Two affidavits in a lawsuit filed against the SJRA for flooding downstream residents during Harvey contain statistics that raise several troubling questions about the operation of gates during the storm.
Did the SJRA wait too long to begin releasing water in significant volumes?
As a consequence, did it create an unnecessarily high peak discharge?
Did it maintain high discharge rates longer than it needed?
As lake levels declined, why did the SJRA continue releasing 2X to 10X more water than it was taking on when it had up to 3 feet of storage capacity in the Lake Conroe?
Why did it never let the level of Lake Conroe reach its flowage easement max?
Could different procedures have reduced downstream flooding?
Part of one page of seven pages of gate operation statistics in affidavits.
Affidavits of Gilman and Olmos Contain Insights
The first affidavit comes from Chuck Gilman, the SJRA’s Director of Flood Management. It contains a gold mine of statistics. Tables at the end of the affidavit show the date, time, average lake level, total inflow, and total discharge (cubic feet per second), and the exact time of gate changes. The statistics start August 26, 2017 at 10 p.m. They end three days later at the same time. The seven pages of statistics capture a snapshot of the storm and the SJRA’s response hour by hour during Harvey. At the peak, the SJRA recorded changes every 15 minutes.
The second affidavit comes from Hector Olmos, a Principal and Vice President of consulting firm Freese and Nichols, Inc. Olmos helped develop the gate operations policy for at Lake Conroe for the SJRA. The Olmos affidavit contains the same statistical information in Gilman’s. However, it also contains more details of the Gate Operations Policy in place at the time of Harvey. And the two affidavits assert different facts.
In the summary that follows, outflow vs. inflow rates are significant. Gilman swore in his affidavit that the gate operation “…policy is programmed so that even in the most extreme situations, peak outflow will never exceed 70% of inflow.” “Peak” is the key word there. Olmos swore in his affidavit that 80% was the limit. However, statistics show that it never significantly exceeded 60%.
As you review the following, keep in mind another key point. SJRA had the ability and authority to increase the lake level to 207, but stopped short at 206.23 for some reason that the affidavits don’t explain.
Summary of Key Statistics and Actions
Key statistics show that:
Lake Conroe started to rise at 11:30 p.m. on August 26, 2017 in response to 1,722 cfs flowing into the lake.
After the lake level reached 201.04 feet at 12:15 a.m. on August 27, SJRA first opened its gates at 12:25 a.m. and started releasing 529 cfs.
After that, inflow generally increased for the next 24.5 hours, though the increases were not a straight line. Inflow fluctuated up and down, likely in response to feeder bands passing over the watershed or variations in readings due to wave and wind action.
More than 24 hours after the start of the storm, at 1 a.m. on August 28, inflow peaked at 129,065 cfs. By then, the lake level had reached 205.65 feet and the SJRA was releasing 62,082 cfs, less than half of the inflow.
From that point on, the inflow generally declined, but not in a straight line.
The water level in Lake Conroe peaked six hours later at 7 a.m., August 28, at 206.23 feet. That’s roughly three-quarters of a foot BELOW the SJRA’s flowage easement.
After that, water continued to go down for the duration of the storm, but the SJRA continued increasing its release rate for five more hours, until 12 noon on the 28th. The water level was 206.17 feet, almost a foot below its flowage easement. Inflow was 63,986 cfs (less than half the peak), yet discharge peaked at 79,141. So the lake level and inflow were going down, but the discharge rate kept increasing when the lake had room to spare.
SJRA kept the release rate above 70,000 cfs until 4:15 a.m. the morning of the 29th, more than 16 hours. By then, the lake level had gone down to 204.58. And the discharge rate was still three times higher than the inflow (71,538 cfs discharge vs 20,287 inflow).
For the rest of the storm, lake level, inflow rates and discharge rates all continued to decline. The table ends at 10 p.m., August 29th. Lake level equaled 203.44, discharge 22,033, and inflow 6,579.
