Rapid Runoff from World’s Largest Trailer Park Wipes Out Plum Grove Road in Liberty County and More

Rapid runoff from Colony Ridge, perhaps the world’s largest trailer park, in Liberty County contributed to a washout of FM1010. Nearby residents in Plum Grove say it also contributed to the flooding of their homes. Moreover, erosion from the development has contributed to the buildup of sedimentation in the East Fork.

Nine years ago, this area was mostly forested wetlands. Today, it’s mostly mobil homes, many on barren lots, stretching mile after mile.

World’s Largest Trailer Park?

There is no definitive source ranking the size of trailer parks, but multiple references to Sun Valley in Nevada come up when you Google “world’s largest trailer park.” That development is one third the size of this one!

Nine years ago, Colony Ridge didn’t exist.

Satellite image from 2011. The land that would become Colony Ridge was covered with forests, wetlands and rice fields. Paper companies owned most of this land for decades and periodically harvested timber.
Colony Ridge today. This is just the southern section. Two more sections are out of frame on the north.

By the end of 2019, Colony Ridge had grown to cover approximately 10,000 acres and it’s still expanding. It has transformed the landscape massively, and it’s not clear whether the development has provided sufficient detention to keep runoff at its predevelopment rate. Judging by the frequency of flood damage to surrounding homes and roads since Colony Ridge was developed, many local residents believe the answer is no.

Documentation about the design and effectiveness of the drainage systems is hard to come by. Authorities in Liberty County have not returned emails or phone calls. And the information is not posted online.

Entire Population Growth of Liberty County in Last Decade

Colony Ridge alone can account for all of the population growth in Liberty County in the last decade. The U.S. Census Bureau officially estimates that Liberty County’s population grew from 75,000 to 88,000 between 2010 and 2019. Unofficially, one local politician estimates the population of Colony Ridge to be about 20,000. Firm numbers are difficult to come by because many residents are undocumented and uncounted.

Contributing to Flooding?

Thousands of acres of trailer homes with open-ditch drainage and no deed restrictions.
Typical landscape in Colony Ridge is highly susceptible to erosion and rapid runoff.

The lack of deed restrictions means many have not planted grass. That accelerates runoff.

Also consider that the developer created many of the lots by filling in wetlands and clearing trees that used to retain water in storms. The absence of wetlands and trees also accelerates runoff.

Wetlands drained by Colony Ridge from USGS National Wetlands Inventory.

Contributing to Road Blow Out

FM1010 lies in the path of a drainage ditch more than 2.5 miles long and 60 yards wide in places. It cuts like a butcher knife through the heart of Colony Ridge.

Satellite image shows massive erosion in straight-line drainage ditch that stretches for 2.5 miles toward Plum Grove Road, out of frame on the left.

The straight line nature of such ditches accelerates water and erosion even more. During Harvey, a combination of factors (population growth, lack of ground cover and deed restrictions, design of drainage, loss of forests and wetlands, impervious cover and extreme rainfall) all contributed to washing out FM1010. (See images below.)

Acceleration of runoff also shortens the time of accumulation during floods which heightens flood peaks.

Effect of Urbanization on Peak Stream Flows” by Dr. William Dupre, professor emeritus from the University of Houston.

One Person’s Dream Turns into Another’s Nightmare

The developer of Colony Ridge had an attractive vision for a niche market: to provide affordable plots of land without deed restrictions (at least in the early stages) to low-income families trying to escape the City. He marketed mainly to Hispanics who dreamed of owning their own land in America. The result may be a dream for some, but it’s turning into a nightmare for others.

A low-altitude shot looking west toward Plum Grove Road (concealed in tree line in distance).

Unintended Consequences or Foreseeable Tragedy

The giant ditch shown above leads directly to where FM1010 washed out. Along the way, there’s little to slow water down. The developer has installed twin culverts under a road that crosses the ditch. They may help. But judging by the results, they’re not working very well.

Cropped and enlarged from wide image above of Colony ditch.

From the bridge above, the elevation drops more than 27 feet in three quarters of a mile before stormwater goes into a strip of woods between FM1010 and the development. There, it gathered the momentum to blow out the road.

