Tag Archive for: City of Houston

Mayor Turner Appoints Aho as new Chief Resilience Officer for City of Houston

The Houston Chronicle reported at noon today that Mayor Sylvester Turner appointed a new Chief Resilience Officer, a job formerly held by Stephen Costello. The story makes only a brief reference to Costello in the last paragraph. It says, “Stephen Costello, Houston’s former chief resilience officer, began overseeing the city’s Harvey recovery efforts in November 2018. He took over as “recovery czar” from Marvin Odum, the former president of Shell.”

Definition of Resilience Broadened to Include Economic Equity

The press release issued by City Hall mentions nothing of Costello and mentions flooding only once. It appears to broaden the scope of resilience and places major emphasis on “social and economic equity” in resilience planning.

Marissa Aho, City of Houston’s new Chief Resilience Officer. Photo Courtesy of Mayor’s office.

It says, “Mayor Sylvester Turner has appointed Marissa Aho, AICP, as chief resilience officer for the City of Houston… The position will play an essential role in leading city-wide resilience-building efforts to help Houston prepare for, withstand, and bounce back from the ‘’shocks’’ – catastrophic events like hurricanes, floods, and cyberattacks – and “stresses” – slow-moving disasters like aging infrastructure, homelessness, and economic inequality, which are increasingly part of 21st century life.”

As chief resilience officer, Aho will report directly to Mayor Turner. She will oversee the development and implementation of a comprehensive Resilience Strategy for the city. Aho comes to Houston from the City of Los Angeles. There she served as Chief Resilience Officer (CRO) for the past four years. 

“The CRO,” says the press release, “…will address the resilience vulnerabilities of all city residents, with a particular focus on low-income and vulnerable populations.”

Bringing LA Experience to Houston

“While serving as CRO in Los Angeles, Aho paved the way for Los Angeles to embed resilience as a value that guides municipal planning, culminating in the appointment of more than 30 departmental chief resilience officers (DCROs) who form an in-city network in each branch of city government. 

“Other innovative initiatives in Resilient Los Angeles,” says the press release, “include developing an urban heat vulnerability index and mitigation plan, placing an equity lens over the city’s response to increasing extreme heat.” 

According to the City, Houston remains vulnerable to less-familiar shocks and stresses, such as environmental degradation and access to economic opportunity.

It’s not clear from either the news release or the Chronicle story what role Costello will play vis-a-vis Aho, if any.

About New Houston CRO Marissa Aho, AICP 

Prior to serving as the Los Angeles CRO, she held senior staff positions at two Los Angeles planning and land use consulting firms. Aho has 15 years of policy, planning, and project management experience in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors where she has worked with interdisciplinary teams to find creative solutions to complex problems. She has a BA in political science from American University and a master of planning from the University of Southern California Price School of Public Policy. She is the Region VI commissioner for the American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP), section director of the Los Angeles Section of the American Planning Association (APA LA), and is a member of the USC Price Alumni Association board of directors. 

Posted by Bob Rehak on February 26, 2019

546 Days after Hurricane Harvey

Log Jam Finally Broken on Long-Awaited Regional San Jacinto River Basin Study

In March last year, the San Jacinto River Authority, City of Houston, Montgomery County and Harris County proposed a river basin study of the San Jacinto.

Scope of River Basin Study

The scope includes evaluating the cost effectiveness and feasibility of a variety of flood mitigation projects. They include additional gates for the Lake Houston Dam, additional dredging and additional upstream detention – all important for the Lake Houston Area.

West Fork Sand Mine Complex inundated by Harvey.

But the scope also includes many other potential projects. The $2+ million grant request to FEMA covered the entire San Jacinto River basin including the East and West Forks.

10 Months of Delays

Then the grant request fell into a great black hole. Nine months went by while FEMA pondered and tweaked the 15-page grant application. Finally, FEMA was ready to write the check in December…when the government shut down.

Finally, a Green Light

Today, however, I got news that FEMA finally green-lighted the project through TDEM, the Texas Division of Emergency Management. TDEM coordinates all FEMA requests for the State of Texas.

This will benefit multiple counties throughout entire basin. It’s not often this many governmental entities come together to impact an area this large.

Residents trying to escape as Harvey's floodwaters rose
Residents of Kingwood Village Estates trying to escape as Harvey’s floodwaters rose. 12 residents died as a result of injuries sustained during evacuation or the stress from losing their homes.

All parties have reportedly signed inter-local agreements (ILAs) already. An ILA is like a contract between governmental entities.

Next Steps Before Kickoff

Next steps: Harris County Flood Control will present details of the grant package to Harris County Commissioners Court at the Court’s Feb 12th meeting.

Following court acceptance of the grant, HCFCD hopes to obtain Commissioner’s Court approval of the agreement with the consulting firms that will execute the river basin study. 

