Additional Rain Puts Lake Conroe Within 1 inch of April Average

Yesterday, I posted about rains that quickly brought Lake Conroe back up to its average for March. Additional rain last night and today brought the lake up another 3.24 inches to 200.23 as of 9pm on 3/22/2020. That means the lake is now within about 1 inch of its average level for April.

Source SJRA.net. Readings as of 9pm on Sunday, March 22, 2020.
46-year average levels for Lake Conroe. Variation due to rainfall, evaporation and releases. Source: SJRA.net. Chuck Gilman presentation and January 2020 board meeting.

This now means that SJRA would release enough water starting April 1 to reduce the level of the lake to 200 feet above sea level. If the lake remains at this level, that would mean lowering it about 3.24 inches starting April 1.

The purpose of the SJRA’s temporary seasonal lake lowering program: to provide a margin of safety against flooding until downstream mitigation measures can be put in place. Those include West Fork mouth bar dredging and additional floodgates on Lake Houston to lower the level of the lake faster during a flood.

Renewal of the policy was the subject of a bitter fight between Lake Conroe and Lake Houston between December 2019 and February 2020. It culminated in a board meeting attended by approximately 1500 residents from both communities.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 3/22/2020

936 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Lake Conroe Returns to Average Level for March

Lake Conroe area businesses, boaters, home values and tax rolls got a boost yesterday. Yes, despite the drought, Lake Conroe returned to its normal level for this time of year. The watershed received an average of 2 to 2.5 inches of rain in the last 36 hours. That’s all it took.

The March average for the last 47 years (since the lake was built) is 199.98. The current lake level as of 5pm on 3.21.2020 is 199.96. That virtually equals the March average.

The difference, 0.02 ft., is less than a quarter inch. That’s less that the thickness of a pencil.

36 hour rainfall totals for Lake Conroe area sensors. Source: SJRA.onerain.com.
SJRA Dashboard as of 5pm on 3.21.2020
47 year average for monthly Lake Conroe levels. Source: SJRA

One decent rain Stopped the Drop. If the lake remains at this level, there will be no seasonal lowering in the Spring. The policy adopted by the board calls for lowering it to 200 starting April 1.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 3/21/2020

935 Days after Hurricane Harvey

The MoCo/LJA Way: Build First; Work Out Drainage Details Later

LJA Engineers submitted a master drainage plan for the 2,200 acre Artavia development that Montgomery County approved. It has no detention ponds. And the drainage channels currently do not connect to the San Jacinto river. Even though LJA said they would connect to the river, the plans do not specify how, when or where. As you will see below.

Dead-end drainage. Currently, the Artavia drainage channel stops just short of the Liberty Materials Moorehead mine in the background. The San Jacinto River lies beyond the mine. This and all other aerial photos below were all taken March 6, 2020.

A Sand Mine Is Not the San Jacinto

The plans DO show the channel terminating in a sand mine between Artavia and the river. A spokesman for the sand mine said the developer is still trying to work out environmental and easement issues.

Aerial photos show the main channel stops about a 100+ yards short of LMI’s shipment facility. Meanwhile, during heavy rains, the dead-end drainage overflows onto surrounding properties. A spokesman for the mine claimed that the overflow flooded the mine last year and caused the dikes to break. He alleged that was the proximate cause for 56 million gallons of white sediment-laden water entering the West Fork.

Exhibit 2 of Artavia Drainage Impact Analysis from 9/20/2018 shows the project outfall in the middle of the LMI sandpit that borders Moorehead Road and the San Jacinto West Fork in Montgomery County.

The project manager for LJA did not return calls to explain their position on the dead-end drainage. And when asked for an explanation, the new Montgomery County Engineer (not the one who signed these plans) only referred me back to LJA.

Below are the drainage plans for Artavia, obtained by a Freedom of Information Act request to Montgomery County.

Several things have jumped out at me so far. LJA has not yet returned phone calls, so to me they remain…

Unaddressed Issues

Elevation Change Accelerates Flow

Elevation drops suddenly as you get near the river – 12 feet. That accelerates water flow and threatens the sand mine. As you can see above and below, the channel is like a firehose aimed at the mine. That mine has enough problems of its own. In the past, dike breaches have affected Lake Houston water quality; we don’t need more of that. The mine blames the breaches on water overflowing from the Artavia ditch.

Note how the water in this short section of Artavia’s drainage ditch does not even pond at one end and reaches halfway up the banks at the other. That shows the slope. The SJR West Fork is between the two sections of the mine in background.
Flow Rates Understated

LJA calculations appear to understate the volume and velocity of flow. They use a Manning’s coefficient of .035, a value associated with pasture/farmland or channels filled with stones and cobbles. The coefficient recommended for smooth channels is 0.022. The difference creates a 63% increase in velocity and a 60% increase in volume of flow. See for yourself. With no real way yet for the water to get to the river or under FM1314, that will cause water to pile up much faster.

Not too many cobbles and boulders in this channel. All sand and silt which is already blocking culverts.

LJA also uses pre-Atlas rainfall statistics in their calculations of 10-, 25- and 100-year peak flows. The new Montgomery County standard is 16.1 inches in 24 hours compared to the 12.17 that LJA used for the 24 hour, 100-year flood.

Did LJA use “good engineering practices” and model Atlas 14 to ensure that it actually contained the 100-yr, 24-hr storm? There’s an ethical issue here. Did they put public safety first? We don’t know because they didn’t say so in any of their documents.

No Mention of Wetlands

LJA never mentions wetlands in their analysis. However, the National Wetlands Inventory shows wetlands on Artavia property and other property Artavia drains through.

Wetlands on Artavia Property or property Artavia drainage would likely have to go through.
Threat to Pipeline

A pipeline crosses the Liberty Materials mine. High velocity flow through the mine could undermine and threaten that pipeline like it did at another Liberty mine and at the Triple PG mine on the East Fork.

