FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Assistance Division is attempting to speed up disaster relief with its Swift Current program. The goal is to shorten the disaster/repair cycle for repetitively flooded or substantially damaged properties.
According to a FEMA press release, “Swift Current strives to better align the delivery of flood mitigation funding with the disaster survivor experience. Swift Current seeks to speed up the availability of flood mitigation funding to disaster survivors.”
Rather than rely on annual grant cycles, Swift Current makes money available immediately from a pool of $3.5 billion under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. This is the second of several rounds of assistance.
The application period for this round opened on Nov. 15, 2023 and will close on Jan. 15, 2025. The funding opportunity is available on Grants.gov.
Eligibility Criteria
For Fiscal Year 2023, Swift Current Flood Mitigation Assistance will offer $300 million after flood disasters for eligible individual flood mitigation projects. Eligible projects include:
Repetitively flooded or substantially damaged properties…
Insured by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)…
Following a flood-related disaster event.
Local government agencies must apply for grants first; individuals will be considered sub-applicants and must apply through the local government agency.
You or your local government relief agency can use grants to:
Acquire property, demolish structures and relocate residents
Elevate structures
Dry flood-proof historic residential structures or non-residential structures
Retrofit existing structures and facilities
Mitigate reconstruction
Applicants will meet eligibility criteria if they have received a major disaster declaration for a flood-related disaster event between June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024. Flood-related disaster events include coastal storms, hurricanes, remnants of hurricanes, and floods. Additionally, one of the following criteria must be met:
The state has at least $1 million in prior National Flood Insurance Program claims from June 1, 2022 to disasters declared before May 31, 2024.
The state has 500 or more National Flood Insurance Program claims in a declared flood-related disaster event from June 1, 2022 to May 31, 2024.
75% – 100% Federal Cost Share
Swift Current funds for individual flood-mitigation projects fall into several different categories:
Repetitive Loss
Severe Repetitive Loss
Substantially Damaged
Socially Vulnerable
See below. The federal match varies depending on the category.
All eligible applicants must submit their FY 2023 Swift Current grant applications to FEMA via Mitigation eGrants. Upon Swift Current activation, the application deadline date will be provided to the applicant. All applications must be received by the deadline.
Local governments should consult with their state, tribal, or territorial agency to confirm deadline to submit subapplications for consideration.
This program is sorely needed and highly welcome. I know people whose homes have not yet been repaired from Hurricane Harvey in 2017.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/24/23 with thanks to Congressman Dan Crenshaw
2278 Days since Hurricane Harvey
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Part 3 of a 3-part series – In Part 1 and Part 2 of this series, I discussed root causes of flood damage. Today, let’s start a community brainstorming session about possible ways to address the issues. I’ll briefly summarize each of the root causes, then list three or four ideas to address them. What are your thoughts?
Unreliable Predictions of Future Rainfall
We can’t do anything about the amount of rain that falls from the sky. We can only control how we prepare for it.
Where do we build homes?
How high do we build them?
How much drainage capacity should we build in new subdivisions?
How much impervious cover should we allow?
How much stormwater detention capacity will it take to protect people downstream?
The amount of rainfall we predict forms the design basis for answers to all those questions and more. If you get the prediction wrong, you get the infrastructure wrong. Homes and businesses flood.
Compared to extreme rainfall estimates used through the 1990s, 100-year/24-hour estimates for Houston increased from 13 inches to 18 inches. 100-year events under the old system are now 25-year events.
If you designed a ditch to hold 13 inches of rain and got 18, where would that extra 5 inches go?
It would pond in streets, homes and businesses. The diagram below shows the difference.
Relative cross-sections of a ditch needed to accommodate a 100-year rainfall before and after Atlas 14.
Extreme rainfall probability estimates in this region have increased only twice since the 1960s. So there’s a lot of stormwater infrastructure around us built to old standards. It’s now under capacity. The problem is even worse in older parts of the city.
What can we do to improve reliability of our predictions and minimize this disconnect?
Build larger safety margins into both estimates and regulations. Instead of building one or two feet above the 100-year floodplain, build even higher.
Incorporate a rate of increase for potential climate change. (Note: NOAA is already working on this.)
Conflicting Floodplain Standards and Building Codes
Rural areas around Houston often still use older design standards. Lower standards help attract development because they lower developers’ costs. And more development fuels growth and tax revenue.
But it’s a dangerous bargain. Insufficient mitigation can flood people downstream. And as the region expands, insufficient mitigation will eventually cause even those recently developed areas to flood.
So, how can we get the entire choir singing from the same songbook?
Adopt a statewide or regional approach to development standards that affect flooding.
Create a regional flood authority.
Raise awareness of increased risk in/from areas with lower standards.
Building Too Close to Threats
People often build too close to flood risks, such as rivers. Developers love the cheap land and buyers love proximity to water. Until the floods come, it’s a “win-win” relationship propped up by the availability of nationally subsidized flood insurance. Then people realize they’ve been lulled into a false sense of security and they demand help.
But there may be no room for mitigation. To widen channels or build stormwater detention basins, HCFCD must sometimes buy out whole neighborhoods. That raises costs, extends mitigation timelines, and often creates political conflict.
Possible solutions:
Buy up green corridors along streams before areas develop. Use it for recreation to enhance community health and home values.
Require greater setbacks from rivers, streams, channels and detention basins to create room for future expansion.
