Yesterday, the final project list was released for the Harris County Flood Bond. There was only one change affecting the San Jacinto Watershed and it was positive. The number of homes covered by subdivision drainage improvements increased tenfold. Early voting starts tomorrow on the flood bond referendum and I hope to be one of the first people at Kingwood Community Center at 8 a.m. because the flood bond is getting my wholehearted endorsement.
Townhomes cut in half by Harvey’s floodwaters. North side of the west fork of the San Jacinto River in Forest Cove. Photo: September 14, 2017.
Additional detention will decrease the input during a flood. Additional dredging will increase the throughput. Additional gates will increase the output. Hopefully, all of that will reduce flooding.
The County has also included money to improve internal drainage ditches so water can get to the river faster.
Together, these measures should help get us back to the point where a 100-year storm produces a 100-year flood. That’s the goal. Over the years, siltation has reduced drainage capacity and upstream development has increased peak flows. Baseline assumptions have changed since most of us bought our homes. Measures in the flood bond should help our drainage systems respond to heavy rains the way they were intended to.
If we don’t address flooding, home values will not increase the way they normally would simply because of proximity to flooding. We must send a signal to the rest of the world that we are dealing with this problem.
For instance, bond money could help us get started on dredging the West Fork mouth bar which is not within the scope of the Army Corps’ current dredging project.
It will help protect homes, schools, businesses, and infrastructure, and make this entire area more secure and resilient.
Reasons to Vote Against are Weak
The main arguments that I have heard against the bond have to do with distrust of government; flexibility that allows officials to cancel or change projects; misplaced anger; and a tax increase.
Re: distrust:
I have had the opportunity to meet for hours with the County Judge, the County Engineer and the Director of Operations for the Flood Control District. I have been impressed by how open, candid and receptive they have all been. I’m just not getting a negative vibe.
We are holding them accountable for preventing another disaster, but without the money to do it, we’re tying their hands. That’s a prescription for another disaster.
Re: flexibility:
It’s true that projects on the list could be changed or cancelled. I may not like that flexibility because it could potentially result in cancellation of what I perceive to be key projects, but I get it. Officials have rushed to respond to an urgent need; preliminary engineering reports have yet to be started on most of these projects. Things will change. No one can tell exactly how every penny will be spent ten years from now. Officials need flexibility to ensure our money is well spent. Sometimes you just have to trust people to use their judgment and do the right thing. I trust these people.
Re: misplaced anger:
Some people are conflating the Harris County Flood Bond with the City of Houston Drainage Fee. Don’t. They’re from two different groups.
Re: a tax increase:
Some people have claimed the bond will double property taxes. Not true! You are NOT doubling your entire tax BILL. You would only double a tiny portion of it, the 1.4% that goes to flood control. Some people – depending on age, exemptions, and home value – won’t see any increase at all. See the typical examples provided by Bill Fowler at this link.
Any increase will be phased in over time as projects get ready to launch.
Yes, I might pay another $100 bucks a year. But it’s an investment in the security of my home – my biggest investment. It will pay me (or my heirs) back many times over. You wouldn’t hesitate to put a new coat of paint on your house if it needed it. Why would you vote against the one thing that might keep your neighborhood from flooding again?
Sleep Better, Look Better, Too
The biggest reason to vote for the bond is that you’ll sleep better. And maybe even look better. My wife keeps telling me that I look better without grocery bags under my eyes. That’s why the flood bond gets her endorsement, too.
Posted by Bob Rehak on August 7, 2018
343 Days since Hurricane Harvey
00adminadmin2018-08-07 05:53:512018-08-07 23:36:20Endorsement of Harris County Flood Bond: I’m voting “For!”
A friend called my attention to Montgomery County Floodplain Management Regulations. These regulations govern permitting of sand mines in the county. The thoughts are great. But are the regulations being enforced? Are they actually protecting the people of Montgomery County and residents downstream? You be the judge.
