Tomorrow is the fifth anniversary of Hurricane Harvey. Many in the Lake Houston Area have asked, “Are we safer now?” The answer is yes, but we have a long way to go to achieve all our goals. Here’s a five-year flood-mitigation report card. It describes what we have and haven’t accomplished in 29 areas. So get ready for a roller coaster ride. I’ll leave the letter grades to you.
Lake Houston Area Mitigation
1) Dredging
The most visible accomplishment in the Lake Houston Area since Harvey is dredging. The City and Army Corps removed approximately 4 million cubic yards of sediment blocking the West and East Forks. Before dredging, River Grove Park flooded six times in two months. Since dredging, it hasn’t flooded once to my knowledge.
West Fork mouth bar after Harvey and before dredging. Now gone, but not forgotten.
Potential location for new tainter gates east of the spillway portion of the dam (out of frame to the right.
3) Upstream Detention
To reduce the amount of water coming inbound during storms, the San Jacinto River Basin Master Drainage Study identified 16 potential areas for building large stormwater detention basins. Unfortunately, they had a combined cost of $3.3 billion and would only reduce damages by about a quarter of that.
So, the SJRA recommended additional study on the two with the highest Benefit/Cost Ratio. Their hope: to reduce costs further. The two are on Birch and Walnut Creeks, two tributaries of Spring Creek near Waller County. Expect a draft report in February next year.
Funding these would likely require State assistance. But the Texas Water Development Board’s San Jacinto Regional Flood Planning Group has just recently submitted its first draft report. The draft also recommended looking at detention basin projects on West Fork/Lake Creek, East Fork/Winters Bayou, and East Fork/Peach Creek.
Building them all could hold back a foot of stormwater falling across 337 square miles. But funds would still need to be approved over several years. We’re still a long way off. Results – on the ground – could take years if not decades.
4) “Benching”
The Regional Flood Planning Group also recommended something called “benching” in two places along 5 miles of the West Fork. In flood mitigation, benching entails shaving down a floodplain to create extra floodwater storage capacity. Like the detention basins, benching is still a long way off…if it happens at all.
5) West Fork Channel Widening
Finally, the Regional Flood Planning Group recommended widening 5.7 miles of the West Fork to create more conveyance. But again, at this point it’s just a recommendation in a draft plan.
San Jacinto River Authority
6) SJRA Board Composition
After Harvey, many downstream residents accused SJRA of flooding downstream areas to save homes around Lake Conroe. At the time, SJRA’s board had no residents from the Humble/Kingwood Area. So Governor Abbott appointed two: Kaaren Cambio and Mark Micheletti. Cambio later resigned due to a potential conflict of interest when she took a job with Congressman Dan Crenshaw. That leaves Micheletti as the lone Humble/Kingwood Area resident on a seven-person board. However, the SJRA points out that the Board’s current president, Ronnie Anderson, represents Chambers County, which is also downstream.
State Representative Will Metcalf, who represents the Lake Conroe area, introduced a bill to limit SJRA board membership to upstream residents. Luckily for downstream residents, it failed.
7) Lake Conroe Lowering
SJRA identified temporary, seasonal lowering of Lake Conroe as a strategy to reduce downstream flood risk until completion of dredging and gates projects in the Lake Houston Area. The lowering creates extra storage in the lake during peak rainy seasons. After SJRA implemented the plan, Lake Conroe residents objected to the inconvenience. They sued SJRA and the City, but lost. After discussion with all stakeholders, the SJRA quietly modified its plan. It still lowers the lake, but not as much.
8) Lowering Lake Houston
Houston also started lowering Lake Houston, not seasonally, but in advance of major storms. The City has lowered the lake more than 20 times since beginning the program. That has helped to avoid much potential flooding to date.
9) Lake Conroe Dam Management
SJRA applied for and received several TWDB grants to enhance flood mitigation and communications in the San Jacinto River Basin. One involves developing a Lake Conroe Reservoir Forecasting Tool. SJRA has also worked with San Jacinto County to develop a Flood Early Warning System.
Finally, SJRA’s Lake Conroe/Lake Houston Joint Reservoir Operations Plan is on hold pending completion of the City’s plan to add more gates to the Lake Houston dam. Such projects may help reduce the risk of releasing unnecessarily large volumes of water in the future.
However, the location is controversial. Geologists say it wouldn’t reduce sediment in the area of greatest damage. Environmentalists worry that it could increase sedimentation through a “hungry-water” effect and open the door to river mining. And I worry that, even if successful, the pilot study would not be extendable. That’s because it relies on partnerships with sand miners. And other tributaries to Lake Houston do not have sand mines or as many sand mines.
Sand bar blocking West Fork after Harvey. The Corps has since removed it.
Federal Funding
It’s hard to get good grades on your flood mitigation report card without funding.
$1.6 million for HCFCD for Taylor Gully stormwater channel improvement.
$1.6 million for HCFCD for Kingwood Diversion Channel improvement.
$1.67 million for Harris County for the Forest Manor drainage improvement project in Huffman.
$8.2 million from FEMA the Westador Basin stormwater detention project on Cypress Creek.
$9.9 million from FEMA for the TC Jester storm water detention basin on Cypress Creek.
Crenshaw also has backed community requests for more funding in Fiscal 23. They include:
$8 million for the Lake Houston Dam Spillway (Gates).
$10 million for the Woodridge Stormwater Detention Basin (see below).
$10 million for a Cedar Bayou Stormwater Detention Basin.