Eliminate grandfathering clauses in floodplain regs that allow development in areas that we know will soon become floodways when new maps are released.
Change Benefit/Cost Ratios so that the purchase of raw land next to streams qualifies for federal grants before development occurs. Buying undeveloped land costs less than buying developed. But it’s difficult to estimate the future benefit of conserving undeveloped land.
Upstream Changes that Undermine Downstream Assumptions
Upstream development should not create “adverse impacts” downstream. But it frequently does. It can increase the amount of runoff; increase sedimentation; and make flood peaks build faster, higher, more frequently.
Suddenly, all those design assumptions for roads and developments downstream become invalid.
What do we do?
Protect green spaces next to rivers, streams and channels.
Tax floodplain development at higher rates.
Beef up enforcement to make sure developers don’t cut corners.
Ensure everyone plays by same rules.
Difficulty of Adapting to Those Changes Downstream
Once an area builds out, it’s difficult to expand stormwater infrastructure.
Historical Unwillingness to Fund Flood Mitigation at Meaningful Levels
As memories of major storms recede, so does the sense of urgency to prepare for the next ones. Historically, we have underfunded flood mitigation. Before Harvey, for instance, HCFCD’s budget averaged only $120 million per year.
Increase awareness of issues throughout the region; build consensus around solutions.
Communicate value being created…consistently.
Eliminate political interference in flood control; let professional engineers do their jobs.
Final Recommendations
Making such changes happen will take civic engagement by large numbers of people with a long view. It will also require putting public interest above self interest.
Politicians respond to voters. But they also respond to special interests.
In the end, our leaders must balance competing interests. Reducing future flooding will take relentless incremental change on many fronts. Even when memories of the last disaster fade.
Invitation to Comment
What are your thoughts on ways to mitigate the root causes of flood damage? Please send to me via the contact page of this web site. Remember to indicate whether I can use your name or you need to remain anonymous. I’ll make sure our leaders see your ideas either way.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/22/23
2276 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
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Second in a 3-part Series on the Root Causes of Flood Damage – Yesterday, I posted about three root causes of flood damage. Beyond “too much rain,” they included:
Inaccurate predictions of future rainfall – Why we don’t expect enough and therefore underestimate risk.
Conflicting standards and building codes – How some jurisdictions fail to update and enforce floodplain standards/building codes as a way to compete for development.
Building too close to threats – How some people invest too much confidence in engineering stamps and government approval, and begin thinking of them as safety guarantees.
Today, I’ll discuss three more root causes of flood damage:
Upstream changes that undermine downstream assumptions
Difficulty of adapting to those changes downstream
Historical unwillingness to fund flood mitigation at meaningful levels
Through this series, I hope to distill key lessons from thousands of observations during the last six years.
Upstream Changes that Undermine Downstream Assumptions
As development expands upstream, it sometimes changes the landscape in ways that increase flood risk for people downstream.
The standard in the development industry is to create “no adverse impact.” However, it doesn’t always work out that way as this tragic story dramatizes.
People living downstream from Woodridge along Taylor Gully in Kingwood had never flooded, even during Harvey. Then they flooded twice in 2019 – AFTER Perry Homes and its contractors clearcut 270 acres of forested wetlands upstream.
Montgomery County Appraisal District Records and Interviews
Then Perry Homes bought the steeply sloping land. Their engineer’s plan called for clearing a section, developing stormwater detention basins for it, then moving on to the next section.
But contractors clearcut and graded the entire area all at once, increasing flood risk. Detention basins were only 7% complete at the time of the first flood and less than 23% at the time of the second. Many Elm Grove residents downstream had just finished refurbishing their homes from the first flood when the second struck.
During the ensuing lawsuit and investigation, it came out that Perry’s soil testing firm had taken samples outside of the known wetland areas. Thus, they overestimated the rate of infiltration by up to 10X.
And LJA, their engineering firm, said there were no floodplains. In reality, the floodplains were there; they just hadn’t been mapped – a tragic misrepresentation. The flood survey simply stopped at the county line.
Lawsuits followed. Perry Homes blamed the victims. LJA denied responsibility, saying they owed “no duty” to victims. But investigation showed many problems with their construction practices.
Even had they built the entire detention capacity specified in the plans before the September storm hit, the site would have been 40% short of new Atlas 14 requirements. Montgomery County had not yet adopted Atlas 14. This would have created a deficit in perpetuity.
In addition to damaging the homes of up to 600 downstream residents, sediment discharged from the site also reduced the capacity of Taylor Gully. Harris County Flood Control (HCFCD) had to clean it out and is now looking for ways to expand channel capacity.
After all that, Perry Homes still blamed the flooding on Acts of God, a common ploy in flooding lawsuits.
Had HCFCD and the City of Houston not purchased the property and started increasing detention capacity, downstream residents would likely suffer from more flooding in the future. The only alternative would have been to raise approximately 600 homes.
Perry and its contractors eventually settled the lawsuit two years after the second flood.
Difficulty of Adapting Downstream to Upstream Changes
Luckily, the purchase of the Perry property happened while there was still open land available to increase flood mitigation. That’s not always the case.
Sometimes, homes, schools, and businesses are built before the flood potential is discovered. Then, mitigation becomes much more difficult.
Properties – or even entire subdivisions – must be bought out before channels or stormwater detention capacity can expand.
