Liberty Materials Sand Mine Built in Floodway, Floodplains, But Flooding Not Likely Cause of Breach

A Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) investigation into the mysterious white water on the West Fork, focused on sand mining upstream. TCEQ cited Liberty Materials for allegedly discharging 56 million gallons of milky-white water into the West Fork.

The mine’s manager said he “didn’t have a clue” about when, why, or how one of the mine’s pits lost 4 feet of water. A water sample showed nearly 25 times the normal amount of dissolved solids.

West Fork on November 4, 2019. It angles from left to right. Spring Creek, by contrast comes from top to bottom.
Color of the water on November 4, 2019 on the West Fork San Jacinto, about a half mile upstream from US59.

The Liberty Materials mine, like virtually all of the mines on the West Fork, sits in the floodway and floodplain. It’s a mile and a half wide and almost three miles long. About a 1000 acres altogether.

San Jacinto West Fork is white ribbon cutting diagonally through image. Floodway = Cross-hatched area. 100-Year Flood Plain = aqua. 500-Year Flood Plain = Brown. Source: FEMA’s national flood hazard layer viewer.

That’s a lot of sand and sediment exposed to the ravages of floodwater.

But the irony in this case is that there was no flood immediately before the breaches.

The gage at State Highway 242 near the Liberty mine shows 2.4 inches of rain during a 3 day period starting six days before the white-water incident.

Rainfall at SH242 and San Jacinto West Form from October 27 through November 3, 2019. Source: HarrisCountyFWS.org.
Late October rainfall caused the West Fork to rise about 3 feet, but the river had another 18 feet to rise before flooding.

That amount of rainfall caused the river to rise about 3 feet. But it was still 18 feet away from flooding!

Alternative Breach Scenarios

So if flooding didn’t do it, how did the water get out of the mine? One possibility is that the terrain funneled rainwater into the pond and caused it to overflow. The overflow then started a fissure which widened into the Grand Canyon of the West Fork.

Several mining engineers suggested other alternative scenarios:

  • Industrial sabotage by a disgruntled employee
  • Liquefaction of the sand around the perimeter of pits as they filled with rainwater
  • A heavy truck driving over sand about to liquify
  • They needed to clean out the pond and intentionally lowered the level
  • Needed purer water to create acceptable frack sand
  • “The Boss Made Me Do It”, possibly related to one of the two points above

I’m not saying there was a deliberate breach, but we’ve seen it happen before.

“Dunno What Happened!”

The mine manager interviewed by the TCEQ claims he doesn’t know when, why, or how the breach happened. Yet it caused a four-foot drop in the level of a major pond for more than a week.

To paraphrase the famous quote from Hamlet, “Methinks, the man professes ignorance too much.” By that I mean, the denials cause him to lose credibility. If your swimming pool suddenly dropped four feet, wouldn’t you want to know the cause?

His responses hint that something else is going on here. We may never know what. Despite tens of millions of gallons of pollution being poured into the West Fork, these cases rarely go to trial.

All the more reason to establish greater setbacks from rivers for sand mines.

The state legislature needs to make it more difficult for “accidents” like these to happen.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/2/2019

825 Days after Hurricane Harvey

October Aerial Photos of Liberty Materials Mine Show Evidence of Previous Breaches

Yesterday, I posted the results of a TCEQ investigation into the Liberty Materials sand mine in Conroe. TCEQ alleged that the mine discharged 56 million gallons of white milky pollution into the West Fork of the San Jacinto. They also found that a water sample taken at the mine contained almost 25X the normal level of dissolved solids. The report mentions four other recent investigations that resulted in citations for unauthorized discharges.

October Flyover Shows Other Discharges At Same Mine

Today, I reviewed aerial photos of the mine that I took on a flyover in October, before the alleged unauthorized discharge.

Note the color of water in two ponds at the Liberty site. All photos taken on 10/2/2019.
Mine in background and West Fork in foreground. Notice discharge despite attempt to plug leak.
Same breach from opposite angle
Another breach almost looks like it was designed to funnel water into the river.
In addition to the major breaches above, note a smaller breach here...
…and the water escaping from the pond alongside the road. Those pipes running along the river sure do make it hard for canoeists and kayakers to get downstream.

More Than a Dozen Discharges Seen on One Day

The TCEQ cited Liberty for 4 previous unauthorized discharges in the last 2.5 years. Had they visited the mine on October 2nd, they might have found that many violations in one day.

And these weren’t the only breaches I found that day. Counting those at other mines on the East and West Forks, TCEQ could have easily tallied another dozen violations on this one day.

Sad to say, this industry has an abysmal health and safety record.

To track the status of TCEQ cases near you, check out this section of their web site.