All those involved hope for an official study kickoff in late February/early March.

Among many other things, study will examine sedimentation and its role in flooding.

For More Information

Harris County Flood Control is currently working to update its website. When additional information becomes available later this week, you will be able to view it at: https://www.hcfcd.org/hurricane-harvey/hurricane-harvey-kingwood-information/upper-san-jacinto-river-regional-watershed-flood-mitigation-plan/

Study to Take 18 Months

Originally, the study was to have taken approximately a year. However, additional FEMA requirements mean it will now take 18 months. That means we should be looking at recommendations 3 years after Harvey. Then the partners will submit additional grants to FEMA for projects that result from the study.

See my previous editorial comments about the state of disaster mitigation. “Time is the enemy of disaster mitigation”. You can quote me on that.

Posted by Bob Rehak on January 29, 2019

518 Days after Hurricane Harvey

Why the City Needs Regular River Surveys and Maintenance Dredging

Three months after supposedly reaching an agreement in principle to remove the mouth bar, FEMA, the Army Corps, the State and City still have no agreement in writing. From Day 1 of negotiations, FEMA and the Corps have consistently said they can’t address pre-Harvey conditions. I’m beginning to believe them. How did we reach this impasse and how can we move forward?

FEMA’s Dilemma

The Stafford Act (FEMA’s enabling legislation) prohibits FEMA from funding repairs not directly related to Harvey. But, because the City conducted no surveys after the Memorial or Tax Day Floods, it cannot prove how much came from Harvey. Yet it has asked FEMA and the Corps to remove the entire mouth bar.

The City’s Dilemma

The City of Houston has done little to maintain Lake Houston, especially the West Fork of the San Jacinto near Kingwood. Lack of regular surveys and maintenance dredging make city officials look like they’re trying to get others to clean up their mess.

Historical Perspective

Decades ago, after the 1994 flood, the City hired Brown & Root to study sedimentation in the lake, which includes about 13 miles of the East and West Forks of the San Jacinto. Engineers recommended surveying the river after every major storm and dredging when necessary to reduce the risk of flooding. They even pinpointed where sediment would likely build up and pointed out that the West Fork was capturing 42% of all the sediment coming into the lake (see page 9). However, before Harvey, the City never dredged and rarely conducted surveys – decisions that haunt us today.

The mouth bar. Sand, in part from the mines, has almost totally blocked the West Fork where it meets Lake Houston. Unofficial before/after measurements show that as much as ten feet was deposited in this area during Harvey (five below water/five above).

Sedimentation: Danger that Can No Longer Be Ignored

One insidious aspect of sedimentation is its invisibility. Like gunk in pipes, you can’t see it – until water backs up and floods your home. That’s exactly what happened to thousands of homes during Harvey. The problem which had slowly built up for years, went from sub-acute to critical almost overnight because of the massive volume of sediment deposited during Harvey.

That brings us to our present impasse.

No News is Bad News

The City, FEMA, the Army Corps and the State have argued about this for at least six months. We thought they reached agreement in principle to remove the mouth bar three months ago. But still no official announcements have been made. Sadly, it didn’t have to come to this:

  • If only the City had followed the advice of the experts it hired…
  • If only the City had maintained its property…
  • If only the City could document how much Harvey contributed to the blockage…
  • If only the City had acted years ago to limit sand mining in the floodway of the river…
  • …we could have been working on the mouth bar already. Instead…

Problem Becoming Demonstrably Worse

In the 80 years since we started keeping records on the West Fork at US59, the river has crested over 50 feet 40 times – once every other year. But in the last 11 months, floods have reached that height SIX times – more than once every other month. We topped 50 feet in the latest flood just minutes ago. All resulted from relatively minor rains. This sudden surge in frequency did not result from global warming.

Is it all a statistical fluke? Wetter than usual weather? El Niño? Upstream development? Perhaps some of each. But one would have to be blind to dismiss the sediment buildup in the river. A delta is marching steadily downstream, creating blockages that back water up.

The West Fork just before Kingwood’s annexation in 1996 and after Harvey. Comparison shows advancing sediment buildups blocking the river.

The High Cost of Ignoring Expert Advice and Routine Maintenance

Harvey brought the high cost of ignoring expert advice and routine maintenance into sharp focus. The lack of a survey that could have been conducted in a few days is costing the City months of delays and potentially tens of millions of dollars in State and Federal assistance. This exposes hundreds of thousands of residents to needless flood risk and undermines property values.

What Needs to Happen

All of this underscores the need to budget for and maintain one’s own property. Drainage fees, which we just put a lock box around, should easily handle the City’s portion of dredging projects and surveys.

How do we break this impasse?

FEMA and the Corps need to restore the conveyance of the river that existed before Harvey. Estimate it using available evidence like aerial photos and satellite images. We’ll never have an exact figure. So quit using that as an excuse to put hundreds of thousands of people at risk. Let’s get started with dredging what we can. Legally.