Halls Bayou provides two examples near I-69. Note the two subdivisions inside the giant detention basins that bracket the freeway.
Streets inside detention basins no longer exist.
This area used to be farmland. Then it rapidly developed. It looks like this today.
Buyouts for the two giant stormwater detention basins started in 2002 after Tropical Storm Allison.
Then HCFCD had to get permits from the City of Houston to demolish the streets. That took several more years.
Construction took three years for each basin; they were completed in 2015 and 2018.
Start to finish, the detention basins took 13 to 16 years.
During that time, we went through Memorial Day, Tax Day and Harvey floods. Those storms, along with Allison and Imelda damaged more than 25,000 structures in the watershed, according to HCFCD Federal Reports, making it one of the most flood-prone in the county.
Worse, we no longer have easy flood-mitigation solutions in this watershed. Even with hundreds of millions of dollars from the GLO, mitigating flood damage will be difficult, expensive and time consuming. It will also be politically controversial because it will likely displace families and even whole neighborhoods.
Historical Unwillingness to Fund Flood Mitigation at Meaningful Levels
Another root cause of flood damage is historical unwillingness to fund flood mitigation at meaningful levels.
We tend to spend more on correction than prevention as you can see from the Woodridge Village example above.
Before the 2018 Flood Bond, HCFCD sometimes had to save up years to build one detention basin.
There was a bump in funding after TS Allison in 2001. But then, for the most part, mitigation spending averaged about $120 million per year through Harvey. Then, we had a large bump in spending with the flood bond.
A greater focus on prevention of flood damage through higher floodplain development standards, monitoring and enforcement could make more money available for mitigation.
Tomorrow, I will focus on more ideas that address the other root causes of flood damage.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/20/2023
2274 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Screenshot-2023-11-20-at-4.18.25%E2%80%AFAM-e1700475638495.png?fit=1100%2C699&ssl=16991100adminadmin2023-11-20 09:48:492023-11-20 10:16:12Root Causes of Flood Damage, Part II
Part 1 of a three part series – We can’t stop flooding because we can’t control rainfall. But we can control flood damage – by regulating where and how we build. So, why do we experience so much flood damage?
If our scientific and regulatory systems always worked, homes would never flood. But they do flood. Why? Root causes include:
Inaccurate predictions of future rainfall
Conflicting standards and building codes
Building too close to threats
Upstream changes that undermine downstream assumptions
Difficulty of adapting to those changes downstream
Historical unwillingness to fund flood mitigation at meaningful levels
To keep this post from getting too long, I’ll consider the first three today, the second three tomorrow, and what we can do about them after that.
Inaccurate Predictions of Future Rainfall
Drainage studies start with worst-case rainfall estimates. When engineers design a community, these estimates form the design basis for:
Channels
Detention basins
Subdivisions
Building codes
Drainage
Roads
How much rain you predict determines how wide the channels need to be, how high buildings should be elevated, etc.
100% of the businesses in Kingwood’s Town Center flooded during Hurricane Harvey. Oops!
Worst-case estimates are based on a branch of mathematics called Extreme Value Analysis (EVA).
By definition, EVA uses extremely small data sets. That limits their reliability.
EVA has one other huge limitation. It assumes stationary, underlying processes. And many believe climate is changing.
From Atlas 14 –NOAA’s most current rainfall probability estimates for the north Houston areaas of 2023. NOAA is already working on Atlas 15 which will incorporate the results of climate change.These estimates vary by zip code.
So, estimates get updated periodically – especially after major storms such as Tropical Storm Allison in 2001 or Hurricane Harvey in 2017. A 1,000-year storm before Harvey is now considered a 100-year storm! But some areas still use estimates from the 1980s. As a result…
The margin of safety you thought you had when you bought your home may not exist today.
To add to the confusion, different areas within a watershed may use different rainfall probabilities. Right now, engineers throughout the region are designing subdivisions that appear to be outside of floodplains but actually are inside of them.
That’s because of inconsistent adoption of new rainfall probabilities. Some areas use lower standards as a way to attract new development. It’s a competitive tool that reduces developer’s costs.
As if the hodgepodge of standards weren’t complex enough for elected officials, regulators, engineers and residents to understand, the environment around us is constantly changing. The population of the Houston region grew 75% since 2000.
Our drainage systems are designed, built and maintained in pieces. At different times. By different people. Using different assumptions, rules, budgets and goals.
Conflicting Standards, Building Codes and Enforcement
That makes it difficult for engineers designing a new subdivision to know what to do.
But a standard has evolved in the industry called “no adverse impact.” The idea: a new development should not cause flood peaks to rise higher or faster downstream.
Engineers estimate adverse impacts by comparing pre- and post-development runoff rates, and recommending flood-mitigation measures such as stormwater detention basins to compensate for any increase in runoff caused by developments. They don’t always get it right.
In addition to the uncertainty discussed above:
Local officials may not want to adopt new higher standards because it could make them less attractive to developers and reducing tax revenue.
Contractors may not always build what engineers designed or regulations specify.
Local regulators may not have the staff to monitor compliance with regulations.
Business people rarely go beyond the minimum that regulations specify because it raises their costs.
A few may cut corners by falsifying drainage studies to reduce their costs.
Whatever the reason(s), consequences can be devastating.
During Harvey, excess stormwater from the Colony Ridge development in Liberty County blew out FM1010, a major evacuation route for tens of thousands of people.As of this writing, it still has not been fixed.