In the last part of its journey across Colony Ridge to the East Fork (left), water drops 27 feet with only a strip of woods to slow it down before it reaches the part of Plum Grove Road that washed out.
FM1010, Plum Grove Road has been impassible since Hurricane Harvey 1020 days ago.
Looking upstream toward Colony Ridge out of frame in the background (upper left)
Looking downstream toward the East Fork about 200 yards to the east.

Detours and Delays

More than 2.5 years after Harvey, this road has yet to be repaired.

The loss of FM1010 makes northbound traffic detour through Colony Ridge or up US59 and then back east. As a result, residents say that it can now take an hour during rush hour to go the five miles from US59 to Plum Grove on FM 2090. But that’s not the only problem.

Rapid Sedimentation Downstream

Downstream from Colony Ridge, we’re now getting rapid sand build ups on the East Fork, much like we have on the West Fork from sand mines. According to boaters, the area shown below was 18 feet deep before Imelda. The deepest point in the channel when this picture was taken last December was 3 feet.

Growing East Fork Mouth Bar

A massive development, such as Colony Ridge, without appropriate safeguards against erosion, contributes to this buildup. They certainly aren’t the only contributors. Sand mines that provided the aggregate for the roads in Colony Ridge have certainly helped.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/14/2020

1020 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 269 since Imelda

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

SJRA Sunset Review Now Underway

Almost a year ago, I posted about an upcoming sunset review for the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA). That process is now underway. The SJRA submitted a self-evaluation last September and the Sunset Review Commission is now accepting public comments.

The Commission will hold one public meeting on December 9th and 10th, before it makes a final decision about the SJRA on January 13.

The SJRA’s 131-page self-evaluation contains a wealth of information about how the SJRA perceives its performance. It will also give you insight into the challenges they face and how they are responding. I have limited discussion below to SJRA’s flood management division, because that is the focus of this website. The bottom of the post contains information about how to make a public comment if you wish.

Surprising Flood Management Objective

Interestingly, the SJRA does not list Flood Management under its Mission, Principles, or Objectives. It does list Flood Management as a Key Function. However, when asked “Do your key functions continue to serve a clear and ongoing objective,” the SJRA had an interesting response.

“In 2018, SJRA created the Flood Management Division to actively seek federal, state, regional, and local partnerships to coordinate flood management activities across the entire San Jacinto River basin, including Harris County. Flood planning and management activities are typically carried out and funded by local taxing entities since the purpose is to protect life and property.”

SJRA Self-Evaluation Report to Sunset Commission, Page 9, September 2019, emphasis added

They see themselves more as a coordinator than doer. The report then goes on to say, “SJRA did not have taxing authority and therefore was limited in its ability to implement large regional flood management projects….”

Two years after the governor told the SJRA to get into the flood management business and identify sources of funding, the SJRA still has not found the golden goose. In eleven separate places in the document, the SJRA cites a lack of taxing authority as the problem. It also makes several references to the failed initiative to establish a Montgomery County Flood Control District. The proposition failed by a vote of 1,222 “For” and 2,714 “Against” … IN 1985 … 35 years ago!

Biggest Opportunities for Improvement

SJRA says it is constantly looking to improve its operations. “At this time, there are four areas in which we are focusing our efforts in order to improve operations and administration: (i) expanding use of technology and social media, (ii) public communications and engagement, (iii) comprehensive and uniform complaint resolution, and (iv) accessibility of historically under-utilized businesses.”

Flood management is not one of the opportunities for improvement.

Expenditures by Goal

Right now, the SJRA is paying salaries for flood management out of water revenues. The River Authority spent roughly $150,000 in 2018 and budgeted $180,000 for 2019. That was roughly 0.14% of the SJRA’s total budget. And less than most people spent to repair their homes.

Flood management has 0.84 FTEs (less than one full-time employee). That’s because they split their time with other divisions.

Page 32

For fiscal years 2019 and 2020, the Flood Management Division continues to be funded via SJRA Raw Water Enterprise revenues. The total budget for FY 2019 for the Division is $776,748.

Objective of Flood Management Division

The SJRA’s Flood Management Division describes following major activities:

  • Developing short-term and long-term regional flood management strategies within the Authority’s portion of the San Jacinto River Basin
  • Building partnerships with federal, state, and local government entities
  • Identifying funding sources and opportunities
  • Coordinating, collaborating, and potentially partnering with other entities throughout the entire San Jacinto River basin.

