Lakewood Cove residents reported yesterday and today that contractors at the Laurel Springs RV Resort are pumping stormwater from their detention pond into Precinct 4’s Edgewater Park. The reports are true. And it’s a permit violation.
I also found contractors bringing in fill from the outside that I thought was going to be “cut” from the detention pond. All photos below were taken on 1/18/22.
Pumping From Pond onto Neighboring Property
The approved permit plans clearly state that “Stormwater runoff shall not cross property lines.”
Stamp on many pages of approved Laurel Springs RV Resort plans.
I guess at some point the water in the pond ceased being runoff. Now it’s just a nuisance. The plans said pond water would be pumped into the City storm sewers. Hmmmm.
Photographed from Laurel Springs Lane looking west.
Here’s an aerial photo looking toward Laurel Springs Lane.
Check out all the muck being washed into the woods. Those woods belong to Harris County Pct. 4. That’s part of new Edgewater Park.
Note the lack of silt fences in the two photos above. Plans clearly state that silt fences will be installed to keep silt from escaping the property. Double Hmmmm!
Bringing in Fill instead of Moving It From Within the Site
As I photographed the pumping, I noticed a parade of dump trucks bringing in fill, dumping it, and leaving as a bulldozer spread it out and another machine quickly compacted it.
Looking NW toward Lowes in top center. Note dump truck depositing fill – one of many that I watched.The area where they deposited fill just north of the pond corresponds to the plans. See below.
From text on the image above, I assumed that the job was to be a routine “cut and fill” operation. Maybe I shouldn’t have assumed.
Cut and Fill is an industry standard in floodplains. It means you move dirt from one part of the site to another. So, there is no additional fill brought into the floodplain. The fill area above appears to be in the .2% annual chance floodplain, according to the old FEMA map below. However, the developer did not mark the .2% chance floodplain on plans.
FEMA floodplain map. Aqua = 1% annual chance. Brown = .2% annual chance.It appears the northern part of the detention pond (not shown on this old satellite image) cuts between the aqua and brown areas.
For the record, Chapter 19 of Houston’s Code of Ordinances currently does not prohibit bringing fill into the .2% annual chance floodplain. See Section 19.34.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/18/2022
1603 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/20220118-DJI_0490.jpg?fit=1200%2C799&ssl=17991200adminadmin2022-01-18 20:33:432022-01-18 20:40:31RV Resort Pumping Stormwater Into Edgewater Park, Bringing in Fill
Between those two dates, Jennifer Coulter, the victim, contacted the City 17 times to ask if she could file an application.
In every call, no HCDD employee ever told her that she was eligible to apply. In fact, they told her the opposite – that they hadn’t gotten to her “Priority Group” yet. After misleading her, when New Year’s Eve came and went last year, the Harvey Reimbursement Program expired, and Coulter was out. Despite multiple requests to clarify her status and two appeals , HCDD denied aid to Coulter for not communicating with them.
Many others, who were denied aid, experienced variations of her problems. For instance, after two years of being kept in the dark about whether he could submit an application, HCDD notified one man that he could apply just hours before the program expired on New Year’s Eve. HCDD told him that he needed to submit his application by 5PM or lose eligibility. Unfortunately, he was visiting out-of-town relatives and didn’t have access to required documents.
Chronic bad planning, mismanagement, disorganization, understaffing, miscommunication and poor record-keeping at HCDD created a malignant and crippled aid-distribution system after Harvey.
In Coulter’s case and many others, HCDD problems victimized flood victims a second time.
Coulter home after Harvey. The family lived in a travel trailer in their driveway for a year with two adults, two kids, two cats and one dog, while they made repairswith money in their 401Ks and kids’ college funds.
I would say Coulter’s case is one of the saddest stories to come out of Harvey…if so many others hadn’t been denied aid for similar reasons.
A 2019 HUD audit of HCDD found in part that “Staff members worked independently and did not communicate with each other re: applications.” Coulter’s call log vividly brings to life the chaos that flood victims were forced to deal with as they struggled to find assistance from the City.
Audits 2 Years Apart Show Similar Organizational Problems
After Harvey, the City of Houston lobbied the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for approximately $1.3 billion to aid Harvey victims, such as Coulter. But a subsequent 2019 HUD audit showed HCDD was unprepared to manage the money, the caseload or the approval process.
Despite assistance and training by the Texas General Land Office (GLO), which manages disaster relief for HUD in Texas, Houston never got its disaster relief programs in gear. A second audit by GLO released last Wednesday arrived at conclusions similar to HUD’s.
City’s Needlessly Complex Two-Step Application Dooms Program
Among the problems: HCDD set up a needlessly complex application process involving two steps. Victims had to “apply to apply” by filling out an online survey. Based on survey answers, HCDD placed victims in one of six “priority groups.” Group 1 represented highest priority flood victims and 6 the lowest.