Even when regulations agree between different jurisdictions, outcomes may differ radically. Harris and Liberty Counties, for instance, have virtually identical regulations for the construction of drainage ditches. The regulations are designed to reduce erosion that can, in turn, reduce the conveyance of rivers downstream.
In the example above, the 3-mile long ditch on the right has expanded almost 80 feet between 2017 and 2023.
Google Earth Pro shows ditch was 122 feet wide in 2017 shortly after construction.By 2023, erosion had widened same ditch to 198 feet.
All that erosion contributed to the formation of a 4,000-foot sand bar where the San Jacinto East Fork meets Lake Houston. Sediment drops out of suspension where water slows down as it meets a standing body of water.
East Fork Mouth Bar in 2019
We frequently see similar runoff from sand mines and developments in Montgomery County.
Confluence of Spring Creek and San Jacinto West Fork. Spring forms the dividing line between Harris and Montgomery Counties. Photo taken 11/11/23.
Such sedimentation reduces conveyance at unnatural (accelerated) rates and creates blockages in the river.
West Fork mouth bar in headwaters of Lake Houston. Army Corps found conveyance of West Fork reduced by 90% because of this and similar blockages upstream.
Sedimentation is a maintenance issue everywhere at every scale. The montage below shows representative images of roadside ditches in Harris County that have filled in. During storms, blocked storm pipes trap water in neighborhoods.
Roadside ditches blocked by sediment keep water from reaching bayous and back water up into homes.
Acceptable foundation types in flood- hazard areas
Building in floodways including width, depth, bracing and other requirements for piers
Where fill can and cannot be used
Detention pond requirements
Wind resistance
Elevation above street level
After Harvey, Harris County Engineering compared damage found in subdivisions built before and after the new standards.
Subdivisions built with the updated standards experienced one twentieth the amount of damage.
However, “grandfathering” of new developments under older regulations often contributes to insufficient mitigation that can affect property owners downstream. For instance, one recently completed 77-acre RV park in the Kingwood area has a detention basin that holds half the stormwater required by new regulations, even though it was built after they went into effect.
Building, Buying Too Close to Threats
The goal of many engineering studies is to build “safely” near water. What do you have to do to protect a family from a hundred-year flood?
These scientific-looking studies are incomprehensible to most people. Yet the engineering seals on them create a sense of security. So does the availability of nationally subsidized flood insurance.
Given those reassurances and given that some people will pay a premium to live near water despite the threats, some developers push the envelope into areas prone to flooding. That’s how we get high-density development in floodplains.
Apartments crowd Brays Bayou at Kirby. HCFCD and its partners have spent more than a half-billion dollars since 2000 to mitigate flooding along Brays.
Similarly, some developers pave over wetlands and ponds that are nature’s stormwater detention systems.
Site of Madera development in Montgomery County at FM1314 (north/south) and SH242 (east/west).Same intersection but looking SW. Looking at what used to be wetlands on the NE side of SH242/FM1314.
Loss of these wetlands reduces floodwater storage. Before development, this area was a 10-year flood zone.
It’s sometimes possible to fix flood threats after the fact. But building on properties like you see here leaves little room for mitigation.
More to Follow
Come back tomorrow when I’ll elaborate on three more root causes of flood damage.
Upstream changes that undermine downstream assumptions
Difficulty of adapting to those changes downstream
Historical unwillingness to fund flood mitigation at meaningful levels
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/19/23
2273 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/image-4.jpeg?fit=1226%2C610&ssl=16101226adminadmin2023-11-19 13:14:492023-11-19 14:44:06Why So Much Flood Damage?
11/18/23 – It was a busy week for the new Northpark South development. A Drainage Impact Analysis submitted to Montgomery County for the development at the west end of Northpark Drive shows that the developer intends to drain its property through adjacent sand mines owned by other entities. The analysis does not address potential sedimentation issues.
The developer also applied for several variances from the Houston Planning Commission.
Meanwhile Century Land Holdings of Texas, LLC continued clearing land at the west end of Northpark Drive that borders the sand pits along the West Fork San Jacinto River. In the last week, contractors have cleared approximately one third to one half of the 54.4 acre development.
Drainage from 107.2 acres outside (upstream from) the development flows through the development on its way to the West Fork.
The remaining 43.2 acres will contain 236 homes on narrow lots for an average of 0.18 acres/home (1/6th acre) with impervious cover of 66%.
Proposed layout in drainage analysis.
Drainage from the development and areas upstream will be routed into an on-site 11.2 detention basin (above) and, from there, into sand pits and the West Fork (below).
Outfall path from Northpark South to sand pits, channel and river.
The drainage analysis claims the outfall from the proposed detention basin will not increase flow to the sand pits.
The analysis by RG Miller also indicates that the on-site basin will provide a storage rate of approximately 1.26 acre-feet per acre. That exceeds the minimum of .55 acre-feet per acre recommended by Harris County Flood Control District for sites this size draining into Harris County.
RG Miller claims that the water surface elevations in the sand pits will decrease during both 25-year and 100-year storm events.
The engineering firm also claims that the proposed development lies outside the 100-year floodplain of the West Fork. However, that claim is based on old data.
100-year floodplain, shown in aqua. Note 2014, pre-Harvey date.
New flood maps, expected to be released next year, will likely show the floodway and floodplains expanding by 50- to 100%, according to preliminary guidance from HCFCD and FEMA.