Turning Points in the Storm
During the entire day of August 27th, outflow fluctuated roughly from 16% to 50% of inflow as the inflow kept building relentlessly.
Outflow exceeded inflow by 8:30 a.m. on the 28th and stayed that way for the duration of the storm even though the lake had up to 3 available feet of storage capacity.
By the morning of the 29th, downstream areas were flooding badly. The SJRA had roughly three feet of extra storage capacity in Lake Conroe within its flowage easement. Yet it kept releasing, on average, 2 – 10X more water than it was taking in. At one point the ratio exceeded 100:1.
Could the SJRA have used more of Lake Conroe’s available storage capacity as lake levels declined to help reduce downstream flooding?
Neither Mr. Gilman’s, nor Mr. Olmos’ affidavits shed light on these issues.
Please Note
Chuck Gilman inherited this problem. The SJRA did not hire him until well after Harvey.
Also note that conditions during an emergency can be chaotic. Keyboard quarterbacking after the fact is much easier.
If the SJRA wishes to respond to this post, I will print its position verbatim.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/11/2020
1017 Days after Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Stats.jpg?fit=1200%2C741&ssl=17411200adminadmin2020-06-10 21:45:062020-06-10 22:17:18Operational Statistics from Lake Conroe Dam During Harvey Raise Troubling Questions
On page 18 of the executive summary, there’s an overview of the recommendation. It requests that “… the State consider legislation clarifying the liability exposure of reservoir operators for passing storm flows through water supply reservoirs.”
Sounds innocent enough. However, the explanation for the recommendation on page 1,411 of the appendices is a little more ominous. I reprinted it verbatim below, but italicized some phrases for the discussion that follows.
Explanation for Recommendation
The explanation says, “Flood control reservoirs are generally drawn down at the beginning of the annual wet season so that when large rain events occur, the runoff may be captured and later released more slowly into the receiving stream. These reservoirs therefore reduce downstream flood levels and prevent inundation in low areas. In contrast, water supply reservoirs are operated to capture and retain as much stream flow as allowable under their permits in order to have supply available during periods of high demand.”
“This practice results in less available storage volume to capture runoff during major storms. When a major storm event occurs upstream or above a water supply reservoir, the reservoir operator must sometimes release flood flows during and after the event to prevent flooding upstream of the reservoir or to prevent damage to the dam and other facilities associated with the reservoir.
“Although this flood flow can contribute to downstream flooding, most reservoirs actually reduce the amount of flooding which could have occurred had the reservoir not been constructed.
“In recent years, plaintiffs with property in the downstream floodplains have brought multiple lawsuits against major water supply reservoir operators. Some recent court decisions have held the operators liable for damages to the downstream properties.
“If this trend is allowed to continue, it will increase insurance rates for these entities and will force operational changes to occur that may result in less available water supply for periods of need. The net effect to water users will be an increase in the cost of surface water throughout the state.”
During Harvey, the SJRA released more than 79,000 cubic feet per second from Lake Conroe.
Sounds Like SJRA
The SJRA has hammered these themes since Harvey.
The text of the explanation sounds as though it is paving the way for a declaration of legislative immunity for Water Authority actions during floods.
Concerns About Recommendation and Explanation
On the surface and in the abstract, the individual claims in the explanation sound reasonable. However, on deeper inspection, they contain logical fallacies, generalizations, false choices, contradictions and questionable assumptions.
The explanation draws a distinction between flood control and water supply reservoirs – as if we have a choice. This area is too flat to allow the construction of classical flood-control reservoirs, such as those described in the text. So our reservoirs must do double duty.
Their rationale only allows the possibility of releasing water during and after the event. It makes no mention of before.
“…most reservoirs actually reduce the amount of flooding…” Hmmm. Is this admitting that they do have a dual purpose? Flood prevention was one of the objectives in the SJRA’s enabling legislation.
