The San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) recently completed a 246-page conceptual design study, in partnership with the Harris County Flood Control District, that explored the feasibility of implementing sediment trapping facilities (“sand traps”). The purpose: to remove sediment from the West or East Fork of the San Jacinto River. The results and findings of this study have been documented in an engineering report entitled “San Jacinto River and Tributaries Sediment Removal and Sand Trap Development.”
Prior to proceeding to preliminary engineering design and any subsequent project phases, SJRA is seeking public input on the proposed project alternatives detailed in the report. The full report, as well as a brief summary document, are located on SJRA’s Flood Management Division website.
Caution: The full study is dated 1/7/22. But the “brief summary” is dated 3/9/22. Make sure you at least read the executive study of the full report as well as the brief summary. There are important differences.
Overview/Purpose
SJRA says the purpose of the sediment trap study was to assess the feasibility of implementing a pilot project to trap and remove sediment from the West OR East Fork of the San Jacinto. The study only assessed locations where one or more Aggregate Production Operations (APOs) could partner with the the SJRA. They restricted the study this way to reduce costs; the SJRA does not have a source of funding to clean out sand traps and would rely on sand miners.
Initial Concerns
The decisions to:
Define the study objective as sediment reduction, not damage reduction and…
Only consider locations near sand mines…
…give me mixed emotions about this project.
Pros
On one hand, I look at this and say, “It’s a pilot project. Try it and see if there’s a benefit.” Sediment IS a problem and they believe they can remove up to 100% of the annual sediment load (from the West Fork).
Cons
On the other hand, the study authors, Freese & Nichols (F&N) claimed (in the San Jacinto River Basin Master Drainage Study) that of all the sediment coming into Lake Houston, two thirds comes from Spring and Cypress Creeks while only 13% comes from the West Fork upstream of US59.
Perhaps that’s because they’re using model inputs from a sediment gage at I-45 located 8.5 miles upstream from most of the large West Fork sand mines (page 34, paragraph 3 of full study).
The “Mouth Bar,” a giant sand bar that blocked the West Fork of the San Jacinto, backing the river up into Kingwood and Humble. Thousands of homes and businesses flooded behind this blockage. The above-water portion has since been removed, but most of the underwater portion remains.
In the entire 246-page F&N study and the three-page summary, the word “damage” occurs only once…in relation to erosion damage, NOT flood damage.
It appears that F&N did not even look at creating sand traps where they were most needed, in the headwaters of Lake Houston, because of cost and logistical considerations. Yet the Army Corps, City of Houston, and State of Texas are spending $200 million to dredge that area. One wonders whether SJRA should have looked harder for partners to clean out the traps.
Finally, if sediment traps only work financially near sand mines, the “solution” will not work on other tributaries that F&N alleges contribute 5X more sediment than the West Fork. They just don’t have the sand mines that the West Fork has.
Nature of Proposed Solution
Five years after Harvey, we have a conceptual design and a recommended location: rock-lined channels cut through one or two point bars at the West Fork Hallett mine.
The shot below shows the same area in real life. To put the magnitude of the proposed solution into perspective, the solution would cover a little more than an acre. But sand mines like Hallett cover 20 square miles on the banks of the West Fork between US59 and I-45.
2021 photo of sand bar outsde Hallett mine that would have a narrow channel cut through it to trap sand.
My Biggest Fears
My biggest fears with the proposed pilot study are that it:
Asks people to chose from a limited menu.
Could divert attention from better solutions that would reduce flood risk faster in the headwaters of Lake Houston.
Might make the public think the problem is solved.
Could open the door to river mining and further destabilize the riverine environment.
Is not a transferrable solution.
For a pilot study, that last point is troubling.
Also, F&N worries that removing too much sediment from the West Fork could create a “hungry-water” effect that increases erosion downstream. But they have no way of directly measuring how much sediment the West Fork transports. Or what percentage they would remove. That’s because they’re relying on a sediment gage upstream from the sand mines. This introduces an element of risk in the pilot study.
Recommendations Should Be Based on a Holistic Examination of Alternatives
Note lack of vegetation on this steep-sided, eroding bank of Hallett mine on West Fork in foreground.
