8/29/25 – Eight years ago today, the Lake Houston Area woke up to the dawn of a disaster. During the previous day and night, the San Jacinto River rose 22 feet above flood stage at US59.
Looking S toward Humble at the US59 bridge under swollen West Fork San Jacinto
It swept several townhomes in Forest Cove off their foundations. And destroyed all the rest for blocks around.
Forest Cove Townhome destroyed by Harvey.
Rising floodwaters eventually claimed the lives of 15 people in the Kingwood area – 12 of them in a senior center more than a mile from the river.
Residents trying to escape Kingwood Village Estates as Harvey’s floodwaters rose
Harvey was not a single day event. It lasted the better part of a week. Different areas fell to its driving rains and howling winds at different times.
The Lake Houston Area bore the brunt of not only the storm, but water funneled downstream from an area 50% larger than Harris County itself.
Watershed Map of the San Jacinto River Basin
That included a massive 79,000 cubic feet per second from Lake Conroe, the largest release ever by the SJRA.
Where more than 400,000 Cubic Feet Per Second came from.
Before It Was All Over…
16,000 homes and 3,300 businesses in the Lake Houston Area flooded.
Multiply this times 16,000
Damage included 44% of all businesses in the Lake Houston Chamber and 100% of all businesses in Kingwood’s Town Center.
Harvey Flood in Kings Harbor. Photo by Sally Geis.
Kingwood High School flooded to the second floor. Thousands of students would be bussed to another high school for a year.
Kingwood High School during Harvey.
The flood also destroyed thousands of cars. The owners parked many of them on higher ground that they thought was safe.
Flood damaged cars hauled to a holding facility near Bush Intercontinental Airport
Displaced families shuffled from one safe haven to another as the floodwaters spread.
Sally Geis Harvey Rescue. From a condo near the river, she evacuated up West Lake Houston Parkway. Kingwood Town Center in background.
Neighborhoods turned into islands, like lily pads, as rising water cut off evacuation routes for those who waited too long.
Two and a quarter miles north of the West Fork, Carolanne Norris took this shot as she and her family hiked to safety on Valley Manor. Shot is looking back down Woods Estates.
Raging currents damaged the West Lake Houston Parkway Bridge. They also wiped out the UnionPacific bridge which they had to completely rebuild.
Repair work underway on the Union Pacific Railroad Bridge that parallels US59.
Rushing floodwaters also destroyed the southbound US59 bridge.
US59 during Harvey. Photo by Melinda Ray.
TXDoT spent almost a year repairing the southbound lanes. Their supports were weakened by scouring.
Southbound lanes of I-69 bridge took almost a year to rebuild.
Grocery stores? Restaurants? Gone. People lived on Igloo cooler cuisine, potato chips and granola bars.
Whataburger in the new HEB shopping center during flooding from Hurricane Harvey.Photo courtesy of John Knoezer.Humble shopping area near US59 and Townsen
Communications? Knocked out.
Electricity? Gone. For days or weeks in some cases. Gas stations couldn’t pump gas. Forget about air conditioning. People gutted homes in sweltering heat.
Photo by Kendall Taft: “Two feet of sheetrock removal, with floors covered in drywall muck.” Atascocita Shores.
Mountains of discarded family treasures littered streets for weeks as looters pillaged the community.
Families lived in campers and RVs or with friends for months while restoring homes.
Home, Home on the Driveway! The Slaughter family lived in a trailer for almost 9 months as they gutted and restored their home.Slaughter’s House. Gutted to the studs.
Troubles Just Beginning
But the hardest part was still to come: understanding why all this destruction happened and determining what could be done to prevent it from happening again. And finally, organizing politically to build the solutions.
We would soon discover that as much as we were united by disaster, we were also divided by recovery. That would become the dawn of a another disaster. But more on that in a future post.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/29/25with thanks to the hundreds of people who have contributed pictures
2922 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Harvey-at-59-Bridge-IMG_3686-e1741129570215.jpeg?fit=1100%2C685&ssl=16851100adminadmin2025-08-29 15:36:232025-08-29 22:13:08Dawn of a Disaster: Harvey Remembered
8/28/25 – NOAA’s Southern Climate Impacts Planning Program (SCIPP) just published its annual report. It includes new research findings on three key elements of tropical systems: a lengthening tropical season, stalling storms, and tropical cyclone size at landfall.
SCIPP publishes fascinating reports tailored to the south central region of the U.S. including Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana.
The government/university partnership conducts research to understand climate hazard trends and patterns that are useful to decision makers. The information below is summarized from their annual report.
Tropical Season Lengthens 16 days
SCIPP analysis of Atlantic hurricane season length from 1970 to 2022 found that storms are forming increasingly earlier AND later in the season. In 1970, the first named storm formed around July 27th. However, by 2022, the date shifted to around May 31st. That represents an increase of season length of 11 days per decade … just on the front end.