Posted by Bob Rehak on December 2, 2019

825 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 74 since Imelda

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Tree Lane Bridge vs. Power of Moving Water

The downstream side of Ben’s Branch at Tree Lane. Photo taken 11/31/2019.

Tree Lane Bridge over Ben’s Branch

Bear Branch Elementary and Child Time on Tree Lane in Kingwood sit right next to a bridge over Ben’s Branch. Most people in Kingwood don’t need a reminder of the power of moving water. But for those with short memories this is it. A floodway and floodplain more than 250 feet wide narrows down to 80 feet at the bridge.

Lap-Band Surgery for the Creek

It’s like the creek had lap-band surgery.

The predictable result: water backs up behind the bridge and then jets through the opening. The water has literally torn the concrete lining designed to prevent erosion into confetti. Note how the erosion has also exposed a pipeline.

The floodway and floodplain constrict radically at Tree Lane. Source: Fema National Flood Hazard Layer Viewer.

Note the erosion immediately downstream from the bridge.

Erosion immediately downstream from the Tree Lane Bridge above. Wood chips are from HCFCD crews de-snagging the banks of the creek. Photo taken 11/30/2019.

Powerful lessons for anyone who thinks he or she can outsmart Mother Nature for long.

One More Thing to Consider in Kingwood Area Drainage Analysis

Harris County Flood Control is in the middle of its Kingwood Area Drainage Analysis right now. I hope they take a close look at this. While the bridge itself seems stable at this point, if this erosion continues unabated, that could easily change.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/2/2019

825 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 74 since Imelda

TCEQ Cites Sand Mine for Allegedly Discharging 56 Million Gallons of White Pollution into West Fork

After receiving complaints and news reports of bright white water in the West Fork of the San Jacinto, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) launched aerial and ground investigations.

West Fork near US59 bridge. Photo taken 11/4/2019.

They found three mines discharging process water into the West Fork of the San Jacinto.

  • Sorters-Eagle Mine, used as Placement Area #2 by the Army Corps, at 231 McClellan Road in Kingwood
  • RGI Materials at 18185 Hill Road in Porter
  • Liberty Materials at 19515 Moorhead Road in Conroe

The Corps found that the discharge from the Eagle-Sorters mine was related to equipment installed by the Corps which is being removed. Therefore, the TCEQ considered it a permitted discharge and did not issue a Notice of Enforcement.

The other two mines, however, were different stories. The TCEQ issued Notices of Enforcement to both for alleged unauthorized discharges of process water.

Double Breach at RGI

At RGI, TCEQ investigators found that a process wastewater pond breached into a stormwater pond. That, in turn, breached into the West Fork. (Click the link above to see the complete investigation report.) Investigators cited the mine for one alleged violation for failure to prevent the unauthorized discharge of process water. The same mine already had one active notice of enforcement for a violation that allegedly occurred on 10/2/2019.

Loss of 56-Million Gallons of Milky-White Waste Water Goes Unnoticed

At Liberty Materials, TCEQ investigators found a 6′ deep by 30′ wide berm breach still discharging process wastewater when they arrived. The initial burst of wastewater had spread out more than 90 feet and had matted down vegetation for 850 feet. The water then entered a gully which emptied into the West Fork. Investigators say the discharge was milky white in color. They also say that water marks indicate the process pond had dropped approximately 3 to 4 feet!

Unauthorized discharge of white process water by Liberty mine on 11/6. Photographed by TCEQ.

Surprisingly, investigators had to notify the operator of the breach. He professed ignorance of it.

The TCEQ cited the mine for unauthorized discharge of pollutants. Their 124-page report makes interesting reading. The investigators collected numerous samples of water and tested for total dissolved solids.

They found one sample contained almost 25X more than the standard limit for dissolved solids in that part of the river.

From Page 100 of the TCEQ investigation of Liberty Material’s Moorhead Plant on 11/6/2019.

They also estimate that a four-foot water drop in the process pond would have dumped more than 56 million gallons of pollution into the West Fork.

“Not Sure. Don’t Know. No Clue. Duh!”

A “must-read” is the interview with one of the mine’s managers on pages 113-114. Some excepts:

  • When did the berm breach occur? Answer: Not sure.
  • How did it occur? Answer: Not sure.
  • Do you have maintenance logs for berm repairs? Answer: Don’t keep them.
  • What happened to the berm of the missing pond? Answer: No clue.
  • When did the berm go? No clue.
  • How did the berm go? No clue.
  • How much did you discharge? Not sure.

Are we really to believe that a competent manager would not notice the loss of four feet of water in his process pond?

Incident Highlights Two Problems

Nowhere does the report say that the milky white discharge that I photographed further downriver two days before this investigation came from this mine. In that sense, the findings of these investigations probably will not satisfy the public’s passion for closure.

But they do shine a spotlight on two problems.