Harris County Flood Control
19) Channel Maintenance and Repair
Harris County Flood Control has already completed several maintenance projects in the Lake Houston Area. In Kingwood, those projects include Taylor Gully, Ben’s Branch, parts of the Diversion Ditch and other unnamed ditches. In Atascocita, HCFCD also completed a project on Rogers Gully. Upstream, HCFCD is working on the third round of repairs to Cypress Creek. Batch 3 includes work at 12 sites on 11 channel sections. I’m sure the District has maintenance projects in other areas, too. I just can’t name them all.
Bens Branch near Kingwood High School after sediment removal.
In 2019, uncontrolled stormwater from the Woodridge Village development twice flooded approximately 600 homes in Elm Grove Village and North Kingwood Forest. HCFCD and the City purchased Woodridge from Perry Homes last year. HCFCD soon thereafter started removing sediment from the site to create a sixth stormwater detention basin that would more than double capacity on the site. At the end of last month, contractors had removed approximately 50,000 cubic yards out of 500,000 in the contract. This gives HCFCD a head start on excavation while engineers complete the basin’s final design.
21) Local Drainage Study Implementation
HCFCD authorized four studies of the drainage needs in the Lake Houston Area. They completed the Huffman and Kingwood studies. Atascocita and East Lake Houston/Crosby started earlier this year and are still underway.
The Kingwood study measured levels of service in all channels and outlined strategies to improve them to the 100-year level. The first two projects recommended: Taylor Gully and the Kingwood Diversion Ditch. Neither has started construction yet. But see the notes under funding above.
The Huffman Study recommended improvements to FM2100, which TxDOT will handle. It also recommended dredging in the East Fork near Luce Bayou which the City has completed. Finally, it recommended a bypass channel for Luce. However, pushback from residents forced cancellation of that project.
22) Buyouts
HCFCD completed buyouts of 80+ townhomes on Timberline and Marina Drives in Forest Cove last month. Contractors demolished the final run-down complex in August. That should improve property values in Forest Cove.
Completion of demolition of one of the last Forest Cove Townhome Complexes in July 2022.
23) Regulation Harmonization
Harris County Flood Control and Engineering have been working to get municipalities and other counties throughout the region to adopt certain minimum drainage regulations. I discussed the importance of uniformly high standards in last night’s post. So far, about a third of the governments have upgraded their regs. A third are still deciding whether to act. And the remainder have taken no action. There has been little movement in the last six months.
City of Houston
As mentioned above, the City has taken a lead role in dredging, adding gates to Lake Houston, and proactive lake lowering. In addition, the City has helped with:
24) Bridge Underpass Clean-Out
The City of Houston successfully cleaned out ditches under Kingwood Drive and North Park Drive in at least six places. Bridges represent a major choke point during floods. So eliminating sediment buildups helps reduce flood risk in areas that previously flooded.
Excavation of Bens Branch under Kingwood Drive by City crews.
The lowest score on the flood-mitigation report card probably goes to LSGCD.
26) Subsidence
The Lone Star Groundwater Conservation District has started pumping groundwater again at an alarming rate. Projected subsidence near the Montgomery County Border equals 3.25 feet, but only 1 foot at the Lake Houston dam. That could eventually tilt the lake back toward the Humble/Kingwood/Huffman area and reduce the margin of safety in flooding. That’s bad news.
Sand Mining Regulations
Twenty square miles of West Fork sand mines immediately upstream from I-69 have exposed a swath of floodplain once covered by trees to heavy erosion during floods. Mathematically, the potential for erosion increased 33X compared to the normal width of the river. Sand mines were also frequently observed releasing sediment into the river. And the dikes around the mines often wash out.
So in 2019, the Lake Houston Area Grassroots Flood Prevention Initiative (LHAGFPI) began meeting with legislators, regulators and the Texas Aggregate and Concrete Association (TACA). The goal: to establish comprehensive Best Management Practices (BMPs) for the sand mining industry in the San Jacinto River Basin.
27) Mine Plan/Stabilization Reports Now Required
TCEQ adopted new regulations, effective January 6, 2022. They required miners to file a ‘Mine Plan’ by July 6, 2022 and also a ‘Final Stabilization Report’ when a mine is played out.
28) Vegetated Buffer Zones (Setbacks)
The new regs also stipulate undisturbed vegetative buffer zones around new mines. Buffer zones aid in sediment filtration and removal by slowing surface water. They also strengthen dikes.
The new regs require a minimum 100-foot vegetated buffer zone adjacent to perennial streams greater than 20 feet in width. However, for streams less than 20 feet wide, the buffer zone is only 50 feet for perennial streams, and 35 feet for intermittent streams.
29) Reclamation Bonds
Unfortunately, the Flood Prevention Initiative could not convince TCEQ to require ‘reclamation bonds.’ Other states use such bonds to prevent miners from abandoning mines without taking steps to reduce future erosion, such as planting vegetation.
My apologies to any projects or parties I omitted. Now it’s your turn. Give grades to those you think have done the best job on YOUR Harvey flood-mitigation report card.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/26/22
1823 Days since Hurricane Harvey and one day from Harvey’s Fifth Anniversary
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210416-DJI_0406.jpg?fit=1200%2C900&ssl=19001200adminadmin2022-08-26 22:09:382022-08-27 12:10:28Harvey: A 5-Year Flood-Mitigation Report Card
Why do we flood? To clarify the obvious: Too much rain … creates too much runoff … in too little time … over terrain that’s too flat. Now, dig a little deeper.
Ask a slightly different question: “Why do we experience so much flood damage?” You get slightly different, but related reasons. Based on what I’ve learned while researching more than 2,000 articles since Harvey, the reasons include:
Inaccurate predictions of future rainfall.