In return, the City could commit to annual river surveys that document the status of the river before each hurricane season.

The City also could commit to a regular maintenance dredging program to keep sediment at a sub-acute level. The annual surveys will determine the exact amounts and frequencies.

The City could also throw its weight behind legislative efforts to move sand mines out of the floodway, where they contribute to levels of sedimentation far beyond natural rates.

I’m not a mediator and I’m not the Mayor, but that sounds like a fair compromise that can protect residents as well as officials on both sides of this negotiation.

Floods don’t happen as often as police or fire emergencies, but when they do, they affect hundreds of thousands of people in ways that can be just as life altering. This is a public safety issue. Let’s go. Reach an agreement, please!

These are my opinions on matters of public policy, protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP statute of the Great State of Texas.

Posted by Bob Rehak on January 4, 2019

493 Days since Hurricane Harvey


Whew! Luck and Aggressive Action Avert Major Flooding

Good to have the Pearl Harbor Day flooding in the rear-view mirror. And good that the worst predictions did not come true. So what happened? Did we just get lucky? Or did something go right for a change? It might have been a little of both.

Here’s what I know at 8 p.m. on Saturday night, about when the flood was expected to crest and flood multiple neighborhoods.

Lake Conroe Releases Have Peaked

According to Jace Houston, General Manager of the SJRA, releases from the Lake Conroe dam have likely peaked. The current release rate of 8181 cfs falls far short of previous floods and short of 9,000 to 11,000 cfs release rates predicted earlier.

Less Rain than Expected

That’s because we got less rainfall than predicted. Most of the area, including Lake Houston and upstream from Lake Conroe, received about 4.5 inches or less instead of the 8 to 10 predicted earlier.  And rain was fairly spread out over time. The heaviest rainfall seems to have happened in The Woodlands with some gages approaching 6 inches.

Aggressive Pre-Release by City

Finally, the City of Houston started releasing water from the Lake Houston Dam two days in advance of the storm. They took the lake level down two feet before the storm and kept releasing water during the storm. Had it not been for that, homes along the shoreline would almost certainly have flooded.

Looking across the flood-swollen San Jacinto at the US Army Corps of Engineers’ Command Site. Had the City not pre-released more than 2 feet of water from Lake Houston, this site would have been inundated.

Trending Steady or Down

At this moment, every stream gage that the SJRA reports upstream from the Lake Houston area is trending down. The peak has passed.

Harris County Flood Control shows that the gages at US59, West Lake Houston Parkway and FM1960 also appear to have peaked.

A photographic tour of the Kingwood area this afternoon showed that the river came out of its banks at River Grove Park and US59 and was on the verge of coming out in many other places. Surprisingly, I saw no flooded homes, not even on Marina Drive in Forest Cove. However, I did hear of many affected by street flooding, especially upstream in Montgomery County.

Still Much Mitigation Work to Do

Ben’s Branch by the Enclave and Kingwood Library had standing water. That should be a reminder that the County needs to make cleaning out this stream a high priority. 

One final point. Late this afternoon, I noticed a huge difference between the gages upstream and downstream from the dredging.

At 59, the West Fork exceeded its banks and peaked at 52 feet.
At West Lake Houston Parkway, the river was well within its banks and peaking around 45 feet.
At FM1960 the river was still well within banks and peaking at 44 feet.

Normally, these gages all read the same elevation. One can partially attribute the differences to spreading of the river. However one must also consider the huge blockages in the river that the Corps has not yet removed. At the moment, one of the biggest is just downstream from River Grove Park. Another, the mouth bar, blocks the river between Kings Point and Atascocita Point.

Even during a flood, the mouth bar (in the middle of this picture) stands out of the water by several feet and blocks the mouth of the West Fork. Water must make its way past this blockage through narrow passages on either side of it. It backs water up throughout the Humble/Kingwood area.
Here’s what the mouth bar looks like from the air, right after Harvey, before grass started growing on it. The area around it averages 1-3 feet deep. The deepest parts of the narrow channel reach 5 feet deep.

The Lake Houston Area lucked out this time due to aggressive action by City officials, a conservative release rate by the SJRA and the kindness of Mother Nature. I hope we don’t press our luck and assume that these blockages make no difference. They do. We need to remove them.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/8/2018

466 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Background on Houston Proposition A: Drainage Fee Re-vote

Warning: I’m not making a recommendation in this post. I am just trying to provide background information that may help you understand this issue and why its on the ballot again.

History of the “Drainage Fee”

Historically, Houston issued bonds to finance capital projects related to drainage and street improvements. About a decade ago, a group of engineers worried that we spent too much on interest, perpetually underfunded drainage, and constantly diverted money to less important things. So in 2010, they managed to get a referendum on the ballot that would create a dedicated fund out of current revenue for such improvements.