Green line shows path of pipeline across across Liberty Materials Mine. White line shows current path of drainage ditch.
No Outlet

There’s no explanation for how Artavia will get water through the pit at the end of their ditch. They can not store Artavia’s runoff in the pit. Their pit is already filled to the brim with highly silty, turbid water. Another unauthorized discharge could affect water quality in Lake Houston...again!

Level of water in the pit that Artavia’s ditch would have to drain through. Pit is already overflowing. West Fork is in background. TCEQ measured suspended solids in pit’s water at 25X higher than river.
Threat to Mine

A representative for the mine owner says the mine owner doesn’t want more water in the pit. They can’t afford the cost from environmental or business perspectives. With the COVID-19 threat, construction activity is way down. So margins are slim. And they can’t afford to have water fill their deep pit where they dry mine.

“No Adverse Impact”

LJA claims the project will have no adverse impact on downstream properties. But it already has. Properties along Greenbaugh and in Oak Tree have flooded since Artavia started clearing land and filling in wetlands.

Oak Tree detention pond (behind camera) used to overflow into wetlands. Then Artavia started clearing and filling. Now water backs up into the 40+ homes in the small subdivision.

The Liberty Materials mine also alleges it was flooded by Artavia’s overflow, resulting in the discharge of 56 million gallons of silty water into the West Fork.

The day the West Fork turned white. TCEQ blamed LMI. LMI blamed Artavia.
Who Pays to Get Water Under FM1314?

LJA can only convey 68 cfs under FM1314. Meanwhile, TxDoT has not yet finished the design for a bridge. They hope to start bidding the job by the Fall of this year. Residents, not the developer, will pay for the improvement through the local municipal utility district.

Artavia ditch on north side of FM1314
Where water exits on the downstream side of FM1314
Channel downstream/south of FM1314.

LJA claims “The culvert crossings were designed to have capacity to convey 100-year storm events.” But they certainly aren’t doing that now.

Diverting Water From East to West Fork

The developer appears to be diverting water from the East Fork watershed to the West Fork watershed. See Section 1.4 and Exhibit One.

It would be harder to “beat the peak” to the East Fork. It’s 12 times farther away; water would take much longer to get there. So the diversion appears to be an attempt to avoid building detention ponds. But the diversion adds to flood volume in heavily populated West Fork areas where far more homes flooded during Hurricane Harvey.

Will LJA Figure It Out In Time?

For the sake of adjacent residents and businesses, let’s hope they figure these loose ends out before the next flood.

We heard of many of the same problems and promises on the Perry Homes Woodridge Village project north of Kingwood that LJA also engineered. Hundreds of homes flooded there twice last year.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 3/20/2020

934 Days after Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Right Before LJA Sued, LJA Employs County Engineer Who Approved LJA Plans

Mark Mooney, PE, the long-time Montgomery County Engineer whose office approved LJA plans for Woodridge Village and Artavia, and whose office oversaw LJA’s investigation of itself, has joined LJA Engineering as a “business development representative.” (Usually that means “sales.”)

A February 17, 2020, press release about Mr. Mooney’s appointment appears on LJA’s Facebook page. According to insiders, Mr. Mooney actually started working part time with LJA shortly after his retirement from MoCo. That happened after the May floods in 2019. However, the release now implies the relationship is full time. It appeared just days before LJA was named as an additional defendant in the Elm Grove flooding case. Below is the entire release verbatim:

MARK MOONEY, PE JOINS LJA AS BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT REPRESENTATIVE

After 34 years with Montgomery County, during which most of the time he served as the County Engineer, Mark Mooney, PE has joined LJA Engineering.

During his tenure, he had oversight of all major road initiatives through numerous bond elections; provided advice, direction, and consultation to 5 different County Judges and 17 different County Commissioners; oversaw the review and approval of over 3500 residential and commercial subdivision plats; oversaw the review, approval and inspection of over 1300 miles of road construction; and, provided daily services to a population that grew from 160,000 residents to over 600,000 residents in the 34-year span.

“I have known and respected Mark for many, many years. When the opportunity presented itself, I knew he was a perfect fit for LJA. We have four offices within Montgomery County and are personally and professionally vested in the growth and success of our employee-owners and clients there. Mark has dedicated his career to this community, and we want him to keep doing what he does best, serving Montgomery County,” said Jeff Cannon, Senior Vice President.

Mark was a Member of the City of Houston planning commission from February 1998 to May 2019. He is a Member of the Texas Association of County Engineers and Road Administrators (TACERA) since 1998; having served as President from 2005-2006, and he has been a Member of the National Association of County Engineers (NACE) since 1998.

Joining LJA, Mark explained, “It was the confidence that I felt between myself and Calvin Ladner (LJA President), that began when we were both a lot younger back in the mid-eighties, that sealed the deal. My responsibilities as the Montgomery County Engineer were made much easier by the honesty I had with Calvin initially and then with so many of the staff at LJA throughout the years. In my 34 years in this business, it always came down to trust as being the most important aspect as a public official. At LJA, I am ready to further develop my industry relationships utilizing the same playbook that worked for me for so many years as Montgomery County’s engineer.”

End of Release

Revolving Door Between Government and Business

[Rehak here again.] Before retirement, I frequently saw how the revolving door worked between government and business. I knew a man who went to Washington and worked for the EPA in a high level position “to get his ticket stamped.” Those were his words, not mine. After working in D.C. for several years, he returned to private industry where he made considerably more money, thanks to the insights he gave clients about how the EPA worked.

Personal connections provide knowledge of agency priorities; understanding of personal hot buttons; insights into procedures; and relationships with decision makers. They all prove valuable to companies whose sales depend on public-sector approval.