Conflicting development standards and building codes.
Building too close to threats.
Upstream changes that undermine our assumptions.
Difficulty of adapting downstream.
Historical unwillingness to fund flood mitigation at meaningful levels.
Many of these self-inflicted wounds have to do with self-interest and the problems we have working together. Let’s explore each in more detail.
Inaccurate Predictions of Future Rainfall
Periodically, scientists update our predictions of future rainfall. No one is omniscient. We can only guess at what might happen in the future based on what has happened in the past. So we rely on a branch of mathematics called EVA (extreme value analysis). EVA predicts the probability of future events based on the observation of extremelyrarepastevents. But that means the mathematicians work with extremely small data sets. And that, in turn, means their confidence is low. So, every time a new superstorm comes along, they get to re-evaluate assumptions.
During the past 20 years, our rainfall assumptions have officially changed at least twice: after Allison and after Harvey. Each monster storm pushed predictions higher. After Harvey, predictions increased 25-30% compared to Allison.
Atlas 14 rainfall probabilities adopted by Harris County after Harvey.
And the amount of runoff new developments must retain varies accordingly. If just one development cut corners, you’d probably never see the difference. But if hundreds or thousands of upstream developments do not retain enough rain, you will.
The casualties in this upstream/downstream conflict will include those who bought homes or built businesses near the limit of the old assumptions. If they were at the edge of the floodplain before, now they’re in it. New floodplain maps based on Atlas-14 have not yet been officially released, but…
We use these imperfect and shifting predictions of future rainfall to design margins of safety into new developments. So your safety depends on when your house was built. And where.
Conflicting Development Standards and Building Codes
Humans, both private individuals and public officials, act in their self interest. Therefore, they also disagree about the probability of future risk. This often brings private property rights and public interest into conflict. People who own cheap land in floodplains, or worse yet in floodways, often want to develop it.
But higher standards can impact developers’ profits now. And the consequences of not observing those standards may not be visible for decades.
Meanwhile, politicians are eager to attract new development. And they live in a competitive world. Higher standards and strict enforcement can cause developers to look elsewhere for more attractive opportunities. So some politicians are reluctant to adopt higher standards.
That has created a patchwork quilt of regulations in the seven-county region. After Harvey, Harris County tried to get all municipalities and counties to adopt five minimum standards. Five years later, we’ve had mixed results. See below.
Variation in shifting and conflicting standards makes it difficult for home buyers, lenders, and even engineers to assess flood risk. “Whose 100-year floodplain are you talking about?”
And when floodplain standards do change, affected home and business owners may fight them because being in a floodplain could reduce the value of their property.
Building Too Close to Threats
People normally like water. They just don’t like it four feet deep in their homes. Water is part of our DNA. We like to live close to it; aspire to own beach homes; and vacation at the shore. We even pay premiums for homes with soothing water views – despite the higher risk.
However, those same locations can turn into raging torrents of water that destroy homes, businesses, vehicles, lives, and our illusions of safety.
Many people find understanding flood risk difficult. And even if they understand it intellectually, they may repress it emotionally.
After all, who wants to think about the possibility of dying in a traffic accident every time he/she goes to the grocery store?
So most people deny and ultimately compromise. For decades, they compromised by purchasing nationally subsidized flood insurance. Until the advent of Risk Rating 2.0 last year, flood insurance didn’t reflect the true cost of payouts.
That subsidy insulated both buyers and sellers. It allowed developers to build in risky, marginal areas without fear of finding homes unsaleable.
The availability of subsidized flood insurance fueled whole industries that made money off of cheap floodplain land.
Among those industries – engineering. Houston has hundreds of engineering companies that study ways to build “safely” near water. The vast majority are highly ethical. But what if you live downstream from a project with an engineering firm that wasn’t? Life can change in an instant.
Upstream Changes that Undermine Downstream Assumptions
Upstream changes cause downstream consequences. I once owned a home in the Dallas/Fort Worth area overlooking a creek. Engineers and surveyors certified that the home was two feet above the 100-year floodplain when built.
But Plano, just upstream from us, was the fastest growing city in America at the time. A new shopping mall with 80+ acres of parking changed things quickly. On small rains, water started coming up to our back door. One day, after a moderate rain, I saw a pickup floating down the creek.
After I complained to our City engineer, he requested the Army Corps to resurvey the creek. The Corps found that the upstream development had changed the floodplain.
Instead of being two feet above the 100-year floodplain, we were now 10 feet below it.
Unwilling to live with that risk, we sold our house, took a loss on it, and moved to Kingwood – two miles from the San Jacinto West Fork on one of the highest points in Harris County.
But soon Conroe became the fastest growing city in America! And Montgomery County became the second fastest growing county in the region. During my 40 years here, I’ve watched floods get higher and higher until, during Harvey, the Cajun Navy launched rescue boats from our driveway.
If all those new upstream developments really had “no adverse impact,” how did that happen? Was Harvey just a freak, monster storm? Yes. But manmade changes upstream also exacerbated the flooding. Engineering firms eager to deliver cost-effective answers for clients pushed the envelope. For instance, I could cite examples where engineers:
Used obsolete rainfall probability statistics to minimize the amount of stormwater detention needed. That increased the number of salable lots and the developer’s profitability.
Mischaracterized soil types to overestimate the rate of infiltration. That virtually eliminated the need for floodwater detention basins.
Tried to build 50-story high rises on land soon to be reclassified as floodway.