Findings of Fact
The regulations start out with “Findings of Fact.” They state on page 4:
“The flood hazard areas of Montgomery County are subject to periodic inundation, which results in loss of life and property, health and safety hazards, disruption of commerce and governmental services, and extraordinary public expenditures for flood protection and relief, all of which adversely affect the public health, safety and general welfare.” Also…
“These flood losses are created by the cumulative effect of obstructions in flood plains which cause an increase in flood heights and velocities, and by the occupancy of flood hazard areas by uses vulnerable to floods and hazardous to other lands because they are inadequately elevated, flood-proofed or otherwise protected from flood damage.”
When they wrote that last statement, they may not have anticipated the specific problem of the giant sandbar at the mouth of the San Jacinto River, but it certainly applies. The bar is backing water up throughout Humble, Kingwood and Atascocita, and it was created – in part – with sand that came from mines built in the West Fork floodway.
The second part of that last statement about “inadequately elevated, flood-proofed or otherwise protected from flood damage” also applies. Common-sense best management practices required in other states could have helped protect us. Those include moving mines out of the floodway, not mining below the thalweg, greater setbacks from the river, wider dikes with more gradual slopes, replanting areas already mined, and more. If only those BMPs were practiced here!
Statement of Purpose
Also on page 4, the next section, “Statement of Purpose,” says, “It is the purpose of these regulations to promote the public health, safety and general welfare and to minimize public and private losses due to flood conditions in specific areas by provisions designed to:
Protect human life and health;
Minimize expenditure of public money for costly flood control projects;
Minimize the need for rescue and relief efforts associated with flooding and generally undertaken at the expense of the general public;
Minimize prolonged business interruptions;
Minimize damage to public facilities and utilities such as water and gas mains, electric, telephone and sewer lines, streets and bridges located in flood plains
Just downstream from River Grove Park in Kingwood, a new sandbar has formed on the west fork of the San Jacinto. Boats that draw 18 inches of water can no longer navigate upstream (foreground) past this sandbar.
Primary Threat of Sand Mining
The primary threat from sand mines is sand and sediment that washes out of the mines during floods and accelerates the natural rate of sedimentation. Sand mine pits probably lower floods within THEIR local area by a small amount. No argument there.
Google Earth shows many instances of river capture and not just in Harvey. Much smaller floods have captured pits, too. These repeated captures are caused by building mines in floodways, excavating too close to the river, and using dikes/levees that are insufficient to withstand the volume of floodwaters – especially when the San Jacinto River Authority releases water from the Lake Conroe Dam. Additionally, mines sometimes increase the height of their levees by piling up sand in a way that constricts the floodway.
Clearly, not all of that sand came from mines, but some did. I flashed on the City Sewage Facility that was inundated, the loss of six buildings at Kingwood College that were contaminated by that sewage, and the $70 million taxpayers will spend on a dredging project…that doesn’t even address the biggest sand blockage on the river.