Problem #1:

This was the sixth alleged violation for the Liberty mine on Moorehead in 2.5 years. They allegedly dumped 56 million gallons of pollution into the West Fork without noticing it and played dumb when investigators caught them in the act. They just do not fear the penalties which have averaged $800 per incident statewide since 2011. At that rate, pollution becomes part of miners’ business plans.

Problem #2:

TACA kills almost all attempts at reasonable regulation by bottling the proposals up in committee every legislature.

Business Friendly Vs. Resident Hostile

I cannot understand how state government allows such flagrant behavior to continue. A teenager who got caught breaking into cars six times in 2.5 years would be heading to Huntsville. Dump 56,000,000 gallons of pollution in a public drinking-water source and you get the equivalent of a speeding ticket. All you have to say to the judge evidently is, “Duh!”, and you’re right back in business.

Go figure. Why does “business-friendly” have to mean “resident-hostile”?

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/1/2019 with thanks to the TCEQ

824 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

HCFCD Crews Work on Thanksgiving Day to Clear Ben’s Branch

Earlier this week, I reported an improbable meeting in Huffman on the eve of Thanksgiving that showed promise to increase conveyance on Luce Bayou. This story is even more amazing holiday miracle. Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) crews worked on Thanksgiving Day to clear trees blocking Ben’s Branch.

HCFCD has a right to cut trees 50 feet on either side of the centerline of the Ben’s Branch and clearing started Thanksgiving week. Photo courtesy of Thomas Blailock.

I did not personally see them but received an email with images from Thomas Blailock Thursday. Blailock says, “The contractor is UFLGC from Ackerman, MS. They had 7 trucks and around 20 employees clearing on Thanksgiving Day. They have been here for 4-5 days.”

I saw evidence of their work at Tree Lane. The areas on either side of Bens Branch look like they got a haircut.

Such clearing reduces the chances that trees will fall into the creek during storms, get hung up on other trees and form “beaver dams” that back water up into neighborhoods.

Result of One Year of Negotiation

The clearing follows a year of negotiation between HCFCD, Friendswood and Bear Branch Trail Association. The Association owns the greenbelt, but Friendswood still exercises deed restrictions.

The Community had mixed reaction to news of the agreement. Many were thankful for progress. Others felt the agreement didn’t go far enough. Many, like Blailock, hoped the creek could be widened or straightened.

Judging by how difficult it was to work out terms of this compromise, widening or straightening won’t happen any time soon – even as upstream development continues to dump more water faster into the creek.

An Alternative That Could Help

I have heard, however, that HCFCD has examined the possibility of widening the Kingwood Diversion ditch that runs down the western side of Woodland Hills and crosses under Kingwood Drive near the fire station. Preliminary reports from HCFCD indicate that a) their easement includes enough room to widen the ditch, b) no bridges would have to be widened (they were built with enough room under them to widen the ditch), and c) that could divert water from Ben’s Branch that would help reduce flooding along the creek.

Looking south down the diversion ditch from over Northpark Drive. That’s Woodland Hills on the left and Kings Mill on the right.
Looking north along the diversion ditch toward where it intersects with Ben’s Branch in front of the new St. Martha Church. That’s Ben’s Branch crossing left to right, parallel with the power lines.
HCFCD’s easement and the bridges are wide enough to widen the ditch without rebuilding the bridges. Note the extra room under the bridges on the right of the water.

Nothing is final yet. The Kingwood Area Drainage Assessment is not yet complete. So things could change. But don’t be surprised if you see this as a future recommendation.

For a full review of issues along Ben’s Branch from Kingwood Drive north past Northpark Drive and St. Martha’s new church, check out this thorough, thought-provoking presentation by Chris Bloch. It underscores the need to use all means possible to improve conveyance.

For more information about HCFCD work in the Kingwood Area, see this page on their new, updated website.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/30/2019 with help from Thomas Blailock and Chris Bloch

824 Days after Hurricane Harvey and 72 after Imelda

What Went Wrong, Part V: How Woodridge Village “Soiled” Perry Homes’ Reputation

Before Perry Homes bought the ill-fated land now known as Woodridge Village, it hired a company called Terracon to sample soils and submit a geotechnical analysis. Their objective: to see whether the land was suitable for residential development. Perry also hired LJA Engineering to analyze drainage. However, it appears that LJA did not consider Terracon’s findings when it modeled runoff (see Section 1.4 of LJA’s report).

LJA also assumed that “sandy loam” covered the entire site when the National Resources Conservation Service soil database shows sandy loam covers only 60 percent. The Terracon report, however, never even mentions “sandy loam.”

Different Findings Could Have Skewed Runoff Analysis

Both the different characterizations of soils and their extent could have skewed the results of LJA’s runoff analysis.

