After finishing excavating silt from under the Kingwood Drive Bridge over Ben’s Branch, City crews are now doing the same under the bridge over the Diversion Ditch near the fire station on Kingwood Drive.
Before excavation began. Looking south at the Kingwood Drive Bridge over the Diversion Ditch in August.
Bridges are often chokepoints during floods because of their supports that reduce and sometimes slow the flow of water and contribute to sediment buildup.
Closer shot of same bridge, still looking south. Note sediment buildup. Also note how bridge supports catch debris.
The City of Houston is responsible for excavation under the bridges because the bridges are City property.
On Ben’s Branch, Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) had excavated both north and south of the bridge at Kingwood Drive. Then the City did its part.
Pictures of Work in Progress At Kingwood Drive.
However, at the Diversion Ditch Bridge, HCFCD has not yet begun excavation. CoH went first.
Dan Monks, a Kingwood resident, captured work in progress last week and gave ReduceFlooding.com permission to use his photos.
Photo By Dan Monks shows excavation in progress under east side of Kingwood Drive Bridge over Diversion Ditch.The City is stacking the dirt on the bank, letting it drain and then hauling it off. Another shot courtesy of Dan Monks. There’s still more work to do on the western side, but that should happen soon. Photo courtesy of Dan Monks.
The Second of Many Such Projects
According to Mayor Pro Tem Dave Martin’s office, the City’s Public Works Department will also be investigating other bridges in the Kingwood area to see if they too need to have silt removed from under them. These projects aren’t glamorous, but they are necessary to restore conveyance of area ditches. HCFCD’s Kingwood Area Drainage Analysis showed that some area ditches were down to a 2-year level of service. That means they were so constricted that they would flood in a two-year rain.
Bridges along Kingwood Drive and Northpark Drive can least afford flooding. They are vital links in crucial evacuation routes.
Thanks to the folks in the District E Council Office and the Public Works Department for addressing these issues.
It’s not yet clear when HCFCD plans to start excavation of the Diversion Ditch in this area.
If you have photos you would like to share with the public, please submit them through the Submissions Page of this website.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/10/21
1503 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20211006_154127.jpg?fit=1200%2C583&ssl=15831200adminadmin2021-10-10 20:41:252021-10-10 20:50:41CoH Excavating Silt from Diversion Ditch at Kingwood Drive
One of the more alarming facts that came out of Thursday’s City Council meeting is that Houston’s Housing and Community Development is spending far more on disaster relief than it gets back in reimbursements. In the case of one program, Economic Development, the ratio between costs and reimbursements to date was actually 1100 to 1, even higher than the headline indicates ($3,596,821 spent vs. $3,260 reimbursed).
The program’s purpose: to help small businesses damaged by Harvey. But the City launched the program just this year. And four years after the storm, those who needed assistance the most have already gone out of business. Most small businesses can’t survive that long after losing essential equipment. Is this program chasing business applicants that no longer exist? It’s hard to tell without more information. (The City’s most recent pipeline report, published just yesterday, doesn’t even mention the Economic Development Program.)
Regardless, the Economic Development Program isn’t the only area where expenses seem out of whack. This raises the questions, “Should the City even be in the disaster-relief business?” And “Can others do it better?”
Disaster Relief Costs Exceed Reimbursements and Budgets in Multiple Areas
Temika Jones, the Department’s new Chief Financial Officer and Assistant Director showed the chart below as part of her presentation. She has one year on the job. Before that, she served as an auditor for a major accounting firm. Her presentation spotlighted two giant problems: Costs exceed reimbursements. And costs exceed budgets – so some may never be reimbursed.
In the chart above, focus on the last two columns in the Total row. They show that the City is incurring disaster relief costs that average 2.3X higher than reimbursements – across the board.
Also focus on the big red numbers at the bottom of the slide. They show budgets that have already been exceeded.
Now compare Columns 3 and 6 in Line 1. The City has already overspent its four-year budget for administration in the first year of its contract with the GLO by $1+ million. Oops. The budget was $15 million. But the City already spent $16 million and has only had draws approved for $1.2 million.