Before moving forward with the pilot study, I suggest a more holistic examination of additional alternatives that might have a greater impact on reducing flood damage, not just sedimentation. Examples include, but are not limited to:
More on the sand trap proposal in coming days. In the meantime, please review the SJRA’s sediment trap proposal and forward your comments to the SJRA. I will also print thoughtful letters, both pro and con, from responsible parties. Send them to: https://reduceflooding.com/contact-us/.
Posted by Bob Rehak on March 27, 2022
1671 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/20210303-RJR_5381.jpg?fit=1200%2C800&ssl=18001200adminadmin2022-03-27 21:14:502022-03-28 01:10:10SJRA Seeks Public Input on Sediment Trap Proposal
After an unannounced investigation of the Laurel Springs RV Resort construction site on February 2, 2022, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) issued a Notice of Enforcement (NOE) Letter to the contractor, Higbie Ventures of Texas, Inc. The TCEQ investigation found Higbie:
Failed to maintain Best Management Practices in effective operation condition
Had not maintained the construction site entrance
Did not protect stormwater inlets
Damaged erosion controls
Improperly installed erosion controls
Did not install erosion controls as prescribed in the Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plan along the southern and western perimeters
Let sediment accumulations travel offsite unimpeded onto neighboring property for approximately 158 yards
Trenched the southern berm of its detention pond, letting stormwater escape onto neighboring property, a non-compliant discharge
Violated requirements of their Construction General Permit
Failed to remove sediment accumulations often enough to minimize further negative effect
The investigator felt the non-compliant discharge in late January warranted enforcement action. The TCEQ then issued a Notice of Enforcement Letter (NOE) to “facilitate” compliance.
64-Page Report Brims With Photos Showing Violations
The TCEQ investigator, Kyle Linville, required documentation showing the contractor had remedied all violations by February 7. But on February 14, Linville noted that several violations remained outstanding, including failure to:
Maintain Best Management Practices in effective operating condition
Install sediment controls on the southern boundary of the site
Remove sediment accumulations often enough to minimize further negative effects.
Linville’s observations largely match mine and those of nearby residents who have communicated with me re: issues at the controversial construction site. Strangely, a City of Houston investigation found no problem, triggering two more investigations, but the City has not yet released the results of those.
Contractor Apparently Still Not Fully in Compliance
Since the TCEQ issued its notice of enforcement letter, most but not all of the violations have been corrected. However, Higbie still has not installed silt fencing along the western perimeter. And when I went by there today, trucks had once again turned Laurel Springs Lane into a muddy mess.
Photo taken on 2/2/22 from TCEQ report showing erosion of southern wall of detention pond.Sediment eroded into Edgewater Park for approximately 158 yards.Another photo from TCEQ report.More sediment farther into park.Another photo from TCEQ report.Note lack of silt fencing along western perimeter (right), which had been mentioned in TCEQ complaint dated 2/2/22. Photo taken 3/24/22, six weeks after compliance deadline.
Contractor Claims Re: Unauthorized Discharge
The contractor admitted that he discharged stormwater into Edgewater Park without authorization. However, he claimed that it was necessary to begin installing pumps that would discharge stormwater into the Lakewood Cove Storm Sewer System. The contractor claimed that standing water in the detention pond had infiltrated the soil in the pond wall. That made the pond wall so unstable that heavy equipment could not operate safely on the wall, said the contractor, in his response to the TCEQ.
However, photos taken on the day of the trenching, 1/29/22, show heavy equipment already operating on the wall and the pump housing already partially installed.
Photo taken 1/29/22 shows contractor draining pond as heavy equipment operates elsewhere on pond wall.
On page 54 of the report, the contractor claims he dug the trench on 1/30/22, not 1/29.
He also admits that he placed 8″ pipe in the wall, but claims he removed it “the next day” on “1/31/21.” That would have been 10 months before the site was even cleared. But assuming he meant 1/31/22, the claim doesn’t match what I photographed that day. I photographed the contractor covering up pipe, not removing it. See below.