LJA said the soil was “fine sandy loam,” everywhere, period. Terracon bored holes to 20 feet at four locations and found mostly clay-based soils. Terracon did, however, find “sandy silt” with “clay pockets” in the first foot of ONE of their borings.

According to the USDA’s Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), clay, sand and loam absorb rainfall at vastly different rates that can approach or even exceed 10X.

Source: Natural Resources Conservation Service, USDA

The NRCS site above does show “sandy loam” on 60% of Perry Homes’ property. However, the NRCS sampling technique usually involves a shovel. They appear to classify primarily surface soils (not surprising for the Department of AGRICULTURE).

That’s why NRCS clearly states that the infiltration rates above only apply to the first two inches of rain during an event. After that, the water may percolate down to another, less permeable layer of soil, such as the clay that Terracon found. At that point, fully saturated ground could force additional rainfall hitting the surface to pond or, if the land slopes, run off. That’s exactly what happened on May 7th and September 19th this year when Elm Grove flooded from Woodridge Village runoff.

According to NRCS, “Soil survey interpretations are rarely suitable for such onsite evaluations as homesites without further evaluations at the specific site.” 

But Terracon’s preliminary investigation sampled only four widely spaced spots at the perimeter of the property. None coincided with the locations of planned detention ponds, known wetlands, or streets. Only one even came close to a future home site. And the Montgomery County Engineer’s office has no record of Terracon performing additional work on the Woodridge site.

Also note that while NRCS shows sandy loam on 60% of the site, LJA assumes uniform distribution everywhere. That could also have skewed LJA’s computer modeling. NRCS showed that another 33% of the site (see below) contained soil consistent with wetlands. Wetlands don’t typically absorb water, often because of clay underlying them.

Wetland-Type Soils on ONE THIRD of Property “Overlooked”

A top geologist retired from one of the world’s largest oil companies sampled the soil at one of Terracon’s borehole sites shortly after the May 7th storm and confirmed Terracon’s findings as to surface soil type – mostly clay.

He also says, “The presence of clay close to the surface can cause water to pond and lead to the formation of wetlands wherever you find depressions in the land.” And in fact, the USGS National Wetlands Inventory shows extensive wetlands on the northern portion of the site.

USGS National Wetlands Inventory map of Perry Home’s site.

It’s not clear where LJA found its soil information; they don’t specify. But if it was from NRCS, they should have been alarmed by the presence of hydric topsoils on ONE THIRD of the property. Hydric soils are one of the defining ingredients of wetlands. Compare with map below, taken from the NRCS site. SosA and SouA are soil types typical of wetlands.

SosA, Sorter-Tarkington complex, 0 1 percent slopes {Hydric, with inclusions that are non-hydric} and SouA, Sorter-Urban land complex, 0 to 1 percent slopes {Hydric, with inclusions that are non-hydric} comprise approximately 29% and 3.6% of the site respectively.

Building homes over wetlands is dangerous because shifting soil can crack foundations. Wetlands also typically serve as collection points for water.

But LJA never mentions wetlands and the Terracon borehole sampling sites came nowhere near the wetlands on the property. Terracon spaced them widely around the perimeter as you can see from the site map with the red lines above.

Groundwater Levels Not Mentioned In LJA Drainage Analysis

LJA, had it read the Terracon report, might have also been concerned by the discovery of ground water at 15 feet, more than a half mile from Taylor Gully. At Taylor Gulley, contractors hit ground water at about 10 feet when excavating the S2 detention pond. But the pond was supposed to hold 15 feet of runoff. That means ground water reduced its capacity by a third. Even worse, a pond by N3 has had standing water near the ground SURFACE for months!

Note the man-made rectangular pond in the upper right. It has been that full since it first appeared in Google Earth satellite images almost a year ago. That’s not a good sign for another area designated to hold a major detention pond (N3).

That means these ponds will never be able to achieve their promised detention capacities with their current dimensions. There just isn’t enough depth. Engineers measure detention capacity from the top of any standing water, not the bottom of the pond.

More Curiosities Re: Testing and Reports

How strange that LJA’s drainage analysis never once mentions the words “water table” or “groundwater”! Especially when detention ponds are a central feature of the report and mentioned 42 times. LJA never mentions “retention” ponds once, although J. Carey Gray, the high-powered litigator representing Perry Homes, called the ponds that in his letter to the City. For the record, detention ponds have no permanent standing water; retention ponds do.

The first thing you notice about the Terracon report: the title says PRELIMINARY. Terracon also put “preliminary” at the top of every page. And repeated it 35 times within the report. Sometimes as many as three times in a single paragraph. Terracon also specifically recommended several followup tests. But if they were done, the Montgomery County Engineers office says it has no record of them.