“Some recent court decisions have held the operators liable for damages to the downstream properties.” Aren’t courts the proper venues for such decisions? How can the legislature possibly foresee the actions of every operator in response to every storm?
“If this trend continues…” What trend? Aren’t we talking about one event? Sounds like a plea for “legislative immunity” even if the recommendation itself doesn’t use those words.
“…force operational changes to occur that may result in less available water supply for periods of need.” True, but with proper controls in place, might they not also strike a balance between water supply and flood reduction?
“…increase the cost of surface water throughout the state.” If a court finds the actions of one operator deficient, how does that affect the insurance of every other operator in the state?
Real Question
No doubt, low lying properties were doomed to flooding during Harvey by the nature of the storm itself.
But did the SJRA have to open Lake Conroe’s gates when they did, as wide as they did, for as long as they did? Could an earlier, smaller, shorter release have avoided some of the flood damage?
I, for one, would feel much more comfortable having a judge answer questions like that after the fact rather than the having the legislature limit liability beforehand in a blanket fashion. Limiting liability also limits accountability.
Such recommendations buried in a statewide water plan on page 1,411 of an appendix show why the public REALLY DOES need to review this plan and give input.
Once approved in October, all recommendations will carry the weight of a state agency. The legislature rarely acts against such recommendations, especially when heavily lobbied behind the scenes. If you have the same concerns I do, the time to speak up is now.
How to Register Concerns about Water Plan
Here’s how to make your voice heard on this or any other issue in the Water Plan. You need to go through the SJRA.
The Region H Water Planning Group (RHWPG) will accept written comments until 5:00 p.m. June 28, 2020. Written comments should be provided to: Hon. Mark Evans, Chair, RHWPG c/o San Jacinto River Authority P.O. Box 329, Conroe, Texas 77305-0329
Written comments about the water plan without attachments also may be emailed to info@regionhwater.org. Comments will be documented in the summary of public comments in the 2021 Region H Water Plan.
Questions or requests for additional information may be submitted to: Jace Houston, General Manager, San Jacinto River Authority, P.O. Box 329, Conroe, TX 77305-0329, telephone 936-588-3111. The San Jacinto River Authority is the Administrator for the RHWPG.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/10/2020
1016 Days after Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/HumbleFloodFromHCFCD-e1761946748900.jpg?fit=1100%2C821&ssl=18211100adminadmin2020-06-09 21:15:482020-06-09 21:17:35Region H Water Plan May Ask Legislature To Clarify Potential Flood Liability of Dam Operators
TWDB is the state agency responsible for water supply and flood planning, financing, and research. The agency helps ensure Texans plan and prepare for the perpetual threat of water scarcity and water surplus in Texas.
Water Newsroom Emphasizes Newsworthy Issues
The new website emphasizes news and timely topics. It bridges the gap between water professionals and consumers. It is a filtered, scaled-down, simplified version of the Board’s existing website, which can best be described as voluminous.
The Texas Water Newsroom was created to tell the stories of Texas water—the people, places, issues, and efforts. It contains videos, articles, press releases, and more. TWDB updates the stories regularly. All content is available for public use and reproduction for informational purposes. However, TWDB discourages promotional use.
The story on regional water plans in the Water Newsroom caught my eye. It talked about how sixteen regional water planning groups are putting the finishing touches on their plans to ensure their areas have enough water to survive a drought. It contained a link to the current drafts of the plans by region. Houston is in Region H.
I won’t pretend that I’ve read the whole thing. But I did skim it. And I found buried nuggets of information that revealed political/legal/private agendas in play.
That in itself is inevitable. But some are shocking. One in particular caught my eye: “Flood Liability of Water Supply Reservoirs.” It contains a legislative recommendation that has the potential to take away some of your rights.