One photo from a sequence taken on 1/31/2022 that shows contractor pulling dirt into trench and spreading it over pipes.
Is he claiming that he filled in the whole trench only to redig it on the same day and remove the pipe? That would have been amazingly inefficient. However, it would help explain some of the contractor’s failures. In the last 20 years, eight of Higbie’s 13 entities in Texas have gone out of business. He lost six of the eight to tax forfeitures.
Trust But Verify
Mr. Linville produced an excellent and thorough report of his investigation. But I hope he explores some of Higbie’s claims further without just taking Higbie’s word that he complied. As auditors say, “Trust but verify.” Did the contractor really remove the pipe? Did he install invisible silt fence on the western perimeter? Why is Higbie still pumping water out of the pond with portable pumps almost two months after installing the housing for permanent pumps.
We should never forget how excess sedimentation contributed to the flooding of thousands of homes along the West Fork during Harvey.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 3/26/22
1670 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
00adminadmin2022-03-26 17:52:282022-03-26 18:02:05TCEQ Issues Notice of Enforcement to Laurel Springs RV Resort
Rachel Tolbert Kimbro, a professor of sociology at Rice, has produced the rarest of commodities: an easily readable book, rich with academic value. In Too Deep: Class and Mothering in a Flooded Community is the story of 36 upper middle-class mothers on Houston’s southwest side before, during, and after Hurricane Harvey. It’s about:
Why they chose the neighborhood they live in – despite knowledge of prior floods
Their struggle to survive during Harvey
The fight to recover after the storm – financially, physically and psychologically – while holding their families together
Why most chose to stay instead of move, despite repeated floods.
Common Themes
Professor Rachel Tolbert Kimbro, Rice University Photo.
Professor Kimbro interviewed the women extensively over the course of several years and found common themes between their stories. Among them: the struggle to protect their children, neighborhood, school, and friendships. The values they found in their neighborhood – affordability, diversity, walkability, a good school, safety, and a supportive network of neighbors – brought them together. And fear of losing those values after the flood kept them from moving elsewhere. Sound familiar? You could substitute “proximity to nature” for “proximity to museums” and understand why so many flood victims chose to stay in the Lake Houston Area after Harvey.
Qualitative Research Yields Insights
For In Too Deep, Kimbro used structured qualitative research, not quantitative. The result is a moving narrative, replete with insight and pathos. It mirrors, in a different part of Houston, many of the interviews I have done in the Lake Houston Area since Harvey.
Those who flooded will find painful memories and, ultimately, a sense of kinship that comes from a recognition of their shared struggles. Kimbro’s description of rescues by kayak; of several families crowding into one upstairs room with their pets; of struggles with contractors and adjusters; and of families sleeping on air mattresses for more than a year will bring many people to tears.
Policy makers will gain insights into what makes buyouts so difficult despite such difficulties. The book explains why many people in this neighborhood wanted to stay put after Harvey despite prior, severe flooding during the Tax and Memorial Day storms.
Kimbro’s editorial decision to focus only on women in one area and from one social class limits her research somewhat. But what it loses in breadth, it gains in depth. There is little academic research into how upper middle-class moms cope with disasters. Most research on flooding focuses on less affluent, communities of color.
Spoiler Alert
Professor Kimbro recreated the Harvey experience completely and faithfully from the standpoint of her interviewees. Women in the Lake Houston Area will likely identify with the struggles Kimbro’s subjects faced. Spoiler alert: keep a box of tissues handy when you read this book.
Kimbro changed women’s names and even the name of their neighborhood to protect their privacy and confidentiality. Many of the women felt almost violated from having neighbors and contractors traipse through the private spaces in their homes (bedrooms, bathrooms, etc.) to rip out wallboard, tile, and carpet. I just wish she had mentioned the fictitious neighborhood name in the introduction, not at the end.
Throughout the book, she refers to the neighborhood as “Bayou Oaks” and the school that the children go to as “Bayou Oaks Elementary.”