Accelerated water flowing into rivers during floods rather than retaining it. To justify this, they used a questionable type of study allowed by Montgomery County but outlawed in Harris County because it makes floods peak higher and faster downstream.
If enough companies push the envelope as these did, gradually flood peaks change, as shown in the graph below.
Red line shows how Brays Bayou watershed would have handled Tropical Storm Allison in 1915 before development. Blue line shows time of accumulation in 2000. Note faster, higher flood peak.
Does anyone really know how all that new impervious cover upstream affects flood peaks downstream? Some areas still use flood data from the 1980s.
Difficulty of Adapting Downstream
Lack of upstream regulation and enforcement saveupstream residents money. But they costdownstream residents. The burden of mitigation costs falls on Harris County residents, not our surrounding counties. And mitigation costs billions of dollars!
It’s easy to build a floodwater detention basin or widen a channel before development, but a Herculean task afterwards.
Another aspect of the difficulty: political conflict. Scarcity of funds has pitted neighborhoods and races against each other, as each vies for funding. Harvey united us in our resolve to finally do something about flooding. But recovery has torn us apart.
Historical Unwillingness to Fund Flood Mitigation at Meaningful Levels
Until Harvey, we have consistently underfunded flood mitigation efforts at the State, county and local levels. Unless we’re dealing with a flood disaster, it seems we have more pressing issues. Even after Harvey, we are now spending more money on bike trails in Harris County than on flood mitigation in the Lake Houston Area.
Harris County Flood Control’s budget before Harvey was so small that the District often had to save up multiple years to build one detention pond.
During the 2011 drought, State Representative Dan Huberty went to City of Houston Mayor Annise Parker. Lake Houston was so far down, the West Fork was a trickle between Humble and Kingwood. Huberty suggested that that would be a great time to get sediment buildups out of the river. You could have done it with trucks, restored the river’s conveyance, protected people from flooding and avoided water quality issues associated with dredging in our water supply. Parker declined.
So why do we flood? It’s not just the rainfall. Many of our wounds are self inflicted.
Future Posts in Harvey-Anniversary Series
My next post in this series will focus on a Harvey-Mitigation 5-Year Report Card. Another will focus on why some Harvey survivors still experience PTSD, and how it could affect them well into their seventies.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/25/22
1822 days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/20210520-RJR_6978.jpg?fit=1200%2C800&ssl=18001200adminadmin2022-08-25 19:21:162022-08-26 09:55:48Why Do We Flood?
In their 8/23/22 meeting, Harris County Commissioners discussed proposed budget priorities for the next fiscal year. Dr. Tina Petersen, PhD, PE, Harris County Flood Control District’s Executive Director, presented her goals for next year. And once again, they revolved around “equity.” See page 64 of the proposed budget for Petersen’s priorities or the summary below. The inequities of the “equity plan” are getting too hard to ignore.
Goal
Petersen wants to “reduce flood risk and strengthen resiliency.” Not much to quibble with there!
However, she also described how she wants to do it: “…through … equitable … strategies.”
The emphasis on “equitable” raises concerns about when HCFCD will start addressing the needs of the Lake Houston Area.
The outcomes associated with reducing flood risk? Harris County is targeting year-over-year reduction in the number of structures susceptible to damage from a 1% ATLAS 14 event. HCFCD also wants to reduce the number of structures susceptible to flooding in any flood. Both of those are admirable outcomes.
Having been burned once, though, I wish they would take it two steps further. Tell me: a) how many structures and b) where they are. Their wording leaves things too open ended and generic for my taste. The district could save a handful of homes and declare victory.
To achieve the not-so-specific outcomes articulated, the District wants to increase its budget for:
Sediment removal by $5 million, due to inflationary costs totaling 35%
Maintenance by $790,000, due to increased contract and material costs.
Mowing by $760,000, due to increased contract costs.
Building costs, professional services, and money paid to other departments, such as IT, by $1.7 million due to inflation.
Desired Outcome #2
Petersen also wants to: “invest in flood control equitably, where the most people are at risk of flooding.” I read that as, “Not the most people with the most risk; just the most people with any risk.”
Her strategy: “…increase alignment of flood control investment to areas of greatest need.” What does she mean by “greatest need”?
The deepest flooding?
The most damage to infrastructure?
The highest frequency of flooding?
Schools, grocery stores, and hospitals underwater?
Loss of critical bridges that cut off whole communities?
The southbound lanes of the I-69 bridge were knocked out by Harvey for approximately a year, causing massive delays and detours.Harvey flooding forced Humble ISD to close Kingwood High School for almost a year and bus 4000 students elsewhere.Chart showing feet above flood stage at 33 gages. Highest flooding was at 59 between Humble and Kingwood on the West Fork.
Thus, the money would go to the most densely populated areas, not necessarily those that suffered the most or worst damage. And the “revised prioritization framework” emphasizes the social vulnerability index (SVI). Ooops. There’s the “tell” again.
At least she’s telling you what you need to know when you go to the polls this fall. If you live in the Lake Houston Area, I wouldn’t count on seeing any benefit from the flood bond next year. Or the Flood Resilience Trust. The Trust contains money diverted from tollroads. That will now likely go to fix neighborhood drainage long ignored by Precincts One and Two, and the City..
Blocked street drainage in Kashmere and Trinity Garden subdivisions.