HUD and the GLO warned Houston about the two-step application process even before it started. They told Houston it was too complex and would cause delays. They recommended that the City have everyone submit full applications and then sort through them to find enough qualified applicants to match the amount of aid available.
That way, everyone would have had a fair chance to meet the deadlines involved. Delays and miscommunication would not have been a factor. HCDD’s repair program expired last December 31st at 5PM with only a small fraction of the aid distributed.
HCDD initially told Coulter that she was in Group 6, the lowest priority. But on May 14, 2020, HCDD sent her an invitation to submit a full application. The invitation got lost in her email. And Coulter continued to call the City for the remainder of the year. Each time she would ask if she could submit an application and each time she was told, “Not yet,” despite already having been invited.
Even though Coulter called HCDD dozens of times to clarify her status, in 15 months, nobody at HCDD ever told her over the phone to check her email or that she could apply. That’s how bad HCDD’s record-keeping, database systems, and internal communications were!
Sadly, we’ve come to expect and accept stories like this from the City of Houston. HUD and GLO audits repeatedly showed problems in HCDD.
After Reimbursement Program Expired, Mayor Claims Commitment to Improvement
The mayor’s response, after the latest audit and after the program expired, was in essence, “We’ll look into it and fix it if we find problems.” His press release about the latest audit concluded, “The City is committed, as it always has been, to transparency and improving its Housing processes.”
Admittedly, the Reimbursement Program that Coulter applied to is just one of many HCDD programs.
But for the Jennifer Coulters of the world, it’s too late. The HUD money will likely go unused and return to Washington for future grants that may give other victims false hope.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/27/2021
1551 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Cart-in-Living-Room.jpg?fit=1200%2C900&ssl=19001200adminadmin2021-11-27 15:48:092021-11-27 16:44:07Harvey Victim Denied Aid for Not Communicating After Contacting City 17 Times
“It is important to note that the GLO previously reviewed the City’s Notice of Funds Availability (NOFA) 1, 2, and 3 and took no exceptions. The GLO also reviewed and approved all program guidelines before they were sent to the city council and subsequently approved. The City has operated under the GLO-approved guidelines for all issued NOFAs and will determine if changes are needed.
“Indeed, the report does not identify any violations of law, regulations or contractual provisions, as asserted by the City during the review process. The report found no conflict of interest violations of law or regulation.”
City of Houston Mayor’s Office
In essence, Turner was saying, “We were being constantly reviewed and GLO approved everything we did.”
Difference Between Guidelines and Following Them
If you took that away from the Mayor’s statement, though, you may have drawn the wrong conclusion. It’s one thing to have GLO-approved guidelines – and another to follow them. There’s often a huge difference between the way things should operate and the way they do.
A former high-level employee of HCDD who wishes to remain anonymous, told me, “You need to understand that GLO and HUD provide the only supervision of HCDD. It’s not coming from the City or City Council.”
The relationship between HCDD, the GLO and HUD has been stormy for a long time. HCDD’s Harvey recovery programs got off to such a slow start, that HUD audited them. The audit was so critical that GLO feared the state might lose future funds from HUD; HUD explicitly stated that as a possibility. That caused the GLO to offer help and increase its supervision of HCDD. And that set the tone through 2020 when GLO tried to take back Harvey relief funds – so that GLO could distribute them itself – and the City sued to keep them.
Wednesday’s blowup was simply the latest in a long line. Let’s not ignore that. This relationship has been stormy from the start.
Houston had not drawn any funds from the Hurricane Harvey grants. The city had only submitted two requests for payment to the GLO – totaling approximately $1 million out of more than $1.2 billion. GLO rejected both requests as incomplete.
HUD had concerns regarding “the city’s expenditure progress and overall financial management processes.”
The City’s compliance website did not meet HUD’s requirements.
Houston was operating at half staff (59 full-time employees; 61 more needed) and had turnover in two key positions.
“The city of Houston’s CDBG-DR program is plagued with many staff vacancies (including several key management positions), high staff turnover, slow hiring processes, and lack of effective hiring and onboarding plans for new staff.”
“The city’s procedures do not provide a clear workflow for program implementation and overall management of its CDBG-DR grant allocations.”
The City did not post details on its website of all contracts funded by HUD money as required by law.
HCDD provided inconsistent explanations of the process used to secure a major contract, and verbally confirmed that the selection was not based on a competitive process.
The City tried to seek reimbursement from FEMA for costs of a HUD program, something prohibited by statute.
HCDD did not follow record-keeping procedures for its Hurricane Harvey Homeowner Assistance Program.
Staff members worked independently and did not communicate with each other re: applications. No one individual reviewed an application for completeness.
