4/9/2026 – Another “lesson learned” about flooding since Hurricane Harvey has been role of sedimentation from industrial-scale sand mining upstream from Lake Houston. It can only be appreciated from the air.
May 2024 flood at Hallett Mine on San Jacinto West Forknear Northpark Drive in Kingwood.Note the difference in water quality in the ditch.
Few, if any, urban watersheds have such dense clusters of sand mines directly upstream from their water reservoirs in major river channels. This is one of the most distinctive features of flooding in the San Jacinto Watershed.
The mines not only contribute to flooding in an outsized way, they impair water quality, damage the environment and harm wildlife.
Chronic Sediment Mobilization During Floods
Most erosion happens during floods. And most sediment moves during floods.
More than 20 square miles of sand mines in the floodway and floodplains of the San Jacinto immediately upstream from Lake Houston provide a ready source of exposed sediment, ripe for mobilization.
I have photographed:
Sand mines pumping sediment over and through dikes
Dike failures.
Rivers capturing sand pits during floods
Mines dumping sediment directly into rivers
See a small sampling of photos below.
LMI sand mine on West ForkBreach of sand-mine dike into San Jacinto West ForkBreach of Triple PG mine dike into Caney Creek in East Fork Watershed. Mine dumping sediment in West ForkSame mine overflowing onto neighboring properties and then West ForkPit capture at Hallett Mine. River now flows through mine instead of around it.FM2090 is now threatened by the East Fork which has rerouted itself through an abandoned sand mine.Pipelines carrying highly volatile liquids undercut by erosion from sand mine on West Fork.East Fork Sand Mine undercutting more pipelines and leaking into Caney Creek Abandoned sand mine equipment leaking oil into West ForkRusting dredge in abandoned sand mine in Humble on North Houston AvenueConfluence of Spring Creek and West Fork in August 2019. TCEQ cited Liberty Mines for discharging 56 million gallons of white sludge into the West Fork.Sand freshly deposited during Harvey blocked West Fork 90%, according to Army Corps. Farther downriver, a mouth bar blocked the West Fork backing water up into thousands of homes and businesses. Army Corps has since dredged this.
The Houston area certainly isn’t the only place in the U.S. with alluvial floodplain mining. But rarely, if ever, do such practices take place with such impunity so close to the water supply for two million people.
For More Information
See the sand-mining page of this website for Best Practices in the U.S. and abroad; academic studies on sand mining; Texas sand mining laws/regulations; observations; and tax appraisal practices. An investigation found that virtually all of the sand mines shown above are in Montgomery County which taxed them as ag- and timberland rather than depleting assets.
Also search on the tag “sand mining” to find more than 300 posts containing thousands of pictures of mining practices in the San Jacinto River Basin.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/9/26
3145 Days since Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/RJR_4154-e1775771233982.jpg?fit=1100%2C733&ssl=17331100adminadmin2026-04-09 16:19:172026-04-09 16:47:27Role of Industrial-Scale Sand Mining in Lake Houston Area Flooding
4/8/26 – Water extraction from aquifers, driven by population growth, causes subsidence. It is a well-recognized phenomenon across the U.S. and in southeast Texas. Here in the Lake Houston Area, differential subsidence is creating a bowl in the landscape that amplifies flood risk for people in southern Montgomery and northern Harris Counties.
Let’s look first at how, why and where subsidence happens. That understanding will help explain how it amplifies flood risk in the Lake Houston Area.
How Subsidence Happens
Extraction of groundwater – faster than nature recharges it – can cause silt and clay layers underground to compact. That compaction is permanent. Think of smashing a brownie; it will never regain its original shape. Innumerable tiny voids in the soil (or brownie) disappear, causing the surface above to sink.
Population growth creates demand for the water in those aquifers, often at the fringes of major metropolitan areas. Developers build new subdivisions faster than water authorities can build pipelines to them from local surface water supplies, such as lakes.
Drilling wells is a much faster, more cost-effective solution at that stage of development – for both the water authorities and developers.
Plus, it’s not just the cost of the pipeline. You need to consider the cost of the water treatment plant. Both together can cost billions of dollars – far more than even a large subdivision could support.
Houston’s new Northeast Water Treatment Plant under construction in 2020. Projected cost was $1.7 billion.
Where Subsidence Happens
As a result, subsidence afflicts fast-growing regions across the U.S. Several examples include:
NASA reports that that more than half of infrastructure in major cities such as New York, Baltimore, and Norfolk is built on land that sank, or subsided, by 1 to 2 millimeters per year between 2007 and 2020. Land in several counties in Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia sank at double or triple that rate.
To feed the hungry growing population of the U.S., agricultural interests in the California’s San Joaquin Valley began over-pumping groundwater in the 1920s. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the land surface there had subsided 30 feet by 1980.
The city subsided 5 feet by 1980. But fast-growing Las Vegas extracts three times more groundwater than the natural recharge rate to this day. Subsidence in northern parts of the city forced residents to relocate.
