Tag Archive for: City of Houston

Perry Homes’ Woodridge Village Investment Could Be Costliest Ever

Usually when you make an investment, the worst thing that could happen is that you lose all your principle. But Perry Homes could loose a hundred times more than they paid for Woodridge Village land. That takes special talent.

Out-of-Pocket Costs

The land that Woodridge Village sits on didn’t cost much; much of it was wetlands and many streams converged there. Regardless, a Perry Homes subsidiary, Figure Four Partners, bought the land. Montgomery County Appraisal District values the two main parcels at less than a million dollars. Together they comprise more than 80% of the 268-acre project. (See screen captures below from Montgomery County Appraisal District website.)

Real Costs Could Be 100X Greater

Now let’s look at the real costs to Perry. Just to screw up the land, they paid for:

  • An engineering study that underestimated drainage needs by at least 40%
  • Clearcutting and grading 268 acres
  • Filling in natural drainage
  • Excavating two detention ponds (out of five they promised)
  • Soil tests and a geotechnical report
  • A mile of pavement to the middle of nowhere
  • Two large box culverts
  • Storm drains

Let’s say that cost another five million.

But all of that contributed to the flooding of approximately 200 homes in May and 350 in September. Let’s assume the damage to each home totaled $100,000. That comes to about $55,000,000.

Furniture, appliances, rugs, window coverings and other contents? Let’s assume an average of $40,000. That would total another $22,000,000.

Let’s also assume that 300 cars flooded. Average cost – $30,000. Bingo. $9 million.

Now let’s estimate the reduced marketability of homes that flooded. To do this, let’s assume an average price of $200,000 per home and a 20% reduction. That would cost homeowners $40,000 each in the market value of their homes. That’s another $22,000,000.

And we haven’t even factored in the legal fees of J. Carey Gray, counselor extraordinaire.

If juries rule in favor of the flood victims, that million dollar investment could add up to more than $100 million in potential liabilities…before any penalties for negligence and/or gross negligence kick in.

Corps Now Investigating Wetland Violations

Perry Homes bought wetlands and must have thought that no one would notice when they filled them in. They didn’t even bother to request a jurisdictional determination from the Corps for the wetlands. That reduced costs even more. It’s a proven formula in business; minimize costs to maximize profits.

But perhaps Perry Homes went too far. People did notice. The wetlands that they conveniently ignored fall under the jurisdiction of the Army Corps. And the Corps is now investigating potential violations of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. That could get expensive all by itself.

Like Building Homes at the End of a Gunnery Range

It just keeps getting worse for Perry. This was kind of like buying land to build homes at the end of a gunnery range. A little risky.

But it’s too late to rethink that decision. No one will ever want to buy a home on this site. It’s less marketable than swampland near Chernobyl.

There’s another rule of thumb in business. When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging. And that’s exactly what Perry has done. They have stopped work on the site for months. Work on detention ponds that would help protect people downstream from future flooding is going undone.

That means the numbers above could balloon with the next big rain. Or a negligence ruling by a jury. Yep, we’re in double Jeopardy now.

Career-Limiting Moves

Whoever made the decision to develop Woodridge Village definitely made a CLM (career-limiting move). At this point, even Perry Homes employees not associated with the decision must worry about their Christmas turkeys. Few careers or companies survive blunders that become case studies for how not to do something.

Eroding Profit Margins

Because of faulty assumptions and corner cutting, Perry Homes put itself between a rock and a hard place. They’ve managed to turn a million dollar investment into a potential $100 million liability. They can’t develop this property profitably now. And they can’t sell it. Who would want to buy this land and inherit the liability every time a storm cloud floats by?

To protect downstream homes from flooding, they would have to expand the detention ponds by at least 40%. And that would eliminate so many homesites that costs could exceed income. I say “at least” because the issue is not just Atlas-14 compliance. While digging the S2 detention pond, contractors hit water that’s not going away.

The S2 Detention Pond has lost about 20-30% of its capacity. The bottom 3-5 feet have been filled with ground water since contractors started digging to the target depth.

That means they can’t achieve their detention goals by going deeper; they’ll have to go wider. And that will cut into marketable land even more.

Toxic for Perry Homes

Let’s face it. When Perry Homes bought this property, Kathy Perry Britton swallowed a poison pill. Woodridge Village now has a toxic reputation that will infect the rest of Perry Homes. No one will ever be able to trust anything Perry Homes says again.

Just imagine how bad this could get for Perry Homes if Montgomery County and the City of Houston really started scrutinizing their permit applications in the future.

But what to do with this land? If you’re Kathy Perry Britton trying to spit shine the legacy of dear old dad, you can’t keep it. And you can’t sell it. You can’t even give it away. No land conservancy organization would take it until the damage done to wetlands and streams was remediated. That could take decades.

The Real Value of Wetlands

However, there are two pieces of good news in this mess.

  • If Perry Homes implodes, it won’t take a lot of investors with it; the company is private.
  • Perry Homes may serve as a lesson to other developers and teach them that the real value of wetlands is their downstream legal costs.

Time To Be Decisive

Just remember, Ms. Britton. Historically, 85% of Houston floods are non-tropical. So if you think you have eight more months to figure this out, think again.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/15/2019

808 Days after Hurricane Harvey and 57 after Imelda

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Aerial Photos of Lake Houston Dam Dramatize Need for More Gates

Before Harvey hit, we knew tremendous rains were coming. But we could do little to prepare Lake Houston for the onslaught. The small gates you see in the photo below release a combined 10,000 cubic feet per second (CFS). That’s nothing compared to the 150,000 from the gates at the Lake Conroe Dam.

Lake Houston’s gates release a maximum of 10,000 CFS.
The gates at Lake Conroe can release water at up too 150,000 CFS...15X faster.

We Were Sunk

When Lake Conroe had to open its gates during Harvey, we were sunk. Literally. Had we had bigger, more modern gates on Lake Houston, we might have been able to lower the lake fast enough to avoid flooding thousands of homes.

11-Foot High Wall of Water Cascaded Over Spillway

Of course, Lake Houston also has a spillway. In fact, the spillway represents the primary way to shed water from the lake. The top of that spillway is at 42.38 feet.

The primary overflow mechanism on the Lake Houston Dam: a 3,160-foot long spillway.

But Harris County Flood Control District’s (HCFCD) final report on Hurricane Harvey stated that a record pool elevation of 53.1 ft was recorded at the Lake Houston Spillway.

Thus, at the peak of Harvey, a wall of water 11 feet high was flowing over that spillway.

HCFCD estimated that’s 5 times the average flow of Niagara Falls and that the flow rate would fill NRG Stadium in 3.5 minutes.

Ten More Gates Could Have Lowered Harvey Flood by 1.9 Feet

HCFCD commissioned a study by Frees & Nichols about what effect additional gates would have in the event of another Harvey. The study found that ten more gates could have lowered the level of the flood by up to 1.9 feet (about 23 inches). That would have saved thousands of homes from flooding in the Lake Houston Area.