Ads featured a man who had flooded repeatedly. He blamed politicians who diverted money away from needed drainage projects. He said we needed to create a “lockbox” around future funds to ensure they were spent for their intended purpose.

Photo by Kilee Northrup. Forest Cove Drive in Forest Cove. From Wednesday, August 30th, late afternoon, "once I was able to drive out of my villiage (Mills Branch)."

Photo by Kilee Northrup. Forest Cove Drive on August 30th during Harvey.

Voters narrowly approved the Amendment (51-49). Subsequently, the City Council voted to add it to the City Charter (Article IX, Section 22: Dedicated Pay-As-You-Go Fund for Drainage and Streets.)

Court Challenge

The new amendment ran into problems immediately, not because of the supposed lockbox, but because of the way the City worded the summary of the amendment on the BALLOT itself.

The summary simply said, “Shall the City Charter of the City of Houston be amended to provide for the enhancement, improvement and ongoing renewal of Houston’s drainage and streets by creating a Dedicated Pay-As-You-Go Fund for drainage and streets?”

In 2015, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the summary (not the amendment) was misleading. It failed to disclose that the money would be raised through a new tax/fee on residents. The Texas Supreme Court then remanded the issue back to a trial court. which voided the election and ordered a new one.

Re-vote Confusing

Now, in 2018, we’re getting a chance to vote again on the 2010 measure. However:

  • The City claims that a positive vote will affirm the drainage fee, but a negative vote will not invalidate it.
  • The wording for the funding formula has changed and no one has yet explained why.
  • The vote is being positioned as a chance to create the lockbox promised eight years ago, but the referendum’s wording is virtually identical to the 2010 wording.
  • Even though this is popularly known as the drainage fee, the language that created it allows money to be used for a wide range of things not related to drainage (streets, salaries, vehicles, etc.)
  • The wording does not define the terms used within the amendment, nor does it specify the percentage of the money that should go toward drainage.

Let’s look at each one of these issues.

Texas Supreme Court and the Do-Over Vote

When you read a summary of any proposed amendment at the ballot box, it’s supposed to be a fair and accurate reflection of the proposal. The Supreme Court ruled that the 2010 ballot language in this case could mislead voters. That’s because it did’t disclose that voters would pay for the dedicated fund with a new tax on themselves.

Justice John Devine said in the conclusion of the ruling (see page 15) that, “The City did not adequately describe the chief features—the character and purpose—of the charter amendment on the ballot. By omitting the drainage charges, it failed to substantially submit the measure with such definiteness and certainty that voters would not be misled.”

The court found no problem with any other wording in the amendment. The new 2018 ballot language DOES disclose the tax on residents this time. Here’s how it reads.

Ballot Language for 2018 Proposition 

[Relating to the Creation of a Dedicated Funding Source to Enhance, Improve and Renew Drainage Systems and Streets]

“Shall the Houston City Charter be amended to establish a Dedicated Pay-As-You-Go Fund, to be used for the enhancement, improvement, and ongoing renewal of Houston’s drainage and streets, funded annually from the following sources: (i) developer impact fees; (ii) drainage charges, to property owners or users, to recover costs of providing drainage to benefitting real properties; (iii) a portion of the City’s ad valorem tax levy; and (iv) third-party contracts, grants, or payments earmarked or dedicated to drainage or streets?”

Vote Could Affirm, But Not Invalidate

After voters narrowly approved the 2010 amendment, a City Council vote actually added it to the City Charter. The City now argues that the Supreme Court ruling does not invalidate the City Council vote, only the results of the referendum. The tax will not go away regardless of how you vote, according to Mayor Sylvester Turner. So why are we having a re-vote if there is no real consequence?

Said Mayor Sylvester Turner in the Houston Chronicle, “We are simply saying in November to the voters: Go and reaffirm the dedicated purpose for which this fee is intended, put a lockbox around it. Voters are not being asked to increase the fee or create another fee, just to reaffirm what already is.”

Does the 2018 Language Create a Lockbox?

According to the Houston Chronicle, Mayor Turner believes that the Supreme Court decision removed a lockbox around the source of funding and that “approving the charter amendment this year would restore it.”

Even though he feels the City does not need voter validation to retain the fee, for some reason, he feels the need for validation to keep the fee dedicated to drainage and streets. Perhaps he feels financial pressures.

Critics claim that revenues have been diverted for unintended purposes in the past. The City is trying to re-sell the concept by saying that a YES vote will create a lockbox around the money and a NO vote will allow money to be used in the general fund. There’s truth to this, and also some scare tactics, especially at a time when the firefighters are asking for large raises. However…

Critics say that there never was an effective lockbox. Moreover, there is NO new language in the 2018 amendment that creates or strengthens one. In fact, the 2018 language  is virtually identical to the 2010 language.