The most obvious areas to explore for permit violations include:
Article IV
Sec (B)(2) Ensure that the proposed … site … will be reasonably safe from flooding (page 15)
Sec (C)(2)(c) Consider the danger that materials may be swept onto other lands to the injury of others. (Page 17)
Sec (C)(2)(f) Consider the costs of providing governmental services during and after flood conditions including maintenance and repair of streets and bridges, and public utilities and facilities such as sewer, gas, electrical and water systems. (Page 17)
Sec (C)(2)(g) Consider the expected heights, velocity, duration, rate of rise and sediment transport of the floodwaters and the effects of wave action, if applicable, expected at the site. (Page 17)
Sec (C)(2)(c) Permits should be denied if there’s a danger that materials could be swept onto other lands to the injury of others. (Page 17)
Sec (D)(2)(b) Variances shall not result in increased flood heights, threats to public safety, extraordinary public expense, create a nuisance or victimize the public. (Page 18)
Sec (D)(10) Any person or persons aggrieved by the decision of the Commissioners Court may appeal such decision in a court of competent jurisdiction. (Page 19)
Article V
Sec (A)(2) All improvements shall be constructed by methods and practices that minimize flood damage. (Page 21)
Sec (A)(8) An engineer must certify that the proposed excavation will have no adverse impact to the drainage on, from or through adjacent properties. (Page 21)
Article VI
Sec (E)(1) Permits can be revoked in cases where there has been a false statement or misrepresentation. (Page 27)
Sec (E)(5) Violators can be fined $100 per day for each violation. (One of those dikes remained open for 3 years and another for 8!) (Page 28)
Sec (E)(7) A permit holder in violation may be forced to restore property to pre-existing conditions. (Page 28)
To read the complete regulations, click here. As stated on pg 26, SECTION F. EXEMPTIONS (5) Commercial mining and dredging are not exempt and must have a professional engineer certify the development plans of sand mines. Therefore, one would expect that the engineer would have evaluated sediment transport from the mines and the potentially increased risk of downstream flooding – especially downstream of the Lake Conroe Dam.
As always, these are my opinions on matters of public policy, protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP statutes of the great State of Texas.
Posted August 6, 2018 by Bob Rehak
342 Days since Hurricane Harvey
00adminadmin2018-08-05 20:34:052018-08-06 07:20:39Montgomery County Floodplain Management Regulations Affecting Sand Mines: Are They Being Enforced?
A lady named Molly Lempriere from Mining Technology magazine (a Global Data publication) contacted me from the UK for an interview. She said she was “writing an article about the effect of sand mining in the wake of Hurricane Harvey and its impact on flooding.”
These were the questions she asked and my responses. Since most of you don’t read Mining Technology, I wanted to share them with you. Her article has not yet appeared and may not. She has not responded to my queries about its publication date.
When we experience a disaster like Harvey, it’s important to examine all the factors that contributed to the damage, and mitigate each to the extent possible.
Q. How long have you been campaigning against sand mining?
Q. How devastating was Hurricane Harvey to the surrounding area?
FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) received more than 16,000 claims from residents and 3,300 from businesses in the Lake Houston area.
Harris County Flood Control documented more than 5,500 damaged structures in the Humble and Kingwood areas alone. Note: One structure, such as an apartment complex, might include hundreds of people.
At least ten people (that I know of) died.
After 11 months, only half of the residents who flooded are fully back in their homes.
City of Houston estimates Lake Houston area damages to be in the billions.
City of Houston estimates this area’s tax revenues were reduced 20-30 percent.
Our local school district documented $97.5 million in damages to its facilities so far; two still have not re-opened.
Kingwood High School closed for 7 months; 4000 students had to be bused to another high school more than an hour away the entire time.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will begin an emergency $70 million dredging project this week.
44 percent of all Lake Houston Area Chamber of Commerce businesses were adversely affected (100% within certain areas up to 1.5 miles from the San Jacinto River).
Union Pacific Railroad had to replace its bridge, disrupting rail traffic for weeks.
TxDoT had to replace part of the I-69 bridge for more than $20 million. All traffic in and out of Houston was delayed for months.
A new hospital facility is still under repair after 11 months.
Lone Star College lost 6 of its 9 buildings in Kingwood for most of the school year and won’t be fully operational until 2019.
Kingwood’s library closed for more than eight months.
Two local parks were inundated with sand; some dunes exceed 10 feet in height.
Harvey knocked out the Union Pacific Railroad bridge over the San Jacinto River near I-69. It disrupted rail traffic for weeks. Picture taken 9/14/2017.
TxDoT had to replace the I-69 southbound bridge at a cost of more than $20 million. The bridge re-opened in July, 2018.
Q. Were the effects of sand mining on flooding considered previously?
A. Yes.
State Representative Dan Huberty introduced legislation in 2011 to regulate sand mines due to concerns about the increasing rate of sedimentation.