Interestingly, the WAY more gates would prevent flooding was not through pre-release; Harvey would have refilled the lake in a matter of hours and the storm lasted days. Rather, additional gates would have widened the spillway area so more water could move over the dam every second. Think of it in these terms: twice the width, half the height. (That’s an over-simplified example of how the principle works; ten more gates would not actually double the width.)

Is Pre-Release Practical?

The Frees & Nichols study only considered one case – Harvey. For lesser floods, the gates could help make pre-release a viable strategy for the Lake Houston Area. At least in my opinion.

Here’s how.

  • More gate capacity could help offset the volume of water released from Lake Conroe, to reduce the risk of Conroe flooding Houston again.
  • More gate capacity could release more water in less time, thus reducing uncertainty when pre-releasing before a storm. That would allow officials to delay releasing water until they were sure they needed to. And that could save precious water in the event that a storm veers off in another direction at the last minute. We may know that a storm will cross the area. But it’s much harder to tell where the heaviest rainfall will occur. For instance, during Imelda, parts of the East Fork received more than 20 inches of rain while Lake Conroe received only two.

In the last year, the City prevented homes from flooding several times by pre-lowering the lake. But the small gate capacity meant that we had to start releasing water DAYS beforehand to make an appreciable difference in the lake level. That has to be nerve wracking for Public Works.

Where the Gate Project Stands

Earlier this year, the City of Houston secured a FEMA grant to design and construct more gates for the Lake Houston Dam. The two-phase grant covers design and construction. Each phase must be completed within 18 months, though extensions are possible. Currently, we are four months into the 18-month design phase. That means we should see more gates by mid-2022.

In the meantime, the photos below give you a feeling for the immensity of the project.

The height of the trees on the San Jacinto River below the dam gives you a feeling for the height of the dam.
Looking SE. Repairs are underway to the structures below the Lake Houston dam. Note the trees caught on top of it.
Looking west over the Lake Houston Dam which dates back to 1953.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/14/2019

807 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Questionable Assumptions by LJA Engineering May Have Compounded Elm Grove Flooding

Questionable assumptions about soil composition, rainfall patterns, wetlands and floodplain status for Perry Homes’ troubled Woodridge Village development may have compounded flooding in Elm Grove and North Kingwood Forest. Previously, I have focused on other more obvious issues, such as missing detention ponds and expected rainfall totals. However, Elm Grove resident Jeff Miller who has been studying the LJA Drainage Report, urged me to explore these additional issues.

Soil Type Closer to Clay than Sandy Loam

The LJA engineers doing the drainage analysis for Perry based their runoff calculations on a soil type called “sandy loam.” Different soil types absorb rainfall at radically different rates. According to 2011 data from Texas A & M Agrilife Extension, water infiltration rates for:

  • Sand = 2″ – 6″ per hour
  • Loam = .6″ – 2″ per hour
  • Clay = .2″ – .6″ per hour

Clay absorbs water very slowly, so rain turns into runoff quickly. Two photos below show what the Woodridge Village construction site looked like ONE WEEK AFTER a 2″ rain. It still had ponding water that did not soak in.

The northeastern portion of Woodridge Village looking southwest. Photo taken on 11/4/2019 one week after a 2″ rain. Note the ponding water that has not yet infiltrated.
A closer shot of the main portion of the north side of the site, also taken on 11/4/2019. Note the ponding water here, too. USGS characterized parts of this portion of the site as WETLANDS.
From the USGS National Wetlands Inventory. Note how the ponding water in the photo aligns with where the wetlands were.
Drone footage of southern section taken two days after May 7th flood. Courtesy of Jim Zura, Zura Productions.

In May, a retired local geologist from a major oil company estimated that the clay content in Woodridge soil was at least 50%, and could be as high as 80%. However, he could not commit to an exact figure.

Going by the A&M infiltration figures above and assuming an infiltration rate of 2″ per hour for a mixture of sand and loam, and contrasting that with the minimum infiltration rate for clay, .2″ per hour, you get a difference of 10X.

What does all this mean?

Based solely on soil type, the LJA Engineering report could err in its runoff calculations by as much as 10X.

Sections 1.1 and 2.1.3 of the LJA report discuss the runoff based on soil type. No matter how sophisticated the calculations, if you base them on the wrong soil type, the result will be inaccurate. “Garbage in, garbage out” as they say in the computer business.

Before clearcutting, there may have been more sandy loam in a thin surface layer. But contractors likely disturbed or buried that when they removed vegetation from the site and regraded the area.

If LJA wishes to challenge this, I will be happy to reprint their response verbatim. I would love to see their soil report.

But I would like to know how they explain the presence of ponding water throughout the entire northern section of Woodridge Village a full week after a two-inch rain. (Note that the northern section is the steepest and largest. It comprises 2/3rds of the Woodridge Village’s acreage.)

I took the aerial shots above at around 2PM on 11/4/2019. Here are the rainfall totals for the previous 7 days. Graph courtesy of Harris County Flood Warning System.

The Presence of Wetlands Should Have Been a Signal

The presence of wetlands should have been a signal to the developer, but the LJA report does not mention the word “wetlands” once.

Many residents who used to hike and bike this area before it was clearcut have told me that they could always find standing water there even in summer. Here’s an interesting article that explains why wetlands stay wet. The authors says, “Wetlands typically form in gently sloping or topographically convergent portions of a landscape, where surface and ground waters meet.” That certainly fits Woodridge Village.

As Miller says, “Drone footage; many photos; and the constant presence of water in the S-2 detention pond and the rectangular pond where N3 should be confirm that the ground is saturated. When the soil is totally wet, water will move over the surface.” And as LJA says in the intro to its report, “The project site naturally drains to Taylor Gully.”

And that’s exactly where so many people flooded when contractors accelerated the runoff through clearcutting and by not providing adequate detention.

Balanced Storm Assumption Rarely Accurate

Section 2.1 of the LJA report says that LJA models assumed a “balanced storm.” “This distribution is constructed such that the depth specified for any duration occurs during the central part of the storm (intensity position = 50%).” [Emphasis added.]

But as Jeff Johnson, the Montgomery County engineer, pointed out, using a “balanced storm” bases calculations on ideal assumptions. He also pointed out that only a small percentage of storms conform with ideal conditions. (Johnson made these remarks at a Montgomery County Commissioners Court meeting at which they discussed closing a loophole in flood regulations.)

According to the US Geological Survey, this graph represents a balanced storm.

In the ideal balanced storm, most of the accumulation happens in the middle of the storm.


But the May 7th and Imelda storms did not follow this pattern. The heavy rainfall was front-loaded in both.

More than half of the total rainfall during the May 7th event fell at the outset, not in the middle of the storm. Thus, it did not conform to the balanced storm model upon which LJA based its calculations.
During the 11 hours of rainfall from Imelda, more than 50% fell in the first three hours, and almost 80% in the first 4 hours. Thus, Imelda was also “front-heavy”.

LJA Assumed Woodridge Was Outside of 100-Year Floodplain

LJA also assumed (see section 1.5 of its report) that Woodridge Village was “outside of the 100-year floodplain.” For permitting purposes, that is technically true. LJA was going by accepted maps. But that area is not shown as flood plain only because FEMA did not model it. Note in the Montgomery County Flood Plain Map shown below how ALL FLOODPLAIN MAPPING STOPS AT THE COUNTY LINE.