The Mayor’s Office concluded his press release with the following:
“The City is committed, as it always has been, to transparency and improving its Housing processes.” Really?
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/26/2021
1550 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Turner.jpg?fit=1500%2C1125&ssl=111251500adminadmin2021-11-26 18:02:122021-11-26 22:09:04Mayor Turner Points Finger at GLO in Latest Harvey Relief Dispute
The original deadline for Hurricane Harvey Homeowner Assistance applications has been extended from this Friday to New Year’s Eve at 5 P.M. Applications do not have to be completed by then, just started by then. So if you still hope to receive aid, move quickly. Money is running out and eligible applications will be prioritized based on who applied first.
The process involves a large number of documents and complex rules that govern eligibility. Here is the full text of this morning’s press release from the GLO. It includes information on where to apply.
What remained of a home washed downstream during Harvey. Photo by Dan Monks.
AUSTIN — The Texas General Land Office (GLO) has extended the deadline to submit applications for the Homeowner Assistance Program (HAP) to 5 p.m. Dec. 31, 2021. All potential applicants must submit draft applications by the deadline to be considered for eligibility so long as funding is available.
We encourage the community to remember that applications do not need to be fully complete to be submitted. Once application intake concludes, additional program resources will be dedicated to processing applicants for eligibility, through the permitting process and into construction. Applications can be submitted even if documentation is missing as HAP applicant coordinators continue to help applicants who are missing documentation.
The HAP regional offices will remain open, and processing of applications will continue indefinitely until program funds are fully expended. Applications will be considered for award on a first-come, first-served basis, according to the priorities outlined in the Regional Housing Guidelines.
Submitting a complete application does not guarantee eligibility nor funding availability, but applicants must submit a complete application by the deadline to be potentially considered for assistance.
Those residing inside the Houston city limits should apply at recovery.texas.gov/hap/houston, while non-Houston residents of Harris County should apply at recovery.texas.gov/hap/harriscounty. New applicants can also call the toll-free intake center line at 1-866-317-1998.
Harris County and the City of Houston received direct allocations of funding for residents in their jurisdictions. Applicants who previously applied to and are receiving assistance from Harris County and the City of Houston directly should continue to work with their program representatives.
In the City of Houston, applications being processed for eligibility already outnumber available funds, but funds remain available in non-Houston Harris County areas. HAP continues to take waitlist applications in Houston in case additional funding becomes available.
Waitlisted applications will be reviewed for eligibility in the order received based on their submission date, should additional funding be approved. Applications that are started, but not yet submitted by 5 p.m. on Dec. 31, 2021, cannot be considered for assistance.
Thus far, in all 49 counties eligible for Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) funding from U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the GLO has approved nearly 6,900 applications for construction, with about 850 homes currently under construction and more than 4,000 completed with keys in the hands of homeowners.
The GLO continues processing completed applications with the expectation of rebuilding up to 10,000 homes total for those needing assistance with available funds, with approximately 3,000 of those homes expected to be rebuilt in Harris County and the City of Houston.
Individuals affected by Hurricane Harvey may qualify for assistance through the Homeowner Assistance Program if:
They owned their home
It was damaged or destroyed by Hurricane Harvey
It was their primary residence at the time of the storm
Other eligibility factors also apply.
The program offers qualified homeowners assistance to repair, rehabilitate or rebuild homes damaged by Hurricane Harvey. Potential applicants should review the Homeowner Assistance Program Checklist to have all applicable documents ready prior to applying.
Applications, including all necessary documentation, must be completed and submitted BEFORE the GLO and its partners will begin processing it for eligibility. Each application submitted must be individually evaluated to determine eligibility. If applicants or potential applicants have questions, please contact 346-222-4686 or 1-866-317-1998 (toll free).
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/15/2021 based on a Texas GLO press release.
1539 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/siding.jpg?fit=1885%2C1060&ssl=110601885adminadmin2021-11-15 15:00:202021-11-15 15:03:07GLO Extends Deadline for Harvey Homeowner Assistance Applications
After finishing excavating silt from under the Kingwood Drive Bridge over Ben’s Branch, City crews are now doing the same under the bridge over the Diversion Ditch near the fire station on Kingwood Drive.
Before excavation began. Looking south at the Kingwood Drive Bridge over the Diversion Ditch in August.
Bridges are often chokepoints during floods because of their supports that reduce and sometimes slow the flow of water and contribute to sediment buildup.
Closer shot of same bridge, still looking south. Note sediment buildup. Also note how bridge supports catch debris.
The City of Houston is responsible for excavation under the bridges because the bridges are City property.
On Ben’s Branch, Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) had excavated both north and south of the bridge at Kingwood Drive. Then the City did its part.