Former State Senator Tommy Williams introduced legislation to tighten restrictions on sand mining near rivers. TACA lobbied against it and it failed.
Lake Houston, the main source of drinking water for America’s fourth largest city, is losing capacity at an increasing rate– even as the City plans to supply another 1.5 million customers with water from the lake.
Area around Kingwood’s only boat launch has required dredging at an increasing rate.
Q. To what extent are sand mines directly to blame?
A. Asking the question this way is like asking what percentage of a train wreck was due to poor visibility, excessive speed, tight curves, or a tired engineer. It’s impossible to quantify.
However, sand miners deserve part of the blame. They contributed to the problem by pushing the safety envelope. They built mines in floodways, lobbied against common sense regulations that could have minimized damage, and ignored best practices commonly observed in other states that reduce erosion.
Certainly, not all sand mines share equally in the blame; some operate more responsibly than others. Certainly, part of the sand comes from natural sources. And certainly, Mother Nature pushed the limits with Harvey.
However, TACA wants people to believe that no sand came from mines because of the way they are designed.
Aerial and satellite imagery show the TACA claims to be misleading. See:
With one exception, all area sand mines have chosen to locate, at least partially, in floodways. Some are entirely in floodways. That means they are in the main current of the river during floods. At the peak of Harvey, that current carried approximately 150,000 cubic feet per second down the West Fork of the San Jacinto River where miners had exposed almost 20 square miles of sand IN THE FLOODWAY.
One mine, whose dikes have repeatedly broken, leaves only 40 feet of unvegetated sandy buffer between operations and the river. Its dikes are not sloped like best management practices recommend.
That sand then constricts the carrying capacity of the river, reduces the river’s gradient, and blocks drainage ditches. In these ways, sand mines contribute directly to flooding.
TACA has fought legislation that: prohibits mining in these dangerous areas, leaves natural buffers against flooding, and makes miners responsible for cleanup.
Q. What more needs to be done to protect the local area against sand mining?
A. Several things.
If all sand mines followed best management practices commonly used in other states for setbacks, erosion controls, buffer zones, vegetation, reclamation, and construction, I believe we could radically reduce the amount of sand coming from mines during floods.
Mining in floodways should be outlawed. It’s reckless. It has also proven dangerous, and harmful.
When dikes are breached, owners should promptly repair them. In one case, a broken dike has gone unrepaired for three years while the mine emits sand and sediment directly into the San Jacinto River. In another case, a dike went unrepaired for eight years.
Sand miners should acknowledge that they are part of the problem instead of denying it. They should post remediation and cleanup bonds rather than externalizing their cleanup costs to downstream residents.
A mine whose dikes were breached and remained open for eight years was repeatedly flooded.
Q. On ReduceFlooding.com you mention that there are multiple agencies with conflicting mandates that govern the river. So is it the mining that’s inherently bad or the management?
A. This question belies TACA’s role in aggressively lobbying against common-sense regulations that would protect residents.
Conflicting mandates have nothing to do with bad management; they’re about focus. Only one agency focuses on flood control. Others focus on conserving and selling water.
Q. Are there lessons that could be learned from other sand mining operations around the world?
A. Yes. If Texas sand miners followed the best management practices (BMPs) from other states and countries, many of the problems here could be reduced or eliminated.
Communication of BMPs also needs to be improved. Louisiana has an excellent guide to best management practices for sand mining. It’s clear, concise, candid, well written and well illustrated. It was developed by government and industry working together, and clearly lays out the dangers if best practices are not followed.
Alaska discourages mining within 1000 feet of a public water source. That could help here. The San Jacinto River is the main source of water for millions of people.
Q. Is there a way for TACA and sand mining to help reduce flooding risks?
A. Yes.
Don’t locate sand mines in floodways.
Follow best management practices used in other states and countries.
Quit misleading people, especially legislators.