More on that in a separate post. Suffice it for now to say that the TWDB really does need public input on these recommendations. And I probably would not have found that recommendation had it not been for the new website. Check it out. Bookmark it. And visit often.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Screen-Shot-2020-06-09-at-1.59.00-PM.png?fit=960%2C206&ssl=1206960adminadmin2020-06-09 15:43:352020-06-09 15:43:47Texas Water Development Board Launches New Web Site
Operational Statistics from Lake Conroe Dam During Harvey Raise Troubling Questions
Two affidavits in a lawsuit filed against the SJRA for flooding downstream residents during Harvey contain statistics that raise several troubling questions about the operation of gates during the storm.
Affidavits of Gilman and Olmos Contain Insights
The first affidavit comes from Chuck Gilman, the SJRA’s Director of Flood Management. It contains a gold mine of statistics. Tables at the end of the affidavit show the date, time, average lake level, total inflow, and total discharge (cubic feet per second), and the exact time of gate changes. The statistics start August 26, 2017 at 10 p.m. They end three days later at the same time. The seven pages of statistics capture a snapshot of the storm and the SJRA’s response hour by hour during Harvey. At the peak, the SJRA recorded changes every 15 minutes.
The second affidavit comes from Hector Olmos, a Principal and Vice President of consulting firm Freese and Nichols, Inc. Olmos helped develop the gate operations policy for at Lake Conroe for the SJRA. The Olmos affidavit contains the same statistical information in Gilman’s. However, it also contains more details of the Gate Operations Policy in place at the time of Harvey. And the two affidavits assert different facts.
Download Gilman Affidavit
Download Olmos Affidavit
Inflow Vs. Outflow and Flowage Easement Max
In the summary that follows, outflow vs. inflow rates are significant. Gilman swore in his affidavit that the gate operation “…policy is programmed so that even in the most extreme situations, peak outflow will never exceed 70% of inflow.” “Peak” is the key word there. Olmos swore in his affidavit that 80% was the limit. However, statistics show that it never significantly exceeded 60%.
As you review the following, keep in mind another key point. SJRA had the ability and authority to increase the lake level to 207, but stopped short at 206.23 for some reason that the affidavits don’t explain.
Summary of Key Statistics and Actions
Key statistics show that:
Turning Points in the Storm
During the entire day of August 27th, outflow fluctuated roughly from 16% to 50% of inflow as the inflow kept building relentlessly.
By the morning of the 29th, downstream areas were flooding badly. The SJRA had roughly three feet of extra storage capacity in Lake Conroe within its flowage easement. Yet it kept releasing, on average, 2 – 10X more water than it was taking in. At one point the ratio exceeded 100:1.
Neither Mr. Gilman’s, nor Mr. Olmos’ affidavits shed light on these issues.
Please Note
Chuck Gilman inherited this problem. The SJRA did not hire him until well after Harvey.
Also note that conditions during an emergency can be chaotic. Keyboard quarterbacking after the fact is much easier.
If the SJRA wishes to respond to this post, I will print its position verbatim.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/11/2020
1017 Days after Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
Region H Water Plan May Ask Legislature To Clarify Potential Flood Liability of Dam Operators
The current draft of the Region H Statewide Water Plan contains a recommendation that many of those who flooded during Harvey may take issue with.
On page 18 of the executive summary, there’s an overview of the recommendation. It requests that “… the State consider legislation clarifying the liability exposure of reservoir operators for passing storm flows through water supply reservoirs.”
Sounds innocent enough. However, the explanation for the recommendation on page 1,411 of the appendices is a little more ominous. I reprinted it verbatim below, but italicized some phrases for the discussion that follows.
Explanation for Recommendation
The explanation says, “Flood control reservoirs are generally drawn down at the beginning of the annual wet season so that when large rain events occur, the runoff may be captured and later released more slowly into the receiving stream. These reservoirs therefore reduce downstream flood levels and prevent inundation in low areas. In contrast, water supply reservoirs are operated to capture and retain as much stream flow as allowable under their permits in order to have supply available during periods of high demand.”