Fine Line Between Harmless and Harmful

There’s nothing illegal or immoral about this per se. On the innocent side, sometimes, if projects get bogged down, a call to an old friend can:

  • Move plans from the bottom of a pile to the top in an emergency.
  • Determine what the agency’s concerns about a set of plans might be so the concerns can be addressed quickly.
  • Speed up slow approval processes that run up costs.

Cases like these harm no one. They represent a form of social engineering or influence peddling that has been around as long as governments. However, what is normal and accepted in principle can sometimes turn sour in practice.

For instance, private-sector engineers/consultants might urge decision makers who are old friends on the government side to:

Between these two extremes, between legal and illegal, infinite shades of gray exist.

Public’s Presumption of Oversight

Cases like those in the latter category can mislead the public and have devastating consequences. The public presumes the government is overseeing development (or at least the permitting of plans). In fact, government may not be. Those plans and stamps and dazzling arrays of figures may create the appearance of professional oversight when none exists.

Families may invest their life savings in homes based on the presumption of government oversight. Officials are supposed to ensure that there is no adverse downstream impact from a new development. But as we’ve seen in Elm Grove and elsewhere, that’s often not the case.

Bad Optics for Ethics

Exerting influence can sometimes cross moral, ethical and legal lines. I’m not saying it happened with Mr. Mooney. I have no evidence to even lead me to suspect such a thing. By all accounts, Mr. Mooney is honest and reputable.

Apparent Conflict of Interest In Elm Grove Investigation

However, it was on Mr. Mooney’s watch as County Engineer that the TCEQ referred a complaint about Woodridge Village involving LJA to Montgomery County for investigation.

Mooney’s department had LJA on retainer to investigate such complaints. So LJA wound up investigating itself.

To inspire public confidence in the outcome of the investigation, you would think that LJA would have recused itself or the county engineer would have hired another company for this particular investigation. Neither thing happened.

Certifying No Need for Detention Ponds in 2,200-Acre Development

Mooney’s department also vetted the LJA Drainage Impact Analysis for Artavia. It certified no detention ponds were necessary for the 2,200 acre development because it would have no impact on the West Fork San Jacinto. However, the report did not examine the impact on:

  • Surrounding homes whose drainage has been blocked
  • The impact on downstream flooding, i.e., loading Lake Houston before floodwaters arrive.
Approving Dead-End Drainage
Artavia’s Drainage Ditch stops before reaching the San Jacinto West Fork. The company hopes to work out some environmental and drainage easement issues that would allow the ditch to cross the LMI mine in the background.

Mr. Mooney’s department also took LJA’s word for the fact they would find a way to get Artavia runoff to the West Fork, despite the fact that illustrations in the approved Drainage Impact Analysis showed the main drainage ditch stopping short of the river.

A year after LJA received approval of their plans, the LMI sand mine at the base of the ditch flooded. LMI blamed Artavia’s ditch overflow for causing a massive breach in LMI’s dikes that allowed 56 million gallons of white gunk to escape into the West Fork.

LMI also blames Artavia’s alleged overflow for flooding a deep pit where they are doing dry mining. A large part of the pit remains flooded; disrupting LMI’s normal operations, according to a company spokesperson. (More on this in a future post.)

Supposedly dry pit that LMI says was flooded by Artavia drainage ditch overflow.

Meanwhile, Artavia is building homes and the developments drainage ditch still does not reach the river.

Certifying “No Adverse Impact” for Woodridge Village Right Before 400 Homes Flood

Under Mooney’s watch, county engineers certified that LJA plans would have no adverse impact on Elm Grove…right before 400 homes in Elm Grove flooded.

MoCo Engineers office certified “No adverse impact” for Elm Grove where hundreds of homes flooded twice in five months last year.
Accepting Job With LJA Right Before LJA Sued by Flooded Elm Grove Residents

Now, LJA finds itself at the heart of lawsuits by hundreds of flooded homeowners in Kingwood. And the former county engineer who could have provided insight into the county’s position has taken a job with the engineering company at the heart of the lawsuits. Think that might slant his testimony? Who wants to testify against his employer?

The optics of these incidents sure don’t inspire trust and confidence in LJA, Mr. Mooney, or Montgomery County developers. In future posts I will dig into more of the details behind these incidents.

Calls to LJA’s project manager for Artavia went unanswered for days before this post. If LJA wishes to submit a response to this post, I will publish it verbatim.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 3/19/2020

934 Days after Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Help Wanted: Can You Explain This Strange Splashing in Water Near RR Bridge Repairs?

On March 6, I flew over the Union Pacific bridge repairs near 59 and the West Fork and noticed some splashing I could not explain. I’ve been on a fruitless search for answers ever since. So now I’m enlisting your help. But first a quick update on the status of repairs.

Update on Repairs

Not much had visibly changed since the previous month on February 23rd. I observed that:

  • The north side of the river looked considerably cleaner.
  • Virtually all supports for the north side of the temporary bridge had been removed.
  • Virtually all of the old supports between the new supports for the main bridge were gone.
  • The big red crane was starting to retreat back to the southern side of the river.
  • Some sort of underwater cutting torch operation was in progress.
  • Pontoon-based lifting equipment was retrieving cut pipe and old cement from the river bottom.
Incremental changes since Feb. 23 flyover. This and all photos below taken March 6.

Enlargement Reveals Splashing

However, when I downloaded the images at home and reviewed them on a big screen, I saw something I could not explain. I saw a giant splash in the water under the bridge that went up at least 10 feet. At first I thought something fell from the bridge. But there was nothing on the bridge as you can see above.

Strange splash in water near old support. Caught at 1/8000th of a second from a helicopter 250 feet away.

Further review of the images reveal tanks of industrial gas, likely used for underwater cutting torches.