When I asked the Mayor’s office to point out the language in the 2018 referendum that created a lockbox around the money, I received a response from an aid who simply asserted it did so without explaining how.

Equal Vs. Equivalent

One key word has changed out of 518 words in the amendment. Amidst all the talk about lockboxes and affirmation, it has been overlooked.

The formula for allocating money to the fund mysteriously changed.

In section B (iii) the word “equal” became “equivalent.” There has been no public discussion of the impact of this change.

It’s not clear whether any change in the language of the amendment is even legal. The Trial Court’s Final Summary Judgment ordered a new election for Proposition 1 (what it was called in 2010), not a new election on a variation of it.

Here’s the change – in context of the funding mechanism in the bill:

City Charter Section B (iii) as adopted in 2010 (see Article IX, Section 22) reads:

“An amount equivalent to proceeds from $0.118 of the City’s ad valorem tax levy minus an amount equal to debt service for drainage and streets for any outstanding bonds or notes…”

B (iii) in the current 2018 ballot reads:

“An amount equivalent to proceeds from $0.118 of the City’s ad valorem tax levy minus an amount equivalent to debt service for drainage and streets for any outstanding bonds or notes…”

You might ask, “Don’t they mean the same thing?”  Not necessarily.

Equal means exactly the same in number; equivalent means the same value or weight. For instance, one 2010 dollar equals one 2018 dollar. However, adjusted for inflation, that same dollar would now be equivalent to $1.16. Another example: At this moment, $1 U.S. dollar is equivalent to $1.31 Canadian dollars.

Changing equal to equivalent makes me wonder whether something else is changing that could affect the debt-service calculation and therefore the amount that comes out of the city’s ad valorem tax. A change in the property tax rate? Interest rates? Home values affected by Harvey?

Usually when finance people talk about “equivalents,” they adjust for something: inflation, deflation, currency fluctuation, discounts, exchange rates, time value, etc. It’s not clear why they made this change….especially if the election is only to “affirm what is.”

The change might or might not be something crucial. But changing one word out of 518 makes me believe that someone did it intentionally, not accidentally, especially in this age of cut-and-paste.

Lack of Clarity

Vagueness and self-contradictions have plagued this amendment from the start.

  • Fees were originally intended for capital projects, but the amendment allows 25% of the money to go toward  maintenance and operations.
  • The public knows Proposition A as a drainage fee, but the fee also pays for street improvements. What constitutes a street improvement? New pavement and bigger storm drains? Surveys? Engineering fees? An asphalt patch? A bicycle lane? A bus lane? Stop signs? Traffic lights? Salaries of Public Works employees? The vehicles they drive? Turns out, it’s all of the above. Pretty much anything that touches a street.
  • Proponents keep talking about a lockbox. But the amendment contains no provisions for financial transparency, segregation of funds, council approvals, audits, or public reporting that would create a true lockbox.

Early Voting Starts Monday

If you believe money was diverted from this fund to pay for services other than drainage, then Proposition A won’t give you much comfort. The language is virtually identical to the last one.

How you vote will depend on:

  • How happy you are with the existing drainage fee
  • How much you trust people to do the right thing
  • Whether you’re a “something-is-better-than-nothing” person or a “let’s-start-over-and-get-this-right” type.
  • Whether you’re satisfied with the speed of mitigation efforts.

Now that you have the backstory, review the original language you’re voting on. Will it do what you want? If so, vote yes. If not, vote no.

Posted by Bob Rehak on October 20, 2018

417 Days since Hurricane Harvey

 

Harvey Time Capsule: Marina Drive in Forest Cove

It’s been more than a year since Hurricane Harvey. Much of Houston has improved remarkably since then. But one neighborhood near the San Jacinto West Fork seems frozen in time: Marina Drive in Forest Cove. It’s the land that Solid Waste forgot.

Forest Cove Townhomes destroyed by Harvey and swallowed by sand. Photograph from 9/14/17, two weeks after Harvey. Not much has changed since then. 

Featured in FEMA Video Filmed Last Month

When FEMA came to Houston last month to shoot a video about Harvey, they asked ReduceFlooding.com for location recommendations. They wanted a place that told the story of the storm. It took me about a nanosecond to recommend the apartments/townhomes on Marina Drive.

Forest Cove Townhomes destroyed by Harvey. This and following photos taken a year later on September 28, 2018.

The Forest Cove Property Owners Association has fixed up the community swimming pool. But everything around it still triggers memories of the terror that night in August, 2017, when Harvey dealt the final death blow to these ill-fated townhomes.

Forest Cove Townhomes now targets for vandals, looters and squatters.

Ravaged by Numerous Floods, but Killed by Harvey

The townhomes had been ravaged by previous floods, but Harvey was different. Three residents I talked to told me the water reached 17-23 feet high – well up into the second story. To put that in perspective, joists in the garage level are set at 11 feet.