I wanted so much to photograph this neighborhood that I Googled the names to find their locations. I also tried to look them up in multiple map apps and Google Earth. No joy! There is no Bayou Oaks Elementary in the Houston ISD. And there is no Bayou Oaks where she described it.
As a consequence, at times I wondered how real In Too Deep was. But it is very real.
Suggestion for Future Research
One thing struck me as odd though. Unless I missed it on first reading, none of the women focused on political action (lobbying for flood mitigation) as a solution to their flood woes. None of these mothers turned into political activists lobbying for flood mitigation dollars – despite their fear of future floods.
In contrast, less affluent, predominantly minority communities seize headlines and more dollars every week. Why the difference? Is it financial desperation? Lack of alternatives? Or something cultural?
This is certainly an area for future investigation. And I hope Kimbro takes it up. She’s both a talented researcher and storyteller. We have a lot to learn from her.
In Too Deep comes in paperback, hardbound and digital editions. I purchased the Kindle edition from Amazon. I highly recommend it.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 3/25/2022
1669 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/kimbro20141.jpg?fit=300%2C300&ssl=1300300adminadmin2022-03-25 12:21:372022-03-25 16:49:16Review: In Too Deep – Class and Mothering in a Flooded Community
SJRA Seeks Public Input on Sediment Trap Proposal
The San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) recently completed a 246-page conceptual design study, in partnership with the Harris County Flood Control District, that explored the feasibility of implementing sediment trapping facilities (“sand traps”). The purpose: to remove sediment from the West or East Fork of the San Jacinto River. The results and findings of this study have been documented in an engineering report entitled “San Jacinto River and Tributaries Sediment Removal and Sand Trap Development.”
Prior to proceeding to preliminary engineering design and any subsequent project phases, SJRA is seeking public input on the proposed project alternatives detailed in the report. The full report, as well as a brief summary document, are located on SJRA’s Flood Management Division website.
How to Provide Input or Ask Questions
Please submit input and questions via email to floodmanagementdivision@sjra.net.
Deadline: No later than April 29, 2022
Caution: The full study is dated 1/7/22. But the “brief summary” is dated 3/9/22. Make sure you at least read the executive study of the full report as well as the brief summary. There are important differences.
Overview/Purpose
SJRA says the purpose of the sediment trap study was to assess the feasibility of implementing a pilot project to trap and remove sediment from the West OR East Fork of the San Jacinto. The study only assessed locations where one or more Aggregate Production Operations (APOs) could partner with the the SJRA. They restricted the study this way to reduce costs; the SJRA does not have a source of funding to clean out sand traps and would rely on sand miners.
Initial Concerns
The decisions to:
…give me mixed emotions about this project.
Pros
On one hand, I look at this and say, “It’s a pilot project. Try it and see if there’s a benefit.” Sediment IS a problem and they believe they can remove up to 100% of the annual sediment load (from the West Fork).
Cons
On the other hand, the study authors, Freese & Nichols (F&N) claimed (in the San Jacinto River Basin Master Drainage Study) that of all the sediment coming into Lake Houston, two thirds comes from Spring and Cypress Creeks while only 13% comes from the West Fork upstream of US59.
Perhaps that’s because they’re using model inputs from a sediment gage at I-45 located 8.5 miles upstream from most of the large West Fork sand mines (page 34, paragraph 3 of full study).
Also, in their discussion of downstream sedimentation mitigation (page 51, paragraph 3 of full study), F&N says that their evaluation was confined to areas where natural processes rather than breeches of sand mine ponds likely contributed to sediment deposition. To see how limiting that is, see the photos of sand mine breeches and their results in this post.
In the entire 246-page F&N study and the three-page summary, the word “damage” occurs only once…in relation to erosion damage, NOT flood damage.
It appears that F&N did not even look at creating sand traps where they were most needed, in the headwaters of Lake Houston, because of cost and logistical considerations. Yet the Army Corps, City of Houston, and State of Texas are spending $200 million to dredge that area. One wonders whether SJRA should have looked harder for partners to clean out the traps.
Finally, if sediment traps only work financially near sand mines, the “solution” will not work on other tributaries that F&N alleges contribute 5X more sediment than the West Fork. They just don’t have the sand mines that the West Fork has.