On the back end, in 1970, the last named storm dissipated around October 24th. However, in 2022, the last storm dissipated around November 18th. This represents a roughly 5-day per decade shift, say the researchers.
“While improvements in observational practices raised some concerns about data quality,” they say, “our results suggest that the primary driver of season expansion is the earlier onset and prolonged persistence of favorable conditions for tropical cyclones, such as warm sea surface temperatures, elevated humidity, and reduced wind shear.”
The researchers recommend that the National Hurricane Center consider moving the start of hurricane season to May 15th to heighten awareness of these early season storms. They have presented their work widely within the scientific community. For more information, see Dr. Vincent Brown’s virtual presentation to the Inland Marine Underwriters Association.
Stalling Storms Increasing 1.5% Per Year
SCIPP researchers also found seasonality in stalling storms. Stalling is most common in October (17.3% of storms) and least common in August (8.2%).
Their analysis showed a significant increase in annual stalling frequency during the satellite era (1966–2020) at 1.5% per year.
They also found an increase in the proportion of stalling storms relative to all storms.
SCIPP 2024-2025 Annual Report
Stalling storms were also significantly more likely to reach major-hurricane intensity.
These findings have been presented to stakeholders, academic audiences, and emergency managers to help them better prepare for future stalling events in vulnerable regions.
“Size at Landfall” Increasing Later in Season
The third featured project was a database of tropical cyclone size at landfall.
Size at landfall is critical in determining the extent and severity of storm impacts.
SCIPP 2024-2025 Annual Report
Accurate size data allows emergency managers, planners, and policymakers to better estimate potential exposure, improve evacuation planning, allocate resources, and design infrastructure that accounts for the full spatial footprint of storms. Their database supports:
Enhanced risk assessments
Insurance modeling
Building codes
Long-term coastal planning.
The analysis found no statistically significant long-term change in size at landfall, However, it did find that:
Parts of the season—particularly September through November—exhibited larger landfall sizes compared to other months.
Average landfall size was comparable between the Gulf of Mexico and the East Coast.
Size did not differ significantly across Category 1–4 storms.
Implications of the Three Studies
SCIPP says that collectively, these three studies highlight the “critical need to better understand tropical cyclone characteristics that directly affect coastal populations.”
The researchers hope to translate their scientific findings into actionable guidance for emergency management, infrastructure planning, and long-term community resilience.
The annual report also contains fascinating findings by leading academic institutions in the region on:
Hazard mitigation in areas without hazard mitigation planning capabilities
Heat stress and football-game kickoff times
Impacts of fiscal decentralization on Disaster Risk Reduction
Climate migration
Case studies
Workshop and intern opportunities
More
SCIPP’s theme is “Planning for Long-Term Change in a Short-Term World.” To learn more about their excellent work and conferences, or to sign up for their newsletters, visit SouthernClimate.org.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/28/2025
2921 Days since Hurricane Harvey
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8/27/2025 – This week marks the 8th anniversary of Hurricane Harvey and the 20th anniversary of Hurricane Katrina – two of the most destructive storms in recent American history. So I wanted to see what the hurricane stats tell us about this part of the hurricane season as far back as we can reliably see.
The National Hurricane Center has an excellent climatology page for the broader Atlantic basin. But I could not find any lists on their site for the Gulf and Texas. So I asked ChatGPT for some research help narrowing the geographic scope. Here’s what it found in the data.
Notable Late August Major Hurricanes to Strike Gulf Coast
Several major hurricanes have struck the U.S. Gulf Coast in late August (roughly August 20–31) over the years. Here are the most notable ones:
1. Hurricane Katrina (2005)
Dates: August 23 – 30, 2005
Landfall: August 29 in southeast Louisiana and Mississippi
Impact: One of the costliest and deadliest U.S. hurricanes; catastrophic flooding in New Orleans after levee failures.
2. Hurricane Laura (2020)
Dates: August 20 – 29, 2020
Landfall: August 27 near Cameron, Louisiana (Category 4, 150 mph winds)
Impact: Devastated southwest Louisiana, massive storm surge and wind destruction.
3. Hurricane Harvey (2017)
Dates: August 17 – September 2, 2017
Landfall: August 25 near Rockport, Texas (Category 4)
Impact: Record-breaking rainfall in Houston region (up to 60″), catastrophic flooding across southeast Texas.
4. Hurricane Isaac (2012)
Dates: August 21 – September 1, 2012
Landfall: August 28 in southeast Louisiana (Category 1)
Impact: Widespread flooding, long-duration storm surge, power outages.