“The Flood Management Division oversees the partnership and implementation of planned and funded projects, including the transfer of operations and maintenance of completed projects to partnering entities,” the report says.

Evidence of Effectiveness and Efficiency of Flood Management

The SJRA says that evidence of its Flood Management success can be seen in applying for a flood protection grant in 2018, receiving it, and beginning the associated project in 2019.

Another example: Participation as a funding and technical partner in the Upper San Jacinto Regional Watershed Master Drainage Plan study being managed by the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD).

Additionally, SJRA cites a “Know Your Watershed” campaign that will help provide the public with a better understanding of the watersheds they live in, as well as the sources of stormwater (i.e. rivers/streams, upstream watersheds, etc.) for those watersheds. The campaign consists of two tools: an online watershed viewer and an interactive story map that will give viewers an educational digital “tour” of the West Fork of the San Jacinto River.

SJRA also provided Senator Brandon Creighton with draft language for a bill that would allow the Authority to take a more active role in sedimentation management in the San Jacinto River basin. That language is included in House Bill 1824 of the 2019 Texas Legislative Session.

Finally, SJRA has been involved in a variety of other flood management related activities, including participation in various stakeholder groups, task forces, etc.

SJRA currently does not participate in any floodplain administration activities, nor does it have the authority to enact or enforce drainage infrastructure criteria or adopt development standards.

Major Issues for Flood Management

Funding. “Since Hurricane Harvey, SJRA has sought partners to fund feasibility studies in the hopes that federal and state funding could be matched with local and regional partners to develop flood management projects to help upstream and downstream land owners.”

Possible Solutions

“The recent passage of Senate Bills 7 and 8 and House Bill 26, along with a few other bills that were passed during the 86th Legislature, could lead to increased opportunities to create the necessary coordination to achieve meaningful, regional flood management strategies.”

They do not yet know what studies and/or projects will be funded. “It is also not yet known if and how local and regional partnerships will develop for flood management projects. However, it can be assumed that without more collaboration of regional flood management strategies and coordination of solutions, the region will continue to face flooding risks.”

Another potential solution: creation of tax-funded, regional entities that cover entire, or large portions, of major river basins. For example, the Harris County Flood Control District has the necessary legal authority and funding mechanism to implement flood mitigation projects, however, it covers less than half of the San Jacinto River basin. This solution would require legislation to implement.

Montgomery County leadership reportedly has little interest in flood control. Most see it as an expense to their taxpayers that benefits residents of other counties.

Pending Lawsuits

SJRA acknowledges that it faces multiple lawsuits associated with flooding that occurred during Hurricane Harvey in 2017.

Regarding those, it says, “The City of Houston is a two-thirds partner in the construction and operation of Lake Conroe and is therefore responsible for two thirds of the costs associated with the lawsuits. While current case law related to the liability of reservoir operators for downstream flooding is favorable, the ongoing costs of litigation is a significant burden related to the operations of the Lake Conroe Division.”

How to Comment by When

To review the entire self-evaluation report, click here.

To provide comments and suggestions to Sunset staff:

  • Send an email to sunset@sunset.texas.gov
  • Submit comments online at www.sunset.texas.gov
  • Send a letter to Sunset Advisory Commission, Attn: SJRA, P.O. Box 13066, Austin, Texas 78711
  • Call (512) 463-1300 and ask to speak to Alan Leonard, project manager of the SJRA review

Please provide your comments by July 31, 2020 to ensure Sunset staff can fully consider your input while conducting their review.  Comments submitted before the staff report is published in November 2020 will remain confidential.

Stay informed!  Visit www.sunset.texas.gov to sign up for email alerts on the Sunset staff report and the Sunset Commission’s public meetings on SJRA.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/11/2020

1019 Days after Hurricane Harvey

What Happened Downstream During Harvey as Lake Conroe Released 79,000 CFS

Last night, I posted some statistics about Lake Conroe levels after the SJRA started the release during Hurricane Harvey. Tim Garfield and R.D. Kissling, two top geologists, now retired from one of the world’s largest oil companies, have looked at the release from a downstream perspective. Last year, they put everything they learned into this 69-page presentation delivered to the University of Houston Honors Program.

From “A Brief History of Lake Houston and the Hurricane Harvey Flood,” by Tim Garfield and RD Kissling with help from Bob Rehak, 2019.