That straight diagonal line you see is the Harris-Montgomery County Line.

Any engineer experienced in working with flood plains should know that physical boundaries do not stop abruptly at political boundaries. Any competent engineer should have questioned this.

Engineering Codes of Ethics Discourage Such Conduct

While LJA did what regulations required, they had a higher ethical obligation to protect people as licensed engineers. See the Code of Ethics of the NSPE – the National Society of Professional Engineers. It states:

“…engineers are expected to exhibit the highest standards of honesty and integrity. Engineering has a direct and vital impact on the quality of life for all people. Accordingly, the services provided by engineers require honesty, impartiality, fairness, and equity, and must be dedicated to the protection of the public health, safety, and welfare. Engineers must perform under a standard of professional behavior that requires adherence to the highest principles of ethical conduct.”

Under Fundamental Canons, the Society’s Code of Ethics also requires engineers to “Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.”

Also see Professional Conduct and Ethics for Texas Engineers.

The latter states “In order to safeguard, life, health and property, to promote the public welfare, and to establish and maintain a high standard of integrity and practice, the rules relating to professional conduct in this title shall be binding on every person holding a license and on all firms authorized to offer or perform engineering services in Texas.” In this regard, LJA failed the people of Elm Grove and North Kingwood Forest dismally.

Overlooked Ethical Obligations Contribute to Dramatic Miscalculations

Ignoring the missing flood plain information, not mentioning wetlands, and mischaracterizing soil composition all contributed to dramatic miscalculations. Add those problems to ignoring new statistics that showed flood plain maps would need to be redrawn based on NOAA’s new Atlas 14, and that a 100-year storm would include 40% more rainfall.

Sometimes when you’re eager to make a project happen, optimism leads one to make “best-case” assumptions. But in my opinion, engineers should act on “worst-case” assumptions” to product public safety.

Sometimes, the cost of failure is simply unthinkable. This is one of them. Elm Grove flooding wasn’t as spectacular as a dam or a bridge failing, but it likely affected far more people.=

Webster and Spurlock law firms are currently trying to subpoena correspondence between LJA and Perry Homes and its subsidiaries. The Perry Homes gang is trying just as hard to stonewall production. It will be interesting to see what pressure, if any, they put on LJA to ignore these obvious problems…if the documents ever become public.

An even bigger ethical question: With such obvious problems, why did Montgomery County Commissioners and the City of Houston approve permits for this development?

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/10/2019 with help from Jeff Miller and video from Jim Zura

803 Days after Hurricane Harvey and 51 after Imelda

The thoughts in this post represent my opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Crenshaw, Brady, Cruz and Cornyn Ask FEMA to Dredge More of West Fork Mouth Bar

On October 24, 2019, Congressman Dan Crenshaw, along with Texas Senators John Cornyn and Ted Cruz and Representative Kevin Brady (TX-08), sent a letter to Acting FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor. The letter requested FEMA’s swift approval of the City of Houston’s new plan to dredge more of the San Jacinto river mouth bar.

Letter in Response to New Request Filed by City

The letter came in response to the most recent request from the City for FEMA aid on or about October 11, 2019.

While FEMA has already completed its initial 500,000 cubic-yard debris-removal mission, sediment brought by Hurricane Harvey still exists in the San Jacinto river mouth-bar. To protect Houston, Kingwood, and Humble residents from future flooding, it is imperative that the remaining debris is removed, said Congressman Dan Crenshaw.

“The City of Houston recently filed a Project Worksheet (PW) for debris removal as Category A work under the Public Assistance program,” the group of legislators wrote. “We urge you to use any and all necessary FEMA resources to expeditiously review and approve the city’s PW. Delay will only increase costs and prevent FEMA from fully leveraging presently available dredging assets.”

To see the complete letter, click here.

Great Lakes Packing Up

Great Lakes Dredge and Dock has finished its Army Corps assignment at the mouth bar. I photographed workers continuing to dismantle the company’s dredge this afternoon.

Packing it in. Great Lakes Dismantles its dredge after a little more than a year on the West Fork. Photo taken 10/26/2019.
The command post opposite Marina Drive in Forest Cove was a behind of activity this afternoon.
Note the sections of dredge pipe stacked up in the background. It is no longer connected to the dredge.
Crew and survey boats, cranes and other heavy equipment still remain to support a future dredging effort…but not for long.

The last line of the letter (“leveraging presently available dredging assets”) refers to assets other than the dredge itself. Such assets include the command post opposite Forest Cove, a second launch point in Atascocita, pipe, cranes, and other assets that could soon be removed. See photos above.

TDEM to Forward Request to FEMA

As of yesterday, according to Houston City Council Member Dave Martin, TDEM still had not forwarded the request to FEMA. However, this reportedly falls within TDEM’s normal processing time for such requests. I wouldn’t read too much into it yet. But let’s hope they hustle up. Those crews at the command site were working late into Saturday night. I’m guessing that represents overtime.

You can clearly see from the pictures above how much equipment it takes to support a dredging operation. And remember, each 40-section of dredge pipe weighs 4,000 pounds and there are about 10 miles of it! This request should not be taken lightly.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/26/2019

788 Days since Hurricane Harvey

“Perry” Letter: A Good Deal?

Thursday night at the Kingwood Town Hall Meeting, the City discussed a meeting between Perry Homes and city officials including the City Attorney. The subject: How to avoid flooding Elm Grove and North Kingwood Forest again. City officials said they demanded multiple concessions from “Perry Homes.” Two days later, and only hours before the Town Hall meeting, Perry Homes (according to City officials) sent the City a letter outlining what it could do. Mayor Sylvester Turner read portions of the letter to the overflow crowd. It met with mixed reaction. Some people were grateful; others skeptical; still others angry.

Much to his credit, Council Member Dave Martin posted the letter on his FaceBook page. I have reposted it here for your convenience, along with my reactions and those of several other residents.

Page 1 of Response.

Page 2 of response.

Rehak’s Opinions

I was not in the meeting between “Perry” and the City so I cannot comment on the tone of the meeting or how the City presented its “demands.” However, several things struck me about this letter right from the opening paragraph. First of all, it’s not from Perry. That’s why I put Perry in quotes above.