Commissioners discussed the budget for 90 minutes Tuesday. A vote on it will come in September. More to follow before then.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/23/22
1820 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/KHS-e1702338318946.jpg?fit=1100%2C616&ssl=16161100adminadmin2022-08-23 21:59:122022-08-24 10:41:55Flood Control Lists Budget Priorities for Fiscal ’23
Harvey: A 5-Year Flood-Mitigation Report Card
Tomorrow is the fifth anniversary of Hurricane Harvey. Many in the Lake Houston Area have asked, “Are we safer now?” The answer is yes, but we have a long way to go to achieve all our goals. Here’s a five-year flood-mitigation report card. It describes what we have and haven’t accomplished in 29 areas. So get ready for a roller coaster ride. I’ll leave the letter grades to you.
Lake Houston Area Mitigation
1) Dredging
The most visible accomplishment in the Lake Houston Area since Harvey is dredging. The City and Army Corps removed approximately 4 million cubic yards of sediment blocking the West and East Forks. Before dredging, River Grove Park flooded six times in two months. Since dredging, it hasn’t flooded once to my knowledge.
State Representative Dan Huberty secured additional funding during the last legislature to continue maintenance dredging. That includes clearing drainage canal outfalls into the lake, such as the entrance to Rogers Gully. The dredging operation is now moving around the lake, according to the City’s District E office.
2) Adding Floodgates
Engineers keep looking for a cost-effective alternative. They first identified 11 options in a preliminary review. They then studied the most promising – spillway crest gates – in more detail. Now they’re looking at tainter gates in the earthen portion of the dam. In case the Benefit/Cost Ratio still doesn’t meet FEMA requirements for moving forward with construction, Houston Mayor Pro Tem Dave Martin is also exploring additional funding sources. But so far, no construction has started on additional gates. Martin hopes to reveal a recommendation in September.
3) Upstream Detention
To reduce the amount of water coming inbound during storms, the San Jacinto River Basin Master Drainage Study identified 16 potential areas for building large stormwater detention basins. Unfortunately, they had a combined cost of $3.3 billion and would only reduce damages by about a quarter of that.
So, the SJRA recommended additional study on the two with the highest Benefit/Cost Ratio. Their hope: to reduce costs further. The two are on Birch and Walnut Creeks, two tributaries of Spring Creek near Waller County. Expect a draft report in February next year.
Funding these would likely require State assistance. But the Texas Water Development Board’s San Jacinto Regional Flood Planning Group has just recently submitted its first draft report. The draft also recommended looking at detention basin projects on West Fork/Lake Creek, East Fork/Winters Bayou, and East Fork/Peach Creek.
Building them all could hold back a foot of stormwater falling across 337 square miles. But funds would still need to be approved over several years. We’re still a long way off. Results – on the ground – could take years if not decades.
4) “Benching”
The Regional Flood Planning Group also recommended something called “benching” in two places along 5 miles of the West Fork. In flood mitigation, benching entails shaving down a floodplain to create extra floodwater storage capacity. Like the detention basins, benching is still a long way off…if it happens at all.
5) West Fork Channel Widening
Finally, the Regional Flood Planning Group recommended widening 5.7 miles of the West Fork to create more conveyance. But again, at this point it’s just a recommendation in a draft plan.
San Jacinto River Authority
6) SJRA Board Composition
After Harvey, many downstream residents accused SJRA of flooding downstream areas to save homes around Lake Conroe. At the time, SJRA’s board had no residents from the Humble/Kingwood Area. So Governor Abbott appointed two: Kaaren Cambio and Mark Micheletti. Cambio later resigned due to a potential conflict of interest when she took a job with Congressman Dan Crenshaw. That leaves Micheletti as the lone Humble/Kingwood Area resident on a seven-person board. However, the SJRA points out that the Board’s current president, Ronnie Anderson, represents Chambers County, which is also downstream.
State Representative Will Metcalf, who represents the Lake Conroe area, introduced a bill to limit SJRA board membership to upstream residents. Luckily for downstream residents, it failed.
7) Lake Conroe Lowering
SJRA identified temporary, seasonal lowering of Lake Conroe as a strategy to reduce downstream flood risk until completion of dredging and gates projects in the Lake Houston Area. The lowering creates extra storage in the lake during peak rainy seasons. After SJRA implemented the plan, Lake Conroe residents objected to the inconvenience. They sued SJRA and the City, but lost. After discussion with all stakeholders, the SJRA quietly modified its plan. It still lowers the lake, but not as much.
8) Lowering Lake Houston
Houston also started lowering Lake Houston, not seasonally, but in advance of major storms. The City has lowered the lake more than 20 times since beginning the program. That has helped to avoid much potential flooding to date.
9) Lake Conroe Dam Management
SJRA applied for and received several TWDB grants to enhance flood mitigation and communications in the San Jacinto River Basin. One involves developing a Lake Conroe Reservoir Forecasting Tool. SJRA has also worked with San Jacinto County to develop a Flood Early Warning System.
Finally, SJRA’s Lake Conroe/Lake Houston Joint Reservoir Operations Plan is on hold pending completion of the City’s plan to add more gates to the Lake Houston dam. Such projects may help reduce the risk of releasing unnecessarily large volumes of water in the future.
Coordination between Lake Conroe and Lake Houston has already improved. You can see it in the SJRA’s new dashboard. It shows releases requested by the City of Houston to lower Lake Conroe.
10) Sediment Reduction
Huge sediment buildups in the West and East Forks of the San Jacinto clearly contributed to flooding. The Army Corps stated that the West Fork was 90% blocked near River Grove Park. To reduce future dredging costs, SJRA also studied the use of sediment traps. SJRA may implement a pilot study soon on the West Fork near the Hallett mine.