Tanks of what might have been acetylene for underwater torches.

Then I noticed the same splash in the same place in dozens of other images as the helicopter circled around the bridge.

Similar splash in same spot several seconds later from different camera position. Also at 1/8000th of a second.

Something falling could have created the splash in one frame. But not multiple frames. Especially since I was shooting at 1/8000th of a second to minimize vibration from the helicopter.

Shot from other side of bridge about 30 seconds later.

The series of shots shows continuous splashing in a virtually identical pattern.

26 Frames Taken 3 Seconds Apart Show Similar Splash

It took almost a minute and a half to circle the operation. During that time, I took 26 shots. Each shot shows water “erupting” in the same place, the same pattern, and to roughly the same height. All while workers sat by unconcerned!

So this was a normal part of the operation. But what caused it? I’m not familiar with underwater cutting. However, I’m guessing, with all the offshore experts in Houston, someone can explain it.

Photo of same site when workers no present by Mike Combat Wilcox.

Mike Combat Wilcox sent me this image from his boat when workers were not present. No workers. No splash. Hmmmm. The mystery deepens.

Two Ways to Help

A hearty corona-virus-free handshake through social media to anyone who has the answer. I will publish it…with a credit if you can explain it.

And let’s have some fun while we’re at it. We need more of that these days.

I’ll also publish a separate list of “creative” answers from the clueless (like me). Try to make people laugh with those. For instance, were the splashes actually “oil company stocks taking a nosedive during corona week”? You get the idea. Have fun people! If you can. I know its painful.

On a More Serious Note

Here’s another wide shot that shows the progress of bridge re-construction. Remember, the goal: widen supports so trees don’t get caught in them during the next flood.

But widening supports requires removing the old ones. Piece by piece. That’s where the cutting and pulling comes in.

If you have possible explanations (real or humorous), please reply through the contact page on ReduceFlooding.com.

Posted by Bob Rehak with image from Mike Combat Wilcox on 3/18/2020

932 Days after Hurricane Harvey

LJA Engineers 2200-Acre Artavia Development in Montgomery County Without Detention Ponds

Last August, I posted about a loophole in Montgomery County Flood Plain regulations. It allowed all developers who could prove they were “beating the peak” of a flood to bypass the requirement for detention ponds. Montgomery County Commissioners decided to leave the loophole open. They said, “We don’t have a flooding problem.”

Giant Development Exploits Detention Loophole

It all seemed somewhat academic at the time – unless you previously flooded from upstream development. Then along came Imelda. The absence of functioning detention ponds on Perry Homes’ Woodridge Village property underscored the need for adequate detention for the second time in five months when hundreds of homes downstream in Kingwood flooded.

Now there’s a 2,200 acre development called Artavia going in upstream from the Lake Houston Area – without detention ponds.

Artavia straddles FM1314 south of 242.

Artavia neighborhood entrance and model homes.

The engineering company for the developer, Aliana, claims their calculations show that floodwater from Artavia will beat the peak of a flood to the West Fork by 35 hours. Dasa Crowell, PE, LJA’s Project Manager for Hydrology and Hydraulics, thus concluded, “This leads us to a conclusion that the peak flows generated by the runoff from project drainage area will have no impact on the WFSJR under proposed conditions, therefore detention is not required.” See page 56 of this PDF.

In fairness, the development does include a retention pond in Section 1 labeled as a detention/amenity pond. However, aerial photos show that it has only a few feet of excess storage capacity above its normal water surface elevation. See the plans here. It’s certainly not going to hold back a 100-year rain falling over 2200 acres.

Little Buck Amenity Facility/Pond. Note that as-built conditions appear smaller than plans.

Engineers seem to be relying on drainage channels to act as their detention basins, but as we will see, that comes with some risk. And one potentially bad assumption may invalidate the whole concept.

Problems with Beat the Peak

In an interview last July, MoCo Engineer Jeff Johnson argued for closing the “beat the peak” loophole. He said that the data developers use to calculate peaks is decades old; doesn’t reflect the current drainage picture; and that models should change every time a new development comes in, but they don’t.

Because detention costs money and limits the number of salable lots, developers try to get their water to the river as quickly as possible so they can “beat the peak.” Of course, racing to get water to the river in a flood is the exact opposite of what you want to happen if you are a downstream resident. Normally, you want developers to hold water back as long as practical so as not to overwhelm downstream channel capacity.

LJA developed the Artavia River Impact Analysis in 2014 (see page 60). Based on LJA’s assurances, Dan Wilds, then MoCo’s assistant county engineer issued a letter of “no objection.”

“No Impact” So No Detention Requirement

Wilds said in part, “The analysis … demonstrates that the peak flow from the developed tract will pass through the downstream cross-section approximately 35 hours prior to the peak flow from the upstream watershed. The report indicates that the 10-year, 25-year and 100-year events were analyzed and concludes that the runoff from the project drainage area will have no impact to the San Jacinto River under proposed conditions.”

“Based on this information, this office offers no objection to the analysis as presented. Storm water detention will not be required for this development as long as the developed flows up to and including the 100-year event can be adequately conveyed to the San Jacinto River.” For the full text, see page 51 of this PDF.

The Executive Summary of the most recent update of the drainage impact analysis for Artavia states, “The November 2014 memorandum documents the analysis supporting no detention requirement; this analysis provides calculations showing that the proposed Star Ridge Ranch development (as it was then called) drainage system will safely convey the rainfall runoff for rainfall events up to and including the one-percent annual chance (100-year) storm event.”

Similarities Between Woodridge Village and Artavia

Please note that both of these analyses base their conclusions on pre-Atlas-14 rainfall statistics and therefore may understate drainage requirements significantly by up to 40%. LJA did the same with Woodridge Village.

Also note two other similarities with the LJA analysis for Woodridge Village, Perry Homes’ disaster-movie-in-the-making project.