However, RG Miller makes no mention of the shifting floodplains. Nor do its engineers mention any wetlands on the property which the US government clearly shows.
Large green area on right was among first to be cleared.
The engineering firm concludes that their design will have “no adverse impact” on downstream properties. Nor will it “unreasonably”:
“Impede the natural flow of surface waters from higher adjacent properties”
“Alter the natural flow of surface waters so as to discharge them upon adjacent properties at a more rapid rate or in a different location…”
One hydrologist I interviewed about this plan said, “Well, this isn’t how I would do it. He is draining directly to the sand pit and showing that he isn’t increasing flows going to the sand pit. Nowhere in the report did he document that he had permission from the sand pit owner to drain to the sand pit. Also, he didn’t have any field survey to back up how he knew the topography and details on the hydraulic connections between the sand pits and the river. So I don’t know how he can be certain of his results.”
The drainage analysis did not address what effect the proposed routing would have on sedimentation. The outfall to the drainage ditch is already severely restricted by sediment accumulations.
Proposed outfall. 11/17/23
Variance Requests
A request for variances obtained from the Houston Planning Commission shows a different outline for the property. It omits the areas designated as commercial at the entry.
Note difference between this diagram and one above in lower right corner by Northpark.
The MoCo Appraisal District (MCAD) shows that Hanover Estates owns the parcels that bracket the entry. MCAD also shows that Hanover and another company called Maryfield LTD jointly own the sandpits. The drainage analysis does not address the ownership issues or permissions.
Requests for Variances from Houston Planning Commission
This property lies within the City of Houston’s extra territorial jurisdiction. The developer requested three variances from the Houston Planning Commission:
To allow lots less than 5000 square feet.
To exceed intersection spacing by not providing a southern stub street (outlet).
To exceed intersection spacing by not providing an east/west street
The planning commission has not yet responded to an information request about whether it granted the variances. Meanwhile, clearing continues.
One Third to One Half of Site Now Cleared
In the last week, contractors have taken down an estimated one half to one third of the trees on the site. See below.
Looking west across Northpark South toward West Fork San Jacintoon11/17/23. Intersection of Northpark Drive in foreground and Sorters-McClellan Road running diagonally through frame.
Friday morning, 11/17/23, four tree gobblers were hard at work.
At this rate, the entire site could be cleared by early December.
A Closing Thought
The goal of most drainage studies is to figure out how to develop property safely. If all of the studies were always correct, we would never flood. But we do. Why?
And why is property that was too dangerous to develop before Harvey now safe after Harvey … when we now realize how much greater the risk is?
More on that in my next post.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/18/23
2272 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/20231118-Screenshot-2023-11-18-at-6.37.37%E2%80%AFAM.jpg?fit=1100%2C512&ssl=15121100adminadmin2023-11-18 08:08:502023-11-18 10:32:42Northpark South Will Drain Through Sand Mines
The Northpark Drive Expansion Project struck oil this week. But this was no Jed-Clampett moment. Oil in the context of a construction project is not good.
Workers discovered what appears to be oil dumped some years ago on the site of what will become the north pond at the 59 entrance to Kingwood.
Ralph De Leon, project manager for the Lake Houston Redevelopment Authority/TIRZ, said that contractors are currently trying to discover the extent of the spill to avoid future contamination on the site. Although the photos below certainly look like excavation, the work is definitely not part of the pond-excavation project, according to De Leon.
Looking south at oil spill areaReverse angle shows trucks entering and leavingThe nasty surpriseClose up of contamination
De Leon also said the budget contained a line item for contingencies such as this. It should not affect the overall cost of the project.
West Sidewalks Complete
De Leon also said contractors have completed the sidewalks west of 59 that connect the main part of the project to the Kingwood Place West and Kingwood College.
This morning, the last cement pour was drying and contractors were removing forms from areas completed earlier.
Workers are still cleaning up, but the job is essentially done. Looking west toward HEB from over 59.Reverse angle. Looking easttoward 59 at top of frame.
Dr. Katherine Persson, retired head of Kingwood College, requested the sidewalk extension to fill in a critical gap for her students who rode their bicycles to school.
Other Highlights
Extension of the drain pipe to Ditch One behind Public Storage is nearly complete. However, contractors still need to install a concrete headwall around the pipe to prevent future erosion.
Contractors are preparing an estimate to install the city-approved, water-main detour under Northpark to the new Parkwood Baptist Church. The original water main was too high and interfered with the box culverts being installed in the median.
Centerpoint has nearly completed relocating its utilities that interfered with the box-culvert installation. As soon as CenterPoint completes that work, installation of the box culverts will resume.
The pole-mounted traffic signal at Northpark and Russell-Palmer must come out before contractors can install the box culverts under that intersection. A wire-mounted, temporary signal will replace the pole-mounted system. The wire will stretch across the road. As construction advances, that will enable the signals to be moved left or right as lanes change.
November 15, 2023 – The San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) Board of Directors announced today the selection of Aubrey A. Spear, PE, as general manager.
Aubrey Spear
Duties
As general manager, Spear will oversee the development and implementation of SJRA’s vision, mission and strategic goals through the collaboration with the SJRA’s Operating Divisions: General and Administrative Services, Lake Conroe, Woodlands, Groundwater Reduction Plan, Highlands, and Flood Management. In addition to providing managerial oversight, Spear will be instrumental in overseeing the development and execution of capital improvement plans, planning, external affairs, leadership development, and budget.