  • The developers expressed how saddened they were by Elm Grove flooding. Yet they are suing the victims. This raises a sincerity issue from the git-go.
  • They say, “Your idea of sharing our collective intellectual capital was a good one, and we appreciate having the City’s input.” Sounds pretty collaborative to me. That’s normally good, but it certainly does not fit with how the City characterized meeting.
  • The law firm representing Perry’s subsidiaries, PSWA and Figure Four Partners, sent the letters, not Perry.
  • Even though the engineering plans for the site call for DETENTION ponds, the lawyer now refers to them as RETENTION ponds. The difference between the two is storage capacity. The latter is like renting a storage shed that’s 80% full…and still paying full price. The City attorney needs to question this.
  • The letter only says that they discussed accelerating the schedule, not that they have accelerated it.
  • The letter lays out timing to construct each detention pond. But it doesn’t say whether they will perform work concurrently or sequentially. If concurrently, the work would take 9+ months. If sequentially, it could take 26 months. They talk about beginning “each project as quickly as the plans can be approved.” This suggests a one-at-a-time approach that could potentially add up to 780 days…assuming there are only “minimal delays” for bidding, approvals, weather, etc.
  • They promised to spend 45 days completing the two southern ponds. Those ponds are already substantially complete.
  • The letter promises to build a berm 2 feet above the 100-year flood elevation between Woodridge Village and Elm Grove. An even higher berm failed during Imelda. Floodwaters overtopped it. Perhaps that’s because Montgomery County bases flood maps on data from the 1980s.
  • They talk about delaying development of homes and streets (impervious cover) until they complete detention ponds. Delaying impervious cover seems like a genuine concession; developers like to build in sections so profit from one can help bankroll the next.
  • The lawyers claim their clients have not yet completed plans and specifications. However, LJA Engineering seemed to have a pretty comprehensive set.
  • The letter provides no guarantees and no penalties for non-compliance or missing target dates.
  • Because Perry has never revealed a construction timetable, we can’t tell whether this schedule beats their original one.

All in all, the timetable in this letter, seemed to take a lot of time for work that they could have completed by now.

Jeff Miller’s Opinions

Jeff Miller is an Elm Grove resident who nearly flooded on May 7th and during Imelda. Most of his neighbors did flood. For months, he has monitored the progress of Woodridge Village construction on a daily basis. He alerted the community when excavation on the site came to a virtual standstill during ideal construction weather.

Miller recently had an “aha” experience when driving by a 5-acre commercial construction site in Kingwood. It had more heavy equipment operating on it than Perry’s 268-acre site did at its peak last summer, he said.

Miller is a retired process engineer. Based on observation of that and other sites, Miller estimated excavation of three more detention ponds would take only about a month if Perry pulled out the stops. Other engineers and construction experts share this opinion.

Josh and Jon Alberson’s Opinions

Both of these brothers have engineering degrees from Georgia Tech. Josh is a chemical engineer and Jon a civil engineer. Jon works on giant construction projects for one of the largest companies in America. The Alberson brothers estimate only 10 days more than Miller. They shared their calculations. The calculations assume a two-step process. Excavate and stack the dirt. Then spread and grade it at a later time.

Basically, they calculated the volume of dirt that needs to be removed. Then they divided that volume by the per-load capacity of heavy equipment. Next, they estimated the time to move one load and return for the next. Using this technique, they could ultimately determine the total time it would take to excavate the three remaining ponds. They consulted with Caterpillar on the capacity of different types of equipment and their recommendations. Follow along to check their math.

Final Capacity of Detention Ponds

N1 + N2 + N3 = 209.9 acre feet = 338,638 cubic yards. (That’s compacted soil before excavation, i.e., bank cubic yards.)

Scraper Capacity per Load
  • Assume typical scraper tractor with 400+ hhp, pulling twin 20 cubic yard (medium size) scrapers.  Then assume a worst case 0.75 load factor for uncompacted soil after excavation (loose cubic yards).
  • Yards per Load = 20 cubic yards per scraper * 2 scrapers per tractor * 0.75 = 32 cubic yards per Load
Total Loads
  • 338,638 cubic yards / 32 cubic yards per load = 10,582 loads
Loads per Tractor per Day
  • Assume tractor cycle time for scraping, moving to pile, and returning to pond is 15 minutes.  This would be a conservative transit time.
  • Then assume the tractor operates 20 hours per day.
    • Lunch – 1 hour per shift = 2 hours per day
    • Maintenance = 1 hour per day
    • Breaks = 2 x 15 minute breaks per shift = 1 hr per day
  • Loads per Day = 20 hours per day * 4 loads per hour = 80 loads per day
Number of Days with 1 Scraper Tractor
  • 10,582 loads / 80 loads per day = 132 days
Number of Days with 4 Scraper Tractors
  • 10,582 loads / (80 loads per day * 4) = 33 days
Assume 20% lost time due to non-productive time, weather, etc.
  • 33 days * 1.2 = 40 days

Said Jon, “Most projects can move 8000 cubic yards per day.”

The two agreed on roughly the same time frame but argued over the optimum combinations of day and shift lengths, pieces of equipment, etc.

That’s just the time to dig the ponds. It assumes they stack the dirt somewhere nearby, then grade and compact it at a later date. Let’s assume that takes another month. But the ponds are excavated!

Now, we’re talking roughly TWO months instead of 9 to 26 months. And beating one or two hurricane seasons.


Note: The LJA Engineering report, upon which these calculations are based, shows at least three different storage capacities for the ponds on the northern section under “ultimate conditions”:

  • Exhibit 2 shows a total of 209.4 acre feet.
  • Table 3 shows a total of 154.2 acre feet.
  • Table 7 and the Conclusion show a total of 163 acre feet.

For the analysis above, the Albersons used the highest volume because it represented the most difficult case. Contractors could excavate the smaller totals, if accurate, in even less time. If 154.2 is accurate, excavation would take only 30 days.


Nancy and Abel Vera’s Opinions

Regardless of how Perry Homes staffs this job, it’s going to take some sweat. That’s the one thing that was not in evidence yesterday or today. Despite the assurances of J. Cary Gray, Attorney at Law, multiple residents reported seeing NO activity on the construction site.

As of Saturday afternoon, Nancy Vera still has seen no activity on the construction site. See the video below taken the day after the Town Hall.

Video taken by Nancy Vera on 10/18/2019, day after Town Hall Meeting

Vera’s husband Abel, manages giant construction projects around the world for one of the world’s largest engineering companies. He agrees that the construction could move much faster.

“If they had the proper equipment and man power, they could move fairly quickly. But they have never done that! They took more than six months to put in this one pond by our house [S2]. And they didn’t even really get going till after the May 7th storm.”

Abel Vera, Resident just south of S2 Detention Pond

A Faster Way?

This video shows the scraper equipment that Alberson and Caterpillar recommended to move large volumes of dirt quickly. The video runs 13 minutes but you will get the idea after a minute or two. These guys collect dirt while rolling.

The Ultimate Scraper Video

Contrast that with what I saw earlier this summer. I watched as a backhoe filled up one dump truck after another. It took several minutes to fill up each truck with multiple scoops. Then each truck took the dirt to its ultimate destination more than a half mile away rather than piling it up near the pond and returning for more dirt. It was a long, slow, dusty procedure with lots of dead time between loads.

Excavation of Woodridge Village S2 Detention Pond took months…one scoop at a time. Photo taken on May 24, 2019.

A Good Deal?