For its modeling, LJA used something called the Clark’s Unit Hydrograph. Their reports never mention the NRCS method specified in the current Montgomery County Drainage Criteria Manual. The use of Clark’s methodology, which minimizes runoff estimates, has become a bone of contention in the Elm Grove lawsuits.

Finally, LJA pushed both the Woodridge and Artavia plans through the MoCo Engineers office right before the drainage criteria manual was about to be updated again with more stringent requirements.

LJA submitted both drainage analyses for MoCo approval within approximately a year of Hurricane Harvey before flood maps, rainfall statistics, drainage criteria, and construction standards were updated.

LJA Engineering was not only playing beat the peak, it was playing beat the clock again. This will be the first of several posts on Artavia. More news to follow.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 3/17/2020

931 Days after Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Perry Homes Says “Now or Never”: Selling the Titanic With an Iceberg Sticking Out of the Hull

Last week, the Houston Chronicle and Community Impact both ran stories about Perry Home’s potential sale of the Woodridge Village property. That property has been implicated in the flooding of Elm Grove twice last year. Sources who wish to remain anonymous have told me that Perry does NOT WANT to develop the property. They would prefer to sell it.

Those same sources also told me that Perry Homes started out asking for their purchase price of the land PLUS the money they spent partially developing it. However, as I reported last week, based on the newspaper articles, that appears to have changed at this point.

Woodridge Village after the May 7, 2019, flood

Full Text of Perry Homes’ Fact Sheet about Land Sale

Below is the full text of a “fact sheet” along with a link to the original PDF Perry Homes PR people allegedly sent out about the sale of their Woodridge Village Property in Montgomery County. I say allegedly because I have never known a public-relations person to put out information that is not on a letterhead and without contact information.

“FACT SHEET ON WOODRIDGE VILLAGE”

“For several months, we have been in discussions with Harris County to sell the +/- 268-acre Woodridge Village site in Montgomery County so that it can be used for regional detention. Our offer price is our original acquisition cost of $14,019,316.85. This sale would represent a loss of the development costs we have already spent, which are over $9 million to date. We would also be foregoing the future profits we would earn from building and selling homes.”

“The draft study performed by LJA Engineering advised this regional detention concept would remove more than 800 homes from the 500-year floodplain and provide additional flood mitigation for hundreds of other area homes. We are willing to absorb the losses referenced in the paragraph above because of the enormous benefit it will offer to downstream residents in Houston and Harris County.”

“If the property is not going to be used for regional detention, we plan to either develop it for Perry Homes or sell it. Work is ready to start on the remaining detention facilities. We have also listed it for sale to other developers at an initial asking price of $23 million, which will increase as additional funds are expended.”

“We first requested to meet with Harris County back in October 2019, and our first face to face meeting occurred on November 8th. At the request of Harris County officials, we even delayed the construction bid process so the commissioners could consider our proposal in executive session. After the executive session, we were informed that Harris County needed the City of Houston to partner with them to make the project occur. However, we have been informed the city is not looking to partner with the county on this project. In any event, we are concerned about delaying improvements any longer. If, by March 31st, we do not have reason to believe a definitive agreement for regional detention is likely, we will move forward with the remaining infrastructure and continue to entertain private market interest in the property.”

For a printable PDF of the fact sheet, click here.

Key Pieces of New News in Fact Sheet

In my opinion, there were four key pieces of new news in this when its was released.

  • First, Perry Homes has dropped its asking price by no longer demanding to recoup its development costs.
  • Second, Perry Homes’ supplier, LJA Engineering, has determined that turning the property into regional detention could mitigate flooding.
  • Third, Perry Homes is already trying to sell the property on the open market.
  • Fourth, Perry Homes has given Harris County a deadline to make a decision – March 31, 2020.

Reaction to the News

Dropping the asking price shows that Kathy Perry Britton has not become totally untethered from reality. However, it still seems high for someone trying to sell the Titanic with an iceberg sticking out of the side of it.

I wish LJA had told Perry Homes the property needed to become regional detention BEFORE Perry Homes bought the property. Duh!

Good luck, Kathy Perry Britton, with trying to sell this property on the open market. With oil prices below $30, the stock market gyrating wildly, 401K’s losing value, and businesses laying off employees, not many people will rush out to buy homes in the immediate future. Lest we forget, in 1985 when oil prices dropped to $35, housing values in Houston collapsed 50%.

Definition of Chutzpah: Perry Homes

Threatening the one potential buyer with a deadline shows, in my opinion, an incredible amount of chutzpah, as my Jewish friends say. Chutzpah (ho͝otspə) in the original Yiddish sense has a strongly negative connotation. It means “insolence,” “cheek,” “incredible gall” or “audacity.” However, since entering English, the word has taken on a broader, more positive meaning. Today, in the business world it usually means the amount of courage that a person has.

Leo Rosten in The Joys of Yiddish defines the term as “that quality enshrined in a man who, having killed his mother and father, throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is an orphan.”

For Perry Homes to put a deadline on this deal shows incredible chutzpah – especially when the world has become focused on the corona pandemic. It shows a similar and scary disconnectedness.

However, I must admit that everyone wants Perry Homes to do something with this property quickly. And it hardly seems fair to make them invest more money in it if Flood Control is going to buy it tomorrow.

An Offer to Perry Homes

So Kathy, I will make you a deal. I’ll buy Woodridge Village for a dollar. Then you can save face and say you dumped the property for 100 times what it was worth … before it flooded again in the spring rains. But the best part … you can take a $23 million tax deduction and make almost as much money as you would have if you had sold it in the first place. Boom! Done. You ditched that dog! You’re a hero again.

Woodridge Village after May flood. Saving money on earth moving by letting nature do it for you.