You can see holes chopped in roofs where thieves stole roof-mounted AC condensers. One building appears to have been swept off its foundation. Bedsheets spray-painted with “FEMA HELP” still flutter from second story balconies. Sand clogs the streets and storm drains. Five foot high dunes cover fences and shoreline. Trash litters the parking lots. Graffiti and mold cover what’s left of the homes. An old oil pumper supports vines. Oil storage tanks sit twisted and lonely, off kilter. Not one person still lives there. The homes are uninhabitable.

Forest Cove Townhome destroyed by Harvey. Area is now a target for graffiti artists. 

More Marina Drive Townhomes destroyed by Harvey. In addition to the trash in the parking lot, note the hole chopped in the roof to rescue people in the middle of the photo.

Reportedly, these properties are being bought out by FEMA and Harris County Flood Control to reduce future flood risk. Some offers have already been made according to Glen Allison, a member of the Homeowners Association. Allison also said that “Three units were swept away. Two more completely collapsed. There was tremendous structural damage throughout.”

Someday the area may be turned into parkland. The county has been trying to buy this land and convert it into a linear park since 1994 – almost 25 years ago. Not much has happened since then. The last section in a document from Harris County Flood Control titled 2018 Federal Briefing: Unprecedented Opportunity discusses progress of various buyout programs going back 29 years.

 

Excerpt from HCFCD map showing historical buyout programs in Forest Cove.

FEMA and HCFCD completed voluntary buyout programs in 1994 (pink), 1998 (blue), 2005 (yellow) and 2008 (lavender).  However, as of this spring, they were still trying to complete buyouts from 2014 and 2016 (see table below, also from 2018 Federal Briefing referenced above).

Forest Cove properties were part of the 2014 and 2016 buyout programs that were still not completed at the time of Harvey and HCFCD’s Federal Briefing last spring.

Maybe this time! Meanwhile, someone please call for a trash pickup.

Posted by Bob Rehak on October 7, 2018

404 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Correction on Post about Ben’s Branch and Taylor Gulley

My apologies. On Wednesday, I posted about easements along Ben’s Branch and Taylor Gulley. The story said that the City of Houston had finally sent long-awaiting documents to Harris County Flood Control that would allow the County to assume maintenance of those areas. It was based on assurances from a source at the City that the documents had finally been sent to the County.

However, different documents actually arrived at the County. They covered a small portion of Taylor Gulley and a small drainage ditch in King’s Forest that parallels Valley Manor west of Kingwood High School.

Like many of the drainage ditches in Kingwood, after annexation, this ditch west of Valley Manor and Kingwood High School fell into a maintenance black hole. The County has now received an easement from the City of Houston that will allow it to maintain the ditch.

Here are maps of the two areas for which documentation has actually been sent to Harris County:

My source at the City now says, “I am working with the legal team to have a full update on all the outstanding channels as well as have requested the expedited completion of Bens Branch.”

To see an interactive map of Harris County drainage projects in Kingwood, go to the Harris County Flood Control District website and see the Kingwood section.

Posted by Bob Rehak on September 7, 2018

374 Days since Hurricane Harvey

 

Seasonal Lowering of Lake Conroe Begins August 1

On August 1, the City of Houston Public Works Department, the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) and the Coastal Water Authority (CWA) plan to begin lowering the level of Lake Conroe as part of a joint operations plan to mitigate flooding threats during the peak of hurricane season. The plan calls for lowering Lake Conroe gradually through small releases – about an inch a day – until the lake level reaches 199 msl (mean feet above sea level).

Intent of gradual lowering of Lake Conroe is to avoid another 79,000 cubic-feet-per-second release rate as we experienced during Harvey. Until normal flow is restored to the West Fork, Lake Conroe will be lowered temporarily and seasonally to mitigate flood risk.

Lake Conroe to Be Lowered 2 Feet Through September

This initial lowering will last through the end of September to create additional storage in Lake Conroe which could delay releases and minimize release rates during a storm, thereby providing a buffer against flooding for residents who live downstream of the dam.

The next lowering would occur during the peak of the spring rainy season – from April 1 – May 31, 2019. However, that lowering would only be by a foot – to 200 msl, because the rain threat is usually lower in spring.

Only Until Dredging Restores River’s Flow

The joint operations plan calls for continuing to lower Lake Conroe seasonally in this manner while the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dredges the West Fork of the San Jacinto to restore flow.

Hurricane Harvey deposited tremendous amounts of silt in the West Fork which  physically changed the river’s ability to safely pass water during storms. Hence, the dredging.

Phase-One Dredging Has Already Started

Phase one will go from River Grove Park to the West Lake Houston Parkway bridge. Great Lakes, the contractor hired by the Corps, has 269 more days to complete the initial phase.