During the last 100 years, Houston has consistently ranked among the fastest-growing major U.S. cities according the Census Bureau, frequently placing in the top five and even top two. Its subsidence problems are legendary. Parts of Baytown subsided more than 10 feet before the formation of the Harris-Galveston Subsidence District, causing the Brownwood subdivision to sink beneath Galveston Bay.
Differential Subsidence in the Lake Houston Area
But subsidence is not just a coastal issue. It also can threaten areas far inland. According to Mike Turco, general manager of the Harris-Galveston Subsidence District, areas in Spring has subsided by almost 4 feet and the area around spring has subsided by about 4 feet. Recent subsidence rates in Spring have generally been between 0.5 and 1.0 foot per decade. That’s much faster than at the Lake Houston Dam. So, in effect, we’re creating a bowl in the landscape.
And that bowl amplifies flood risk.
Even though homes may be 75-100 feet above sea level, they may only be one foot above the floodplain.
As water, from say Spring Creek or the San Jacinto West Fork, goes into that bowl, it increases erosion on the upstream side and deposition on the downstream side. That deposition contributes to pooling within the bowl. A double whammy.
So, when a major storm comes along homes may have had their “freeboard factor” wiped out. In engineering and insurance, “freeboard” means your “safety margin above the floodplain.” Live in a place long enough and you may find water creeping closer and closer to your home in successive storms.
Of course, subsidence is only one of many factors that could cause that. But it amplifies those other factors and increases your flood risk.
Woodloch Subdivision damage near San Jacinto West Fork in Southern Montgomery County from May 2024 flood.
To complicate matters for the poor homeowners shown in the picture above, Dallas-based Scarborough recently purchased 5,300 acres nearby between Spring Creek and the West Fork. Any new subdivisions built on that property would use well-water and further contribute to subsidence.
For More Information
Your safety ultimately depends on maintaining a healthy safety margin – much like the distance between you and the car in front of you on the freeway. We’ve all seen what can happen without enough distance.
For a discussion of other factors that contribute to flood risk, see the Lessons page of this website.
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/20240522-RJR_3549.jpg?fit=1100%2C733&ssl=17331100adminadmin2026-04-08 13:04:282026-04-09 14:11:04How Subsidence Amplifies Flood Risk in Lake Houston Area
Flat terrain is one of the most under-appreciated aspects of flood risk. It complicates virtually every aspect of flood control.
Flat terrain increases flood risk primarily by reducing the speed of runoff. It causes water to pool rather than drain away. Also, lack of gradient lets floodwaters spread wider, increases sedimentation, backs water up into storm sewers, and creates unpredictable backwater effects.
Spreading Wider
In steep, mountainous areas, a one-foot rise in a river can be relatively contained; it won’t spread out much. But in flat areas, water spreads out easily. Even a slight rise in water level can submerge numerous properties. And that water may not drain away quickly. As water fills channels, it backs up water into storm sewers and may cause street flooding.
Increases in rainfall can also shift floodplain boundaries significantly, as we saw recently with the introduction of new draft flood maps based on Atlas 14. Homes once considered outside of floodplains are now within them.
Increasing Sedimentation
Flat terrain also makes rivers move slowly. This enables suspended sediment to settle and reduces a river’s capacity to convey stormwater, leading to more frequent flooding.
It can also lead to the creation of sand bars, especially where rivers meet standing bodies of water, such as Lake Houston. During Harvey, we saw “mouth bars” grow thousands of feet on the East and West Forks above Lake Houston.
San Jacinto West Fork Mouth Bar after Hurricane Harvey
Mouth bars are sand bars found at the mouths of rivers. Such blockages create partial sediment dams that back water up and promote even more deposition upstream. For instance, see below.
Farther upstream from the West Fork mouth bar, additional freshly deposited sand during Harvey reduced West Fork conveyance by 90% at this location, according to the Army Corps.
The Army Corps has since dredged the West Fork. However, while dredging can temporarily deepen a channel, it does nothing to increase the slope (gradient). Without a steeper slope, the river remains slow, and new sediment quickly refills the dredged areas.
In steep river systems, flood waves pass quickly. But in Southeast Texas, flood waves move slowly down rivers. Peaks linger and lengthen. This increases the probability that the peaks will synchronize, i.e., stack on top of each other.
That’s especially true in large storms, such as hurricanes, that may stall over an area for days and dump rain uniformly across the region. Stormwater peaks from different tributaries then stack on top of each other as they moves downstream.
The highest flooding in Harris County during Harvey occurred at the confluence of Spring Creek (L) and West Fork (R). Looking NW from over I-69 Bridge.
Other Backwater Effects
The low gradient of streams in southeast Texas makes them extremely sensitive to a variety of backwater effects.
In flat river basins like the San Jacinto, Trinity and Brazos, mild slopes amplify “backwater effects.” Examples include
Bridges, culverts, sand bars, levees, dikes, and new developments
Can constrict conveyance and back water up
Same confluence as shown above but from a different angle shows how floodplain fill is constricting floodplain storage and the floodway near a critical choke point, the I-69 Bridge
Implications for Policy Making
In low gradient systems, many streams become hydraulically coupled during floods. So, basin-wide coordination is essential.