If they sell it to me, maybe I will get into the mud spa business.

Posted by Bob Rehak with Jeff Miller’s Titanic line

930 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 179 since Imelda

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

A Little Bit of Utah’s Bryce Canyon Comes to Conroe

Sand mining is turning parts of Conroe into areas that look a little bit (a very little bit) like Bryce Canyon in Utah.

Hoodoo Magic

On March 6, I flew over the Liberty Materials Moorehead Mine in Conroe and captured this image.

Deep pit portion of Liberty Materials Moorehead mine in Conroe.

It struck me as similar to the hoodoos in Utah’s Bryce Canyon National Park.

Bryce Canyon NP, Utah. Photo courtesy of National Park Service.

Bryce Canyon Hoodoos

Hoodoos are tall, thin spires of rock that have usually eroded from the edge of a drainage basin. Hoodoos typically consist of relatively soft rock topped by harder, less easily eroded stone that protects each column from the elements. In the case of the Conroe hoodoos, the vegetation at the top of the pit helps provide that protection.

Of course, the hoodoos in Bryce Canyon formed over the last 40-60 million years, through the relentless forces of erosion. The Conroe hoodoos formed in the last two years. They’re not quite as spectacular or as tall. And they’re made out of sand, not sandstone.

Sandstone is formed when sand is cemented by such materials as silica and calcium carbonate. Most sandstones form through the accumulation of river sediments on seabeds. They are then compressed and uplifted to form new lands. Bryce Canyon was uplifted 8,000 feet, Conroe about two hundred.

Liberty Materials vs. Mother Nature

Here are some more pictures of the Liberty Materials mine in question.

And to give equal time to Mother Nature, here are some more pictures of Bryce Canyon.

Sunrise, Bryce Canyon National Park, Utah, Photo © Bob Rehak 2011
Bryce Canyon National Park, Utah, Photo © Bob Rehak 2011

Liberty looks a little sloppier than Mother Nature. But then, Mother Nature takes her time.

It may take a few more years before 2 million people a year start visiting the Liberty pit.

Posted by Bob Rehak

929 Days since Hurricane Harvey

Note: Unlike the other images on this site which are public domain, please refrain from copying or distributing my images of Bryce Canyon. To see more of my photography, visit BobRehak.com.

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Clean Water Act, R.I.P.

Confluence of Spring Creek (left) and San Jacinto West Fork (top) on March 6, 2020. The Montgomery County line cuts left to right through the center of this picture at the tip of that white sand bar.

If the Clean Water Act were still being enforced, we might see scenes like this less often. You’re looking at the confluence of Spring Creek and the San Jacinto West Fork. It has looked like this during random flyovers in four out of the last six months.

Clean Water Act Abuses

Only after the infamous and extreme white-water incident in November last year was West Fork pollution reduced briefly. The white-water episode was so egregious that it attracted network television attention and prompted a crackdown by the TCEQ. TCEQ cited Liberty Materials in Conroe for allegedly discharging 56 million gallons of white goop into the West Fork. The discharge had 25 times the normal level of suspended solids in it.

Liberty isn’t the only sand mine on the West Fork. You can find approximately 20 square miles of sand mines in the twenty mile stretch between I-69 and I-45. Spring Creek on the other hand has only one mine – almost 30 miles upstream at SH249.

Most West Fork mines have a tendency to leak waste water from time to time. That’s part of what you see in the photo above. Below are seven NEW breaches spotted this month upstream on the West Fork.

Mine water leaks into wetlands and out past perimeter road at LMI E. River Road mine in Conroe.
Pumping water over dike at same Liberty Materials Mine on River Road.
At same mine, a pipe through the dike discharges water at a fixed height into an adjoining ditch that leads to the West Fork.
Liberty Materials leaks water into backyard of home in Bennett Estates. From here it goes into a storm drain on Calhoun and into the river.
Difficult to see at this resolution, there’s a pump in front of the trees on the left. It’s sending waste water into the wetlands below the mine.
Hallett sprouts another leak into the West Fork (lower right).
Most of these breaches happen out of sight and never get reported.

MoCo Tax Breaks for Polluters

Why such a high concentration of mines on the West Fork? It might have something to do with tax breaks by the Montgomery County Appraiser’s Office which passes out ag and timber exemptions for industrial cesspools. That’s contrary to how the State Controller says MoCo should appraise the mines. But nobody at the state level seems to put much pressure on MoCo.

Construction Practices Muddy Clean Water Act, Too

Another part of the West Fork turbidity problem is upstream construction in Montgomery County. Believe it or not, Montgomery County starts at the tip of that white sand bar at the confluence of Spring Creek and the West Fork.

Sediment control is not a high priority for MoCo developers. Nor is enforcement a high priority for MoCo. In fact, the East Montgomery County Improvement District actively advertises its LACK of rules as a way to lure developers.

That’s how you get construction practices like those in the new 2200 acre Artavia complex going in next to the West Fork sand mines, just south of SH242 by FM1314. Brand new culverts are already clogging. See below.

Artavia drainage ditch and culverts. A river of mud.

More on Artavia in a future post.

The erosion is so bad, even the erosion is eroding in many places.

Decline of Clean Water Act

Then, of course, another part of the problem is the gutting of the Federal Clean Water Act. States, counties and municipalities used to have someone setting standards and looking over their shoulders. The rollback of key provisions, such as the redefinition of “waters of the U.S.”, has been heralded as a boon to developers and the death knell of wetlands.

Just last week, we saw the Army Corps rule that the wetlands on Perry Homes Woodridge Village property did NOT fall under their jurisdiction, so there was no violation of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.

Of course, you don’t have to change regulations to kill them. You can just not enforce them. By turning a blind eye. Gutting enforcement staff. Overruling staff. Reinterpreting policy. Ignoring evidence. Or resetting priorities. To name just a few.