Phase-Two Still Needs Funding

The total project could take longer. Community leaders are now working furiously to arrange funding to dredge the remainder of the west fork, including the mouth bar.

Mobilization and demobilization comprise 25 percent of the total phase one project costs (approximately $18 million out of almost $70 million). Having phase two ready to start before phase one ends could save that money, creating extra value for taxpayers and enabling even more dredging, say for instance, on the East Fork.

Temporary Lake Conroe Lowering Could Last Up to 3 Years

The City, SJRA, and CWA will continue the seasonal lowerings for up to three three years. They will monitor progress of the dredging and annually re-evaluate the need to lower Lake Conroe. If the river’s flow is restored before three years, the temporary lowering would cease.

Lakes will Operate under Two Different Strategies

LAKE CONROE
Lake Conroe is located upstream from Lake Houston. Large pre-releases immediately before a storm run the risk of pushing water into Lake Houston at a rate that could flood residents. Therefore, the SJRA will release at a much more gradual, controlled rate and maintain the lower level until the largest flood threat passes.

LAKE HOUSTON
Lake Houston, as the lowest lake on the river system, can pre-release more safely. Therefore CWA will pre-release from Lake Houston if the National Weather Service predicts more than 3 inches of rain within the San Jacinto River basin in a 48-hour period. Coastal Water Authority will lower Lake Houston to 41.5 feet from its normal elevation of 42.5 feet.

To track lake levels visit:

  • Lake Conroe – www.sjra.net
  • Lake Houston – www.coastalwaterauthority.org

4 Million People Depend on City for Water

Lake Conroe and Lake Houston comprise two of the largest parts of the City’s drinking water system. More than 4 million Houstonians and residents of the greater Houston region rely on water provided by the City.

Posted by Bob Rehak on July 30, 2018

335 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Need for Sediment Management Planning

Sand and sediment clog our rivers and lake. “Dredge!” you say.

“Not that simple,” say the experts. “Who will pay for it? How much should we dredge? Where will the sediment go?”

That’s why we need planning for sediment management. We need to dredge the worst parts of the river now; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has already started that as an emergency project. But we also need to dredge other parts of the river that are not quite critical yet. And we need to figure out how to do all this on a regular basis so that it never gets this bad again.

A giant sand dune has formed at the mouth of the west fork of the San Jacinto. It is not being addressed by the Army Corps dredging project but should be. Thousands of homes upstream from this massive blockage flooded during Harvey.

Sediment Management Challenges That Lie Ahead

I have talked about these issues with experts from Harris County Flood Control and USACE. Both say planning is crucial to a successful maintenance dredging/sediment management program. One provided this document: Galveston-Bay-Programmatic-RSM-Plan-Rev-1, as an example of what we need for the San Jacinto. It’s a long document – 112 pages. But it is worth reading the executive summary, introduction and table of contents at the very least. Parts of it discuss the upper reaches of the San Jacinto. But the main value it provides is that it outlines the challenges ahead.

  •  Who will lead the effort? Who will support it?
  • How much money is needed per year? How can we budget for it? Who will share in the costs?
  • Where will the dredged materials go? How can we identify opportunities to reuse and sell them? Who will market them and how? To what extent can sales defray dredging costs?
  • What are the true life-cycle costs of the sand and sediment that miners send downstream to us?
  • How can we reduce their contribution to the problem? Is there a way to make them part of the solution?
  • How can we coordinate upstream and downstream efforts so that the entire river system flows freely?
  • How can we remove channel blockages more quickly after floods to help prevent additional flooding?

All of these are difficult questions. Starting such an extensive program is like starting a new business.

Budgeting Comes First

A business plan and budgeting are the first issues we need to address. Where will the money for all this come from? Without answering that first, everything else is moot.

So who are the stakeholders?

  • City of Houston – Ensuring the future of Lake Houston is essential to ensuring the future of the City. It’s the City’s main source of water.
  • Harris County Flood Control – Half of the people that live in the county, live in the City.
  • San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) – The State created the Authority back in the 1930s to impound water and protect people from flooding. Those missions were recently reconfirmed by the Governor.
  • Coastal Water Authority – CWA is the contract operator for Lake Houston Dam and Reservoir. They sell water just like SJRA and can raise money thru water rates to fund flood mitigation. Their enabling legislation mentions drainage and flood responsibilities – same as SJRA.
  • State of Texas – This region has a quarter of all the people who live in the state. Nuff said.

Expecting all costs to be covered by the Harris County Flood Bond in perpetuity is just wishful and foolish thinking. The bond is for capital projects, not ongoing maintenance. You might be able to justify the first dredging as “channel improvements.” But after that, for the sake of the community, we need to find a way to make this program sustainable. Paying interest for ongoing operations is unwise.