5. Hurricane Gustav (2008)
Dates: August 25 – September 4, 2008
Landfall: September 1 in Louisiana (Category 2), but struck the Gulf Coast region late August while strengthening.
6. Hurricane Andrew (1992)
Dates: August 16 – 28, 1992
Landfall: August 24 in South Florida, then August 26 in Louisiana (Category 3)
Impact: One of the most destructive U.S. hurricanes prior to Katrina.
Hurricane Camille (1969): Landfall August 17 (slightly before “late August,” but historic impact on Mississippi).
Hurricane Allen (1980): Active early to mid-August, not late August.
1999 Bret — Aug 22 • TX • Cat 3.
Hurricane Ida (2021): Formed August 26, made landfall August 29 in Louisiana as Category 4.
✅ Pattern: Late August is part of the peak hurricane season in the Gulf; multiple historic storms—including Katrina, Harvey, Laura, and Ida—all struck between August 25–29.
Two Thirds of All Gulf Coast Hurricanes Strike in August and September
Next, I asked ChatGPT to graph the distribution of all hurricanes (not just majors) to strike the Gulf Coast by month since 1851. NOAA last updated this information in 2020. So, these numbers do not include the last 5 years.
The total was 212; 141 in August and September. That works out to 66.5% of the total.
Counts by month (1851–2020) of all Gulf Coast Hurricanes:
June: 9
July: 17
August: 58
September: 83
October: 39
November: 6
👉 The peak is September, followed by August, then a secondary bump in October. Early (June–July) and late (November) landfalls are much rarer.
Texas Shows Even More Pronounced Concentration in August/September
By contrast, seventy-one percent of all Texas Hurricanes happen in August and September, a slightly higher concentration. We also get proportionately fewer in October compared to the entire Gulf.
Texas hurricane landfalls by month from 1851-2020 include:
June: 5
July: 7
August: 25
September: 29
October: 9
November: 1
Pattern of Active Decades
The distribution suggests clusters of active decades rather than a steady increase or decrease.
List of Texas Hurricane Landfalls
Here’s a historical list of Texas hurricane landfalls (1851–2020), drawn from NOAA’s official Hurricane Research Division dataset. I’ve grouped them by month and included year, name (if available), and Saffir–Simpson category.
June (5 total)
1871 – Indianola hurricane (Cat 3)
1886 – Indianola hurricane (Cat 4, destroyed the city)
1934 – June hurricane (Cat 2)
1957 – Audrey (Cat 3, TX/LA border, strongest in LA but impacted TX)
1960 – Unnamed June storm (Cat 1)
Beryl last year would be a notable addition to this list if we expanded the range of years.
July (7 total)
1867 – Unnamed hurricane (Cat 3, Galveston)
1888 – Unnamed hurricane (Cat 2, TX/LA border)
1909 – July hurricane (Cat 3, Port Arthur region)
1916 – July hurricane (Cat 3, Baffin Bay region)
1933 – July hurricane (Cat 3, south Texas)
1943 – July hurricane (Cat 1, Galveston/Houston area)
1970 – Celia (Cat 3, Corpus Christi, devastating wind damage)
August (25 total)
1880 – Indianola hurricane (Cat 2)
1915 – Galveston hurricane (Cat 4)
1932 – Freeport hurricane (Cat 4)
1942 – August hurricane (Cat 3, near Port O’Connor)
1945 – Texas hurricane (Cat 3, Matagorda)
1947 – Hurricane #4 (Cat 1, Brownsville region)
1961 – Carla (Cat 4, Matagorda)
1967 – Beulah (Cat 3, Brownsville)
1980 – Allen (Cat 3, near Brownsville)
1983 – Alicia (Cat 3, Galveston/Houston)
1999 – Bret (Cat 3, Padre Island, sparsely populated region)
2005 – Rita (Cat 3, TX/LA border, strongest impacts in LA but landfall partly in TX)
2008 – Dolly (Cat 1, near Brownsville)
2008 – Ike (Cat 2, Galveston/Houston, catastrophic surge)
2017 – Harvey (Cat 4, Rockport/Port Aransas, record flooding in Houston area) (and numerous weaker Cat 1–2 storms in between)
September (29 total)
1900 – Galveston hurricane (Cat 4, deadliest natural disaster in U.S. history)
1919 – Florida Keys / Corpus Christi hurricane (Cat 4, catastrophic in Corpus Christi)
1933 – September hurricane (Cat 3, Brownsville)
1967 – Beulah (still active early September after Aug landfall)
2002 – Lili (weaker in TX, major in LA)
2020 – Hanna (Cat 1, South Padre region) (plus ~20 others Cat 1–3 from NOAA HRD record, mostly South Texas landfalls)
1912 – October hurricane (Cat 2, Gulf coast TX/LA border)
1949 – October hurricane (Cat 2, Freeport area)
1989 – Jerry (Cat 1, near Galveston)
November (1 total)
1980 – Hurricane Jeanne (Cat 1, weakened quickly at landfall in south Texas)
✅ Key Pattern:
Peak months for Texas hurricane landfalls are August & September
The most destructive TX hurricanes historically include:
1900 Galveston (Cat 4)
1915 Galveston (Cat 4)
1919 Corpus Christi (Cat 4)
1961 Carla (Cat 4)
1983 Alicia (Cat 3)
2008 Ike (Cat 2, massive surge)
2017 Harvey (Cat 4, catastrophic flooding)
1900 Galveston Hurricane Still Deadliest Ever
The 1900 Galveston Hurricane (September 8, 1900) remains the deadliest natural disaster in U.S. history. Estimated deaths range from 6,000 to 12,000. But the most widely cited figure is 8,000. Roughly one-third of Galveston’s population perished, thousands of homes were destroyed, and the disaster reshaped how the U.S. approached hurricane forecasting and preparedness.