However, the location is controversial. Geologists say it wouldn’t reduce sediment in the area of greatest damage. Environmentalists worry that it could increase sedimentation through a “hungry-water” effect and open the door to river mining. And I worry that, even if successful, the pilot study would not be extendable. That’s because it relies on partnerships with sand miners. And other tributaries to Lake Houston do not have sand mines or as many sand mines.
Federal Funding
It’s hard to get good grades on your flood mitigation report card without funding.
11-18) Appropriations
In March this year, Congressman Dan Crenshaw secured appropriations that should help advance projects in the San Jacinto Basin. They included:
Crenshaw also has backed community requests for more funding in Fiscal 23. They include:
Harris County Flood Control
19) Channel Maintenance and Repair
Harris County Flood Control has already completed several maintenance projects in the Lake Houston Area. In Kingwood, those projects include Taylor Gully, Ben’s Branch, parts of the Diversion Ditch and other unnamed ditches. In Atascocita, HCFCD also completed a project on Rogers Gully. Upstream, HCFCD is working on the third round of repairs to Cypress Creek. Batch 3 includes work at 12 sites on 11 channel sections. I’m sure the District has maintenance projects in other areas, too. I just can’t name them all.
20) Woodridge Stormwater Detention Basin Expansion
In 2019, uncontrolled stormwater from the Woodridge Village development twice flooded approximately 600 homes in Elm Grove Village and North Kingwood Forest. HCFCD and the City purchased Woodridge from Perry Homes last year. HCFCD soon thereafter started removing sediment from the site to create a sixth stormwater detention basin that would more than double capacity on the site. At the end of last month, contractors had removed approximately 50,000 cubic yards out of 500,000 in the contract. This gives HCFCD a head start on excavation while engineers complete the basin’s final design.
21) Local Drainage Study Implementation
HCFCD authorized four studies of the drainage needs in the Lake Houston Area. They completed the Huffman and Kingwood studies. Atascocita and East Lake Houston/Crosby started earlier this year and are still underway.
The Kingwood study measured levels of service in all channels and outlined strategies to improve them to the 100-year level. The first two projects recommended: Taylor Gully and the Kingwood Diversion Ditch. Neither has started construction yet. But see the notes under funding above.
The Huffman Study recommended improvements to FM2100, which TxDOT will handle. It also recommended dredging in the East Fork near Luce Bayou which the City has completed. Finally, it recommended a bypass channel for Luce. However, pushback from residents forced cancellation of that project.
22) Buyouts
HCFCD completed buyouts of 80+ townhomes on Timberline and Marina Drives in Forest Cove last month. Contractors demolished the final run-down complex in August. That should improve property values in Forest Cove.
23) Regulation Harmonization
Harris County Flood Control and Engineering have been working to get municipalities and other counties throughout the region to adopt certain minimum drainage regulations. I discussed the importance of uniformly high standards in last night’s post. So far, about a third of the governments have upgraded their regs. A third are still deciding whether to act. And the remainder have taken no action. There has been little movement in the last six months.
City of Houston
As mentioned above, the City has taken a lead role in dredging, adding gates to Lake Houston, and proactive lake lowering. In addition, the City has helped with:
24) Bridge Underpass Clean-Out
The City of Houston successfully cleaned out ditches under Kingwood Drive and North Park Drive in at least six places. Bridges represent a major choke point during floods. So eliminating sediment buildups helps reduce flood risk in areas that previously flooded.
25) Storm Sewer Inspections, Clean-Out, Repairs
The City has inspected storm sewers throughout Kingwood and cleaned those that had become clogged. It also repaired sinkholes and outfalls that had become damaged.
Lone Star Groundwater Conservation District
The lowest score on the flood-mitigation report card probably goes to LSGCD.
26) Subsidence
The Lone Star Groundwater Conservation District has started pumping groundwater again at an alarming rate. Projected subsidence near the Montgomery County Border equals 3.25 feet, but only 1 foot at the Lake Houston dam. That could eventually tilt the lake back toward the Humble/Kingwood/Huffman area and reduce the margin of safety in flooding. That’s bad news.
Sand Mining Regulations
Twenty square miles of West Fork sand mines immediately upstream from I-69 have exposed a swath of floodplain once covered by trees to heavy erosion during floods. Mathematically, the potential for erosion increased 33X compared to the normal width of the river. Sand mines were also frequently observed releasing sediment into the river. And the dikes around the mines often wash out.
So in 2019, the Lake Houston Area Grassroots Flood Prevention Initiative (LHAGFPI) began meeting with legislators, regulators and the Texas Aggregate and Concrete Association (TACA). The goal: to establish comprehensive Best Management Practices (BMPs) for the sand mining industry in the San Jacinto River Basin.
27) Mine Plan/Stabilization Reports Now Required
TCEQ adopted new regulations, effective January 6, 2022. They required miners to file a ‘Mine Plan’ by July 6, 2022 and also a ‘Final Stabilization Report’ when a mine is played out.
28) Vegetated Buffer Zones (Setbacks)
The new regs also stipulate undisturbed vegetative buffer zones around new mines. Buffer zones aid in sediment filtration and removal by slowing surface water. They also strengthen dikes.
The new regs require a minimum 100-foot vegetated buffer zone adjacent to perennial streams greater than 20 feet in width. However, for streams less than 20 feet wide, the buffer zone is only 50 feet for perennial streams, and 35 feet for intermittent streams.
29) Reclamation Bonds
Unfortunately, the Flood Prevention Initiative could not convince TCEQ to require ‘reclamation bonds.’ Other states use such bonds to prevent miners from abandoning mines without taking steps to reduce future erosion, such as planting vegetation.