So, does the letter from Counsellor Gray represent a good deal for the residents of Elm Grove. I think not. If Perry Homes really cared about the safety and peace of mind of Elm Grove residents, they could move much faster. The letter commits them to nothing except delaying homes and streets until all detention is in. That’s something. But with most of the surface being hard-packed clay, the threat of rapid runoff remains until they finish all those detention ponds. And someone really needs to proofread that LJA report. It’s scary to think that this whole development could be based on erroneous calculations. I’m surprised Montgomery County approved it.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/19/2019 with help from Josh and Jon Alberson, Abel and Nancy Vera, and Jeff Miller

781 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 30 since Imelda

The thoughts in this post represent my opinions on matters of public policy and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

City To Host Meeting Tuesday, 6:30, At Kingwood Community Center for Homeowners Who Suffered Repetitive Flood Damage

This post is for all those unfortunate people who have suffered repetitive flood damage. Learn how you may qualify for federal assistance to elevate your home.

On Tuesday, October 15, at 6:30 p.m., the City of Houston will host a meeting about mitigation grant assistance for repetitive flood-damaged properties at the Kingwood Community Center.

The community center is at 4102 Rustic Woods, Kingwood, TX 77345 on the corner of West Lake Houston Parkway, near the Kingwood Park ‘N Ride.

Properties may qualify for Federal Emergency Management Assistance (FEMA) funding for structure elevation.

Many families in Elm Grove who flooded in May also flooded in September and should explore the options in this meeting. Regardless of where you live in the City, if your home has flooded at least twice, you may be eligible to have your home elevated.

Homeowners can speak with the City regarding options. To quality, property owners must:

  • Hold a National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) policy.
  • Reside within Houston city limits.
  • Have flooded at least twice.

Below is more information.

Information about Tuesday’s meeting
Info About the Program.

Please submit the voluntary interest form available here. 

Thanks to Houston City Council Member Dave Martin for setting this up.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/13/2019

775 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 24 since Imelda

Harris County Declared Federal Disaster Area in Wake of Imelda; State Taking Control of Disaster Mitigation Funding

On October 1st, Governor Greg Abbott sent a disaster-request letter to President Trump in response to the damage caused by Tropical Storm Imelda. The 31-page letter to President Trump lays out the case for Federal aid. It also includes an impressive catalog of storm-related damages.

The thirteen counties impacted by Tropical Storm Imelda (Imelda) are still recovering from previous disasters, including Hurricane Harvey. The population of the counties affected by Imelda exceeds 7.59 million people. That represents more than a quarter of the state’s population.

Six Counties Declared Disaster Area

Abbott requested a Presidential Disaster Declaration for the six counties in the Gulf Coast region that sustained severe flooding. Today, the President granted Governor Abbott’s request.

That means Individual Assistance for those in Chambers, Harris, Jefferson, Liberty, Montgomery, and Orange counties will now become available. The Governor’s press release states that “Individual Assistance includes up to $35,500 per household for damages sustained during the severe weather.”

“This means that even if people did not have flood insurance, they may receive financial aid and low-cost SBA loans,” said Kaaren Cambio, staff assistant for Congressman Dan Crenshaw.

GLO Designated to Lead Disaster Mitigation Efforts

In a separate statement, the Governor announced that Commissioner George P. Bush and the Texas General Land Office will lead the State’s comprehensive disaster mitigation program. Bush will direct more than $4 billion in U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Community Development Block Grant for Mitigation (CDBG-MIT).

The program will prioritize large-scale, regional projects that increase the state’s resilience to disasters statewide, protect lives and mitigate against future hurricanes and other natural disasters. Bush says he will focus on projects that benefit the most Texans. That means “prioritizing regional partnerships to protect Texans from future storms.”

On August 23, 2019, HUD released mandatory rules for the use of more than $4.3 billion in funding for mitigation projects. They covered money appropriated by Congress on February 9, 2018. Before the GLO could begin drafting a state action plan, those rules had to be published in the Federal Register. The GLO has already begun drafting the plan. It should take approximately nine months or more to complete, at which time, the GLO can send it to HUD for approval.

In total, HUD allocated $4,383,085,000 in CDBG-MIT funds to Texas. Altogether, 140 Texas counties are eligible for some part of this allocation of funding for 2015, 2016, and 2017 (Hurricane Harvey) disasters.

ABC13 Says Choice of GLO Was Response to Slow Pace of Recovery

Ted Oberg of ABC13 News reported today that Abbott tapped the GLO because the City of Houston and Harris County were not moving fast enough with their flood mitigation efforts. The article’s headline says, “Slow pace costs Houston, Harris County control of flood money.” It begins, “Texas Gov. Greg Abbott has taken notice of Houston’s slow-moving progress with its Harvey recovery program.”

“Houston and Harris County’s lack of movement on Harvey housing recovery is the reason the city and county will not get a direct allocation. Victims need this money. That’s why this will go through GLO,” Abbott spokesman John Wittman told 13 Investigates’ Ted Oberg.

In the Mayoral Debate on Wednesday, Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner said that the city had received $1.3 billion for home repair and recovery.

Oberg reported in June, 2019, that only four people received housing aid as of that date, despite private companies being paid millions to operate the program. Oberg says that the City’s latest figures show that since then, only an additional 11 people have received financial assistance, despite more than 16,400 homeowners expressing interest in it. 

As of August 1, of the 4,900 people that the City invited to apply for its federally-funded Homeowner Assistance Programs, less than half submitted an application.

Reaction from Local Officials

According to Oberg, Mayor Sylvester Turner said, “It’s on them now.”

Judge Lina Hidalgo said in a statement to 13 Investigates. “While we’re disappointed in Governor Abbott’s decision to run this program out of Austin instead of providing us local control, we’ll continue to work as a team to make sure we apply every single federal dollar available towards building a stronger, safer Harris County.”

Questions Still Remain

It’s still unclear to me at this hour how the GLO’s focus on large scale mitigation projects affects individual homeowners seeking financial assistance. They seem to tap two different pots of money. But they also seem to have been conflated by the reporting on this issue. Let’s hope that the state can speed things up on both fronts. Flooded homeowners need help immediately, not three years after the disaster.

More than a dozen homes on Dunnam Road near Tailor Gulley flooded for the second time in four months during Imelda. The owner of the home on the left told me he did not apply for federal assistance.

Need to Re-engineer Disaster Mitigation is NOT in Question

As I’ve stated before, we need to re-engineer the whole disaster mitigation business. Sometimes fewer people, not more, can get results faster.

Harris County’s Final Harvey report stated: “Based on house flooding assessments, the estimated total number of homes flooded within Harris County is 154,170.” That only 15 homeowners have received HUD financial assistance more than two years after Harvey is an indictment of the whole crazy system that has evolved.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/3/2019

766 Days after Hurricane Harvey and 15 since Imelda

FEMA Concludes Partial Mouth-Bar Dredging

Over the weekend, Rachel Taylor, a Lake Houston area resident who lives near the mouth bar sent me the video below. It shows an idle dredge near its starting point. The video, plus reports from boaters, fueled speculation that the mouth bar dredging had concluded. That fact was confirmed this afternoon by Houston City Council Member Dave Martin. His office issued a press release stating that FEMA had finished dredging 500,000 cubic yards of sediment from the San Jacinto West Fork Mouth Bar.

Lake Houston area resident Rachel Taylor shot this video of the Great Lakes Dredge on 9/8/2019. The dredge had returned to its starting point, fueling speculation that it had completed its mission assignment.