Five Previous Developers Sold Site Rather than Develop It

At Thanksgiving Dinner yesterday, we had three engineers at the table. I posed the question, “Do you ever reach a point in projects when you say to yourself, “We shouldn’t do this,” as opposed to “How can we do this?”

The general consensus: There’s always a way to engineer a solution…if you don’t consider cost.

I wonder if that’s why five previous developers who owned this site didn’t do anything with it. They included Lennar, Kingwood 575, Reddy Partnership/Kingwood, Woodbridge 268, and Concourse Development.

It could be that they were just holding it and hoping to flip it at a higher price. Land generally appreciates faster than the rate of inflation. But it could also be that they investigated the cost of developing it more closely than Perry Homes did.

Below: the sales histories for the two major pieces of land that comprise Woodridge Village.

Source: Montgomery County Appraisal District
Source: Montgomery County Appraisal District

Of all the curiosities associated with this development, the sales history ranks near the top. Concourse held the property for less than a week before selling it to Perry Homes’ subsidiary, Figure Four Development LTD.

Perry Homes even commissioned and received Terracon’s Geotechnical report BEFORE Concourse bought the property. But that’s the subject for another post at another time. What was that about?

The important thing to note for now: When you’re selling dirt, it pays to know what kind of dirt you’re selling.

As Perry Homes Drags Out Court Case, It Could Incur More Liability

The once-proud Perry Homes is now buried under a mountain of law suits alleging that their actions flooded hundreds of homes…not once, but twice…in six months.

As Perry Homes drags these lawsuits out, Kathy Perry Britton could expose her father’s company to enough liability to bring it down. Can you imagine how a jury would react if Elm Grove flooded a third time when so many regulations have been flaunted? And when Perry has made no further attempt at mitigation since early August? I can.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/29/2019 with help from Jeff Miller

842 Days after Hurricane Harvey and 71 after Imelda

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Triple PG Sand Mine Agrees to Stop Dredging Until Trial Next June

Triple PG Sand Development, LLC and Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton agreed to a temporary injunction on Friday, November 25, 2019. The giant mine between Caney and White Oak Creeks agreed to stop dredging while it finds a way to engineer permanent fixes to its dikes. The dikes have breached repeatedly in numerous places. And the mine has left some breaches open for years.

Triple PG Sand Mine dike breech into White Oak Creek. This is the third time this year.

Triple PG’s process wastewater has poured into the drinking water supply for two million people. The State is suing the mine for more than a million dollars.

Triple PG Trial Set for Next June

The judge has set the trial for June 22, 2020. That should give Triple PG time to engineer a fix. It should also give time a chance to test the repairs.

Terms of Triple PG Injunction

Read the full text of the agreed temporary injunction here.

Under terms of the injunction, this dredge will remain idle until trial in June 22nd of 2020.

Key elements of the agreement:

  • No dredging.
  • No discharges of process wastewater.
  • Defendant must hydraulically isolate industrial waste with berms.
  • Berms shall be constructed to halt influx of water from adjacent creeks.
  • Defendant will hire a professional engineer to ensure berms prevent future discharges during rain events.
  • Defendant agrees to comply with Texas Water Code 26.121 (unauthorized discharges).
  • Make sure the berms work or reclaim the dredge ponds.
  • Provide a proposed plan to TCEQ within 90 days.

Good News for East Fork Residents

All this represents good news for the people on Caney Creek and the East Fork. Recent storms have left both clogged with sand, at least some of which washed out of the mine.

Sand inundated thirty acres of East End Park for the second time in two years and destroyed about a mile of trails. Repair costs could exceed $80,000 for just a portion of the trails. KSA will abandon the Eagle Point trail permanently.

People directly south of the mine in Walden Woods should rejoice. They may finally get the protection from this mine that they should have had all along.

Reportedly, Triple PG is dry-mining frack sand and working down its stockpile to stay in business while it makes repairs.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/28/2019

821 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 70 since Imelda

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Giving Thanks for Committed People on Thanksgiving

Tuesday afternoon at 4 p.m., most of America had already physically or mentally checked out for the long Thanksgiving holiday. Those still at work were making shopping lists or travel arrangements. Those still trying to DO work, found it harder and harder. Clients had left for vacation. Telephone calls went unanswered. Suddenly the calculus had shifted. What you could accomplish at work paled in comparison to what you had to do at home.

An Improbable Meeting on the Eve of Thanksgiving

So it surprised me when Kaaren Cambio, Congressman Dan Crenshaw’s field representative, invited me to a meeting near Luce Bayou in Huffman. But I knew many people had flooded there during Imelda, so I went.

When I arrived, I discovered I was at the flooded home of Dr. Tom Kelchner and his wife Laura. Most of the group had already gathered in Tom’s front yard. It turned out this would be a stand-up meeting. There was no place to sit. The Kelchner home was still under repair. Harvey and Imelda hammered them.