Finally, compare Columns 3 and 5 on Line 4: The Homeowner Assistance Program. The department budgeted only $8.2 million for project delivery, but has already spent $30.6 million – almost quadruple. That means they have no budget remaining to finish the program. Worse, reimbursement for $22.3 million could be in jeopardy.
City Operating Outside of Its Core Competencies
There are several reasons for the problems discussed above:
HUD and the GLO operate on a reimbursement basis. The City can give money to flood victims and expect reimbursement, but then have the victim’s application refused for some reason – often missing forms or incomplete data.
The City’s accounting systems don’t handle disaster relief programs well, so the problems lack visibility.
Disaster relief just doesn’t seem to be one of the City’s core competencies.
The City is operating waaaaay outside of its areas of expertise. Police. Fire. Water. Streets. Trash. Those are the things people expect from the City and what the City should focus on. In business, any time you tread outside of your core competencies, your costs and risks escalate exponentially. That takes money away from flood victims.
It appears that the City was so eager to get its hands on hundreds of millions of dollars in disaster relief money that no one asked whether the City even should be in that business. Or whether the City should just have let the GLO handle disaster relief – as it did so well in 48 other counties.
As of the end of last year, the GLO had reimbursed 2961 homeowners; Houston reimbursed 119.
And while the GLO reconstructed 2500 homes, the City reconstructed only 117.
Increasing the Pace, But Falling Father Behind
The City has accelerated its pace this year, but Jones’ presentation also shows that the City is still sitting on top of applications worth $114 million that have yet to be filed. That’s almost triple the previous year’s number. Meanwhile, expenses have more than tripled.
That brings us full circle. The City’s Economic Development Program has spent more than $3 million to get $3 thousand approved. It makes one wonder whether the purpose of pursuing HUD money was to create employment in Housing and Community Development or to help flood victims.
Turfing this to the GLO could have helped many more flood victims much faster at a lower cost.
The City put a third bureaucracy between money in Washington and the flood victims who need it. Two could have done the job faster, easier, and better.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/9/2021
1502 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Screen-Shot-2021-10-09-at-12.45.15-PM.png?fit=1918%2C1448&ssl=114481918adminadmin2021-10-09 18:49:242021-10-10 10:10:47Should City Be in Disaster Relief? For One Program, It Spent $3 Million to Get $3 Thousand
Since Harvey, Houston’s Housing and Community Development Department has been criticized severely by HUD, the GLO, media, and flood victims alike for poor performance and non-performance in flood assistance efforts. Thursday, Keith Bynam, the Interim Director of the Department, and Temika Jones, the Department’s Assistant Director and Chief Financial Officer, informed city council members about other issues: severe and repeated budget overages in their department.
Their explosive testimony drew sharp questions and raised many more about the department’s management and oversight by the City.
Eight Main Recommendation to Improve Disaster Assistance
Bynam and Jones made eight recommendations as part of their Corrective Action Plan for flood assistance.
Reduce future Admin spending and forecast Admin dollars needed to execute programs.
Restructure reporting lines to other city departments in consultation with Central HR.
Re-evaluate all staffing decisions approved by the former director, Tom McCasland.
Align future expenditures with program spending.
Implement strike teams to focus on GLO submissions
Timely submission of draw requests to GLO (within 90 business days)
Continue operating successful programs (such as Multifamily, Public Services)
Ensure new CDBG-DR 2017 (Harvey) programs are implemented successfully (Economic Development, Small Rental, Single Family)
Flood Assistance: A Multi-level Problem
The meeting yesterday focused on fixing the negative financial impact to the City. But the impact to flood victims caught up in this bureaucratic miasma needs to be considered simultaneously.
During my business career, I found it hard to go wrong if you structured your organization around clients’ needs. In this case, there are two sets of clients: the GLO and HUD on one hand. And flood victims on the other. Both have one primary need: speed.
Some victims are still struggling to fix their homes or recover from the financial devastation caused by Harvey.
The GLO needs to use the money appropriated by Congress and HUD or lose it when program deadlines expire.
One program (Home Repair) has already expired. And 1501 days out from Hurricane Harvey, hundreds of millions in funds remain to be distributed – despite overspending on administrative expenses, such as employee salaries and computer expenses, by 400% last year.