Pictures of Work in Progress At Kingwood Drive.
However, at the Diversion Ditch Bridge, HCFCD has not yet begun excavation. CoH went first.
Dan Monks, a Kingwood resident, captured work in progress last week and gave ReduceFlooding.com permission to use his photos.
Photo By Dan Monks shows excavation in progress under east side of Kingwood Drive Bridge over Diversion Ditch.The City is stacking the dirt on the bank, letting it drain and then hauling it off. Another shot courtesy of Dan Monks. There’s still more work to do on the western side, but that should happen soon. Photo courtesy of Dan Monks.
The Second of Many Such Projects
According to Mayor Pro Tem Dave Martin’s office, the City’s Public Works Department will also be investigating other bridges in the Kingwood area to see if they too need to have silt removed from under them. These projects aren’t glamorous, but they are necessary to restore conveyance of area ditches. HCFCD’s Kingwood Area Drainage Analysis showed that some area ditches were down to a 2-year level of service. That means they were so constricted that they would flood in a two-year rain.
Bridges along Kingwood Drive and Northpark Drive can least afford flooding. They are vital links in crucial evacuation routes.
Thanks to the folks in the District E Council Office and the Public Works Department for addressing these issues.
It’s not yet clear when HCFCD plans to start excavation of the Diversion Ditch in this area.
If you have photos you would like to share with the public, please submit them through the Submissions Page of this website.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/10/21
1503 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20211006_154127.jpg?fit=1200%2C583&ssl=15831200adminadmin2021-10-10 20:41:252021-10-10 20:50:41CoH Excavating Silt from Diversion Ditch at Kingwood Drive
One of the more alarming facts that came out of Thursday’s City Council meeting is that Houston’s Housing and Community Development is spending far more on disaster relief than it gets back in reimbursements. In the case of one program, Economic Development, the ratio between costs and reimbursements to date was actually 1100 to 1, even higher than the headline indicates ($3,596,821 spent vs. $3,260 reimbursed).
The program’s purpose: to help small businesses damaged by Harvey. But the City launched the program just this year. And four years after the storm, those who needed assistance the most have already gone out of business. Most small businesses can’t survive that long after losing essential equipment. Is this program chasing business applicants that no longer exist? It’s hard to tell without more information. (The City’s most recent pipeline report, published just yesterday, doesn’t even mention the Economic Development Program.)
Regardless, the Economic Development Program isn’t the only area where expenses seem out of whack. This raises the questions, “Should the City even be in the disaster-relief business?” And “Can others do it better?”
Disaster Relief Costs Exceed Reimbursements and Budgets in Multiple Areas
Temika Jones, the Department’s new Chief Financial Officer and Assistant Director showed the chart below as part of her presentation. She has one year on the job. Before that, she served as an auditor for a major accounting firm. Her presentation spotlighted two giant problems: Costs exceed reimbursements. And costs exceed budgets – so some may never be reimbursed.
In the chart above, focus on the last two columns in the Total row. They show that the City is incurring disaster relief costs that average 2.3X higher than reimbursements – across the board.
Also focus on the big red numbers at the bottom of the slide. They show budgets that have already been exceeded.
Now compare Columns 3 and 6 in Line 1. The City has already overspent its four-year budget for administration in the first year of its contract with the GLO by $1+ million. Oops. The budget was $15 million. But the City already spent $16 million and has only had draws approved for $1.2 million.
Finally, compare Columns 3 and 5 on Line 4: The Homeowner Assistance Program. The department budgeted only $8.2 million for project delivery, but has already spent $30.6 million – almost quadruple. That means they have no budget remaining to finish the program. Worse, reimbursement for $22.3 million could be in jeopardy.
City Operating Outside of Its Core Competencies
There are several reasons for the problems discussed above:
HUD and the GLO operate on a reimbursement basis. The City can give money to flood victims and expect reimbursement, but then have the victim’s application refused for some reason – often missing forms or incomplete data.
The City’s accounting systems don’t handle disaster relief programs well, so the problems lack visibility.
Disaster relief just doesn’t seem to be one of the City’s core competencies.
The City is operating waaaaay outside of its areas of expertise. Police. Fire. Water. Streets. Trash. Those are the things people expect from the City and what the City should focus on. In business, any time you tread outside of your core competencies, your costs and risks escalate exponentially. That takes money away from flood victims.
It appears that the City was so eager to get its hands on hundreds of millions of dollars in disaster relief money that no one asked whether the City even should be in that business. Or whether the City should just have let the GLO handle disaster relief – as it did so well in 48 other counties.
As of the end of last year, the GLO had reimbursed 2961 homeowners; Houston reimbursed 119.
And while the GLO reconstructed 2500 homes, the City reconstructed only 117.