Nature of Proposed Solution
Five years after Harvey, we have a conceptual design and a recommended location: rock-lined channels cut through one or two point bars at the West Fork Hallett mine.
The shot below shows the same area in real life. To put the magnitude of the proposed solution into perspective, the solution would cover a little more than an acre. But sand mines like Hallett cover 20 square miles on the banks of the West Fork between US59 and I-45.
My Biggest Fears
My biggest fears with the proposed pilot study are that it:
For a pilot study, that last point is troubling.
Also, F&N worries that removing too much sediment from the West Fork could create a “hungry-water” effect that increases erosion downstream. But they have no way of directly measuring how much sediment the West Fork transports. Or what percentage they would remove. That’s because they’re relying on a sediment gage upstream from the sand mines. This introduces an element of risk in the pilot study.
Recommendations Should Be Based on a Holistic Examination of Alternatives
Before moving forward with the pilot study, I suggest a more holistic examination of additional alternatives that might have a greater impact on reducing flood damage, not just sedimentation. Examples include, but are not limited to:
More on the sand trap proposal in coming days. In the meantime, please review the SJRA’s sediment trap proposal and forward your comments to the SJRA. I will also print thoughtful letters, both pro and con, from responsible parties. Send them to: https://reduceflooding.com/contact-us/.
Posted by Bob Rehak on March 27, 2022
1671 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
TCEQ Issues Notice of Enforcement to Laurel Springs RV Resort
After an unannounced investigation of the Laurel Springs RV Resort construction site on February 2, 2022, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) issued a Notice of Enforcement (NOE) Letter to the contractor, Higbie Ventures of Texas, Inc. The TCEQ investigation found Higbie:
The investigator felt the non-compliant discharge in late January warranted enforcement action. The TCEQ then issued a Notice of Enforcement Letter (NOE) to “facilitate” compliance.
64-Page Report Brims With Photos Showing Violations
The 64-page TCEQ report meticulously documents the complaints with time-stamped photographs.
The TCEQ investigator, Kyle Linville, required documentation showing the contractor had remedied all violations by February 7. But on February 14, Linville noted that several violations remained outstanding, including failure to:
Linville’s observations largely match mine and those of nearby residents who have communicated with me re: issues at the controversial construction site. Strangely, a City of Houston investigation found no problem, triggering two more investigations, but the City has not yet released the results of those.
Contractor Apparently Still Not Fully in Compliance
Since the TCEQ issued its notice of enforcement letter, most but not all of the violations have been corrected. However, Higbie still has not installed silt fencing along the western perimeter. And when I went by there today, trucks had once again turned Laurel Springs Lane into a muddy mess.
Contractor Claims Re: Unauthorized Discharge
The contractor admitted that he discharged stormwater into Edgewater Park without authorization. However, he claimed that it was necessary to begin installing pumps that would discharge stormwater into the Lakewood Cove Storm Sewer System. The contractor claimed that standing water in the detention pond had infiltrated the soil in the pond wall. That made the pond wall so unstable that heavy equipment could not operate safely on the wall, said the contractor, in his response to the TCEQ.
However, photos taken on the day of the trenching, 1/29/22, show heavy equipment already operating on the wall and the pump housing already partially installed.
On page 54 of the report, the contractor claims he dug the trench on 1/30/22, not 1/29.
He also admits that he placed 8″ pipe in the wall, but claims he removed it “the next day” on “1/31/21.” That would have been 10 months before the site was even cleared. But assuming he meant 1/31/22, the claim doesn’t match what I photographed that day. I photographed the contractor covering up pipe, not removing it. See below.
Is he claiming that he filled in the whole trench only to redig it on the same day and remove the pipe? That would have been amazingly inefficient. However, it would help explain some of the contractor’s failures. In the last 20 years, eight of Higbie’s 13 entities in Texas have gone out of business. He lost six of the eight to tax forfeitures.