City Council needs to look at the flood assistance from their clients’ perspectives and start there. How can they speed up the assistance?
Insights from Former Employees, the GLO, and Flood Victims
Not wanting to rely solely on Bynam and Jones recommendations, I also talked to former employees of the department, the GLO, as well as flood victims who described several problems:
An accounting system that can’t recognize liabilities incurred on behalf of the federal government in reimbursement programs
Featherbedding (keeping and protecting political friends on a payroll, often by stretching out work)
Personnel with lack of experience who don’t know what to do
Inadequate management and training
Refusing help from the GLO
Turnover in managerial ranks (five managers in the Home Repair program alone since Harvey, according to Bynam)
No one from the Mayor on down ever asking the questions, such as “Why are we in this business? Do we want to stay in it?”
It’s amazing how closely these comments map back to the recommendations made by Bynam and Jones. The two lists closely parallel each other, though they are not identical.
Ten People to Pay Two Bills?
In her testimony yesterday, Ms. Jones, who joined the department a year ago, said that, shortly after arriving, she discovered that, “We had 10 people paying bills in accounts payable and two people requesting reimbursements. That change was made immediately.” She said, “The GLO compliments us at least weekly on the progress we are making, but we have a long way to go.”
Friends in the media who have covered the department for decades describe persistent problems that previous mayors and city councils found convenient to ignore.
I applaud Jones and Bynam for having the courage to air dirty laundry in public. That is the only way these problems will ever get fixed. Departments like Housing and Community Development cannot become fiefdoms for featherbedding, or as one former employee put it “a receptacle for misfits and castoffs from other departments.”
Some Unsolicited Advice: Restructure Around “The Right Five”
I had a highly successful information technology (IT) client for 30 years that did government as well as private-sector work. They believed that for their clients to be successful, IT systems had to deliver the “right five”:
The right information
In the right form
For the right people
In the right place
At the right time
Example: a successful airline must juggle equipment availability, maintenance, reservations, pricing, baggage, seating, staffing, gate availability, check-in, air traffic control, weather, seating and other variables…for each flight, thousands of times a day.
For the system to work efficiently, customers, employees, and vendors see only what they need, when they need it, where they need it, in a form that lets them do the task at hand. Software guides them through each step.
It’s safe to say that Houston’s Housing and Community Development Department does not have “the right five.” I say that based on the testimony we heard yesterday, from City Council reactions, from former employees, and from the persistent criticisms offered by HUD, the GLO, and flood victims.
Checking the “Flight Status” of Flood Applications
And part of the fix will require managing the information so that low-wage employees can perform their individual roles in a very complex process.
The whole notion of “trying” to file paperwork within 90 business days feels repugnant to me. But with the “right five,” filing those applications in real time with a fraction of the people could happen automatically.
If the City were a private business, it would not be trying to figure out how to timely file flood assistance applications right now. It would be filing for bankruptcy. We seriously need to fix this.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/8/2021
1501 days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/IMG_3456.jpg?fit=640%2C480&ssl=1480640adminadmin2021-10-08 21:28:242021-10-08 21:38:27How to Speed Up Flood Assistance
CoH Excavating Silt from Diversion Ditch at Kingwood Drive
After finishing excavating silt from under the Kingwood Drive Bridge over Ben’s Branch, City crews are now doing the same under the bridge over the Diversion Ditch near the fire station on Kingwood Drive.
Bridges are often chokepoints during floods because of their supports that reduce and sometimes slow the flow of water and contribute to sediment buildup.
The City of Houston is responsible for excavation under the bridges because the bridges are City property.
On Ben’s Branch, Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) had excavated both north and south of the bridge at Kingwood Drive. Then the City did its part.
Pictures of Work in Progress At Kingwood Drive.
However, at the Diversion Ditch Bridge, HCFCD has not yet begun excavation. CoH went first.
Dan Monks, a Kingwood resident, captured work in progress last week and gave ReduceFlooding.com permission to use his photos.