Increasing the Pace, But Falling Father Behind
The City has accelerated its pace this year, but Jones’ presentation also shows that the City is still sitting on top of applications worth $114 million that have yet to be filed. That’s almost triple the previous year’s number. Meanwhile, expenses have more than tripled.
That brings us full circle. The City’s Economic Development Program has spent more than $3 million to get $3 thousand approved. It makes one wonder whether the purpose of pursuing HUD money was to create employment in Housing and Community Development or to help flood victims.
Turfing this to the GLO could have helped many more flood victims much faster at a lower cost.
The City put a third bureaucracy between money in Washington and the flood victims who need it. Two could have done the job faster, easier, and better.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/9/2021
1502 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Screen-Shot-2021-10-09-at-12.45.15-PM.png?fit=1918%2C1448&ssl=114481918adminadmin2021-10-09 18:49:242021-10-10 10:10:47Should City Be in Disaster Relief? For One Program, It Spent $3 Million to Get $3 Thousand
The agenda is scant. It entails a Housing and Community Development “Financial Update” with three speakers:
Keith Bynam, Deputy Director, Housing and Community Development
Temika Jones, Chief Financial Officer, Housing and Community Development
Andy Icken, Chief Development Officer, Mayor’s Office
I asked Mayor Pro Tem Martin for more detail. He replied, “Fiduciary update on City of Houston Housing, specifically CDBG and DR-17, and the status of the investigation from the City Attorney regarding his decision to bring in outside Firms and appropriate resources to ensure independence and completeness.”
Turner Vigorously Denies Allegations
The last part about the City Attorney refers to a self-investigation Mayor Sylvester Turner launched in the wake of explosive allegations by Tom McCasland, Housing and Community Development’s former director. Turner fired McCasland two weeks ago after McCasland accused the Mayor of improperly influencing the award of a housing grant. The Mayor skipped over the top seven recommendations by McCasland’s department to pick the eighth ranked project. The Mayor’s selection would have delivered one quarter of the affordable housing for basically the same price as the four projects recommended by the Department of Housing and Community Development. It just happened to turn out that the Mayor’s former law partner, Barry Barnes, is also a stakeholder in the eighth ranked project.
I spent the better part of the day reviewing complex documents in this case. I will post them below with some brief comments for those who like to refer to original source materials.
The 110-page contract between the GLO and City of Houston for $835 million. This is a subset of the $1.2 billion original contract that became the subject of a lawsuit between the same two parties last year. It lays out the expectations for each party, allocates totals to each program, sets performance goals for each, and lists deadlines. The Mayor signed it on Page 104.
The agenda for a review and a list of requested documents. Some of the acronyms in this may be puzzling. MQA stands for “Monitoring Quality Assurance.” MFRP stands for Multi-Family Rental Program. Page 4 lists the purpose of the review. Page 5 lists the scope. Page 11 lists the items that the City had not yet supplied as of 9/30/2021. Page 12 explains regulations that could penalize the City if it fails to provide the requested records.
The 40-page 2021 Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) refers to Round 3 of the Disaster Recovery (DR-17) and Multifamily Program. It lays out the ground rules and selection criteria for the controversial Clear Lake apartment complex preferred by the Mayor. This was the “report card” for companies submitting proposals. It told them how they were going to be graded – i.e., what would increase or decrease their chances of success. It includes such factors as “flood resilience,” “experience,” “project readiness,” “cost reasonableness,” “disaster-recovery construction standards,” “location relative to the floodway,” and more.
Significantly, in the last document, the City’s Chief Procurement Officer, Jerry Adams, promises, “Bid proposals will be reviewed, underwritten and scored to select awardees based on a predetermined set of criteria outlined in the NOFA.”
Is There a Contract?
Yes and No.
No, in that a contract has not been signed with the Mayor’s hand-picked developer. The developer has not been paid any money. GLO has not even received a recommendation yet as to the developer. Everything blew up on the launching pad before things got that far.
However, the GLO and HUD contend that the NOFA is a contract. It obligates the City to solicit proposals according to criteria that have been agreed to beforehand.
The documentation calls into question whether bypassing seven higher scoring proposals in favor of a lower scoring project might violate the NOFA and federal procurement process regulations.
Here are some important federal requirements listed in the Code of Federal Regulations under 2 CFR Part 200:
Appendix I to Part 200 – Full Text of Notice of Funding Opportunity: “The intent is to make the application process transparent so applicants can make informed decisions when preparing their applications to maximize fairness of the process.” (E. Application Review Information)
§ 200.319 Competition: “All procurement transactions for the acquisition of property or services required under a Federal award must be conducted in a manner providing full and open competition consistent with the standards of this section and § 200.320.
From that perspective, there was and is a contract. As this controversy plays out, the contract question will likely play a central role. Don’t be fooled if someone says, “There was no contract.” Clarify what that means.