SJRA Board President Ronnie Anderson expressed confidence in Aubrey Spear’s arrival saying, “After a thorough search, the SJRA Board of Directors is proud to welcome Aubrey to SJRA. Aubrey’s extensive experience in water utility management, water and wastewater infrastructure projects, and stakeholder relationships make him a great fit for our team.”
Goals
“I am excited to join the dedicated team at SJRA,” said Spear. “I look forward to collaborating with key stakeholders including employees, customers, and elected officials to determine major areas of focus for the Authority moving forward. I am passionate about implementing the river authority’s vision to provide reliable, cost-efficient, and sustainable water resource management that supports the significant growth in the region while earning the trust and confidence of our customers and community.”
Background
Aubrey Spear brings extensive professional leadership and managerial experience to SJRA. He served the City of Lubbock in a senior management role as Director of Water Utilities for 16 years leading the city’s Water Utilities Department of more than 200 employees. Additionally, he served as liaison to multiple water boards including the Lubbock Water Advisory Commission, Canadian River Municipal Water Authority, High Plains Underground Water Conservation District and served as the chairperson of the Region O Water Planning Group and on the executive committee of the Upper Brazos Regional Flood Planning Group.
Spear has also guided public relations, marketing, and customer service activities and facilitated major projects including the city of Lubbock’s first new surface water supply reservoir in more than 25 years, Lake Alan Henry.
Spear will start with SJRA in January 2024.
Challenges
Aubrey Spear’s appointment comes almost six months after Jace Houston resigned from SJRA at the end of May 2023.
After 16 years with the SJRA, Houston had become the focus of criticism over a groundwater reduction plan designed to reduce subsidence and ensure the water future of Montgomery County. Houston had led the conversion from dwindling groundwater to surface water. That included construction of a water treatment plant at Lake Conroe and several water distribution pipelines.
As Spear prepares to navigate new waters in SE Texas, he will be forced to thread a needle between downstream and upstream interests.
Memories of the SJRA’s role in downstream flooding during Harvey when it released 79,000 cubic feet per second from Lake Conroe will constrain him. So will the reluctance of Lake Conroe residents to live with seasonally lower lake levels. Lake lowering didn’t generate much controversy this year. Because of drought, lake lowering wasn’t necessary.
However, it could in the future if the project to add more flood gates to Lake Houston ever gets off the drawing boards.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/15/23 based in part on a press release from SJRA
2269 days since Hurricane Harvey
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The San Jacinto West Fork has turned into a sludge fest again. I took the picture below on 11/11/23. Not since the day that the West Fork turned white have I seen the contrast so dramatic at the confluence with Spring Creek.
Looking NW from over US59 Bridge. Confluence of Spring Creek (left) and San Jacinto West Fork (right). Cypress Creek joins Spring Creek 2.7 miles west of this location.
In that prior case, the cause was obvious. Two sand mines were discharging process wastewater into the West Fork. The TCEQ determined that one, the Liberty Materials mine, dumped 56 million gallons of white sludge into the river.
This time, the cause is not so obvious. I can’t even be certain I determined the cause. After taking the photo above, I spent a whole day ruling out various possibilities while searching for others.
Ruling Out Causes
The dramatic difference was not caused by huge variation in rainfall totals across the region.
The highest total on the West Fork was that 2.68 inches south of Conroe at SH242. Further investigation showed that 1 inch fell between 3 and 4PM on 11/09/23. That was the highest intensity at that gage in more than a month.
Uneven soil saturation across the region would also not cause the zebra pattern in the river. The entire region is still rated either “abnormally dry” or in “moderate drought.”
And Lake Conroe did not release any large volumes of water lately that would have scoured river banks. That eliminated another potential cause.
Now here’s where it gets really baffling.
SJRA Study Claims Most Sediment Comes from Spring/Cypress Creeks
The San Jacinto River Basin Master Drainage Study by Freese & Nichols claims that more sediment comes down Spring and Cypress Creeks than the West Fork.
In fact, they say, of all the sediment coming into Lake Houston, two thirds comes from Spring and Cypress Creeks while only 13% comes from the West Fork upstream of US59. So where is all the sludge coming from?
In my opinion, it most likely came from new developments or sand mines that move large volumes of loose sediment.
So the next day, I went out with my drone and found several possibilities.
Possible Sources for Sediment Pollution
Two sand mines had pits open to the river, but I did not see large volumes of sediment oozing out of them as I sometimes do.
The most interesting possibility: new developments very near that gage on SH242 that read 2.68 inches.
Two connected developments straddle FM1314 immediately north of SH242. Early plans called them both Mavera. But now, the one on the east has a sign that says Mavera. The sign on the west section calls it Evergreen.
Most of the development’s stormwater drains into Crystal Creek and then into the West Fork about a half mile downstream from where I took this photo.
Sediment-laden stormwater burst through the wall of this detention basin.Enlarged detail from shot above shows water was strong enough to destroy the outfall pipe.
Now let’s see what’s upstream from this breach.
Evergreen drainage channel. Water flows toward camera and the breached detention basin.Even farther up the channel. Note all recently exposed sediment.
The ditch above appears to be much wider than it was in January 2021, almost three years ago. Now, let’s jump back south to where this area drains into the West Fork.