The Second of Many Such Projects
According to Mayor Pro Tem Dave Martin’s office, the City’s Public Works Department will also be investigating other bridges in the Kingwood area to see if they too need to have silt removed from under them. These projects aren’t glamorous, but they are necessary to restore conveyance of area ditches. HCFCD’s Kingwood Area Drainage Analysis showed that some area ditches were down to a 2-year level of service. That means they were so constricted that they would flood in a two-year rain.
Bridges along Kingwood Drive and Northpark Drive can least afford flooding. They are vital links in crucial evacuation routes.
Thanks to the folks in the District E Council Office and the Public Works Department for addressing these issues.
It’s not yet clear when HCFCD plans to start excavation of the Diversion Ditch in this area.
If you have photos you would like to share with the public, please submit them through the Submissions Page of this website.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/10/21
1503 Days since Hurricane Harvey
Should City Be in Disaster Relief? For One Program, It Spent $3 Million to Get $3 Thousand
One of the more alarming facts that came out of Thursday’s City Council meeting is that Houston’s Housing and Community Development is spending far more on disaster relief than it gets back in reimbursements. In the case of one program, Economic Development, the ratio between costs and reimbursements to date was actually 1100 to 1, even higher than the headline indicates ($3,596,821 spent vs. $3,260 reimbursed).
The program’s purpose: to help small businesses damaged by Harvey. But the City launched the program just this year. And four years after the storm, those who needed assistance the most have already gone out of business. Most small businesses can’t survive that long after losing essential equipment. Is this program chasing business applicants that no longer exist? It’s hard to tell without more information. (The City’s most recent pipeline report, published just yesterday, doesn’t even mention the Economic Development Program.)
Regardless, the Economic Development Program isn’t the only area where expenses seem out of whack. This raises the questions, “Should the City even be in the disaster-relief business?” And “Can others do it better?”
Disaster Relief Costs Exceed Reimbursements and Budgets in Multiple Areas
Temika Jones, the Department’s new Chief Financial Officer and Assistant Director showed the chart below as part of her presentation. She has one year on the job. Before that, she served as an auditor for a major accounting firm. Her presentation spotlighted two giant problems: Costs exceed reimbursements. And costs exceed budgets – so some may never be reimbursed.
In the chart above, focus on the last two columns in the Total row. They show that the City is incurring disaster relief costs that average 2.3X higher than reimbursements – across the board.
Also focus on the big red numbers at the bottom of the slide. They show budgets that have already been exceeded.
Now compare Columns 3 and 6 in Line 1. The City has already overspent its four-year budget for administration in the first year of its contract with the GLO by $1+ million. Oops. The budget was $15 million. But the City already spent $16 million and has only had draws approved for $1.2 million.
Finally, compare Columns 3 and 5 on Line 4: The Homeowner Assistance Program. The department budgeted only $8.2 million for project delivery, but has already spent $30.6 million – almost quadruple. That means they have no budget remaining to finish the program. Worse, reimbursement for $22.3 million could be in jeopardy.
City Operating Outside of Its Core Competencies
There are several reasons for the problems discussed above:
The City is operating waaaaay outside of its areas of expertise. Police. Fire. Water. Streets. Trash. Those are the things people expect from the City and what the City should focus on. In business, any time you tread outside of your core competencies, your costs and risks escalate exponentially. That takes money away from flood victims.
It appears that the City was so eager to get its hands on hundreds of millions of dollars in disaster relief money that no one asked whether the City even should be in that business. Or whether the City should just have let the GLO handle disaster relief – as it did so well in 48 other counties.
As of the end of last year, the GLO had reimbursed 2961 homeowners; Houston reimbursed 119.
And while the GLO reconstructed 2500 homes, the City reconstructed only 117.
Increasing the Pace, But Falling Father Behind
The City has accelerated its pace this year, but Jones’ presentation also shows that the City is still sitting on top of applications worth $114 million that have yet to be filed. That’s almost triple the previous year’s number. Meanwhile, expenses have more than tripled.
That brings us full circle. The City’s Economic Development Program has spent more than $3 million to get $3 thousand approved. It makes one wonder whether the purpose of pursuing HUD money was to create employment in Housing and Community Development or to help flood victims.