FEMA Concludes Dredging Addtional 500,000 Cubic Yards

Said Council Member Dave Martin, “The Federal Emergency Management Administration’s (FEMA) mission assignment modification to address partial removal of the San Jacinto River West Fork mouth-bar has concluded.” The mission assignment authorized the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to remove an additional 497,400 cubic yards of debris from the West Fork near its confluence with Lake Houston. As of September 3, 2019, USACE removed 500,000 cubic yards of debris from the mouth-bar.

However, Martin never accepted the amount of debris included in the mission modification and continues to fight that number to this day.

Running, Year-Long Argument Over Volume

Council Member Martin and the City of Houston, through Chief Recovery Officer Stephen Costello, argued for almost a year to remove more sediment, believing that 500,000 cubic yards was much too low. But their pleas have fallen on deaf ears.

According to Martin, FEMA cannot explain how 497,400 cubic yards was calculated, even while the City of Houston has provided verifiable scientific data showing the volume deposited by Harvey near the mouth bar was 1.4 million cubic yards.

During a meeting in June, 2019, FEMA representatives verified the City’s estimate was sound. That lead Martin to believe another contract extension was feasible. In August, FEMA representatives again stated, “Your (City of Houston) data is NOT bad data”, leaving Martin with lingering questions as to why no additional modification had been granted.

Comparison of Two Reports

The analysis that FEMA used to justify their number (497,000 cubic yards) is a four-page table top study that does not begin to answer questions that were asked of the City of Houston by FEMA, which produced a 94-page comprehensive report. I previously analyzed and compared these two reports and believe there are major flaws in the Corps’ analysis which they tried to keep secret for months.

How You Can Help

As a result of the most recent meeting held in Austin, Texas, with representatives from FEMA, USACE, Texas Division of Emergency Management, City of Houston, and Governor Greg Abbott’s office, Council Member Martin along with Mayor Sylvester Turner have sent a letter to our Federal Congressional Delegation requesting action be taken to address the Hurricane Harvey debris remaining in the mouth-bar. This letter urges Senator John Cornyn, Senator Ted Cruz, Chairman Kevin Brady, and Congressman Dan Crenshaw to continue to support recovery of our area through requesting an additional mission modification from FEMA. It would enable dredging another one million cubic yards of sediment related to Hurricane Harvey.

Overall, dredging in the San Jacinto removed more than 2 million cubic yards of sediment. That will help reduce the effects of potential future flooding, but it will not restore the conveyance of the river.

Granting a second mission modification allows the use of existing pre-positioned resources as well as an estimated savings of nearly $20 million for mobilization.

The City of Houston has secured a third disposal site, Barry Madden’s property south of the river, that has already received USACE permits for another 500,000 cubic yards of sediment disposal.

Request from Council Member Martin

Martin asks residents who support the request for additional dredging to contact their federal representatives. Martin says he remains committed to removing additional sediment in the mouth-bar and will continue to fight for additional dredging at that location.

Why We Still Have A Problem

Last weekend, boaters, canoeists and kayakers reported that water depth in the mouth bar was only 3-5 feet deep. Even though the Corps has so far refused to release its plans or survey results, that’s very close to the estimate I calculated when dividing 500,000 cubic yards by the acreage within the dredge area.

However, boaters also report the water upstream from the mouth bar is almost 40 feet deep in places.

This will herd water into an underwater box canyon.

As water hits that wall, it will also slow down, dropping more sediment out of suspension faster. That, in turn, will accelerate re-deposition and quickly fill in the area that FEMA just spent $90 million dredging. What a tragic waste of tax dollars!

Benefits of Additional Dredging

Creating a consistently wide and deep channel through the mouth bar that connects upstream areas with the Lake beyond FM1960 will reduce flood damages to properties regionally and provide for increased resilience to transportation systems, water treatment systems, public/private utilities, emergency response facilities, petrochemical industries, and other critical infrastructure, in the West Fork, San Jacinto River Watershed, plus Harris, Montgomery, and Liberty Counties.

Last year, the Corps estimated the flood protection benefits to be on the order of $200 billion.  

FEMA regulations allow the agency to restore a river to a prior good condition if a risk to health and human safety exists.

Given that petrochemical industries in the region produce a significant amount of the nation’s petroleum-based energy products, reducing flood risks to these plants and their workers who reside in flood-prone areas will provide greater resiliency and a National security benefit. 

Environmental benefits include reduced risks to water treatment plants from flooded sand mines and chemical spills which are threats to human health and safety. Non-monetary benefits include reduced risks to life, especially among residents with insufficient means.

Start writing. It’s your home and your community.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/10/19

742 Days since Hurricane Harvey

FEMA/Corps To Stop Dredging Mouth Bar Before Finishing Job; What You Can Do

Having barely scratched the surface of the mouth bar of the San Jacinto West Fork, FEMA and the Army Corps will pack up their gear next week and call their job done. Last-ditch pleas by the City of Houston, Harris County and the State of Texas to get the federal government to extend its dredging program have fallen on deaf ears, perhaps because of the shifting of disaster relief funds to the construction of migrant detention facilities.

Mouth bar of the West Fork shortly after start of supplemental dredging. Photo courtesy of BCAeronautics.

Regardless, the bottom line is this: the Corps and FEMA will leave millions of cubic yards of sediment in place without restoring conveyance of the West Fork to a prior good condition.

The pullout caps months of arguments over how much sediment Harvey deposited. The City estimated 1.4 million cubic yards and the Corps 500,000.

According to City Council Member Dave Martin, the Corps agreed Harvey deposited 1.4 million cubic yards of sediment in the river near the mouth bar. The Corps also agreed, said Martin, that there was nothing wrong with the Tetra Tech study that arrived at that total.

Waffling by Corps

As late as last Friday, Martin said, the Corps agreed to write a letter to FEMA, recommending dredging more than the 500,000 cubic yards. The letter would say that almost a million cubic yards of Harvey-related sediment remained in the river and should be removed. However, at a meeting in Austin this Tuesday, the Corps revealed that FEMA told it not to write the letter. The Corps now intends to demobilize equipment as soon as it finishes dredging 500,000 cubic yards from the mouth bar. That should only take until next week.

These developments confirm speculation that the Corps “backed into” the 500,000 cubic yard number for reasons unrelated to Harvey. Mystery still surrounds how they arrived at that number. The Corps refused to release many documents related to their decision. A review of their 4-page analysis obtained from the City found numerous issues, logical flaws, and questionable assumptions – uncharacteristic of the Corps.

Next Steps

With the year-long dredging program now almost complete and perhaps less than a quarter of the sediment removed that is required to restore the natural flow of the river, what will happen next? We have some hope.

  • The Corps has finally approved Berry Madden’s property as a storage site for 500,000 cubic yards. That should be enough to get the next phase of the program started while the City seeks additional storage sites.
  • The City has committed to a maintenance dredging program according to Martin.
  • The State and Harris County have earmarked $30 million and $10 million respectively to continue dredging.
  • Additional funds may become available early next year through SB7.
  • Callan Marine has agreed to remain on site and do the dredging.