Crystal Creek (middle) empties into the West Fork (bottom left). Note how milky water from Crystal comparesto the West Fork.
Note that the picture above was taken two days after the heaviest recent rainfall, so the volume may not seem impressive.
There likely were other areas along the West Fork that contributed to the sedimentation you saw in the first photo at the top of this post. But I was not in a helicopter and it’s virtually impossible to cover the entire river with a drone. So I can’t say for sure.
How to Report Issues You May See
This is not the first time I have documented excessive sediment coming off the West Fork.
The zebra effect at the confluence is common.
The angle of the shots above varies. But in each instance, the West Fork is the most polluted branch.
Why is sediment so concerning? After all, it’s natural, right?
When sediment reduces the conveyance of rivers, they come out of their banks faster and higher on smaller rainfalls. The rivers flood more frequently and increase your flood risk.
So, if you see unnatural situations in rivers or streams, make sure you report them to the TCEQ, which investigates such matters.
Together, we may be able to improve our safety and water quality.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/13/2023
2267 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
Colorado-based Century Land Holdings of Texas, LLC has started clearing land for Northpark South in Porter along the West Fork of the San Jacinto River at the west end of Northpark Drive.
Documents from the Houston Planning Commission, USGS, and FEMA; eyewitness accounts from nearby residents and flood professionals; and aerial photos indicate:
Most of the area is in floodplains defined decades ago and not updated since.
The entire area – and then some – went underwater during Harvey.
The entrance to the property near Northpark Drive and Sorters-McClellan Road sits in a bowl that rescue trucks could not get through during Harvey. That would make evacuation difficult in the event of another large flood.
Wetlands dot the property.
Abandoned sand mines may pose safety threats.
The same developer just completed a sister development called Northpark Woods across a drainage channel from this one. But so far, the gutsy developer has avoided any consequences for its risky gamble thanks in large part to a multi-year drought and interminable delays at FEMA releasing the new post-Harvey flood maps.
All Underwater During Harvey
Eyewitness accounts and damage reports indicate that Harvey floodwaters stretched about a third of a mile east of Sorters-McClellan to Northpark and Kingwood Place Drive. That’s on the high side of Sorters-McClellan; the new development will be on the low side.
Floodwaters in this area stopped at about 83 feet above sea level. However, the entrance to the new subdivision is at 75 feet, according to the USGS National Map. That means the water was an estimated 8 feet deep at the entrance.
One long-time resident in the area said, “The intersection of Sorters and Northpark sits in a bowl. It was not passable by Montgomery County Precinct 4 constables in an Army deuce and a half [used for high-water rescue]. Water from the river came right up past that intersection and continued up Northpark to just past the intersection of Kingwood Place Dr.”
Also on the high side of Sorters-McClellan, six of nine buildings at nearby Kingwood College flooded during Harvey. Restoration cost: $60 million!
Documents obtained from the Houston Planning Commission indicate that RG Miller is the engineer of record for Northpark South.
Bordering River and Sand Mines
During Harvey, 160,000 cubic feet per second rampaged down the West Fork behind this property.
Looking west past Sorters-McClellan Road toward what will become Northpark South.Note clearing starting in the middle in what used to be wetlands(see below).From the National Wetlands Inventory.Dark green area on right corresponds to cleared area above.Looking NW. Intersection of Northpark and Sorters-McClellan in lower left. Another subdivision called Northpark Woods by the same developer is in the upper right. West Fork San Jacinto and sand mines at top of frame.
Here’s what they hope to build on this property.
General plan submitted to Houston Planning Commission in 2021.
Current Floodplains Will Soon Expand
Most of the property already sits in floodway or floodplains. But the FEMA map below has not yet been updated to reflect new knowledge gained as a result of Memorial Day, Tax Day, Harvey and Imelda floods.
In fact, the 2014 date on the map below is misleading. It reflects an update of the base map, but the data that determines the extent of floodplains has not been updated since the 1980s, according to an expert familiar with Montgomery County flood maps.
FEMA and Harris County Flood Control have warned people that when new “post-Harvey” flood maps are released in the next year or two, floodplains will expand 50-100%. The floodway (striped area above) will likely expand into the 100-year floodplain (aqua). In turn, the 100-year will expand into the 500-year (tan). And the 500-year floodplain will extend past any of the colored areas.
That’s consistent with eyewitness accounts. And that could potentially put the entire property in floodplains.
Taking Advantage of Map-Update Window
The developer seems to be taking advantage of a window between post-Harvey flood surveys and release of the new maps.
I’m sure the developer’s lawyers would argue that they are complying with all current, applicable laws. But an ethical question arises. Will the new development expose unsuspecting homebuyers to greater-than-expected risk?
If so, why aren’t officials pushing to update maps and floodplain regs faster?
Could some officials be prioritizing economic development now over public safety later?
Certainly not all are. But many flood professionals worry about that.
Next to 5-Square Miles of Sand Mines
The new development sits next to the largest sand-mining complex on the San Jacinto West Fork. Sand mines in this area occupy almost five square miles. However, not all the mines are active. But they still show signs of heavy sediment pollution.
Looking E toward Sorters-McClellan from over West Fork. Northpark South is at top of frame beyond the sand pits.The operator of this mine decided not to fish its equipment out when they abandoned the site.More colors than Crayola. No telling what’s growing in these ponds.
