

Status of Other GLO/HUD Programs

The GLO continued advancing long-term recovery and resilience by administering more than $1 billion in Community Development Block Grant for Disaster Recovery and Mitigation Projects. Additionally, HUD approved the GLO’s plan for $555 million to help communities impacted by 2024 Disasters.

The GLO completed reviews and approvals of all remaining project applications under the Regional Mitigation Program (RMP), providing funding for critical infrastructure improvements including drainage systems and flood-prevention measures. In total, the GLO has approved more than 200 RMP projects for more than $1.1 billion.

The GLO also approved more than $135 million in applications through the Disaster Recovery Reallocation Program (DRRP). It utilizes unspent disaster recovery funds from older disasters to help communities with outstanding unmet needs. These investments will reduce risk related to hurricanes, tropical storms, flooding, and other hazards.  

The agency also announced it will be closing applications at the end of the year for both the Local Hazard Mitigation Plans Program (LHMPP) and the Resilient Communities Program (RCP). Both are part of the GLO’s long-term strategy to help communities strengthen local planning efforts, modernize codes, and protect life and property from future disasters.

Montgomery County Updates Flood Regulations

Eight years after Harvey, Montgomery County finally adopted new subdivision, floodplain, and drainage regulations.

The county adopted its new subdivision (development) regulations on March 4, then amended them on May 27 and October 14. MoCo also issued subdivision guidelines and recommendations on November 4.

Commissioners adopted a new Drainage Criteria Manual on August 26. And new Floodplain Management Regulations became effective on October 1, 2025.

While MoCo regs don’t perfectly reflect the Minimum Drainage Standards recommended by Harris County for other counties draining into it, they are a great improvement.

Competing Forces at Work

Flood safety is a constant struggle between competing forces that increase or reduce flood risk. There are so many, the public can hardly know whether it’s winning or losing.

Just because the government appropriates money, doesn’t mean it’s enough or will be spent promptly.

Even if it is, will it actually reduce risk in the face of offsetting factors such as legislative loopholes, grandfather clauses, willful blindness, the profit motive, shifting political winds, and insufficiently mitigated upstream development?

And maybe that’s THE Top Flood-Related Story of 2025. More on that tomorrow.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/28/2025

3043 Days since Hurricane Harvey