Acknowledge the risks and dangers; quit pretending they don’t exist.
During Harvey, when the San Jacinto River Authority had to open the floodgates on Lake Conroe, approximately 150,000 cubic feet per second swept through 20 square miles of sand mines.
Partially as a result, one particular sand dune that the Army Corps of Engineers expects to begin dredging next week grew 1,500 feet in length and 12 feet in height in one day during Harvey. It completely blocked a drainage ditch that empties the western third of Kingwood. More than 650 homes and a high school that depend on that ditch flooded. Result: more than $250 million dollars in damages. Did all of that sand come from mines? No. Did mines contribute? Yes.
Q. What ideally would you like to happen next?
A. We need to:
Stop sand mining in the floodway of the main drinking water source for America’s fourth largest city.
Establish minimum setbacks between mines and rivers, especially the San Jacinto.
Create a clear, concise set of best management practices (BMPs) that everyone can read and understand.
Raise awareness of BMPs.
Follow BMPs.
Increase fines for those who fail to follow BMPs.
Remediate abandoned mines.
Within active mines, immediately re-vegetate areas that are no longer being actively mined.
All but one of the West Fork mining operations are not only in the floodplain, they are in the FLOODWAY! The Red cross-hatched areas above show the floodway, while the Aqua shows the 100-year flood plain.
Q. Is there anything else that you’d like to add?
A. I contacted TACA. They did not respond to me.
Posted 8/5/2018 by Bob Rehak
341 Days since Hurricane Harvey
00adminadmin2018-08-04 19:54:352018-08-05 05:07:54Mining Technology Feature Article about Sand Mining in the Wake of Hurricane Harvey
Endorsement of Harris County Flood Bond: I’m voting “For!”
Yesterday, the final project list was released for the Harris County Flood Bond. There was only one change affecting the San Jacinto Watershed and it was positive. The number of homes covered by subdivision drainage improvements increased tenfold. Early voting starts tomorrow on the flood bond referendum and I hope to be one of the first people at Kingwood Community Center at 8 a.m. because the flood bond is getting my wholehearted endorsement.
Townhomes cut in half by Harvey’s floodwaters. North side of the west fork of the San Jacinto River in Forest Cove. Photo: September 14, 2017.
Reasons to Vote “For” Are Numerous
I like this bond for many reasons:
Reasons to Vote Against are Weak
The main arguments that I have heard against the bond have to do with distrust of government; flexibility that allows officials to cancel or change projects; misplaced anger; and a tax increase.
Re: distrust:
Re: flexibility:
It’s true that projects on the list could be changed or cancelled. I may not like that flexibility because it could potentially result in cancellation of what I perceive to be key projects, but I get it. Officials have rushed to respond to an urgent need; preliminary engineering reports have yet to be started on most of these projects. Things will change. No one can tell exactly how every penny will be spent ten years from now. Officials need flexibility to ensure our money is well spent. Sometimes you just have to trust people to use their judgment and do the right thing. I trust these people.
Re: misplaced anger:
Some people are conflating the Harris County Flood Bond with the City of Houston Drainage Fee. Don’t. They’re from two different groups.
Re: a tax increase:
Sleep Better, Look Better, Too
The biggest reason to vote for the bond is that you’ll sleep better. And maybe even look better. My wife keeps telling me that I look better without grocery bags under my eyes. That’s why the flood bond gets her endorsement, too.
Posted by Bob Rehak on August 7, 2018
343 Days since Hurricane Harvey
Montgomery County Floodplain Management Regulations Affecting Sand Mines: Are They Being Enforced?
A friend called my attention to Montgomery County Floodplain Management Regulations. These regulations govern permitting of sand mines in the county. The thoughts are great. But are the regulations being enforced? Are they actually protecting the people of Montgomery County and residents downstream? You be the judge.