West Fork sand mine frequently inundated by floods illustrates need for vegetative controls to reduce erosion.
Summary
To summarize, in flat coastal plains with low-gradients:
Low slope = low velocity = poor drainage
Water spreads laterally instead of moving quickly downstream, flooding many structures
Stormwater from different tributaries has a higher chance of stacking up
Sediment accumulates faster
Infrastructure bottlenecks can have large spatial impacts.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/7/26
3143 Days since Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
4/6/26 – One of the biggest “lessons learned” from Harvey is that coordinated Joint Reservoir Operations are crucial. The San Jacinto River Basin has two reservoirs controlled by dams. But coordinating their operation to reduce flooding remains elusive after 53 years.
The San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) finished the Lake Conroe dam in 1973, but is still seeking public input on its Joint Reservoir Operations Study. They hope to have a first draft of the study by the end of 2026.
Benefits of Reservoir Coordination
Other authorities around the world have long recognized the benefits of coordinating the operations of multiple dams on their rivers. Benefits include:
Enhanced flood control and mitigation – By acting in tandem, dams can reduce flood peaks more efficiently than isolated dams.
Improved water security and drought resilience – Coordinated dam systems can manage water storage across a basin to alleviate water stress during dry seasons.
Reduced sediment transport – Tandem operation can reduce peak flows that cause heavy erosion, clogging rivers and downstream lakes.
Increased hydropower generation – Although not a factor in the San Jacinto Basin, coordinated operations allow water to be used multiple times as it passes through a series of dams, exponentially increasing total energy output from the same water resource.
Environmental sustainability – Strategic releases of water can sustain downstream ecosystems, habitats, and species, as seen in the U.S. Sustainable Rivers Program.
Improved navigation and trade – A system of coordinated locks and dams can regulate river flow consistently, facilitating the transport of goods via barges and promoting regional economic development.
Water security – Upstream dams can supplement the water supply in downstream dams that may support major metropolitan areas. Lake Conroe, for instance, provides backup to the smaller Lake Houston, which is the primary water supply for more than 2 million people.
River Authorities that Manage Multiple Dams for Flood Control
Examples of coordinated management abound. Take for instance:
In Texas, the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA) provides a textbook example of coordinated dam management for flood control through the Highland Lakes system. The LCRA manages a “staircase” of six dams northwest of Austin. All six assist with flood mitigation. They operate as an integrated unit to protect downstream communities.
Tennessee Valley Authority manages a network of 9 main-river dams and 22 tributary dams. The system is designed to catch heavy runoff in tributary reservoirs before it reaches the main river, significantly reducing flood risks for downstream cities like Chattanooga. The TVA operates these dams as a single unit. That way, they also ensure a consistent water depth of at least 11 feet along the entire 652-mile main channel. That lets 28,000 barges transport goods annually.
California Department of Water Resources found that “weather-informed reservoir operations” at Lake Oroville and New Bullards Bar Reservoir can further reduce flood risk for communities along the Yuba and Feather rivers during extreme atmospheric river storm events and potentially benefit water supply during drier periods.
In the Delaware River Basin, a “flexible flow management program” mitigates flooding impacts immediately downstream of reservoirs.
Two Key Houston-Area Reservoirs Have Different Missions, Management
So, why can’t the SJRA manage two dams?
For one thing, SJRA only controls Lake Conroe. The Coastal Water Authority controls Lake Houston.
For another, the two dams have slightly different goals and radically different construction.
Lake Conroe was conceived as a water supply and flood control reservoir (even though SJRA now claims Lake Conroe is strictly for water supply). Lake Conroe’s tainter gates can release 150,000 CFS.
Lake Houston, on the other hand, is primarily for water supply. It has limited flood control capability because of its fixed height spillway. Lake Houston has only four small gates with a combined release capacity of 10,000 cubic feet per second (CFS).
Engineers are currently studying ways to add more and bigger tainter gates to Lake Houston. The current plan under study would boost the release rate to 78,000 CFS, thus matching the highest release rate ever from Lake Conroe (during Harvey). That would enable better coordination between the dams.
Why It Matters
Timing of releases can materially affect downstream flooding in a densely developed floodplain. During Harvey, a wall of water 11 feet high was going over the Lake Houston spillway. 16,000 homes and 3300 businesses behind the dam flooded. It backed water up for miles. Lake Houston’s Dam had 5X more water going over it than Niagra Falls usually does – enough to fill NRG Stadium in 3.5 minutes – 425,000 CFS.
Lake Houston Dam During Harvey. Can you even see the gates at the right end of the spillway?
Twenty percent of all homes and forty percent of all businesses in the area were affected.
Lake Houston Area Flood Task Force
Getting the water out faster is crucial. But it must be done safely. In a way that doesn’t hurt downstream interests.