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20210520-RJR_6964.jpg?fit=1200%2C800&ssl=18001200adminadmin2021-10-06 21:52:062021-10-07 08:15:30Special City Meeting Thursday At 2 PM Will Address Multi-Family Housing Flap
For this round of funding, the TWDB selected 19 sub-applications from local government entities. After screening, FEMA eliminated 6 and identified 13 “for further review.”
Here’s a summary from the TWDB of what they will vote on.
Harris County Drainage Project in Bear Creek Village
Bear Creek Village is located on the west side of the Addicks reservoir near Highway 6. This is an $11.3 million project of which the federal government would pay $8.5 million.
The Harris County project would mitigate 1,421 structures. The current storm sewer system is designed for a 3-year event and is inadequate to collect and drain extreme event runoff. The proposed drainage improvements are intended to provide an additional flow path, so that excess storm water is contained within street right-of-way to an outfall. The project will incorporate a combination of channel construction, street regrading, and enhancement of outfalls. The project has a positive Benefit-Cost Ratio of 1.09.
Harris County Flood Control District Single-Family Home Acquisitions
Total cost = $16.7 million with federal government paying $14.7 million.
Harris County Flood District seeks to mitigate 61 structures: 23 Severe Repetitive Loss structures, 17 Repetitive Loss structures, and 21 at risk of continual future flooding. HCFCD would acquire and demolish structures, then convert the land to open green space. The project has a positive Benefit-Cost Ratio of 1.09.
Harris County Flood Control District Commercial Acquisition
This is a $3.7 million buyout with the federal government picking up the whole tab.
Harris County Flood Control District wants to buy out a hotel on the east freeway with a severe repetitive loss history. HCFCD would demolish the property and convert the land to open green space. The project has a positive Benefit-Cost Ratio of 1.84. The grant application notes that since 1979, FEMA has paid out $8 million in NFIP claims on this property.
City of Houston Single-Family-Home Elevation Project
Total Cost $1.5 million (all paid by federal government) to elevate 5 severe-repetitive-loss homes ($300,000 each). All would be elevated at least 2 feet above the 500-year floodplain. That would hopefully reduce or eliminate future NFIP claims. The project has a positive Benefit-Cost Ratio of 1.1.
Jersey Village Single-Family-Home Elevation Project
Total Cost $4.9 million with federal government covering $400,000.
Jersey Village seeks elevate 16 structures: 10 are Severe Repetitive Loss, five Repetitive Loss and one at risk of continual future flooding. Elevation will raise structures one-foot above Base Flood Elevation per the City’s freeboard requirements. The project has a positive Benefit-Cost Ratio of 1.32.
Montgomery County Single-Family-Home Acquisition and Demolition
Total Cost = $12.6 million with federal share of $12.4 million.
Montgomery County seeks to mitigate 40 flood prone structures (31 Severe Repetitive Loss and 9 Repetitive Loss structures) by acquisition, demolition, and the conversion of land to open green space. The project has a positive Benefit-Cost Ratio of 1.36.
Tammy Gunnels’ Home in Porter is an example of a Severe Repetitive Loss Home. It flooded like this 13 times in 11 years and was bought out yesterday as part of another Montgomery County grant.Before the buyout, it cost FEMA more than 3 times its fair market value and would have continued flooding had nothing been done.
Pearland Single-Family-Home Elevation Project
Total Cost $500,000, all covered by federal government.
The City of Pearland seeks to mitigate two Severe Repetitive Loss structures by elevation one-foot above the Base Flood Elevation per the City’s freeboard requirements. The project has a positive Benefit-Cost Ratio of 1.08.
Taylor Lake Village Single-Family-Home Elevation Project
Total Cost $2.77 million with federal government covering $2.75 million.
Taylor Lake Village wants to elevate eight Severe Repetitive Loss structures and one Repetitive Loss structure one foot above the 100-year flood level. The project has a positive Benefit-Cost Ratio of 3.1.
In each of the projects above, the owners have all voluntarily committed to the elevation or demolition of the structures.
Recommendation of TWDB Staff
The Executive Administrator of the TWDB recommends that his board approve all these grants. This program meets the agency’s objectives of providing financial assistance to communities to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk of flood damage and to become more flood resilient.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Gunnels_01_01.jpg?fit=1500%2C844&ssl=18441500adminadmin2021-10-02 21:19:082021-10-02 21:19:12TWDB To Vote on Accepting $63.6 million in FEMA Flood Mitigation Assistance Grants
Most of us have seen sinkholes. And most of us have probably given little thought to what causes them.