Your Help Is Needed

However, to make that money stretch far enough to finish the job, we will need FEMA and the Corps to designate the remaining sediment as Category A. City Council Member Dave Martin is sending this letter to all congressional and senatorial representatives in the area. Designating the sediment as Category A will:

  • Enable reimbursement from FEMA
  • Allow the City of Houston to utilize existing resources and pre-positioned contracts.
  • Save nearly $20 million associated with mobilization.

Please Contact These Officials

Here’s how you can help. Send the letter below to:

Tell them that you support the Category A designation and see the mouth bar removal as crucial to public safety with a letter like the one below.

Sample Letter

Subject: PLEASE CLASSIFY MOUTH BAR REMNANTS AS CATEGORY A

Dear _____________: 

Thank you for helping to make dredging of the San  Jacinto West Fork a priority.  It will help reduce flooding, protect property, save lives, and improve public safety.  

However, part of the existing mouth-bar located at the confluence of the San Jacinto River and Lake Houston remains.  

I’m writing to enlist your support in urging the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) to designate that remaining debris as Category A for reimbursement.  

Category A designation will allow the City of Houston to:  

  • Utilize existing resources and pre-positioned contracts  
  • Save nearly $20 million associated with mobilization  
  • Protect life, property and safety  

Field data collected by the City of Houston and provided to FEMA demonstrates that the remaining debris was directly associated with Hurricane Harvey. As of August 20, 2019, the City of Houston has proactively secured a third United States Army Corps of Engineers permitted disposal site needed for the additional debris.  

Your assistance is crucial to rehabilitate the San Jacinto River to its prior good condition.  Please urge FEMA to grant this Category A designation. It will let the City of Houston continue rebuilding from Harvey.  

Sincerely,  

INSERT  

YOUR NAME  

YOUR ADDRESS  

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/30/2019 with drone photo from BCAeronautics

731 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Recently Obtained Documents Raise Questions about Amount of Sediment in Mouth Bar Due to Harvey

ReduceFlooding.com has obtained a copy of the study withheld by the Army Corps that the Corps used to justify dredging only 500,000 cubic yards from the mouth bar of the San Jacinto West Fork. The Corps refused to supply it in response to my Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in June. However, the City of Houston did supply the Corps document in response to a similar FOIA request. Now, thanks to Council Member Dave Martin, the public has an opportunity to compare the two studies side by side for the first time.

Kings River resident near mouth bar wading in knee deep water almost to West Fork channel marker. Caution: do not let children attempt this. Pockets of deeper water may exist that could cause drowning. Picture taken eight days ago. The island being excavated in the distance has since been removed; see last image in post.

After reviewing the Corps document, I can see why the Corps refused to supply it. It has more holes in it than a West Texas stop sign.

History of Controversy

For almost a year, the City and the Army Corps have argued over how much sediment was deposited in the mouth bar of the San Jacinto river by Hurricane Harvey. That determines how much dredging FEMA will fund. Initially, the City recommended working with two Texas Water Development Board sedimentation surveys conducted in 2011 and 2018. But no measurements exist from the period immediately BEFORE Harvey – only AFTER. So the Corps rejected that idea.

Corps Demands then Rejects Stockton Protocol

To determine Harvey volume, the Corps then required the City to provide direct measurement of the sediment through something called the Stockton Protocol. (See this memo from Stephen Costello, Houston’s Chief Recovery Officer, outlining this request and the reasons for it.)

The Stockton Protocol combines ultra-high-resolution CHIRP seismic data with core sampling. The seismic identifies layer thickness and the core sampling identifies layer composition. (Note: the process is somewhat like the oil field practice of confirming seismic with core samples from exploratory wells.) The hope: that by analyzing changes in sediment composition (such as color, grain size, roundness, hardness, etc.), researchers can differentiate Harvey sediment from other floods and then measure it accurately.

Core sample from Tetra Tech Study. Different colors and consistencies indicate sediment came from different floods.

The Army Corps recommended a Texas A&M Galveston professor, Dr. Timothy Dellapenna, to do the research. However, the City of Houston and A&M could not agree on contract terms. Therefore, the City hired Tetra Tech, to perform the research that Dr. Dellapena outlined.

Corps Produces Own Analysis

Tetra Tech concluded Harvey deposited 1.4 million cubic yards in the mouth bar (although they didn’t state it that clearly). The Corps rejected Tetra Tech’s results and produced its own study. That study concluded Harvey deposited only 283,000 cubic yards in the mouth bar – one fifth as much. However, the Corps authorized 500,000 cubic yards to compensate for the margin of error and additional sediment they would have to dredge just to reach the mouth bar.

At the end of the day, even with 500,000 cubic yards, those two estimates still vary by almost 3X. According to Houston City Council Member Dave Martin, the Corps never explained why they rejected the Tetra Tech analysis.

The Corps simply accepted its own results and started dredging without public explanation or input. The Corps document raises many questions that may or may not have valid answers.

The USGS gauge used by the Corps for its analysis stopped working during the peak of Harvey when most sediment would have been moving. The Corps report did not acknowledge this.

Corps Analysis Requires Explanations Never Supplied

Why did the Corps:

  • Base its analysis on a gage at US59 that stopped functioning during the peak of Harvey, when most sediment was moving?
  • Assume Harvey distributed sediment in the same patterns over the same distances as lesser storms?
  • Ignore build up of sediment from Tax Day and Memorial Day storms at the mouth bar as a factor that could have increased the percentage of sediment falling out of suspension during Harvey?
  • Not consider bank erosion downstream from the gage, relying instead on standard charts for “bed-load transport” for sandy rivers?
  • Ignore approximately 20 square miles of sand mines in the West Fork floodway where loose sand and silt were inundated by 131,000 cubic feet of water per second, unlike previous storms?
  • Use a 1-D instead of a 2- or 3-D model for this complex environment?
  • Not publicly disclose model inputs/outputs and data for peer review and validation?
  • Initially reject the use of two TWDB surveys, then reverse course and base all of their findings on them – without explaining why?
  • Exclude extreme data from their study, even though Harvey was one of the most extreme rainfall events in U.S. history?
  • Mislabel all charts, graphs and photos in its report?
  • Refuse to disclose their report in response to a FOIA request, contrary to official Army policy?
  • Omit the organization’s name and the author’s name from the report?
  • Treat the volume that Tetra Tech found related to Harvey in the mouth bar area alone as if it represented the total volume deposited in the entire West Fork by Harvey?

Corps Rejects Use of TWDB Surveys, Then Bases Own Analysis On Them

To estimate Harvey-related volume, the City initially proposed analyzing two Texas Water Development Board sedimentation surveys from 2011 and 2018.

The Corps rejected that idea, suggested the Stockton Protocol, rejected those findings, then based its own analysis on the two TWDB surveys it rejected earlier. This is like following a Three-Card Monte game!