While Coastal Water Authority figures out how to add more gates, SJRA is building a forecasting tool for the entire watershed that has the potential to:
Improve coordination between the dams
Inform decisions about pre-releases and gate operations
See ReduceFlooding’s new Lessons page for more “lessons learned” about flooding. It’s my attempt to distill my most important findings from more than 3000 posts since Harvey.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/6/26
3142 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/LakeHoustonDamDuringHarvey.jpg?fit=1500%2C968&ssl=19681500adminadmin2026-04-06 13:24:242026-04-06 18:17:53Reservoir Coordination Still Elusive After 53 Years
4/5/26 – Today’s “lesson learned” from almost nine years of research into flooding is about the counterintuitive “Limitations of Multiple Small Detention Basins at Watershed Scale.”
Research shows that hundreds of small ponds built during subdivision construction do little to reduce flooding at the watershed scale and may increase it in places. A 2009 National Academies study found (Page 422) that “In many cases the site-by-site approach has exacerbated downstream flooding and channel erosion problems as a watershed is gradually built out.”
Regional stormwater detention basins are superior to multiple small, on-site basins because they offer better flood control, higher water-quality treatment, and increased cost efficiency.
Regional basins effectively manage large-scale runoff from multiple developments by providing comprehensive peak flow reduction. Simultaneously, they reduce the maintenance burdens and land-use inefficiencies of scattered, small, and often poorly maintained small ponds.
With the exception of Lake Conroe, the 2,500 square miles upstream from the Lake Houston Area in the upper San Jacinto River Basin has no other regional detention basins/reservoirs as of this writing. And Lake Conroe controls only 13% of the watershed flowing into Lake Houston.
How Detention Basins Work
The goal of detention basins in general is to ensure post-development runoff is less than or equal to pre-development rates. That’s important because increases in impervious cover during development increase the speed of runoff. So floods peak faster and higher.
Detention basins do nothing to reduce the total amount of runoff. They just spread it out over a longer time. And that spread increases the probability that peak flow from one tributary will stack on top of another peak somewhere downstream in the river systems branching structure.
Peak Stacking
While detention basins effectively reduce peak flows at individual sites, they don’t necessarily reduce peak flows everywhere because of this stacking effect.
A flood-frequency analysis of large European river basins found that “If a flood peak in the main river is superimposed by a simultaneous peak from a tributary, the magnitude of the flood peak may be increased significantly downstream.”
This graph illustrates the concept.
What happens downstream when peaks from different tributaries arrive simultaneously instead of separately.
The simultaneousarrival of peak flows from different tributaries can increase the height of a flood even if total volume remains unchanged.
Factors that Contribute to Peak Stacking in Lake Houston Area
Several factors present in the Lake Houston Area increase the probability of this “peak stacking.” They include:
Convergence of many major tributaries and sub-tributaries
Low gradients, flat terrain
Rapid upstream growth
Largely uncontrolled sedimentation reducing conveyance and creating backwater
Detention basins usually have no way to delay or accelerate the timing of releases. Stream levels control timing; when they get low enough, water can start trickling out of the basin. But that’s precisely what maintains peaks longer. And that longer peak increases the probability of peaks merging at confluences instead of arriving at different times.
Regional Detention Prospects Look Bleak for Lake Houston Area
While regional detention may be preferable and more effective than hundreds or even thousands of small detention basins, it is difficult to find space for regional basins – at least with a Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) that justifies the project.
A recent feasibility study on regional detention upstream on Spring Creek offered little hope after developers snapped up the land before the study was completed. The federal government also excluded social benefits from BCR calculations during the study.
The same land could have been purchased decades ago for a fraction of the cost when it was good for nothing but timber. But the BCR would have been even lower because few people lived in the “benefit” area at that time. Damage to structures would have been minimal.
Ten of 16 projects recommended by SJRA’s Master River Basin Drainage Plan involved regional detention basins.
Similarly, HCFCD’s promising Little Cypress Creek Frontier Program, which would have created regional detention, has been cancelled. Harris County Commissioners reportedly felt reluctant to spend money where few people lived.
These examples highlight a systemic problem: Most effective regional detention basin projects with available land are far upstream in their respective watersheds where few people live. That means the people who benefit from them may live across jurisdictional boundaries, such as city or county lines.
For instance, the Spring Creek detention basins were in Waller County. But most of those who benefited from them lived in Montgomery County. That makes financing and managing them more difficult.
Conclusion
Regional detention basins are more efficient and effective than small local detention basins. But until people of the river basin recognize the benefits of working together on flood mitigation, we must live with distributed detention and suffer the consequences.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/5/2026
3141 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/flood_peaks_comparison.png?fit=1979%2C1177&ssl=111771979adminadmin2026-04-05 23:24:242026-04-05 23:50:27Limitations of Multiple Small Detention Basins at Watershed Scale
4/4/26 – States, counties and communities across the U.S. prioritize flood mitigation over flood prevention, despite FEMA studies that have found prevention costs up to 5-6X less than correction. What types of costs?
Examples of Mitigation Costs
Examples of mitigation costs include:
Post-flood buyouts: Government often buys and demolishes homes after repeated flooding.
Levees/dams/detention basins/channel improvements: Expensive to build and maintain — and they can fail.