My apologies to any projects or parties I omitted. Now it’s your turn. Give grades to those you think have done the best job on YOUR Harvey flood-mitigation report card.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/26/22
1823 Days since Hurricane Harvey and one day from Harvey’s Fifth Anniversary
Why Do We Flood?
Why do we flood? To clarify the obvious: Too much rain … creates too much runoff … in too little time … over terrain that’s too flat. Now, dig a little deeper.
Ask a slightly different question: “Why do we experience so much flood damage?” You get slightly different, but related reasons. Based on what I’ve learned while researching more than 2,000 articles since Harvey, the reasons include:
Many of these self-inflicted wounds have to do with self-interest and the problems we have working together. Let’s explore each in more detail.
Inaccurate Predictions of Future Rainfall
Periodically, scientists update our predictions of future rainfall. No one is omniscient. We can only guess at what might happen in the future based on what has happened in the past. So we rely on a branch of mathematics called EVA (extreme value analysis). EVA predicts the probability of future events based on the observation of extremely rare past events. But that means the mathematicians work with extremely small data sets. And that, in turn, means their confidence is low. So, every time a new superstorm comes along, they get to re-evaluate assumptions.
During the past 20 years, our rainfall assumptions have officially changed at least twice: after Allison and after Harvey. Each monster storm pushed predictions higher. After Harvey, predictions increased 25-30% compared to Allison.
Unfortunately, the differences are even greater for those who live near county lines where upstream rainfall standards may be based on data from the 1980s. For instance, the difference between official rainfall probabilities in Harris and Montgomery Counties approaches 40%.
And the amount of runoff new developments must retain varies accordingly. If just one development cut corners, you’d probably never see the difference. But if hundreds or thousands of upstream developments do not retain enough rain, you will.
The casualties in this upstream/downstream conflict will include those who bought homes or built businesses near the limit of the old assumptions. If they were at the edge of the floodplain before, now they’re in it. New floodplain maps based on Atlas-14 have not yet been officially released, but…
We use these imperfect and shifting predictions of future rainfall to design margins of safety into new developments. So your safety depends on when your house was built. And where.
Conflicting Development Standards and Building Codes
Humans, both private individuals and public officials, act in their self interest. Therefore, they also disagree about the probability of future risk. This often brings private property rights and public interest into conflict. People who own cheap land in floodplains, or worse yet in floodways, often want to develop it.
Big floods, by their very definition, happen rarely. This often fuels arguments between developers and regulators. John Blount, Harris County’s former head of engineering showed that higher development standards and building codes reduced flood damage 20X.
But higher standards can impact developers’ profits now. And the consequences of not observing those standards may not be visible for decades.
Meanwhile, politicians are eager to attract new development. And they live in a competitive world. Higher standards and strict enforcement can cause developers to look elsewhere for more attractive opportunities. So some politicians are reluctant to adopt higher standards.
That has created a patchwork quilt of regulations in the seven-county region. After Harvey, Harris County tried to get all municipalities and counties to adopt five minimum standards. Five years later, we’ve had mixed results. See below.
Variation in shifting and conflicting standards makes it difficult for home buyers, lenders, and even engineers to assess flood risk. “Whose 100-year floodplain are you talking about?”
And when floodplain standards do change, affected home and business owners may fight them because being in a floodplain could reduce the value of their property.
Building Too Close to Threats
People normally like water. They just don’t like it four feet deep in their homes. Water is part of our DNA. We like to live close to it; aspire to own beach homes; and vacation at the shore. We even pay premiums for homes with soothing water views – despite the higher risk.
However, those same locations can turn into raging torrents of water that destroy homes, businesses, vehicles, lives, and our illusions of safety.
After all, who wants to think about the possibility of dying in a traffic accident every time he/she goes to the grocery store?
So most people deny and ultimately compromise. For decades, they compromised by purchasing nationally subsidized flood insurance. Until the advent of Risk Rating 2.0 last year, flood insurance didn’t reflect the true cost of payouts.
That subsidy insulated both buyers and sellers. It allowed developers to build in risky, marginal areas without fear of finding homes unsaleable.
The availability of subsidized flood insurance fueled whole industries that made money off of cheap floodplain land.
Among those industries – engineering. Houston has hundreds of engineering companies that study ways to build “safely” near water. The vast majority are highly ethical. But what if you live downstream from a project with an engineering firm that wasn’t? Life can change in an instant.
Upstream Changes that Undermine Downstream Assumptions
Upstream changes cause downstream consequences. I once owned a home in the Dallas/Fort Worth area overlooking a creek. Engineers and surveyors certified that the home was two feet above the 100-year floodplain when built.
But Plano, just upstream from us, was the fastest growing city in America at the time. A new shopping mall with 80+ acres of parking changed things quickly. On small rains, water started coming up to our back door. One day, after a moderate rain, I saw a pickup floating down the creek.
After I complained to our City engineer, he requested the Army Corps to resurvey the creek. The Corps found that the upstream development had changed the floodplain.
Unwilling to live with that risk, we sold our house, took a loss on it, and moved to Kingwood – two miles from the San Jacinto West Fork on one of the highest points in Harris County.
But soon Conroe became the fastest growing city in America! And Montgomery County became the second fastest growing county in the region. During my 40 years here, I’ve watched floods get higher and higher until, during Harvey, the Cajun Navy launched rescue boats from our driveway.
If all those new upstream developments really had “no adverse impact,” how did that happen? Was Harvey just a freak, monster storm? Yes. But manmade changes upstream also exacerbated the flooding. Engineering firms eager to deliver cost-effective answers for clients pushed the envelope. For instance, I could cite examples where engineers:
If enough companies push the envelope as these did, gradually flood peaks change, as shown in the graph below.