Recap of Key Points About Lake Conroe Release

To recap several key points:

  • The SJRA never did let Lake Conroe rise to its allowable flowage easement. The water level in Lake Conroe peaked at 7 a.m., August 28, 2017, at 206.23 feet. The SJRA’s flowage easement is 207 feet.
  • Outflow exceeded inflow by 8:30 a.m. on the 28th and stayed that way for the duration of the storm. As the lake level declined, the lake had up to 3 available feet of storage capacity.
  • Yet the SJRA kept releasing, on average, 2X – 10X more water than it was taking in. At one point, the ratio exceeded 100:1.

Tracking the Release Down West Fork

Garfield notes that the discharge ramp up that began the evening of the 27th reached a peak discharge rate of more than 79,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) just before noon on the 28th. The discharge rate didn’t dip below 70,000 cfs until 4 a.m. on the 29th – more than 16 hours later.

Following in lockstep with the Conroe release, flow rates at downstream gauges ramped up, in lockstep. By lining up the peaks of gages downriver, you can literally see the water surging down the West Fork all the way to Lake Houston. (See left side of image above.)

Significantly, Garfield says, these gauges all showed flattening flow-rate curves before the release ramp up. Those curves then turned and steepened upward as the Conroe release pulse arrived at those gauges.


Timing and Impact of Release in Lake Houston Area

Peak flow at the Humble gauge was reached shortly after noon on the 29th, roughly 24 hours after peak discharge was reached at the dam and roughly 30 hours after the high-rate release ramp up began.

Water started creeping under the doors of Kingwood Village Estates, a senior living center in Kingwood Town Center about 1.4 miles from the West Fork, at 3 a.m., on August 29th, 2017. It kept rising all morning and finally stopped another mile further inland. Water entered the last (highest) house to flood in Kings Point (the Kingwood subdivision closest to the main body of Lake Houston) at 2 p.m. that same day, according to Elise Whitney Bishop.

Residents trying to escape as Harvey's floodwaters rose
Kingwood Village Estates residents trying to escape as Harvey’s floodwaters rose. Twelve later died.

The level of upper Lake Houston, as measured at US59, rose an additional 7 feet during this period.

Significant additional flooding of Kingwood homes can be tied to this same period of increased discharge.

Flow rates measured at the Grand Parkway gauge and calculated at the Humble gage indicate a flow rate increase in this period of between 70,000 to 80,000 cfs, corresponding closely to the 79,000+ peak flow rate added by the Conroe dam discharge.

“The data from the affidavits further supports several key conclusions from the Harvey Flood Fundamentals section of our University of Houston talk,” said Garfield. Those include:

  • The large sustained release from Lake Conroe made West Fork flooding worse. The extra 80,000 cfs increased the West Fork flow 50%.
  • The release occurred as the storm was abating. It significantly increased flood damage in the Lake Houston area.
More than 4,400 structures flooded in Humble and Kingwood along the West Fork. Source: HCFCD.

The list of damages ran well over a billion dollars.

The SJRA Argument

The SJRA maintains to this day that Lake Conroe is a water-supply reservoir, not a flood-control reservoir. See the affidavits of Hector Olmos and Chuck Gilman. Olmos is a consultant who helped design the operations manual for the gates at Lake Conroe. Gilman is the SJRA’s Director of Flood Management, hired the year after Harvey.

They are basically claiming, “We don’t have the right tool to prevent downstream flooding.”

Editorial Opinion

Editorial opinion: That excuse has always sounded hollow to me. It attempts to curtail discussion of whether the SJRA waited too long to start releasing water, released too much at the peak, and then kept on releasing too much for days.

That discussion is a matter of public concern that could save lives and property in the future. We need to have it.

Sadly, it will take the courts to figure this out. In the meantime, the SJRA has hired some of the highest priced lawyers in the country and now appears to be angling for legislative immunity by hinting at higher water prices “statewide” if liability can’t be controlled.

It all smacks of similar arguments in other industries. If you’ve lived long enough, you’ve heard them all before, such as car companies that would be driven out of business if forced to install seat belts and other safety features. Well, that prediction didn’t quite work out! Luckily, for General Motors, the addition of safety features helped fuel its resurgence.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/12/2020 with thanks to Tim Garfield and RD Kissling

1018 Days after Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.