Two days ago, I wrote about San Jacinto East Fork Flooding at FM2090 in Plum Grove. Yesterday, floodwaters were peaking downstream at FM1485/SH99. No homes were threatened that I saw, but at least one vehicle stalled and was abandoned.
Pictures Taken on 4/10/23 Just After Peak
See the pictures below that I took Monday afternoon when the river was at 63 feet.
Looking west along SH99 at the San Jacinto East Fork where FM1485 parallels the Grand Parkway.
Note the difference in the width of the spans in these bridges. The newer bridge is at least 5X wider. Because water flows right to left, this creates a bottleneck that causes the roads in this area to go underwater frequently. TxDoT probably needs to widen the 1485 bridge or elevate the roadway or both.
Looking east. Upstream (left) of the 1485 bridge, the East Fork remained placid. But downstream, you can actually see the currents in the rushing water.Looking east from over eastbound FM1485 as vehicles attempted to plough through water. Note the black car stalled at the side of the road farther up. That one didn’t make it.Looking west at same location. Despite the dangers, vehicles persisted through the water. There was no room for them to turn around.
As of this writing (noon on 4/11/23), SJRA has scaled back its releases from Lake Conroe to about 1000 cubic feet per second (CFS).
Caution to Swimmers and Waders
Swimming or wading in floodwater can endanger your life. A cubic foot of freshwater weighs about 62 pounds. Rapidly moving water that rises above knee level has enough force to easily knock adults over and sweep them downstream.
The East Fork at FM1485 is still moving at more than 4000 CFS!
So swimmers and waders beware. This morning a reader wrote me about a woman and her daughter who were killed in the East Fork after Harvey. The woman could not battle the current. Her daughter tried to save her and both died.
Understand also that floodwaters can easily scour the riverbed to create drop-offs in unexpected places. Even if you could safely wade in areas before the flood, after the flood, you could easily step into holes over your head.
If you find yourself swept up in a strong current, don’t try to swim against it. Swim perpendicular to it or with it to reach shore.
Bills proposed in both the Texas House and Senate could transform the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) into the Gulf Coast Resiliency District (GCRD). The proposed legislation would make the management of the GCRD a board appointed by the Governor instead of Harris County Commissioners Court.
Senator Paul Bettencourt introduced SB2431 and Representative Dennis Paul introduced its companion bill, HB5338, in the House. Both go back to the enabling legislation for HCFCD in 1937 and change the original language in key places. For example:
“Gulf Coast Resiliency” replaces “Harris County Flood Control.”
“The bounds of the district” replaces “Harris County.”
“The Board” replaces “Commissioners Court.”
“Presiding officer” replaces “County Judge.”
Check out the bill language yourself by clicking on the links above. Virtually all HCFCD capabilities and functions remain the same. GCRD can issue bonds, build projects, partner with other entities, and acquire property as it always has.
The big change: the governor-appointed board would manage GCRD instead of Harris County Commissioners.
Why These Bills Would Benefit Harris County
While local control is normally a good thing, excessive political interference can also hinder professionals in the performance of their duties. And in fact, that has happened in Harris County. Below, I discuss eight distinct performance-sapping issues I have observed under the current administration.
1. Limited Purview of Some Harris County Commissioners
Language in both the 1937 enabling legislation for HCFCD and the 2018 flood bond let HCFCD acquire land and build projects in neighboring counties. This is necessary because floodwaters do not respect political boundaries. We need a regional approach to solve watershed-wide problems.
However, Commissioner Rodney Ellis has blocked virtually all such efforts and his Democratic colleagues have gone along with him.
Ellis rarely misses an opportunity to express his regret over letting HCFCD purchase the Woodridge Village property on the Montgomery County line. It contributed to flooding up to 600 homes in Kingwood/Harris County twice in 2019. Since acquiring the property in 2021, the county has spent less than $1,000 to build a flood-mitigation project on it.
Meanwhile, hundreds of millions of dollars have gone to projects inside the Beltway where most of Ellis’, Garcia’s and Hidalgo’s constituents live.
2. Undermining Regional Cooperation
Ellis’ stonewalling of projects across county lines also cut the legs out from under an HCFCD/Engineering Department program called Fix Flooding First.
The program proposed five “minimum drainage standards” for adjoining counties draining into Harris County. The only inducement Harris County could offer neighboring areas to cooperate was flood-bond money for partnership projects.