Trust But Verify
Mr. Linville produced an excellent and thorough report of his investigation. But I hope he explores some of Higbie’s claims further without just taking Higbie’s word that he complied. As auditors say, “Trust but verify.” Did the contractor really remove the pipe? Did he install invisible silt fence on the western perimeter? Why is Higbie still pumping water out of the pond with portable pumps almost two months after installing the housing for permanent pumps.
We should never forget how excess sedimentation contributed to the flooding of thousands of homes along the West Fork during Harvey.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 3/26/22
1670 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
Review: In Too Deep – Class and Mothering in a Flooded Community
Rachel Tolbert Kimbro, a professor of sociology at Rice, has produced the rarest of commodities: an easily readable book, rich with academic value. In Too Deep: Class and Mothering in a Flooded Community is the story of 36 upper middle-class mothers on Houston’s southwest side before, during, and after Hurricane Harvey. It’s about:
Common Themes
Professor Kimbro interviewed the women extensively over the course of several years and found common themes between their stories. Among them: the struggle to protect their children, neighborhood, school, and friendships. The values they found in their neighborhood – affordability, diversity, walkability, a good school, safety, and a supportive network of neighbors – brought them together. And fear of losing those values after the flood kept them from moving elsewhere. Sound familiar? You could substitute “proximity to nature” for “proximity to museums” and understand why so many flood victims chose to stay in the Lake Houston Area after Harvey.
Qualitative Research Yields Insights
For In Too Deep, Kimbro used structured qualitative research, not quantitative. The result is a moving narrative, replete with insight and pathos. It mirrors, in a different part of Houston, many of the interviews I have done in the Lake Houston Area since Harvey.
Those who flooded will find painful memories and, ultimately, a sense of kinship that comes from a recognition of their shared struggles. Kimbro’s description of rescues by kayak; of several families crowding into one upstairs room with their pets; of struggles with contractors and adjusters; and of families sleeping on air mattresses for more than a year will bring many people to tears.
Policy makers will gain insights into what makes buyouts so difficult despite such difficulties. The book explains why many people in this neighborhood wanted to stay put after Harvey despite prior, severe flooding during the Tax and Memorial Day storms.
Kimbro’s editorial decision to focus only on women in one area and from one social class limits her research somewhat. But what it loses in breadth, it gains in depth. There is little academic research into how upper middle-class moms cope with disasters. Most research on flooding focuses on less affluent, communities of color.
Spoiler Alert
Professor Kimbro recreated the Harvey experience completely and faithfully from the standpoint of her interviewees. Women in the Lake Houston Area will likely identify with the struggles Kimbro’s subjects faced. Spoiler alert: keep a box of tissues handy when you read this book.
Kimbro changed women’s names and even the name of their neighborhood to protect their privacy and confidentiality. Many of the women felt almost violated from having neighbors and contractors traipse through the private spaces in their homes (bedrooms, bathrooms, etc.) to rip out wallboard, tile, and carpet. I just wish she had mentioned the fictitious neighborhood name in the introduction, not at the end.
Throughout the book, she refers to the neighborhood as “Bayou Oaks” and the school that the children go to as “Bayou Oaks Elementary.”
I wanted so much to photograph this neighborhood that I Googled the names to find their locations. I also tried to look them up in multiple map apps and Google Earth. No joy! There is no Bayou Oaks Elementary in the Houston ISD. And there is no Bayou Oaks where she described it.
As a consequence, at times I wondered how real In Too Deep was. But it is very real.
Suggestion for Future Research
One thing struck me as odd though. Unless I missed it on first reading, none of the women focused on political action (lobbying for flood mitigation) as a solution to their flood woes. None of these mothers turned into political activists lobbying for flood mitigation dollars – despite their fear of future floods.
In contrast, less affluent, predominantly minority communities seize headlines and more dollars every week. Why the difference? Is it financial desperation? Lack of alternatives? Or something cultural?
This is certainly an area for future investigation. And I hope Kimbro takes it up. She’s both a talented researcher and storyteller. We have a lot to learn from her.
In Too Deep comes in paperback, hardbound and digital editions. I purchased the Kindle edition from Amazon. I highly recommend it.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 3/25/2022
1669 Days since Hurricane Harvey