Retired engineer Chris Bloch, a local flood fighter, measured a 13-foot deep sinkhole near Taylor Gulley earlier this year that had become overgrown with vegetation. Working with the City of Houston and a local homeowner who first reported the problem, they found the sinkhole related to a nearby storm drain.
Bloch lowered this length of PVC pipe into the Taylor Gully sinkhole to measure the depth.Note how the hole had become overgrown with vegetation.
Other things can cause sinkholes, but in this area and in this part of the world, “storm drain gone bad” ranks high on the list of things to investigate.
Corrugated Pipe Commonly Used At Outfalls When Kingwood Built
According to Bloch, when Friendswood built Kingwood, they commonly used corrugated metal pipe (CMP) at storm sewer outfalls. CMP has an expected service life of approximately 35 years, says Bloch. And corrosion commonly causes failure at older outfalls constructed with such pipe.
For example, see the section of pipe below. This photo was taken on Ben’s Branch, not Taylor Gully, but it shows how the pipe rusted, bent, and crimped. Also look just to the right of the wooden posts, and you can even see a large hole in the pipe. It even tilts upward before it reaches the creek.
Bloch frequently walks ditches looking for sinkholes to report to the City. He says he’s aware of at least five right now.
The 72-inch outfall to Taylor Gully serviced drainage area G03408-00-OUT which encompasses all of Greenriver Valley Drive and Mountain Bluff Lane as well as portions of Appalachian Trail, Natural Bridge and Echo Falls Drives. That area comprises 33.4 acres. See below.
Service area for damaged outfall encompasses 33.4 acres where several homes flooded.
The transition from a 72-inch concrete storm sewer to the 72-inch CMP outfall is at a manhole on the edge of the Taylor Gully right of way. See below.
Over the years, the CMP at the connection to the manhole failed. The earth above the failed pipe washed into the outfall and then downstream where it helped reduce the conveyance of Taylor Gully.
Repairs Started But Not Complete
The City of Houston has already repaired several storm sewers with failed corrugated metal outfalls. At least five additional storm sewer outfalls with sinkholes have been identified that have not yet been repaired.
Vegetation frequently hides the presence of these sinkholes. In addition to posing a danger to citizens walking along the banks of the drainage channels, the soil that falls into the sewer can be held up by the corrugations of the metal pipe reducing the flow capacity of the sewer, says Bloch.
Even without obstruction from soil falling into a sewer outfall, the rough surface of the corrugated metal pipe generates greater friction than smooth concrete. The friction slows the flow of storm water and reduces flow capacity which becomes critical during high intensity rains that cause street flooding.
Bloch somehow convinced the City of Houston Public Works Department to replace the damaged CMP at Taylor Gully with concrete pipe. See below.
“This upgrade in the outfall piping will significantly improve the flow capacity of the storm sewer system,” says Bloch.
Concrete pipe replaced CMP at the location of the 13-foot sinkhole on Taylor Gully. Installed by City of Houston Public Works Departmentafter HCFCD repaired Gully.
Concrete Better for New Atlas-14 Rainfall Intensities
When Friendswood Development installed stormwater sewers in Kingwood, they met standards which applied at that time. With new Atlas-14 rainfall projections, we now understand that we should expect more rainfall. Several homes along Appalachian Trial suffered flood damage during Tropical Storm Imelda.
How to Report Sinkholes When You Find Them
As they say, it takes a village to reduce flooding. Now that you know the story behind sinkholes…
If you jog or walk along drainage ditches, exercise caution. Look out for developing sinkholes. And report them to 3-1-1 when you find them. They can pose dangers to children and even grown adults. To put that in perspective, Bloch (shown in the first photo) is more than 6 feet tall, but the sinkhole dwarfs him.
This NBC News story on YouTube has some spectacular examples of sinkholes in Florida along with easy to understand animations that show how they form.
Another 7 minute YouTube video from a series called Practical Engineering focuses on how sinkholes form. It contains both real world examples and table-top experiments that bring the processes to life.
Posted by Bob Rehak based on information and photos provided by Chris Bloch
1492 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Sinkhole-Depth-2-scaled.jpg?fit=1920%2C2560&ssl=125601920adminadmin2021-09-29 16:40:182021-09-30 15:53:15Sinkholes Often Sign of Damaged Storm Drains
Tuesday, City of Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner and Houston Housing and Community Development Director Tom McCasland got into a verbal brawl over alleged improprieties in the distribution of Harvey relief funds.
Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner photographed in February of 2020.
The Mayor overrode the recommendations of McCasland and his staff, who pointed out that $16.2 million could have created four times the number of affordable units in poorer neighborhoods. Those projects all scored higher in the competition for funding.