Democrats Ellis, Garcia, and Hidalgo have consistently steered 2018 flood-bond money away from areas on the periphery of the county. This has punished political opponents.
For instance, not one capital-improvement construction project is currently underway anywhere in Precinct 3. P3 is the last remaining precinct led by a Republican in Harris County.
Having spent billions of dollars since 2000 to mitigate flood risk in Low-to-Moderate-Income areas, Harris County’s Democratic majority now seeks to de-emphasize flood risk in its funding formula.
They have also eliminated common-sense metrics such as flood damage, deaths, depth of flooding, and protection of infrastructure such as schools and hospitals when scoring projects.
Using this system, projects in areas with 50-year flooding could get funded before those with 2-year flooding. But that seems to be the way the Democratic majority wants it.
5. Exhausting Local Dollars to Avoid Waiting on Federal Dollars
Roughly $2.5 billion – half the money for 2018 Flood Bond Projects – originated locally. And about a third of that was designated to attract matching funds. For instance, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development often pays up to 90% of projects, but it requires a 10% local match.
This leverage could have doubled the funds available for Harris County flood-mitigation projects. But two catches existed:
HUD prioritizes projects in low-to-moderate-income areas.
HUD money takes longer to work its way down from Washington to Austin to Harris County.
Instead of waiting on HUD, Democrats started using local money in LMI neighborhoods. Now there may not be enough money to cover projects in predominantly Republican neighborhoods like Kingwood, Spring, Cypress and Huffman.
6. Falloff in Partner Funding
When Commissioners voted to plow ahead with local dollars instead of waiting on Federal dollars, they said they would continue to seek partner funding wherever possible.
But almost two years after the GLO announced Harris County would get $750 million in funding, the County still hasn’t submitted a complete plan for how it would spend the money. In fact, it changed its plan twice in the last month.
Problems like these do not inspire partner confidence. And it shows.
Grants by month since approval of flood bond in August 2018. Data obtained via FOIA request from HCFCD.
7. Slowing Progress on Flood-Mitigation Projects
Political interference in HCFCD has led to 100% turnover in the executive ranks of HCFCD under County Judge Lina Hidalgo.
Data obtained from HCFCD via FOIA request.Decline coincides with departures of key executives.
The flood bond passed in the third quarter of 2018 when Russ Poppe, Matt Zeve and Alan Black led HCFCD.
Then in 2021, Poppe, the executive director, resigned after relentless backbiting in Commissioners Court over made-up equity issues. Zeve, the deputy executive director, resigned in January 2022 under similar circumstances. And Alan Black, operations manager (and later acting director), left later that year.
This slowed down HCFCD performance and placed the entire county at higher risk.
Preliminary data for the first quarter of 2023 indicate that spending could decline even more radically this year.
Commissioners had criticized the executives for not spending enough money in minority and low-income areas. In fact, HCFCD was already spending as much in eight watersheds with LMI-majority populations as they were in all 15 others combined. See below.
Spending compiled from HCFCD December 2022 Flood-Bond Update. HCFCD has released no additional updates since then.
Still unhappy, Democrats have had to think up new ways to send even more projects to their constituents inside the Beltway.
Hence, the constant revisions to the equity scoring matrix. According to several former employees, the revisions have led to starts, stops, wasted work, frustrations and delays. These contribute to slowdowns and keep flood risk high.
Benefits to Citizens
An article by Holly Hansen in the Texan quotes Rep. Paul on why he introduced the companion bill to Bettencourt’s in the House. He cites Harris County’s mismanagement, lack of progress, and the politicization of infrastructure planning.
Solving these problems will reduce flood risk, increase productivity, and save taxpayer dollars.
Those don’t seem important under the current leadership in Harris County. Can we afford to wait another four years for a change in administration?
Normally, I favor local control. The more, the better. But with HCFCD, that local control has failed us. That’s why I wholeheartedly support these bills.
If you agree, please consider showing your support. Email Senator Bettencourt and Representative Paul. The more they hear from people, the more motivated they will be to pass the bill.
Posted by Bob Rehak on April 10, 2023
2050 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Screenshot-2023-04-08-at-7.17.12-PM.png?fit=1764%2C1058&ssl=110581764adminadmin2023-04-10 10:35:212023-04-10 10:58:25Lawmakers Propose Transforming HCFCD and Its Management
As floodwaters worked their way down the East and West Forks of the San Jacinto from last week’s heavy rains, they invaded sand mines on both rivers on Easter Sunday, 2023.