Don’t Know What You Got Till It’s Gone

Many of us who grew up before the Clean Water Act (formerly known as Federal Water Pollution Control Act, passed in 1972) remember how bad things were. Like the Cuyahoga River fire in 1969.

The San Jacinto West Fork has already been named one of the most endangered rivers in America. But my biggest fears are not for the river. They’re for the health of the millions of people who depend on water from the river. For the people who will flood when the river becomes clogged with sediment. For the poor and elderly who can’t afford sky high bills to cover the cost of water treatment. And for the long-term health of the economic hub of the region, Houston.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 3/14/2020

928 Days after Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Triple PG Mine Appears to Violate Injunction

Triple P.G. Sand Development LLC appears to have violated provisions of an injunction by dredging before its trail and flooding neighboring properties with industrial waste water.

Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton is suing the mine for discharging millions of gallons of process wastewater into the headwaters of Lake Houston last year. On November 25th, 2019, the mining company (operated by a cardiologist from Nacogdoches, Tx., Prabhakar Guniganti, MD), agreed to the terms of a temporary injunction. Within days, his employees apparently started violating it.

Terms of Injunction

In part, the injunction stipulated that the defendant shall:

  • Not conduct any dredging operations at the Facility.
  • Not engage in any operations at its Facility that discharge process wastewater, nor shall Defendant engage in any operations at the Facility that produce process wastewater that must be discharged off Defendant’s property without express prior approval from TCEQ.
  • Immediately and permanently cease and prevent all discharges of any Industrial Waste and/or Process Wastewater from the Facility into or adjacent to waters in the state.
  • Not allow any discharge of water that is in or has ever been in the Facility’s Dredge Ponds without the express prior approval of TCEQ.

Aerial Photos Show Potential Violations

The aerial photos below show that within eight days of agreeing to the injunction, the mine started pumping process wastewater OVER BERMS into a pit that then overflowed onto the property of adjoining landowners and lands adjacent to White Oak Creek.

Before showing you the photos, let me show you a satellite image that helps illustrate the relationship between the different elements of this report.

Overview of mine, area drainage and adjoining properties in Montgomery County.
Note the location of the mine’s stockpile in the satellite photo above for orientation when viewing the photos below.
Brownish creek to right of mine is Caney Creek.
Blue line shows approximate path of White Oak Creek through forest.
Red oval shows adjoining properties in area of interest.
Solid red line shows ditch around perimeter of mine.
Green lines show approximate locations of breaches in Attorney General’s lawsuit.

The lot lines are from the Montgomery County Appraisal District Web Site. The properties within the red oval belong to multiple people or trusts. Guniganti owns the large forested areas outside the red oval and west of the mine. However…

Water pumped out of the mine’s wastewater pond is now flooding neighboring properties within the red oval that he does not own. The mine also dug a ditch around the perimeter of its property (solid red line) through dense forest that channels the process wastewater toward White Oak Creek (solid blue line) and the wetlands along it. It’s not clear, though, whether the wastewater has actually entered the creek yet; the forest canopy limits visibility. Regardless, the injunction says they can’t discharge waste adjacent to waters of the state.

No Flooding That Lasted Months of Adjoining Properties Until Injunction

None of the historical satellite images in Google Earth dating back to 1989 show flooding in the red oval. Some of the properties in the red oval lie in the 100-year flood plain. However, there has been no widespread flooding in this area since Imelda on September 19, 2019.

Nor has there been prolonged flooding as far as I can determine. Photos taken of this exact location on 9/27/2019, ten days after Imelda, show no flooding of the adjacent properties. Likewise, the property was not flooded on 9/14/2017, two weeks after Harvey. I can find no evidence that this area has ever flooded for months before.

Looking south toward stockpile in background. Properties in the forested strip do not belong to Guniganti. On 9/27/2019, ten days after Imelda, they showed no flooding.

For months, I’ve been watching waste water build higher and higher in the area above until it overflowed the pit and invaded neighboring properties. That made me curious and prompted a review of thousands of aerial photos. Here’s what I found.

Photos Taken In November Before Injunction Show Neighboring Land Still Not Flooded

The neighboring properties were NOT flooded on November 4, 2019 (before the injunction). Notice the level of water in the foreground pit – higher than after Imelda, but still waaaay short of overflowing.

Think of the November 4th photo below as the “before” shot. Compare it with other photos below taken from December through March 2020.

Properties in the red oval are between the pit in the foreground and stockpile in background. Note level of water in pit. Photo taken November 4, 2019, looking south. The mine’s process waste water enters the pit immediately to the left of the trees.

After Injunction, Mine Starts PUMPING Waste Water OVER Dike

Eight days AFTER the injunction, on December 3, 2019, I flew over the mine again. I noticed that the mine was pumping water out of its main waste water pond and into the pit in the photo above. But the pit had not yet overflowed. Here’s how the pumping looked. (Note: You can even see the pumping from outer space if you zoom in on this area within Google Earth and look at the Dec. 1 satellite image.)

Close up of pump taken on 12/3/2019. The pumping operation can also be seen in Google Earth satellite photo dated 12/1/19.

On January 20, Pumping Continues From Different Location

I flew over the mine again on January 20, 2020; the pumping from and into the same pits continued – but from a different location.

Looking West. Notice the line running from the arc in the wastewater pond (diagonally from center to lower right).
Looking south. The same line dumps water into the trench (bottom left). The trench then carries the water south (toward the top of the frame) to fill the pond next to the stockpile and flood adjoining properties with waste water.
Looking SE. Here’s what it looked like closer up. Notice the waste water extending into the tree line and ending at the stockpile (upper right). The same pond that had plenty of excess capacity in September and November was now overflowing.
Looking south. This wider shot shows the flooding wastewater curled around the stockpile and headed south into the woods where White Oak Creek flows toward the mine.
Looking SE. Close up of the waste water turning the corner around the stockpile.