Like so many others in different places around Lake Houston, they worried about repetitive flooding. They saw sediment and dead trees building up in the Bayou and worried about backwater effects that could flood them again. As they explored ways to get the trees and sediment removed, they discovered they had fallen into a black hole.

Fallen trees, such as these, can form “beaver dams” that back water up and flood homes.

No one governmental entity, it seemed, had responsibility for the maintenance of Luce Bayou. The Inter-Basin Transfer Project had thrown it into a bureaucratic black hole. Harris County, Flood Control, the Coastal Water Authority and the City of Houston would all have to collaborate to fix the problems on Luce Bayou.

Thanksgiving Miracle #1

Now here’s where we get to the holiday magic part of the story. Rather than let these residents labor indefinitely under the threat of more flooding, Ms. Cambio called representatives of all the groups together. AND THEY ALL SHOWED UP! That was the first miracle.

Left to Right: Laura Kelchner, Dr. Tom Kelchner (Property Owners); Nick Dragon, Property Manager, Tetra Tech; Kaaren Cambio, Field Representative, Office of Congressman Dan Crenshaw & Board Member, San Jacinto River Authority; Layne Yeager, Property Manager, Harris County Flood Control District; Shane Hrobar, Urban Forester,  Harris County Flood Control District; Dr. Reynaldo Guerra, Capital Improvement Program Manager, Harris County Commissioner – Precinct 2; Jeremy Phillips, Senior Director of Infrastructure,  Harris County Commissioner – Precinct 2; Mike Lykes, Chief of Staff,  Harris County Commissioner – Precinct 2; Maria Martin, Property Owner; Anthony Bowie, Deputy Director-Operations, Solid Waste Management Department, City of Houston.

After handshakes and introductions, the meeting moved from the front to the back yard where you could see Luce Bayou and some of the problems. For more than an hour, the group discussed technical and organizational issues. Everyone who needed to be part of the solution was there. And before the meeting ended, all participants knew exactly what they had to do.

In one hour, the problems went from “What’s this meeting about?” to “Let’s do this.”

The ad hoc “team” discusses needs and possible solutions.
Layne Yeager from Harris County Flood Control and resident Maria Martin discuss where the issues are.

Thanksgiving Miracle #2

There was no bureaucratic jealousy. No egos got in the way. No “This is not my problem.” And no “Death by PowerPoint.” That was the second miracle.

It reminded me that thousands of public servants like these join government to make a difference and, in this case, I suspect they will. This Thanksgiving season, I’m thankful for committed people like these.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/21/2019, with thanks to the committed staff at Congressman Dan Crenshaw’s office

821 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 70 since Imelda

What Went Wrong, Part IV: Perry Homes Develops Flood Plain That Wasn’t

Chapter 9 of the Montgomery County Drainage Criteria Manual discusses development in flood plains. Perry Homes and LJA Engineering somehow “overlooked” many of the points in this chapter. A flood plain ran through the property, but FEMA had not yet mapped it. LJA used that as an excuse to claim none existed.

Notice how flood plain mapping stops at county line. Perry Homes has the undeveloped property along and above the county line. Color code: Cross-hatched = floodway; aqua = hundred year flood plain; brown = 500-year flood plain. Source: MoCo Maps

Unfortunately, physical boundaries of flood plains do not observe political boundaries. Taylor Gully bisects this property, if you look at the flood maps, it magically defies flooding on the MoCo side of the county line.

Montgomery County Regulations Affecting Flood Plains

Below are guidelines from the Montgomery County Drainage Criteria Manual that Perry Homes would have had to follow had the property been mapped.

From Section 9.1.1 Floodplain Regulations:

“No fill or encroachment is permitted within the 100-year floodway which will impair its ability to discharge the 100-year peak flow rate except where the effect on flood heights has been fully offset by stream improvements.” [Emphasis added.]

“Placement of fill material within the floodplain requires a permit from the County Drainage Administrator. Appropriate fill compaction data and hydrologic and hydraulic data are required before a permit will be issued.”

From Section 9.1.2 Floodplain Development Guidelines and Procedures

“Construction within the floodway is limited to structures which will not obstruct the 100-year flood flow unless fully offsetting conveyance capacity is provided.”

  • “The existing designated 100-year floodplain and floodway should be plotted on a map of the proposed development.”
  • “The effect of the proposed development and the encroachment into the flood plain area should be incorporated into the hydraulic model and the resulting flood plain determined.”
  • “Careful consideration should be given to providing an accurate modeling of effective flow areas taking into account the expansion and contraction of the flow.”
  • “Once it has been determined that the proposed improvements adequately offset the encroachment, a revised floodway for the stream must be computed and delineated.”
From Section 9.2 Downstream Impact Analysis

“Pursuant to the official policy for Montgomery County, development will not be allowed in a manner which will increase the frequency or severity of flooding in areas that are currently subject to flooding or which will cause areas to flood which were not previously subject to flooding.”