Up to 9 inches of rain fell in the headwaters of both rivers during 3 days from 4/5 to 4/7. Atlas-14 rainfall probability statistics indicate that equals a 5-year rain.
The Lake Conroe Dam intercepted much of the West Fork rain and is now releasing it at about 6400 cubic feet per second. There are no dams on the East Fork and the flooding there appears much worse.
West Fork Near Northpark South Development
Near the Northpark South Development on Sorters Road, the West Fork snakes its way through four square miles of sand mines. In the image below, the Hallett Mine on the right seemed secure. But the abandoned sand mines on the left and top center both opened to the river.
Photo taken 4/9/2023 two days after rain stopped.
East Fork Near FM2090 on 4/9/2023
Normally, the East Fork at 2090 is about 30-40 feet wide – the size of the opening in the woods circled in red below. But today, the river swelled to about 2000 feet wide.
Looking south from over East Fork San Jacinto toward FM2090.Looking East along FM2090 across the East Fork.
As the East Fork rose, it invaded the abandoned Texas Concrete Sand and Gravel Mine in Plum Grove.
Abandoned Texas Concrete Sand and Gravel Plum Grove Mine north of FM2090 between East Fork and FM1010
Water entered the northern end, swept through the mine, and punched through the dikes on the southern end, carrying silt and sand with it. See sequence of pictures below.
Looking N toward northern end of mine.Water entered mine in upper left and cut off house.Water then swept under and around house moving south.Looking S.The water then exited back into the river through several breaches in dikes.Rushing water carrying silt and sand found two more breaches close to 2090. Left unchecked, the force of this water will eventually erode the banks of FM2090.Baptist Church Loop Road south of FM2090 was also underwater.
Mine Fails to Meet Guidelines for Abandonment
This mine does not meet TCEQ guidelines for abandonment. The miners left equipment, including a dredge. They also failed to grade stockpiles, remove buildings, and plant grass. Yet somehow, the TCEQ gave them a pass.
This is the second time in less than two years that this mine has been inundated. The public will bear the cost of dredging all the sand carried downriver.
I guess the miners need the money more than you do.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/9/2023
2049 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/20230409-DJI_0542.jpg?fit=1200%2C799&ssl=17991200adminadmin2023-04-09 19:10:132023-04-10 17:15:03Swollen San Jacinto East and West Forks Sweep Through Sand Mines
East Fork Flooding Migrates Downstream
Two days ago, I wrote about San Jacinto East Fork Flooding at FM2090 in Plum Grove. Yesterday, floodwaters were peaking downstream at FM1485/SH99. No homes were threatened that I saw, but at least one vehicle stalled and was abandoned.
Pictures Taken on 4/10/23 Just After Peak
See the pictures below that I took Monday afternoon when the river was at 63 feet.
Note the difference in the width of the spans in these bridges. The newer bridge is at least 5X wider. Because water flows right to left, this creates a bottleneck that causes the roads in this area to go underwater frequently. TxDoT probably needs to widen the 1485 bridge or elevate the roadway or both.
All this was caused by rain falling 20 or more miles upstream last week.
According to the stream elevation table below, the floodwaters at FM1485 have since receded.
The floodwaters are moving even farther downstream toward the headwaters of Lake Houston. According to the Harris County Flood Warning System, the lake elevation is still about a half to a full foot above the spillway. According to USGS, the top of the spillway is at 42.4 feet above sea level.
As of this writing (noon on 4/11/23), SJRA has scaled back its releases from Lake Conroe to about 1000 cubic feet per second (CFS).
Caution to Swimmers and Waders
Swimming or wading in floodwater can endanger your life. A cubic foot of freshwater weighs about 62 pounds. Rapidly moving water that rises above knee level has enough force to easily knock adults over and sweep them downstream.
So swimmers and waders beware. This morning a reader wrote me about a woman and her daughter who were killed in the East Fork after Harvey. The woman could not battle the current. Her daughter tried to save her and both died.
Understand also that floodwaters can easily scour the riverbed to create drop-offs in unexpected places. Even if you could safely wade in areas before the flood, after the flood, you could easily step into holes over your head.
If you find yourself swept up in a strong current, don’t try to swim against it. Swim perpendicular to it or with it to reach shore.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/11/2023
2051 Days since Hurricane Harvey
Lawmakers Propose Transforming HCFCD and Its Management
Bills proposed in both the Texas House and Senate could transform the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) into the Gulf Coast Resiliency District (GCRD). The proposed legislation would make the management of the GCRD a board appointed by the Governor instead of Harris County Commissioners Court.