Flood insurance subsidies: Taxpayers often foot the bill via programs like the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which is deeply in debt.
Examples of Prevention Costs/Strategies
Examples of much more cost-effective Prevention Strategies include:
Zoning restrictions to keep development out of high-risk zones.
Green infrastructure like wetlands that absorb floodwaters.
Elevated buildings or flood-resistant designs where development is unavoidable.
Parks,buying out land, and conservation easements before development occurs.
Kingwood’s East End Park provides habitat and recreation while improving the value of neighboring homes and distancing them from flooding.
While development in floodplains may seem cheaper at first, the long-term economic, environmental, and social costs almost always outweigh the initial savings.
National Subsidies Distort Local Priorities
So, why do the inverted priorities persist? The developer reaps the profit, but taxpayers bear the costs. Economists call it an “externality problem” when the production or consumption of a good, such as housing, imposes unintended costs or benefits on third parties not involved in the transaction.
In this case, the availability of cheap, nationally subsidized flood insurance distorted the market for floodplain properties by insulating buyers and lenders from the true costs of flooding.
And when flooding did happen, FEMA and HUD were there to help bail out local communities with hundreds of billions of dollars of flood mitigation grants.
As a result…
The U.S. chronically underinvests in mitigation and over-relies on post-disaster funding.
We see this economic and policy pattern across the U.S. and locally.
Scarborough Example
For instance, in the Lake Houston Area, residents are fighting a 5,300+ acre development upstream from the I-69 bridge where the San Jacinto West Fork, Spring Creek, Cypress Creek and Turkey Creek all converge. It is one of the most flood-prone parcels in south Texas and large parts of it have just been reclassified as “floodway.”
Unbelievably, the Texas General Land Office (GLO) is helping bankroll the development. The GLO is also responsible for distributing billions of dollars of federal flood-mitigation aid in Texas. (Somebody needs to write President Trump!)
For More Information
To learn more about the cost of prevention versus correction, see:
For more on other causes of flooding, see the Lessons page of ReduceFlooding.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/4/26
3140 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SJR_704_048-e1612057029212.jpg?fit=1200%2C811&ssl=18111200adminadmin2026-04-04 17:34:192026-04-04 17:41:52How U.S. Prioritizes Flood Mitigation Over Flood Prevention
Infrastructure bottlenecks reveal themselves during extreme events. This is a universal phenomenon. Bridges, culverts, and channel constrictions control flood elevations behind them.
You see this everywhere around the world. It’s a well studied phenomenon. Let’s look at two areas.
Openings then catch debris floating downstream, further reducing the conveyance of the river. Forested basins supply large wood during storms. Inlet plugging is common. Debris blockage can reduce culvert capacity by 30–80%.
This is especially acute in Appalachia because of steep basins susceptible to flash flooding and the fact that roads usually follow streams. They can have many crossings per mile.
Older culverts and bridges may have been designed in previous eras when engineers anticipated smaller storms. You see scour at outlets where water churns, trying to get under the bridge. You also see jetting on the downstream side. Both lead to channel instability.
In June 2016, West Virginia experienced one of the worst floods in its history. After the event, U.S. Geological Survey, Federal Highway Administration and West Virginia Department of Transportation documented:
Hundreds of culvert and small bridge failures
Widespread road overtopping and washouts
Extensive debris blockage at inlets
Excessive erosion and sedimentation downstream.
NOAA photo from 2016 West Virginia Flood
Houston-Area Examples
In the Houston area, we see the same hydraulic constraint issues.
FM1010 culverts could not handle the drainage from new upstream development larger than Manhattan.
I-69 Bridge Over West Fork
TxDot had to replace part of the I-69 bridge over the San Jacinto West Fork while residents endure massive traffic jams because of scouring under the supports for the southbound lanes.
Replacement took almost a year.
UPRR Bridge over West Fork
Union Pacific’s Bridge over the San Jacinto West Fork was destroyed by Harvey. Trees washing downstream formed a dam that raised the flood level.
Tree Lane Bridge
Multiple floods backed water up behind the Tree Lane Bridge over Bens Branch in Kingwood. They raised water levels upstream as jetting scoured bridge supports on the downstream side. The bridge has been repaired several times since Harvey.
Tree Lane bridge after Imelda in 2019.
Given upstream development, the width was insufficient. Engineers ultimately had to widen the opening of the bridge to let high peak flows pass through.
Rustic Elms Bridge
Up to 600 homes flooded twice in Kingwood’s Elm Grove Village in 2019. The bridge below was one of the problems. The culverts convey less water than the open span design of the West Lake Houston Parkway Bridge over Taylor Gully in the background.
The bridge will soon be replaced as part of a HUD/GLO/HCFCD project.Rustling Elms Bridge underwater as school bus tries to cross it in May 2019.
West Fork Mouth Bar
Eroded sediment washed downstream during Harvey and dropped out of suspension where water slowed as it met Lake Houston. Thousands of homes and businesses flooded behind this sediment dam, which reached more than 10 feet about normal water level.
West Fork mouth bar after Harvey and before dredging. Note the openings under the FM1960 bridge in the background.