What LJA Said About Perry Homes’ Project

On Page 1-2 of its Drainage Analysis, LJA Engineering explicitly states, “As shown on Exhibit 3, the proposed development is outside the 100-year floodplain.”

Phyllis Mbewe, P.e., CFM, LJA Project Manager – Hydrology and Hydraulics
LJA Exhibit 3 shows the floodplain stopping at the county line. LJA also did its best to make the .2 percent risk area blend into the area of minimal flood risk. This visually minimizes the amount of floodplain bordering MoCo, so the abrupt stoppage at the county line becomes less visible. Source: LJA.

Ms. Mbewe then states in her conclusion, “Based on these findings, the proposed development of the 268-acre tract creates no adverse drainage impacts for events up to and including the 100-year event.” [Emphasis added.]

What Does “No Adverse Impact” Really Mean?

People often twist the definition of terms you think are self evident. Especially in legal, technical, and political contexts.

To me, “No Adverse Impact” should mean, “Downstream people who didn’t flood before won’t flood after development.” That’s what section 9.2 states explicitly.

But when I talked to a flood professional, I got a different answer. To that person, “no adverse impact” meant, “the amount of water flowing across the property did not increase after development.” Much narrower! And seemingly contradictory to the spirit of 9.2.

“Floodplain” Definition Shocked Me

But that person’s definition of floodplain really shocked me. To me, floodplain means “the area adjacent to a stream that fills with floodwater after a very heavy rain.” But the professional told me I was WRONG. To the professional, a floodplain was “an area on a map that FEMA designated a floodplain for insurance purposes.”

In that person’s mind, because FEMA had never mapped the area in question, a floodplain did NOT EXIST. Whether or not the area flooded!

To me, that’s like saying an apple is something you see in a Kroger’s flyer, not something you eat. We’re talking about the difference between a symbol of something and the reality of it.

This discussion proved once again that words and phrases have different meanings that depend on the social context of usage.

In the minimum compliance environment of Montgomery County, LJA and Perry Homes argued that there was no floodplain. They found someone in the county engineer’s office who agreed with them…or was told to agree with them.

FYI, the official FEMA definition says, “Any land area susceptible to being inundated by floodwaters from any source.”

Consequences of Overly Narrow Definition

So did Elm Grove flood because Perry Homes, LJA and Montgomery County did not enforce the floodplain regs in section 9.2 of the Drainage Criteria Manual?

  • They certainly did not offset peak flows with stream improvements.
  • They did not plot the REAL-WORLD floodway and floodplain on a map of the proposed development (see above).
  • LJA did not incorporate encroachment into the floodplain in its hydraulic modeling, because they denied a floodplain existed.
  • Neither did LJA provide “an accurate modeling of effective flow areas taking into account the expansion and contraction of the flow.”
  • Finally, LJA did not compute, revise and delineate the floodway for the stream.

Had they done all these things, perhaps people would have seen that downstream homes that had never flooded were now subject to greater flood risk. But that’s really something for the jury to decide. And it would require FEMA to model the floodplain after the fact.

But like the narrow definition of floodplain, this whole discussion symbolizes a bigger problem.

How Do You Fix a Permissive, Minimum-Compliance Environment?

LJA had an obligation to its client and a higher one to the public that it ignored in my opinion.

Perry Homes could have demanded honest answers from its engineers, not the ones they wanted to hear.

FEMA could label areas like Woodridge Village “UNMAPPED”. This would send a signal to potential home buyers if sellers tell them they’re NOT in a floodplain. That might make developers think twice.

Home buyers need to demand integrity in this process. They need to ask better questions. They need to learn more about flooding.

But at the end of the day, Montgomery County Commissioners must define the kind of future they want. Do they want constant flooding? Or not. Because right now, they’re competing with other areas for new development on the basis of willful blindness and self-serving definitions.

Thirty years down the road, when it’s too late to fix the infrastructure problems they ignore today, MOCO residents will be paying the price. Some, who have flooded repeatedly, might argue they already are.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/26/2019 with help from Jeff Miller

820 Days after Harvey and 69 since Imelda

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

A Simple Proposal to Fix NFIP, Reduce Elm Grove’s Flood Risk, Save Taxpayer Dollars, and Force Perry Homes to Follow Rules

This morning, I was talking to a friend, John Knoezer, about flooding in Elm Grove when he suddenly blurted out, “You know, the National Flood Insurance people should sue Perry Homes and turn that Woodridge Village into a giant detention pond.”