Senator Paul Bettencourt introduced SB2431 and Representative Dennis Paul introduced its companion bill, HB5338, in the House. Both go back to the enabling legislation for HCFCD in 1937 and change the original language in key places. For example:
Check out the bill language yourself by clicking on the links above. Virtually all HCFCD capabilities and functions remain the same. GCRD can issue bonds, build projects, partner with other entities, and acquire property as it always has.
The big change: the governor-appointed board would manage GCRD instead of Harris County Commissioners.
Why These Bills Would Benefit Harris County
While local control is normally a good thing, excessive political interference can also hinder professionals in the performance of their duties. And in fact, that has happened in Harris County. Below, I discuss eight distinct performance-sapping issues I have observed under the current administration.
1. Limited Purview of Some Harris County Commissioners
Language in both the 1937 enabling legislation for HCFCD and the 2018 flood bond let HCFCD acquire land and build projects in neighboring counties. This is necessary because floodwaters do not respect political boundaries. We need a regional approach to solve watershed-wide problems.
However, Commissioner Rodney Ellis has blocked virtually all such efforts and his Democratic colleagues have gone along with him.
Ellis rarely misses an opportunity to express his regret over letting HCFCD purchase the Woodridge Village property on the Montgomery County line. It contributed to flooding up to 600 homes in Kingwood/Harris County twice in 2019. Since acquiring the property in 2021, the county has spent less than $1,000 to build a flood-mitigation project on it.
Meanwhile, hundreds of millions of dollars have gone to projects inside the Beltway where most of Ellis’, Garcia’s and Hidalgo’s constituents live.
2. Undermining Regional Cooperation
Ellis’ stonewalling of projects across county lines also cut the legs out from under an HCFCD/Engineering Department program called Fix Flooding First.
The program proposed five “minimum drainage standards” for adjoining counties draining into Harris County. The only inducement Harris County could offer neighboring areas to cooperate was flood-bond money for partnership projects.
Without that incentive, neighboring counties, such as Montgomery and Liberty, have been slow to upgrade their drainage standards. And predictably, areas in outlying parts of Harris County have suffered as a result of insufficiently mitigated development projects upstream.
3. Punishing Republican Areas
Democrats Ellis, Garcia, and Hidalgo have consistently steered 2018 flood-bond money away from areas on the periphery of the county. This has punished political opponents.
For instance, not one capital-improvement construction project is currently underway anywhere in Precinct 3. P3 is the last remaining precinct led by a Republican in Harris County.
Screen Capture from HCFCD Active Capital and Maintenance Construction Projects on 4/8/2023. Purple dots represent capital construction projects. Orange represent maintenance projects. Precinct 3 is pink area.
4. Minimizing Flood Risk in Funding Formulas
Having spent billions of dollars since 2000 to mitigate flood risk in Low-to-Moderate-Income areas, Harris County’s Democratic majority now seeks to de-emphasize flood risk in its funding formula.
They have also eliminated common-sense metrics such as flood damage, deaths, depth of flooding, and protection of infrastructure such as schools and hospitals when scoring projects.
Flood risk now accounts for only 20% of project scoring. Non-flood-related factors such as income, population and ethnic origin account for 80%.
Using this system, projects in areas with 50-year flooding could get funded before those with 2-year flooding. But that seems to be the way the Democratic majority wants it.
5. Exhausting Local Dollars to Avoid Waiting on Federal Dollars
Roughly $2.5 billion – half the money for 2018 Flood Bond Projects – originated locally. And about a third of that was designated to attract matching funds. For instance, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development often pays up to 90% of projects, but it requires a 10% local match.
This leverage could have doubled the funds available for Harris County flood-mitigation projects. But two catches existed:
So the Democratic majority simply voted to eliminate any partnership funding from its scoring matrix – despite the fact that historically, almost a third of Harris County flood-mitigation funding has come from partners.
Instead of waiting on HUD, Democrats started using local money in LMI neighborhoods. Now there may not be enough money to cover projects in predominantly Republican neighborhoods like Kingwood, Spring, Cypress and Huffman.
6. Falloff in Partner Funding
When Commissioners voted to plow ahead with local dollars instead of waiting on Federal dollars, they said they would continue to seek partner funding wherever possible.