From where you lose visibility of the ditch under the forest canopy to White Oak Creek is about 80 yards according to Google Earth.

Floodwaters Even Higher on February 13

On my February 13, 2020, overflight, I captured the following images. They show the floodwater had risen even higher and backed up farther.

Looking SW. On February 13th, the flooding wastewater appeared even higher.
Looking SE. It still curled down the ditch on the west (right) side of the mine and flowed into the woods toward White Oak Creek

Water backed up so far, it even flowed into the utility corridor at the north end of the mine.

Looking East. Water in utility corridor at north end of mine on February 13, 2020

In March, Possible Dredging Observed, Still Flooding Neighboring Properties

In March, one of the first things I noticed was the dredge. The cutterhead, which had been elevated for months, was now DOWN. That usually indicates the dredge is working. And that’s something the injunction prohibited.

Dredge with its cutter head down usually means active dredging.

The pond next to the waste water pit overflowed onto neighboring properties even more. It came right up to the road. Note the huge difference between the levels of the two ponds below.

Note how high the water level is in the pond at the top of the frame compared to the waste pit at the bottom.
Looking SW. Floodwaters stretch into adjoining properties. Stockpile is behind trees in upper left.
Looking SE. Floodwater still fills the ditch running south along west side of stockpile.
Looking NW at wastewater flooding adjoining properties. Stockpile is in lower left.
Looking SE. Adjoining properties are in tree strip in front of stockpile. Notice waste water among the trees.
Looking north from over stockpile toward vast area flooded with waste water.
Looking west. Even more of utility corridor is flooded in March.

Water In, Water Out

Miners use water to clean silt out of the sand before shipment. Note the damp sand coming off the conveyor belts.
Looking south. A river of waste water is seen leaving the processing equipment on March 6, 2020.
Looking NW. The silt-laden waste water even forms a delta in the waste pit. Flooded properties are on the other side of the road that cuts diagonally through the frame from middle left to upper right.

So water is leaving the processing equipment and going into the waste pit. It has to come in from somewhere. But where? As you can see from the photos below, the supply lines for the processing equipment come from the dredge pond.

Looking west. Water goes into the processing equipment from the dredge pond.
Looking North. Wide shot showing dredge with cutterhead down and discharge pipe leading back to shore.

In the shot above, you can see that the lowest pond in the whole operation is the pond receiving ALL the waste water. Why is that?

The Big Questions and Some Possible Answers

So it appears that the mine is pumping water out of the dredge pit, into the waste pit, and finally into the surrounding forest. The big questions are these.

  • Why is the mine keeping the level of the water in the waste pit so low?
  • Why is the mine flooding the surrounding forest and neighboring properties with industrial waste water?
  • Is the waste water polluting White Oak Creek?

To hypothesize some answers to those questions, let’s look at two pictures: the first from February and the second from March.

Looking south. February 20, 2020. Miners have been removing sand from area with all the tracks in the center and the big pond at the lower left.

From this one photo, we can see that to avoid dredging (per the injunction), the miners have started surface mining. But the level of mining is getting down to a) the water table, and b) the level of the waste pit.

Looking NW. March 6, 2020. Three weeks later, mining is now BELOW level of water in the waste pit.

Note the differing levels of water in the forest (top) and waste pit (middle). Also note that the level of the surface mining has now gone far below the level of sediment in the waste pond.

From this photo (and others in the series) we can conjecture what happened. Please note: I have no proof of this. It is only conjecture.

Theory for the Discharge

I suspect that the mine realized that if it were to continue filling orders while it waited for trial on June 22, 2020, it would need to start surface mining AND mine below the level of water in the waste pit. So, I’m guessing they started lowering the level of the pond to keep mining as long as possible.

I’m also guessing that the terms of the injunction and heightened scrutiny by the TCEQ meant they could no longer make excuses about discharging water into the creek. So they discharged into the forest instead…most of which Guniganti owns except for that strip north of the stockpile. If the discharge drained into White Oak Creek deep in the forest, at least it wouldn’t be visible.

Is Discharge Reaching White Oak Creek?

Is the waste-water pollution reaching White Oak Creek? Because of the dense forest canopy, that’s impossible to determine from the air. One could only tell from the ground. And because Guniganti owns all the land around the mine (except for the properties in the red circle), the only way to determine that would be by trespassing. That makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to spot any illegal discharge, such as Tony Buzbee did when he was running for Mayor of Houston. Fortunately, the TCEQ has the right to inspect the property from the ground if it suspects a violation of the restraining order. And they are investigating this.

Summary of Potential Violations

This whole affair once again raises questions about whether sand mines should be permitted in floodways. This mine actually sits at the confluence of TWO. Which is part of the reason why it was sued by the attorney general in the first place. Both Caney and White Oak Creeks captured the pit last year and the TCEQ estimates millions of gallons of process waste water were discharged without a permit into the headwaters of Lake Houston.

Meanwhile, Triple PG appears to be discharging again without the benefit of storms to blame the behavior on. They also appear to be violating terms of their injunction by:

  • Dredging
  • Discharging process wastewater
  • Producing process wastewater that had to be discharged off their property.
  • Discharging water that had been in the Facility’s Dredge Ponds.
  • Discharging Industrial Waste and/or Process Wastewater adjacent to waters of the state (White Oak Creek)

I have contacted the TCEQ twice already about whether they permitted any of these activities. They have not responded yet, citing the ongoing investigation. However, I must believe that had they permitted the activities, they would not be investigating and would have replied immediately. They visited the site yesterday.

Posted by Bob Rehak on March 13, 2020

927 Days after Hurricane Harvey and 176 since Imelda

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.