Here is the full text of the Corps’ 4-page unsigned study. We now know that…

Basically, the Corps tried to estimate the amount of sediment that Harvey’s flow could theoretically carry. That would depend on velocity and sediment size/weight. But the gage at US 59 stopped recording at the peak of Harvey. So they also had to estimate the discharge (volume of flow in cubic feet per second [cfs]). Then they used industry-standard curves to estimate sediment transport based on estimated discharge. But they discarded rates over 45,000 CFS because they produced unexpectedly high values.

They also ignored the presence of mile-wide sand mines upstream. The river ruptured the dikes of those mines and captured the pits during Harvey.

West Fork Sand Mine Complex inundated by Harvey. This reach of the river is normally about 150 feet wide. On this day, the day AFTER Harvey’s peak, the flow was more than a mile wide.

Corps Rules Out Extremes for Extreme Event

The Corps says in its report, “there are no measurements above 45,000 cubic feet per second.” Yet the combined peak flows coming from the West Fork, Spring and Cypress Creeks reached approximately 240,000 cubic feet per second during Harvey – five times more. The faster and higher the flow, the more sediment that can be transported downstream and over greater distances.

When the industry-standard sediment transport curves yielded unacceptably high results, the Corps resorted to a simple 1-D model (developed earlier for another purpose) to calculate the sediment load, because flows beyond 45,000 cubic feet per second “produced sediment loads far beyond a reasonable range.”

Corps Assumes Harvey Transported Same Percentage To Mouth Bar as Other Storms

One potentially fatal assumption: The Corps assumes that Harvey transported the same percentage of its sediment load to the mouth bar as all other storms between 2011 and 2018. Said another way, they assume that Harvey behaved LIKE all other storms. Yet not all those floods inundated sand mines.

Moreover, had the Corps measured river bank erosion at intervals between 2011 and 2018, they would have found that virtually all of it occurred during Harvey and very little occurred during Tax Day, Memorial Day and other storms.

Quantum Leap in Erosion Not Factored In

Harvey’s erosive power was NOT proportional to other storms, as the photos below show. River banks eroded more than a hundred feet during Harvey in many places. Yet the Corps report never even mentions erosion.

In 2011, the distance from the ridgeline of this home on Riverbend Drive to the West Fork was 326 feet.
On 1/23/2017, after the Tax and Memorial Day Floods, the distance had decreased only 2 feet.
This shows how much shoreline Harvey ALONE eroded. The yellow line is exactly the same length as after the 2016 floods.
After Harvey, the new distance to the river bank was 216 feet – 108 feet less.

The Tax and Memorial Day Floods combined eroded this river bank by 2 feet. Harvey alone eroded it another 108 feet – 50 times more!

Photographic analysis shows similar quantum leaps in erosion related to Harvey elsewhere along the West Fork.

  • Another home west of River Grove Park lost 27 feet between 2011 and early 2017, but 111 feet in Harvey.
  • River Grove Park lost 0 feet from 2011 to early 2017, but 74-feet in Harvey.
  • Romerica lost 62 feet between 2011 and early 2017, but 144 feet in Harvey.

Net: In four days, Harvey eroded from 2X to 75X more sediment than all other storms during the previous six years. It did NOT act proportionally.

The shearing force of 240,000 cubic feet per second coming down the West Fork literally pulled thousands of trees out by their roots and dislodged sediment disproportionately compared to previous floods (see below). The Gallery page of this web site clearly shows the extent of this devastation. It contains 450 images taken from a helicopter on 9/14/2017, two weeks after Harvey.

Hurricane Harvey ripped trees out by their roots to a degree that previous storms did not. This increased erosion exponentially compared to other storms.

Corps Assumes Mouth Bar Growth Did Not Affect Percentage Deposited by Harvey

The Army Corps also assumes that Harvey transported the same fraction of the total sediment load (20%) to the mouth bar that all storms did between 2011 and 2018. That’s a dubious assumption for several reasons:

  • Previous storms progressively built a wall across the mouth of the West Fork that grew higher and higher during the study period.
  • As it grew, that wall increasingly slowed water down and likely accelerated the rate of deposition behind it (which helps explain why the Corps had to dredge its way to the mouth bar).

Yet the Corps based its estimate on a constant 20%. Page 3 of their report spells out the assumption. Harvey, they say, deposited approximately the same fraction of sediment at the mouth bar as all other storms did during the period between surveys.

This constant 20% contradicts numerous anecdotal reports from lakeside residents and boaters claiming that Harvey carried vastly more sediment to the mouth bar (and their yards/docks) than previous storms. The wife of the resident wading across the river in the image above told me that, on a scale of 1 to 5, the Tax and Memorial Days floods deposited sediment in her yard equal to a 1. But Harvey, she said, was a 6. In other words, off the scale.

No wonder the Corps didn’t want the public looking at this!

Taxpayers Deserve Independent Scientific Review

Professionals rarely like to have their conclusions questioned. However, those who have confidence in their conclusions welcome peer and public review. They encourage second opinions and provide all of their data for review. They also welcome the opportunity to explain and defend their results. None of those things happened in this case.

Instead, the Corps concealed its results as if this involved national security, not public safety. Why? That may be the biggest question of all associated with this project.

The Corps has an excellent, hard-earned reputation. This study undermines it.

As mentioned above, the Tetra Tech study may also have flaws, but the Corps never revealed what its concerns were.

Only one thing is certain. Public safety rests on wildly differing studies. Taxpayers deserve an independent scientific review to resolve the differences between these two studies. The City concurs with the findings in this post and also calls for an independent scientific review. The Corps could not be reached for comment; their new public affairs officer does not list her phone number.

Dredging will likely end next week, with the Corps proclaiming it has restored the conveyance of the river to pre-Harvey conditions (when they have no pre-Harvey measurements).

So we need an independent scientific review to happen quickly. Email you Congressmen and Senators immediately.

Corps Plans Still Being Kept from Public

The Corps still has not released its dredging plans, despite a FOIA request made in June when mouth bar dredging started.

Visual observations of the operation suggest that they are dredging a wide area by three feet, to a total depth of about five feet, instead of trying to cut a channel through the mouth bar. That would leave something like an underwater mesa, still blocking the flow and still trapping sediment. Water coming downriver would have to climb a steep hill to get over it.

If that is an accurate assessment, the Corps would leave a sediment wall under the water approximately 30-35 feet high and 1-2 miles long in the mouth of the West Fork.

Congressman Dan Crenshaw reviews progress of dredging operation on Friday, August 16. Looking southwest towards Atascocita. Notice how the small island in the first image above has now been removed. The mouth bar itself will remain in place, most of it underwater now where it is invisible to the public.

Others Scrambling to Pick Up the Pieces

It may look like the Corps has dredged. But it also looks like the Corps will leave 80-90% of the mouth bar in place. Remember, sand bars are like ice bergs in the sense that what you see above water is small compared to the amount you can’t see below water.

At this point, City, County, State and Federal leaders are scrambling to put together a plan to address the rest of the sediment. Some of that sediment is clearly pre-Harvey. I will discuss options for removal of that portion and maintenance dredging in a future post.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/20/2019

721 Days after Hurricane Harvey

As in previous posts on this subject, I promise the Corps that I will print their rebuttal verbatim if they disagree with any of the points in this post.