Findings of Fact
The regulations start out with “Findings of Fact.” They state on page 4:
“The flood hazard areas of Montgomery County are subject to periodic inundation, which results in loss of life and property, health and safety hazards, disruption of commerce and governmental services, and extraordinary public expenditures for flood protection and relief, all of which adversely affect the public health, safety and general welfare.” Also…
When they wrote that last statement, they may not have anticipated the specific problem of the giant sandbar at the mouth of the San Jacinto River, but it certainly applies. The bar is backing water up throughout Humble, Kingwood and Atascocita, and it was created – in part – with sand that came from mines built in the West Fork floodway.
The second part of that last statement about “inadequately elevated, flood-proofed or otherwise protected from flood damage” also applies. Common-sense best management practices required in other states could have helped protect us. Those include moving mines out of the floodway, not mining below the thalweg, greater setbacks from the river, wider dikes with more gradual slopes, replanting areas already mined, and more. If only those BMPs were practiced here!
Statement of Purpose
Also on page 4, the next section, “Statement of Purpose,” says, “It is the purpose of these regulations to promote the public health, safety and general welfare and to minimize public and private losses due to flood conditions in specific areas by provisions designed to:
Just downstream from River Grove Park in Kingwood, a new sandbar has formed on the west fork of the San Jacinto. Boats that draw 18 inches of water can no longer navigate upstream (foreground) past this sandbar.
Primary Threat of Sand Mining
The primary threat from sand mines is sand and sediment that washes out of the mines during floods and accelerates the natural rate of sedimentation. Sand mine pits probably lower floods within THEIR local area by a small amount. No argument there.
However, when the West Fork of the San Jacinto River captures the pits (as it has done repeatedly), large volumes of sediment can be swept downstream and contribute to flooding elsewhere. The professional engineer that certified the development plans of these sand mines should have anticipated this, especially downstream of the Lake Conroe Dam.
Google Earth shows many instances of river capture and not just in Harvey. Much smaller floods have captured pits, too. These repeated captures are caused by building mines in floodways, excavating too close to the river, and using dikes/levees that are insufficient to withstand the volume of floodwaters – especially when the San Jacinto River Authority releases water from the Lake Conroe Dam. Additionally, mines sometimes increase the height of their levees by piling up sand in a way that constricts the floodway.
As You Review these Regulations…
I reviewed these regulations as I thought about the thousands of homes and businesses flooded downstream from the mines, partially as a result of massive sand bars that that blocked drainage ditches and the river itself (see photo above).
Clearly, not all of that sand came from mines, but some did. I flashed on the City Sewage Facility that was inundated, the loss of six buildings at Kingwood College that were contaminated by that sewage, and the $70 million taxpayers will spend on a dredging project…that doesn’t even address the biggest sand blockage on the river.
The most obvious areas to explore for permit violations include:
Article IV
Article V
Article VI
Mining Technology Feature Article about Sand Mining in the Wake of Hurricane Harvey
A lady named Molly Lempriere from Mining Technology magazine (a Global Data publication) contacted me from the UK for an interview. She said she was “writing an article about the effect of sand mining in the wake of Hurricane Harvey and its impact on flooding.”
These were the questions she asked and my responses. Since most of you don’t read Mining Technology, I wanted to share them with you. Her article has not yet appeared and may not. She has not responded to my queries about its publication date.
Q. How long have you been campaigning against sand mining?
A. I’m not campaigning against sand mining per se. I’m campaigning against reckless sand mining. I began in September 2017, when it became apparent that giant sand deposits left by Hurricane Harvey contributed to billions of dollars in damages in my area.
Q. How devastating was Hurricane Harvey to the surrounding area?
Harvey knocked out the Union Pacific Railroad bridge over the San Jacinto River near I-69. It disrupted rail traffic for weeks. Picture taken 9/14/2017.
TxDoT had to replace the I-69 southbound bridge at a cost of more than $20 million. The bridge re-opened in July, 2018.