The City put a third bureaucracy between money in Washington and the flood victims who need it. Two could have done the job faster, easier, and better.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/9/2021
1502 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
How to Speed Up Flood Assistance
Since Harvey, Houston’s Housing and Community Development Department has been criticized severely by HUD, the GLO, media, and flood victims alike for poor performance and non-performance in flood assistance efforts. Thursday, Keith Bynam, the Interim Director of the Department, and Temika Jones, the Department’s Assistant Director and Chief Financial Officer, informed city council members about other issues: severe and repeated budget overages in their department.
Their explosive testimony drew sharp questions and raised many more about the department’s management and oversight by the City.
Eight Main Recommendation to Improve Disaster Assistance
Bynam and Jones never did get to finish their presentation. Unfortunately, recommendations on how to fix the department’s problems were at the end. Arguably, Pages 22 and 23 should have been the focus of their presentation.
Bynam and Jones made eight recommendations as part of their Corrective Action Plan for flood assistance.
Flood Assistance: A Multi-level Problem
The meeting yesterday focused on fixing the negative financial impact to the City. But the impact to flood victims caught up in this bureaucratic miasma needs to be considered simultaneously.
During my business career, I found it hard to go wrong if you structured your organization around clients’ needs. In this case, there are two sets of clients: the GLO and HUD on one hand. And flood victims on the other. Both have one primary need: speed.
One program (Home Repair) has already expired. And 1501 days out from Hurricane Harvey, hundreds of millions in funds remain to be distributed – despite overspending on administrative expenses, such as employee salaries and computer expenses, by 400% last year.
City Council needs to look at the flood assistance from their clients’ perspectives and start there. How can they speed up the assistance?
Insights from Former Employees, the GLO, and Flood Victims
Not wanting to rely solely on Bynam and Jones recommendations, I also talked to former employees of the department, the GLO, as well as flood victims who described several problems:
It’s amazing how closely these comments map back to the recommendations made by Bynam and Jones. The two lists closely parallel each other, though they are not identical.
Ten People to Pay Two Bills?
In her testimony yesterday, Ms. Jones, who joined the department a year ago, said that, shortly after arriving, she discovered that, “We had 10 people paying bills in accounts payable and two people requesting reimbursements. That change was made immediately.” She said, “The GLO compliments us at least weekly on the progress we are making, but we have a long way to go.”
Friends in the media who have covered the department for decades describe persistent problems that previous mayors and city councils found convenient to ignore.
I applaud Jones and Bynam for having the courage to air dirty laundry in public. That is the only way these problems will ever get fixed. Departments like Housing and Community Development cannot become fiefdoms for featherbedding, or as one former employee put it “a receptacle for misfits and castoffs from other departments.”
Some Unsolicited Advice: Restructure Around “The Right Five”
I had a highly successful information technology (IT) client for 30 years that did government as well as private-sector work. They believed that for their clients to be successful, IT systems had to deliver the “right five”:
Example: a successful airline must juggle equipment availability, maintenance, reservations, pricing, baggage, seating, staffing, gate availability, check-in, air traffic control, weather, seating and other variables…for each flight, thousands of times a day.
For the system to work efficiently, customers, employees, and vendors see only what they need, when they need it, where they need it, in a form that lets them do the task at hand. Software guides them through each step.
It’s safe to say that Houston’s Housing and Community Development Department does not have “the right five.” I say that based on the testimony we heard yesterday, from City Council reactions, from former employees, and from the persistent criticisms offered by HUD, the GLO, and flood victims.
Checking the “Flight Status” of Flood Applications
Neither the City Controller, City Council, Mayor, HUD, GLO, the Department, nor flood victims can tell the “flight status” of pending applications at a glance. That’s how you get an economic development plan where the City has spent $3.6 million to get $3,260 of aid approved (see line 3, page 14). That needs fixing.
And part of the fix will require managing the information so that low-wage employees can perform their individual roles in a very complex process.
The whole notion of “trying” to file paperwork within 90 business days feels repugnant to me. But with the “right five,” filing those applications in real time with a fraction of the people could happen automatically.
If the City were a private business, it would not be trying to figure out how to timely file flood assistance applications right now. It would be filing for bankruptcy. We seriously need to fix this.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/8/2021
1501 days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.