FM 1960 Bridge
Post-Harvey analyses revealed a significant constriction in the San Jacinto near the headwaters of Lake Houston. The openings in the FM 1960 causeway across the lake are half the width of upstream and downstream bridges.
John Blount, Harris County Engineer at the time of Hurricane Harvey said he noticed a difference in the water surface elevations on the upstream and downstream sides of the bridge. Downstream was lower by 1-2 feet.
During Harvey, one hundred and ten homes in Kings Forest flooded behind these culverts half clogged with sediment. The City of Houston cleaned them out in 2025.
HCFCD 2019 photo of blocked culverts under Kingwood Drive
Lake Houston Dam
The single biggest blockage in the Lake Houston Area is the Lake Houston Dam. While the dam has a spillway to handle high-water events, it does not have gates with a sufficient release capacity to lower water levels immediately before storms. The City of Houston is designing additional gates that will allow greater coordination with pre-releases from Lake Conroe. And the San Jacinto River Authority is studying ways to coordinate pre-releases.
Earthen portion of Lake Houston Dam where new gates will be added.
I-45 Bridge at Cypress Creek
Harvey’s floodwaters in Cypress Creek were so strong that they literally picked up parts of the southbound I-45 lanes and shifted the bridge. The constriction caused by the bridge backed water up into hundreds of homes.
I-45 southbound feeder over Cypress Creek showing cattywumpus bridge panels
I could go on. But you get the idea. Bridges and culverts restrict flow in large events, creating dangerous backwater. Those bridges and culverts may have been adequate early in their lives, but upstream growth rendered them inadequate.
For more information about other factors that contribute to flooding, see the Lessons page of this website.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/3/26
3139 Days since Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/I69Damage-e1775243525276.jpg?fit=1100%2C733&ssl=17331100adminadmin2026-04-03 14:15:142026-04-03 14:42:25How Infrastructure Bottlenecks Constrain Peak Flows, Cause Local Flooding
4/2/2026 – Across the U.S., fragmented governance increases flood risk by creating a patchwork quilt of local interests that makes regulation, compliance and enforcement difficult.
One might think that our multi-level system of government – federal, state, county, city, improvement districts, etc. – creates defense in depth. In reality, each governmental entity plays by its own rules and is responsible to different groups of voters with different priorities and interests.
The problem is especially visible in large metro regions that involve numerous cities and counties with upstream/downstream conflicts of interest. Watersheds fragment into jurisdictional silos.
People downstream may experience flooding issues decades before upstream residents. And those upstream residents have no incentive to increase their taxes to pay for downstream mitigation.
Fragmented governance, therefore pits groups against each other as development spreads outward.
It also creates an accountability gap – “Not our job!”
And regulatory inconsistency (different rules for detention, rainfall and fill) make it almost impossible to measure the cumulative impact of hydrological changes throughout the watershed.
In any given river basin, we may all be part of the solution. But we don’t all feel the problem. At least, not yet.
Denver’s South Platte Basin
Fragmented governance in the Denver metro—especially in the South Platte River basin—has been a persistent, structural driver of flood risk. A patchwork of cities, counties, special districts, and state/federal agencies manage the basin. The result: coordination gaps that translate directly into flood risk.
Special districts like the Mile High Flood District (MHFD)
MHFD develops regional drainage criteria.However, it does not regulate land use; local governments do. As a result:
Different jurisdictions adopt different stormwater standards, detention requirements, and update cycles
Upstream communities can:
Allow higher impervious cover
Use less conservative rainfall assumptions
Provide insufficient detention
Flows arriving at Denver often stack on top of each other and higher in volume
Cumulative peak flows exceed what any one jurisdiction modeled
No entity is responsible for system-wide flood control.
Need for Basin-Wide Master Planning
According to the EPA, each jurisdiction optimizes locally, not basin-wide. Upstream cities capture the tax base from new development and export their runoff downstream. Meanwhile, downstream, Denver bears the flood risk and mitigation costs.
Denver has acknowledged the need for basin-wide master planning. But historically, many tributaries fell outside FEMA mapping and were handled locally. Imagine every city along a freeway each designing the freeway to meet its own needs. That’s the system in flood control.
Storm sewers, channels, and detention systems do not align across boundaries and have mismatched capacities.
Encroaching development has already narrowed the South Platte floodplain. But no single entity has tracked the loss of floodplain storage.
Furthermore, no one jurisdiction coordinates infrastructure development of bridges and highways where they intersect drainage. Undersized crossings create system-wide backwater effects.
In addition, the South Platte is heavily regulated by upstream reservoirs, which the Army Corps operates. But urban stormwater systems are operated locally and not fully synchronized. Sound familiar?
In Chicago, suburban expansion has increased runoff, but regional drainage capacity has not kept pace.
The Chicago area has even more extreme jurisdictional fragmentation than Denver. Cook County and three surrounding counties have more than 200 municipalities, plus a variety of state and federal agencies all sharing responsibilities for parts of the drainage.