Cost Sharing and 5-Year Intervals Can Make It More Doable than Avoidable

In 2000 Brown & Root, recommended dredging every 5 years – a perfect match for a venture with five partners. If each budgeted one fifth of the cost annually, and you did only one fifth of the job each year, this just might be more doable than avoidable. (Avoidance seems to have been the preferred approach in the past.)

We can’t budget sediment management forever on an emergency basis. That’s like using an emergency room for basic medical care. It’s probably not the best idea, nor the most cost effective. So let’s begin the dialog with stakeholders. As Grandma used to say, “An ounce of prevention…”

Posted on July 13, 2018 by Bob Rehak

318 Days since Hurricane Harvey

TCEQ Approves SJRA and City Plan to Temporarily Lower Lake Conroe

This morning, I received a press release announcing that the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) had approved the joint decision by the City of Houston and the San Jacinto River Authority to temporarily lower the level of Lake Conroe during the peak of hurricane season. The lake will be lowered by two feet from 201 mean feet about sea level (msl) to 199 msl between mid-August and the end of September. This will provide buffer against flooding while the Army Corps of Engineers removes excess sediment from the West Fork deposited by Hurricane Harvey that is exacerbating flooding. Because this has legal implications and the Lake Conroe Association fought the lowering, I’m reprinting the entire text of the press release below…with special thanks to Houston City Council Member Dave Martin, Mayor Sylvester Turner,  and SJRA Board Members Kaaren Cambio and Mark Micheletti who lobbied long and hard for this. Also to all the Lake Houston and Lake Conroe residents who made the trek to testify about this issue to the SJRA board.

Text of Press Release

CITY AND SJRA RECEIVE APPROVAL TO MOVE FORWARD WITH TEMPORARY FLOOD MITIGATION PROPOSAL FOR LAKE HOUSTON AND LAKE CONROE

Texas Commission on Environmental Quality will use “enforcement discretion” if flood mitigation releases for Lake Houston and Lake Conroe exceed annual water rights

HOUSTON, TEXAS – Hurricane Harvey deposited tremendous amounts of silt in the West Fork of the San Jacinto River. The silt physically changed the river’s ability to safely pass flows during storms and created the need for a significant dredging project to restore the river’s capacity. As a temporary flood mitigation solution, the City of Houston and the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) proposed a temporary, joint reservoir operations strategy for Lake Houston and Lake Conroe. The temporary flood mitigation would be in place for up to two years or until the dredging project is completed.

The proposed strategy involves the pre-release of water from Lake Houston immediately prior to certain storms and the seasonal lowering of Lake Conroe’s water level during the Spring and Fall.  

A significant hurdle to final consideration of the proposed temporary strategy was a decision by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) on how releases of water from the two reservoirs would be “accounted for” by the state. TCEQ issues permits that limit how much water can be diverted each year from water supply reservoirs like Lake Houston and Lake Conroe.

The proposal from Houston and SJRA highlights the difficulty of balancing the state’s long-term need for reliable water supplies with the short-term goal of protecting public health and safety while emergency measures are implemented to reduce flood risks.

In a letter to the City of Houston and SJRA on Friday, June 15, 2018, the TCEQ expressed its intent to use enforcement discretion to allow the two agencies to move forward with finalizing their temporary flood mitigation strategy.

The letter states that “if flood mitigation releases . . . result in an exceedance of the annual permitted amounts for diversion or release by SJRA of the City of Houston, the TCEQ Executive Director will exercise enforcement discretion with respect to such exceedance.” The TCEQ’s decision acknowledges the importance of accounting for all diversions from the state’s water supply reservoirs, but it also recognizes the emergency nature of the flood mitigation work being conducted in the San Jacinto River.

The City of Houston and SJRA express their sincere appreciation to the leadership and staff at the TCEQ for their thoughtful consideration of the unique flood challenges that our region is facing. We look forward to finalizing the details of our proposed joint reservoir operations strategy. Additional details on the project including a timeline will be provided as they become available.

ABOUT HOUSTON PUBLIC WORKS

Houston Public Works (www.HoustonPublicWorks.org) is responsible for streets and drainage, production and distribution of water, collection and treatment of wastewater, and permitting and regulation of public and private construction covering a 627-square mile service area. Houston Public Works is accredited by the American Public Works Association. Facebook & Twitter:@HoustonPWE

ABOUT SAN JACINTO RIVER AUTHORITY

Created by the Texas Legislature in 1937, the San Jacinto River Authority is a government agency whose mission is to develop, conserve, and protect the water resources of the San Jacinto River basin.  Covering all or part of seven counties, the organization’s jurisdiction includes the entire San Jacinto River watershed, excluding Harris County.  SJRA is one of two dozen river authorities in Texas, and like other river authorities, its primary purpose is to implement long-term, regional projects related to water management and development. For more information, visit www.sjra.net.