Will routing drainage from Northpark South through these sand mines pose a safety risk for people downstream?
Will it be safe for kids to play or fish near these steep-sided pits?
Floodplain Development Called New Form of Redlining
Owner financing often accompanies floodplain developments. Such financing can bypass many flood-risk detection procedures that accompany traditional bank financing.
Then, when floods come, the people who can least afford to repair homes suffer the most and longest. Neighborhoods decay faster. And that makes it harder for people to recover their investments.
Years later, the public is left holding the bag. We are asked to fund expensive flood-mitigation projects that would not be necessary had the developer built in a safer area.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/11/2023
2265 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
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The details of the Austin Transit plan story differ from the Harris County 2022 Road and Parks Bonds. But both controversies arise from alleged “bait and switch” tactics used to sell voters something radically inferior to what was promised to them beforehand. If successful, the Austin lawsuit could set a precedent for Harris County.
Outline of Austin Lawsuit
To summarize the Austin controversy, voters approved a tax rate increase in 2020 to fund construction of three light rail routes and an underground transit system at a cost of $7.1 billion. Three years later, the cost has ballooned to $11.6 billion – a 63% increase in three years – while the length of the proposed rail system has decreased from 27 miles to 10 – 62% less.
The crux of the lawsuit: the current project is different from the one voters approved, “and represents the largest property tax increase in Austin’s history.” The complaint reads, “This lawsuit is brought because “Austin taxpayers are not getting anything close to the benefit of the bargain they made for Project Connect …”
The lawsuit continues, “They (the plan authors) unilaterally adopted a Replacement Plan, that in the context of consumer-protection law would be called a “bait and switch” because it is so inferior to what voters “bought.” For reasons described in the lawsuit…
“…the Defendant Officials no longer have statutorily required voter authorization to assess, collect, or spend the Project Connect Tax increase nor do they have authority to issue bonds to be paid from that tax.”
Austin Lawsuit
But it gets worse. Paragraph 18 of the suit contends, “None of the Project Connect advocates have publicly admitted that the dramatic 257% increase in cost per rider—a key criteria in the competitive process for federal funding—reduces the odds of Project Connect receiving a 50% federal match…” Then it continues, “Nor is there any recognition of the effect on whether federal evaluators—or Austin voters for that matter—can trust the figures presented…”
That plan went off the rails. Much like Harris County’s 2022 Road and Parks Bonds.
Parallels with Selling 2022 Harris County Bonds to Voters
The Harris County 2022 Bonds have nothing to do with the Austin Transit Plan – except for the way they were sold, i.e., with false information.
Before the Commissioners Court put the 2022 Road and Parks Bonds on the ballot, Commissioners Ellis and Garcia openly talked about the need to distribute funds based on so-called “equity” principles, using a race-based social vulnerability formula – not one that accounted for road miles or square miles of parks that required maintenance. Their race-based approach would skew the distribution of funds from the new bond in favor of their precincts.
An uproar then ensued that threatened to kill the bond offering. So, Ellis, Garcia and Hidalgo voted to guarantee a minimum $220 million from the bonds to each precinct. Based in part on the promise of an equal minimum for EACH precinct, the bonds passed comfortably.
Then shortly after the election, the deal changed again. Equity and social vulnerability were back in. The minimum guarantee was ignored.
Precinct 3, which has 47 percent of the county’s roads and 35 percent of the county’s parks to maintain, received $188 million – $32 million less than the minimum and only 19% of the total money allocated.
Commissioners Ellis and Garcia received 30% and 27% respectively. That was because of their race-based formula, despite the fact that their precincts fall largely within municipalities that maintain roads and parks. Those municipalities are responsible for their own roads and parks.
In a commercial context, the FTC would consider this bait and switch.
To sell the bonds, the County told people one thing in newspapers, on social media, in public meetings, in handouts and on the County’s website. But soon after the bonds were approved, the deal changed.
Ironically, Precinct 3 voters who were all negatively impacted could have sunk the bond offering had they not been deceived.
Frankly, I see the Austin lawsuit as a positive thing. I hope someone in Harris County lodges a similar lawsuit. Perhaps it can rein in some egregious, bait-and-switch promises that have become hallmarks of Harris County politics lately.
The bait and switching didn’t start with the Road and Parks Bonds. Consider the 2018 Flood Bond. It promised “equitable” treatment of the various watersheds, with the worst being addressed first. Since then, equitable was redefined as “equity” by Rodney Ellis in a way that Webster’s Third International and Oxford English dictionaries do not recognize.
Ellis even bragged openly in commissioners court about tricking voters.
And of course, the areas with the worst flooding are among those getting the least help…and pushed to the end of the line.
Feet above flood stage at 33 gages throughout Harris County during Harvey.
The San Jacinto West Fork had the highest flooding in the county during Harvey. But the San Jacinto watershed ranks twelfth in the county in funding to date. See below. And most of that has gone to areas downstream from where flooding was so severe.
Worse, while we wait our turn for projects, a steady decline in the speed of project delivery has added to inflation costs which now threaten the delivery of promised projects. Just as in Austin.
Flood-mitigation spending has slowed to less than half its peak in 2020. Delays add to the inflation burden on the entire bond program and threaten cancellation of some projects.
We need some civic-minded lawyers who care about the future of Harris County to step up and look at these policies.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/9/2023 with thanks to Brad Johnson and The Texan
2263 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
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