Q. Were the effects of sand mining on flooding considered previously?
A. Yes.
Q. To what extent are sand mines directly to blame?
A. Asking the question this way is like asking what percentage of a train wreck was due to poor visibility, excessive speed, tight curves, or a tired engineer. It’s impossible to quantify.
However, sand miners deserve part of the blame. They contributed to the problem by pushing the safety envelope. They built mines in floodways, lobbied against common sense regulations that could have minimized damage, and ignored best practices commonly observed in other states that reduce erosion.
Certainly, not all sand mines share equally in the blame; some operate more responsibly than others. Certainly, part of the sand comes from natural sources. And certainly, Mother Nature pushed the limits with Harvey.
However, TACA wants people to believe that no sand came from mines because of the way they are designed.
Aerial and satellite imagery show the TACA claims to be misleading. See:
With one exception, all area sand mines have chosen to locate, at least partially, in floodways. Some are entirely in floodways. That means they are in the main current of the river during floods. At the peak of Harvey, that current carried approximately 150,000 cubic feet per second down the West Fork of the San Jacinto River where miners had exposed almost 20 square miles of sand IN THE FLOODWAY.
One mine, whose dikes have repeatedly broken, leaves only 40 feet of unvegetated sandy buffer between operations and the river. Its dikes are not sloped like best management practices recommend.
As a consequence of ignoring best management practices for setbacks, buffer zones, slopes, and vegetative erosion controls, the dikes in that mine have broken repeatedly. Floodwaters go over and through its dikes, washing sand downstream.
That sand then constricts the carrying capacity of the river, reduces the river’s gradient, and blocks drainage ditches. In these ways, sand mines contribute directly to flooding.
TACA has fought legislation that: prohibits mining in these dangerous areas, leaves natural buffers against flooding, and makes miners responsible for cleanup.
Q. What more needs to be done to protect the local area against sand mining?
A. Several things.
A mine whose dikes were breached and remained open for eight years was repeatedly flooded.
Q. On ReduceFlooding.com you mention that there are multiple agencies with conflicting mandates that govern the river. So is it the mining that’s inherently bad or the management?
A. This question belies TACA’s role in aggressively lobbying against common-sense regulations that would protect residents.
Conflicting mandates have nothing to do with bad management; they’re about focus. Only one agency focuses on flood control. Others focus on conserving and selling water.
Q. Are there lessons that could be learned from other sand mining operations around the world?
A. Yes. If Texas sand miners followed the best management practices (BMPs) from other states and countries, many of the problems here could be reduced or eliminated.
Communication of BMPs also needs to be improved. Louisiana has an excellent guide to best management practices for sand mining. It’s clear, concise, candid, well written and well illustrated. It was developed by government and industry working together, and clearly lays out the dangers if best practices are not followed.
Alaska discourages mining within 1000 feet of a public water source. That could help here. The San Jacinto River is the main source of water for millions of people.
Q. Is there a way for TACA and sand mining to help reduce flooding risks?
A. Yes.
During Harvey, when the San Jacinto River Authority had to open the floodgates on Lake Conroe, approximately 150,000 cubic feet per second swept through 20 square miles of sand mines.
Partially as a result, one particular sand dune that the Army Corps of Engineers expects to begin dredging next week grew 1,500 feet in length and 12 feet in height in one day during Harvey. It completely blocked a drainage ditch that empties the western third of Kingwood. More than 650 homes and a high school that depend on that ditch flooded. Result: more than $250 million dollars in damages. Did all of that sand come from mines? No. Did mines contribute? Yes.
Q. What ideally would you like to happen next?
A. We need to:
All but one of the West Fork mining operations are not only in the floodplain, they are in the FLOODWAY! The Red cross-hatched areas above show the floodway, while the Aqua shows the 100-year flood plain.
Q. Is there anything else that you’d like to add?
A. I contacted TACA. They did not respond to me.
Posted 8/5/2018 by Bob Rehak
341 Days since Hurricane Harvey