But almost two years after the GLO announced Harris County would get $750 million in funding, the County still hasn’t submitted a complete plan for how it would spend the money. In fact, it changed its plan twice in the last month.
Problems like these do not inspire partner confidence. And it shows.
7. Slowing Progress on Flood-Mitigation Projects
Political interference in HCFCD has led to 100% turnover in the executive ranks of HCFCD under County Judge Lina Hidalgo.
Data obtained from HCFCD via FOIA request. Decline coincides with departures of key executives.
The flood bond passed in the third quarter of 2018 when Russ Poppe, Matt Zeve and Alan Black led HCFCD.
Under their leadership, spending more than doubled in a year a half as they launched 136 projects.
Then in 2021, Poppe, the executive director, resigned after relentless backbiting in Commissioners Court over made-up equity issues. Zeve, the deputy executive director, resigned in January 2022 under similar circumstances. And Alan Black, operations manager (and later acting director), left later that year.
This slowed down HCFCD performance and placed the entire county at higher risk.
Preliminary data for the first quarter of 2023 indicate that spending could decline even more radically this year.
The turnover issue is not limited to HCFCD. It’s endemic. Under Lina Hidalgo, the heads of virtually every Harris County department have turned over – some as many as six times!
8. Equity Obsession
Commissioners had criticized the executives for not spending enough money in minority and low-income areas. In fact, HCFCD was already spending as much in eight watersheds with LMI-majority populations as they were in all 15 others combined. See below.
Still unhappy, Democrats have had to think up new ways to send even more projects to their constituents inside the Beltway.
Hence, the constant revisions to the equity scoring matrix. According to several former employees, the revisions have led to starts, stops, wasted work, frustrations and delays. These contribute to slowdowns and keep flood risk high.
Benefits to Citizens
An article by Holly Hansen in the Texan quotes Rep. Paul on why he introduced the companion bill to Bettencourt’s in the House. He cites Harris County’s mismanagement, lack of progress, and the politicization of infrastructure planning.
Solving these problems will reduce flood risk, increase productivity, and save taxpayer dollars.
Those don’t seem important under the current leadership in Harris County. Can we afford to wait another four years for a change in administration?
Normally, I favor local control. The more, the better. But with HCFCD, that local control has failed us. That’s why I wholeheartedly support these bills.
If you agree, please consider showing your support. Email Senator Bettencourt and Representative Paul. The more they hear from people, the more motivated they will be to pass the bill.
Posted by Bob Rehak on April 10, 2023
2050 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
Swollen San Jacinto East and West Forks Sweep Through Sand Mines
As floodwaters worked their way down the East and West Forks of the San Jacinto from last week’s heavy rains, they invaded sand mines on both rivers on Easter Sunday, 2023.
Up to 9 inches of rain fell in the headwaters of both rivers during 3 days from 4/5 to 4/7. Atlas-14 rainfall probability statistics indicate that equals a 5-year rain.
The Lake Conroe Dam intercepted much of the West Fork rain and is now releasing it at about 6400 cubic feet per second. There are no dams on the East Fork and the flooding there appears much worse.
West Fork Near Northpark South Development
Near the Northpark South Development on Sorters Road, the West Fork snakes its way through four square miles of sand mines. In the image below, the Hallett Mine on the right seemed secure. But the abandoned sand mines on the left and top center both opened to the river.
East Fork Near FM2090 on 4/9/2023
Normally, the East Fork at 2090 is about 30-40 feet wide – the size of the opening in the woods circled in red below. But today, the river swelled to about 2000 feet wide.
As the East Fork rose, it invaded the abandoned Texas Concrete Sand and Gravel Mine in Plum Grove.
Water entered the northern end, swept through the mine, and punched through the dikes on the southern end, carrying silt and sand with it. See sequence of pictures below.
Mine Fails to Meet Guidelines for Abandonment
This mine does not meet TCEQ guidelines for abandonment. The miners left equipment, including a dredge. They also failed to grade stockpiles, remove buildings, and plant grass. Yet somehow, the TCEQ gave them a pass.
This is the second time in less than two years that this mine has been inundated. The public will bear the cost of dredging all the sand carried downriver.
Ironically, a bill introduced by State Rep. Charles Cunningham requiring financial surety for sand mine reclamation remains bottled up in the House Natural Resources Committee. See HB1093.
I guess the miners need the money more than you do.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/9/2023
2049 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.