I knew John had a genius for heating and air conditioning. But I had no idea he also had a genius for politics, too. Boom. There it was. One simple idea to fix multiple problems. The NFIP budget deficit. Flood mitigation. Mushrooming tax bills. And rogue developers who ignore flood regulations at others’ peril. And all it requires is getting NFIP to act like any other insurance company.

Get NFIP to Behave Like a Normal Insurance Company

If the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) sued the people responsible for flooding Elm Grove, North Kingwood Forest and Porter, it could likely recover enough payouts to fix the lack of detention in Woodridge Village, Perry Homes’ troubled development in Montgomery County.

All we’re really talking about is getting NFIP to behave like a normal commercial insurance company. For instance, if someone rear-ends your car, your insurance company sues the person who did it (or their insurance company) to recover the amount of your claim. But not NFIP, according to everyone I’ve talked to.

Elm Grove after the May 7th storm, where block after block, homes were being gutted. Several feet of water from Perry Homes Woodridge Village development inundated homes that had never flooded before.

NFIP currently carries a $20 billion debt to taxpayers. Going after egregious companies that contribute to repeat flooding could reduce that amount.

It might also get those rogue companies to behave more cautiously and responsibly in the future. That could reduce future claims and NFIP’s overhead.

Imagine all the taxpayer dollars that could have been saved if Elm Grove, North Kingwood Forest and Porter had never flooded.

NFIP has already paid out twice this year to hundreds of flooded homeowners. And those homeowners could easily flood again and again. Because Perry Homes is doing NOTHING to reduce future flooding! Nothing incentivizes Perry Homes to reduce flooding.

NFIP has created no deterrent to flooding neighbors. So why would developers care if they do?

Another Benefit: Recovering Money in Court to Fix the Problem

If the repair costs downstream from Perry Home’s Woodridge Village total $100 million and just half the people had NFIP insurance, that’s $50 million that NFIP might recover from Perry Homes in court.

That money could easily buy the Woodridge Village land and construct a massive detention pond that would prevent future flooding.

Such lawsuits, if won, could also help reduce future taxpayer-subsidized flood-mitigation expenditures, most of which the federal government helps underwrite in some manner. But that’s just for starters.

Get Developers to Stop Pushing the Flood-Risk Envelope

Going after flagrant developers might help in another way, too. It might change the economics of pushing the flood-risk envelope. Right now, the economics favor those who push it hardest and furthest.

Developers have no disincentive to keep pushing these envelopes. NFIP bears all the flood risk; developers make all the profit.

Virtually all the incentives in this process foster behavior that worsens flooding.

We’re giving a competitive advantage to developers who worsen flooding. If NFIP were to sue a developer occasionally, it might change that.

Create Incentives to Follow Rules

In this case, had Perry Homes followed the rules and developed Woodridge the way it said it was going to, hundreds of homeowners would likely not have flooded.

Before Perry started developing the property, Elm Grove and North Kingwood Forest flood victims had weathered many storms as bad as May 7 and Imelda without flooding. So had people in Montgomery County on the western edge of the development where block after block of homes flooded that had never flooded before. See map of that area below and note the number of homes that flooded during the Harvey, Memorial Day, Tax Day and 1994 floods – ZERO!

According to residents, not one home flooded in this neighborhood west of Woodridge Village flooded before May 7, 2019. However, on May 7th, the vast majority of homes did flood…after Woodridge Village contractors altered the drainage going out of the subdivision. Flood data from Montgomery County. Flood Story Map hosted by ESRI.

So far, we’ve found numerous instances where Perry Homes did NOT follow Montgomery County or State of Texas regulations. People downstream paid the price.

More than 200 homes in Elm Grove and North Kingwood Forest flooded in May and more than 300 again in September.

For details, see installments to date in these “What Went Wrong” posts:

  • Part I – Overview
  • Part II – Lack of Erosion and Sediment Controls
  • Part III – The Detention Pond Catastrophe

If NFIP successfully sued the developer, the precedent might encourage all developers everywhere to follow the rules instead of bending them.

Save Tax Dollars

The precedent of NFIP suing a developer might also deter other developers in the future from pushing flood-prone projects or developing them in ways that contribute to flooding. So it could further reduce NFIP payouts and overhead. That could save even more dollars for this taxpayer subsidized program.

Bypass County Commissioners Who Refuse to Enforce Their Own Regulations

Another benefit of John’s brilliant suggestion: it eliminates a political battle with Montgomery County Judges and Commissioners – which may be unwindable for people in another county. Just get NFIP to make an example of a high-profile developer, such as Perry Homes. That might change some developers’ behavior who operate under the protective cover of local politicians. Those politicians compete for development dollars by not enforcing their own regulations. And that’s a huge part of the problem. Especially when a county line divides the perpetrators and victims as it does in this case.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/26/2019, with inspiration from John Knoezer

819 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 68 since Imelda

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.