Historically, each county has had different design storms, release rates, and detention requirements. Previously developed areas have had trouble keeping pace with upstream expansion.
The Chicago Area Waterway System also has three main rivers: the Chicago, Des Plaines and Calumet rivers. No single authority controls basin-wide runoff timing, impervious cover, or development in flood-prone areas.
But after several early successes, the program seems to have quietly dropped out of the headlines.
Likewise, the San Jacinto Region 6 Flood Planning Group proposed minimum floodplain management practices throughout the river basin in 2025. But it is strictly an advisory group.
Texas 2036 and the American Flood Coalition hosted an informative seminar on 2/17/26. It emphasized lessons learned from other states about the need for river-basin-wide flood control to help ensure flood resilience.
Everyone seems to recognize the need. But no one seems to have the power to address fragmented governance.
In Texas, we even have a state agency charged with flood mitigation investing in the development of property in floodplains and floodways…and denying FOIA requests to keep the investment secret. That’s how entrenched the problem of fragmented governance has become.
To see how fragmented governance compounds other factors that contribute to flooding, see the Lessons Page of this website.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/2/2026
3138 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
4/1/26 – In my quest to summarize the most important “lessons learned” since Hurricane Harvey, here’s Lesson #3: Floodplain Encroachment. Floodplain encroachment is consistently rated one of the most important drivers of flooding worldwide. Think about it. If people didn’t build in floodplains, no one would flood. But that’s only part of the story. Floodplain development also changes flood assumptions for communities downstream.
Why People Build in Floodplains
Despite the risks, people worldwide build in floodplains. The land usually costs less. And it can yield extraordinary profits to developers lucky or persistent enough to obtain building permits.
After all, people pay premiums to live near water. Water views are prestigious, beautiful and soothing. Plus, historically, living near water translated to “security.” Water sustains life. The need for water is hard-wired into our DNA, our culture, and even our economy.
Once a thriving community. Destruction on Bolivar Peninsula in 2008. Storm surge 15 feet high during Hurricane Ike washed away homes and ripped storm sewers right out of the ground.
Yet during Hurricane Ike in 2008, storm surge reached 30 miles inland in places. And despite being leveled, within 10 years, homes on the vulnerable Bolivar Peninsula had built back.
While I have focused primarily on the Houston Area, floodplain encroachment is a global problem. Nearly all growing metro areas encroach on floodplains – coastal or riverine.
Loss of Natural Storage Can Increase Downstream Flood Elevations
The problem isn’t just “putting people in harm’s way.” It’s also about the loss of natural floodplain storage. In riverine systems, floodplains function as temporary storage reservoirs during overbank flows.
Insufficiently mitigated development can remove that storage volume or prevent it from being accessed.
Apartments and commercial development along Houston’s Brays Bayou
That’s why after Harvey, Houston and Harris County changed floodplain regulations so developers couldn’t bring fill into floodplains. Fill displaces water. Nature compensates for the fill by increasing water surface elevations elsewhere.
Floodplain development can also reduce the duration of floodplain storage, resulting in faster, higher peaks downstream.
See examples below.
Mississippi Floodplain Development
Historically, the Mississippi River occupied a broad alluvial valley tens of miles across in places. It inundated seasonally . Floodplains functioned as massive, temporary storage reservoirs.
Encroachment occurred primarily through federal levee construction under the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and urban/industrial development that occurred later behind the levees.
As a result, floodplain width narrowed dramatically. The levees confined the river’s flow into a narrower channel where floods moved higher and faster, often breaking through levees with devastating consequences.
Levee failure also played a major role in the inundation of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Floodplain encroachment can turn into a vicious feedback loop. Levees reduce frequent flooding. That attracts more investment and development behind the levees. But as the consequences of levee failure increase, there’s more pressure to build higher, stronger levees.
West Fork San Jacinto/Spring Creek Confluence
Closer to home for most of my readers, developers have recently been trying to figure out ways to develop 5,300 acres between the West Fork San Jacinto River and Spring Creek. Virtually the entire area is in floodplain or floodway. Though current flood maps don’t fully reflect the danger, FEMA’s new draft flood maps for the area show part of the property. See below.
Dark blue/gray = floodway. Dark green = 100-year floodplain. Light green = 500-year floodplain.From HCFCD MAAPnext.
A leading hydrologist in the area told me that developing this area would be like “aiming a fire hose at the Humble/Kingwood Area.”
It’s not clear yet what the developer has planned for the site. Both the Texas General Land Office (GLO) and the Texas Attorney General have denied FOIA requests for the plans.
An “externality problem” occurs when the production or consumption of a good, such as housing, imposes unintended costs or benefits on third parties not involved in the transaction. In economic terms, this leads to market inefficiencies. It is a form of market failure. Private costs/benefits differ from social costs/benefits.
For instance, sand mines help produce a raw material needed for concrete. It generates profit for producers. But in their zeal to maximize their profit, they mine too close to rivers and in a manner that exacerbates erosion and sedimentation.
It’s the same way with flooding. Developers profit from building in floodplains. And the vast majority try to do it safely.