General Land Office Response
Brittany Eck, a spokesperson for the Texas General Land Office (GLO), issued a statement within hours. She said, “The GLO is looking into the serious allegations of fraud or corruption regarding projects by the City of Houston’s Harvey Multifamily Program. The GLO is responsible for ensuring all money allocated through the Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) are spent appropriately. These projects and funds are intended to be utilized to aid the greatest number of low-income Texans as possible.”
Eck continued: “As such, we will re-review all requests for funding draws allocated to the City of Houston by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The GLO will coordinate with HUD and other investigative entities to determine what actions should follow regarding these allegations. Fraud has no place in helping Texans recover from disaster.”
She concluded, “Anyone with information relating to potential fraud, waste, and/or abuse is encouraged to report it by calling 1-844-893-8937 or emailing cdr@recovery.texas.gov.”
Mayor’s Response
According to multiple news reports and a press release from the Mayor’s Office, Turner denied specific knowledge of the deal with his former law partner. He claimed there was no impropriety, that McCasland had raised no objections to the deal, and that he (Turner) had the right as Mayor to override McCasland’s objections.
The Mayor also asserted he was trying “to place affordable housing projects throughout the City…” Finally, he claimed he severed all ties with his former law partner before assuming his position as Mayor.
McCasland’s Point of View
McCasland insisted this was not the first time the Mayor’s office interfered. The Houston Chronicle, which broke the story, said “McCasland acknowledged the Mayor has the authority to overturn staff recommendations, but McCasland argued that in this case it represented a subversion of a competitive process to benefit one applicant.
McCasland said he was not alleging fraud, but said the pattern of behavior was emblematic of a broader problem in Turner’s administration, a “do-it-because-I-said-so” management style. McCasland did say that drives out public servants dedicated to integrity and breeds a “culture for corruption.”
Further, the Chronicle article quoted McCasland as saying he briefed the Mayor August 17 and again on August 24.
McCasland said the Clear Lake complex (Huntington at Bay Area) ranked 8th out of 12 proposals, and had the lowest percentage (60%) of its units reserved for low income tenants.
Note McCasland’s comments on page 4. He claims “The outcome of that process was predetermined before the funding opportunity was even issued.”
If you don’t read anything else, skip to the last page. It’s an email from McCasland to the Mayor dated September 17. In it, he summarizes all his objections to the Clear Lake deal. That would seem to contradict the Mayor’s claim that McCasland did not register his objections.
Mayor Fires McCasland
McCasland said to City Council, “I am being forced to participate in a charade that this was a competitive process, when I know it was not a competitive process. That’s the problem here and I’m being forced to ask my teammates to participate in that charade and that is not something that we can do and that is not something that we will do.”
According to those who watched the gripping testimony in City Council, it was like watching someone commit career suicide. By the end of the day, the Mayor issued a terse press release. He denied McCasland’s allegations, said he had lost confidence in McCasland, and that it was time to move on.
Why All of a Sudden?
The big question is this: Why now? McCasland and his embattled department have been under fire for years:
Coming forward when he did – as he did – almost felt like a Law & Order episode in which the DA flipped a witness with a promise of immunity. Some veteran City Hall observers felt McCasland was being unusually frank and fearless for someone at the center of such a huge mess. If there was a pattern of ethics violations, why wait years before objecting to them?
Mayor Likely Overstepped Authority
Both McCasland and the Mayor said the Mayor had the right to overturn staff decisions. But Eck pointed out the Mayor did not have the power to “rewrite” the Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) to favor one applicant; any project selected must meet federal regulations.
She said that had the City written the NOFA to favor affluent neighborhoods, and had HUD and the GLO approved it that way, there would be no problem at this point. However, the City did not do that.
From McCasland’s report and the documentation provided, it appears the City’s award went against the scoring system laid out in the published NOFA, resulting in a competition that was not full, fair and open. The result led applicants to believe their projects would be considered against one criterion when other unknown criteria were actually utilized.
We now know the City awarded the project to a former partner of the Mayor in a high-income area…ignoring the posted and approved scoring system. In that regard, the Mayor evidently overstepped his authority.
The GLO has been in touch with HUD, the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, Gov. Greg Abbott’s office and the Department of Public Safety, according to Eck.
KTRK’s Ted Oberg said DPS would only be involved to investigate criminal matters.
Brown, who audits City projects, continued, “In the past several months alone, our office has been denied procurement documents required to conduct an audit of the Strategic Procurement Department and were told to stop all work on a financial transparency project that would bring much-needed insight into the city’s spending practices. Taxpayers deserve a city government that is transparent and above reproach. Unfortunately, recent events suggest that the city is falling short of that goal.”
Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/22/2021
1485 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/20191017-RJR_3755.jpg?fit=1200%2C800&ssl=18001200adminadmin2021-09-22 22:05:092021-09-23 11:27:43Blowup Between Mayor and Housing Director Triggers Fraud Investigation over Harvey Funds