Does anyone really know how all that new impervious cover upstream affects flood peaks downstream? Some areas still use flood data from the 1980s.
Difficulty of Adapting Downstream
Lack of upstream regulation and enforcement save upstream residents money. But they cost downstream residents. The burden of mitigation costs falls on Harris County residents, not our surrounding counties. And mitigation costs billions of dollars!
More than one third of that goes to right-of-way acquisition, in large part, because people built too close to bayous.
To implement new mitigation projects, HCFCD must buy-out whole subdivisions and move entire neighborhoods, as it did along Halls Bayou. That’s a difficult, expensive, time-consuming process. And that exposes people to risk longer than would otherwise be necessary.
It’s easy to build a floodwater detention basin or widen a channel before development, but a Herculean task afterwards.
Another aspect of the difficulty: political conflict. Scarcity of funds has pitted neighborhoods and races against each other, as each vies for funding. Harvey united us in our resolve to finally do something about flooding. But recovery has torn us apart.
Historical Unwillingness to Fund Flood Mitigation at Meaningful Levels
Until Harvey, we have consistently underfunded flood mitigation efforts at the State, county and local levels. Unless we’re dealing with a flood disaster, it seems we have more pressing issues. Even after Harvey, we are now spending more money on bike trails in Harris County than on flood mitigation in the Lake Houston Area.
Harris County Flood Control’s budget before Harvey was so small that the District often had to save up multiple years to build one detention pond.
During the 2011 drought, State Representative Dan Huberty went to City of Houston Mayor Annise Parker. Lake Houston was so far down, the West Fork was a trickle between Humble and Kingwood. Huberty suggested that that would be a great time to get sediment buildups out of the river. You could have done it with trucks, restored the river’s conveyance, protected people from flooding and avoided water quality issues associated with dredging in our water supply. Parker declined.
So why do we flood? It’s not just the rainfall. Many of our wounds are self inflicted.
Future Posts in Harvey-Anniversary Series
My next post in this series will focus on a Harvey-Mitigation 5-Year Report Card. Another will focus on why some Harvey survivors still experience PTSD, and how it could affect them well into their seventies.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/25/22
1822 days since Hurricane Harvey
Flood Control Lists Budget Priorities for Fiscal ’23
In their 8/23/22 meeting, Harris County Commissioners discussed proposed budget priorities for the next fiscal year. Dr. Tina Petersen, PhD, PE, Harris County Flood Control District’s Executive Director, presented her goals for next year. And once again, they revolved around “equity.” See page 64 of the proposed budget for Petersen’s priorities or the summary below. The inequities of the “equity plan” are getting too hard to ignore.
Goal
Petersen wants to “reduce flood risk and strengthen resiliency.” Not much to quibble with there!
However, she also described how she wants to do it: “…through … equitable … strategies.”
Desired Outcome #1
“Equitable” might cause people in outlying areas concern, considering that Judge Hidalgo, Commissioner Ellis and Commissioner Garcia redefined that term after voters approved the 2018 Flood Bond. Equitable no longer means “fair and impartial” as most dictionaries would define it. Equitable now means prioritizing projects in watersheds with a majority of Low-to-Median Income (LMI) households and a high social-vulnerability index.
Since being blindsided in 2019, taxpayers in more affluent watersheds have largely been put on hold. For instance, out of $236 million dollars in active construction projects at the end of July 2022, the heavily flood-damaged Lake Houston Area has only $2000. That’s less than one-thousandth of one percent – 0.0008% to be precise. So…
The outcomes associated with reducing flood risk? Harris County is targeting year-over-year reduction in the number of structures susceptible to damage from a 1% ATLAS 14 event. HCFCD also wants to reduce the number of structures susceptible to flooding in any flood. Both of those are admirable outcomes.
Having been burned once, though, I wish they would take it two steps further. Tell me: a) how many structures and b) where they are. Their wording leaves things too open ended and generic for my taste. The district could save a handful of homes and declare victory.
To achieve the not-so-specific outcomes articulated, the District wants to increase its budget for:
Desired Outcome #2
Petersen also wants to: “invest in flood control equitably, where the most people are at risk of flooding.” I read that as, “Not the most people with the most risk; just the most people with any risk.”
Her strategy: “…increase alignment of flood control investment to areas of greatest need.” What does she mean by “greatest need”?
Apparently, Petersen means none of those things when she talks about greatest need. She wants to “Use the revised Prioritization Framework that emphasizes people, not structures.”
Thus, the money would go to the most densely populated areas, not necessarily those that suffered the most or worst damage. And the “revised prioritization framework” emphasizes the social vulnerability index (SVI). Ooops. There’s the “tell” again.
Petersen wants to spend her budget in the most highly populated neighborhoods with a high SVI. Translation: mostly inside the Beltway where the vast majority of funding for the last 22 years has already gone.
I’ll give Petersen one thing. She’s open about her priorities. No secrets there, unlike the trick Commissioner Ellis played on voters in 2018 with the bond language.
At least she’s telling you what you need to know when you go to the polls this fall. If you live in the Lake Houston Area, I wouldn’t count on seeing any benefit from the flood bond next year. Or the Flood Resilience Trust. The Trust contains money diverted from tollroads. That will now likely go to fix neighborhood drainage long ignored by Precincts One and Two, and the City..
Commissioners discussed the budget for 90 minutes Tuesday. A vote on it will come in September. More to follow before then.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/23/22
1820 Days since Hurricane Harvey