Regardless, in 2023, the Joint Economic Committee of Congress estimates that each year flooding costs Americans between $179.8 and $496.0 billion. The total depends on the types of damage included, i.e., structural, lost economic output, infrastructure repairs, insurance losses, decreased tax revenues, transit, deaths, etc.
Assuming the higher flood-damage estimate of nearly half of a trillion dollars, that represents 7% of last year’s entire federal budget. I’d sure like a 7% tax cut. April 15th is two weeks away!
For More Information
For more “lessons learned” about flooding since Harvey, see this website’s Lessons Page.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/1/2026
3137 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Hurricane-Ike-363.jpg?fit=1500%2C993&ssl=19931500adminadmin2026-04-01 19:10:362026-04-02 08:47:26Floodplain Encroachment: Another Consistent Driver of Flooding Worldwide
3/31/26 – Since Hurricane Harvey, one of the dominant themes of more than 3,000 posts on this website has been outdated rainfall assumptions and how flood-infrastructure design lags those assumptions. That design lag contributes to flooding nationwide.
How Infrastructure Design Lags Rainfall Estimates
Almost nine years after Harvey, Harris County finally has new “draft” flood maps issued by FEMA based on Atlas-14 rainfall assumptions. But they won’t take effect for another two to three years. Meanwhile, parts of the region have built and will continue to build infrastructure, homes and businesses based on long-outdated rainfall predictions.
Different regulatory agencies and jurisdictions update at different speeds.
Imagine members of a choir each singing from different songbooks.
These rainfall predictions affect many aspects of flood control and building codes, including:
Stormwater detention basin sizing
Floodplain mapping
Subdivision drainage criteria, i.e., size of storm sewers
Elevation of homes and businesses above the 100-year floodplain and street level
Acceptable foundation types in flood- hazard areas
Building in floodways including width, depth, bracing and other requirements for piers
Where fill can and cannot be used
In 2009, Harris County revised its floodplain development standards. After Harvey, Harris County Engineering compared damage found in subdivisions built before and after the new standards.
Subdivisions built with the updated standards experienced one twentieth the amount of damage.
EVA and the Difficulty of Developing Rainfall Estimates
So getting the rainfall right is important. But why do we get it wrong so often? Rainfall predictions stem from an obscure branch of mathematics, known as EVA (Extreme Value Analysis). With EVA, forecasters try to predict the probability of unobserved future events based on the frequency of somewhat smaller past events.
But there’s a problem. All predictions (500-year storms, etc.) are based on extremely small data sets. EVA may produce the best numbers possible, but predicting 500-years into the future based on 100 years of data takes a lot of guess-work. And we design entire cities based on these probabilities!
And that’s what I mean by the “design lag” problem based on outdated rainfall assumptions. Assumptions change with major new storms, such as Harvey. But we can’t just wave a major wand and change trillions of dollars of infrastructure already in the ground. We are systematically under-designed for current rainfall statistics.
This isn’t just a Houston problem. And it’s not just “in the ground” infrastructure. For example…
Mississippi Levees
Engineers typically design levees to contain a 100-year (1% annual chance) storm. Even small increases in in rainfall when levees constrain a river can produce huge increases in water surface elevation and push crests above levees. We’ve seen this happen recently in 2008 and 2019.
Design lag manifested itself as systemic underestimation of river stage, leading to overtopping of levee defenses.
Street Flooding in New York City
In 2023, extreme rainfall (up to 2.5 inches per hour) snarled the New York metropolitan area. It knocked out subways, commuter rail lines, flooded basements and closed a terminal at LaGuardia. It was the City’s wettest day since 1960 and came just two years after Hurricane Ida killed at least 13 people.
Engineers from previous generations designed storm sewers for much lower peak intensities. Usually, they design urban systems around peak intensities for short time periods (minutes to a few hours). But pre-Atlas 14 standards underestimated those short duration bursts.
Storm sewers were simply designed for much lower peak intensities. Systems failed almost instantly. Subway entrances became inlets for street flooding.
The Lesson Learned
Flooding results not just from rainfall. It results from under-designed infrastructure for rain that falls. For example:
Homes not high enough.
Channels not wide enough.
Storm sewers not big enough.
As a result, NOAA hopes to update rainfall frequency estimates much more frequently in the future. NOAA developed Atlas 14 region-by-region from approximately 2000–2018.
Texas lagged other regions by years. Before Atlas 14, the prior standard (TP-40) dated to 1961. And during that time, Houston grew exponentially. So most of our infrastructure is built to older standards.
NOAA is trying to eliminate the “outdated by the time it’s adopted” issue. But:
Local adoption will still likely lag availability
Regulatory inertia will remain the bottleneck.
See Lessons Page For More Information
For more information about other causes of flooding, see the Lessons page of this website.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 3/31/26
3136 Days since Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/NOAA-Atlas-14-Rainfall-Rates-for-Kingwood.png?fit=976%2C828&ssl=1828976adminadmin2026-03-31 17:07:382026-03-31 17:28:03Outdated Rainfall Assumptions: A Systemic Design-Lag Problem