“This practice results in less available storage volume to capture runoff during major storms. When a major storm event occurs upstream or above a water supply reservoir, the reservoir operator must sometimes release flood flows during and after the event to prevent flooding upstream of the reservoir or to prevent damage to the dam and other facilities associated with the reservoir.
“Although this flood flow can contribute to downstream flooding, most reservoirs actually reduce the amount of flooding which could have occurred had the reservoir not been constructed.
“In recent years, plaintiffs with property in the downstream floodplains have brought multiple lawsuits against major water supply reservoir operators. Some recent court decisions have held the operators liable for damages to the downstream properties.
Sounds Like SJRA
The SJRA has hammered these themes since Harvey.
Concerns About Recommendation and Explanation
On the surface and in the abstract, the individual claims in the explanation sound reasonable. However, on deeper inspection, they contain logical fallacies, generalizations, false choices, contradictions and questionable assumptions.
Real Question
No doubt, low lying properties were doomed to flooding during Harvey by the nature of the storm itself.
I, for one, would feel much more comfortable having a judge answer questions like that after the fact rather than the having the legislature limit liability beforehand in a blanket fashion. Limiting liability also limits accountability.
Once approved in October, all recommendations will carry the weight of a state agency. The legislature rarely acts against such recommendations, especially when heavily lobbied behind the scenes. If you have the same concerns I do, the time to speak up is now.
How to Register Concerns about Water Plan
Here’s how to make your voice heard on this or any other issue in the Water Plan. You need to go through the SJRA.
The Region H Water Planning Group (RHWPG) will accept written comments until 5:00 p.m. June 28, 2020. Written comments should be provided to: Hon. Mark Evans, Chair, RHWPG c/o San Jacinto River Authority P.O. Box 329, Conroe, Texas 77305-0329
Written comments about the water plan without attachments also may be emailed to info@regionhwater.org. Comments will be documented in the summary of public comments in the 2021 Region H Water Plan.
Questions or requests for additional information may be submitted to: Jace Houston, General Manager, San Jacinto River Authority, P.O. Box 329, Conroe, TX 77305-0329, telephone 936-588-3111. The San Jacinto River Authority is the Administrator for the RHWPG.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/10/2020
1016 Days after Hurricane Harvey
Texas Water Development Board Launches New Web Site
The Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) has launched a new website called the Texas Water Newsroom.
Water Supply and Flood Planning
TWDB is the state agency responsible for water supply and flood planning, financing, and research. The agency helps ensure Texans plan and prepare for the perpetual threat of water scarcity and water surplus in Texas.
Water Newsroom Emphasizes Newsworthy Issues
The new website emphasizes news and timely topics. It bridges the gap between water professionals and consumers. It is a filtered, scaled-down, simplified version of the Board’s existing website, which can best be described as voluminous.
The Texas Water Newsroom was created to tell the stories of Texas water—the people, places, issues, and efforts. It contains videos, articles, press releases, and more. TWDB updates the stories regularly. All content is available for public use and reproduction for informational purposes. However, TWDB discourages promotional use.
Currently featured articles include:
A Layer Cake of Information
The story on regional water plans in the Water Newsroom caught my eye. It talked about how sixteen regional water planning groups are putting the finishing touches on their plans to ensure their areas have enough water to survive a drought. It contained a link to the current drafts of the plans by region. Houston is in Region H.
The Region H plan consists of two parts: the 326 page plan and 1576 pages of appendices.
I won’t pretend that I’ve read the whole thing. But I did skim it. And I found buried nuggets of information that revealed political/legal/private agendas in play.
That in itself is inevitable. But some are shocking. One in particular caught my eye: “Flood Liability of Water Supply Reservoirs.” It contains a legislative recommendation that has the potential to take away some of your rights.
More on that in a separate post. Suffice it for now to say that the TWDB really does need public input on these recommendations. And I probably would not have found that recommendation had it not been for the new website. Check it out. Bookmark it. And visit often.
For future reference, I’ve posted it on the LINKS page of this web site.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/9/2020
1015 Days after Hurricane Harvey