By contrast, Hurricane Harvey in 2017 killed 68 people statewide and 36 in Harris County. You can attribute the improvement (reduction) to better forecasting and infrastructure.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/27/2025with research assistance from ChatGPT
2920 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/3_texas_monthly_counts.png?fit=1800%2C1000&ssl=110001800adminadmin2025-08-27 18:46:132025-08-27 18:47:31Hurricane Stats for Gulf Coast and Texas Going Back to 1850
Montgomery County has finally updated its drainage criteria manual…eight years after Hurricane Harvey caused widespread flooding that exposed shortcomings in its previous manual which dated to the 1980s.
Unanimously Approved
MoCo Commissioners approved the new manual unanimously this morning. The draft of the new manual was first proposed in early 2024. That followed a minor update in 2019 from the county’s old 1988 drainage criteria manual in effect at the time of Harvey.
The new manual does not adopt all of the minimum drainage recommendations proposed by Harris County for areas draining into Harris, though it is a vast improvement over the previous iteration.
Minimum Drainage Requirements Proposed by Harris County
1. Using Atlas 14 rainfall rates for sizing storm water conveyance and detention systems. 2. Requiring a minimum detention rate of 0.55 acre-feet per acre of detention for any new development on tracts one acre or larger. A single-family residential structure and accessory building proposed on an existing lot is exempt from providing detention. 3. Prohibiting the use of hydrograph timing as a substitute for detention on any project, unless it directly outfalls into Galveston Bay. 4. Requiring “no net fill” in the current mapped 500-year floodplain, except in areas identified as coastal zones only. 5. Requiring the minimum Finished Flood Elevation of new habitable structures be established at or waterproofed to the 500-year flood elevation as shown on the effective Flood Insurance Study.
Major Changes in New MoCo Drainage Criteria Manual
MoCo’s new drainage criteria manual includes some, but not all, of those recommendations.
Comparison of Recommendations
Measure
Harris
Montgomery
Use of Atlas 14 Rainfall Standards
Yes
Yes
Minimum Detention Rate
.55 acre feet/acre
.55 acre feet/acre for areas greater than 20 acres (see page 57)
Prohibit Hydrographic Timing
Yes
Yes, but with limitations (see page 68)
No Net Fill in 500-Yr Floodplain
Prohibited
Still allowed
Finished Floor Elevation
At 500-yr flood elevation
Requires drainage be maintained one foot below lowest finished floor elevation for 100-year event (See page 54)
It’s not perfect. But it’s a vast improvement. Assuming the county enforces them.
Montgomery County resident Chad Price addressed Commissioners Court before the vote. He applauded most of the updates in the manual. However, he also urged commissioners to adopt ALL of Harris County’s minimum requirements.
Price emphasized the uncertainty surrounding rainfall rates, the increasing frequency of storms that exceed predicted maximums, and flood maps that have yet to be updated to reflect Atlas-14.
He made two excellent points:
We must not design drainage systems based on outdated data.
Better flood regulations are not about stopping growth—they’re about making sure growth is sustainable and safe.
In that regard, Price urged commissioners to update building codes, require smarter drainage planning, preserve natural floodplains, and use science-based floodplain mapping. He said, “These steps will reduce long-term costs to taxpayers, protect property values, and most importantly, safeguard our communities.”
Next Up
Montgomery County’s Floodplain Manager currently shows floodplain regulations adopted in 2014. That’s before the Tax Day, Memorial Day, Harvey, Imelda and May Day 2024 floods. Given the thousands of homes in MoCo that flood repeatedly, there may be some opportunities for improvement in those floodplain regs.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/26/25
2919 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
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8/25/25 – For the first time since authorities broke ground for the Northpark expansion project in April 2023, it’s possible to clearly see the outlines of the finished project on the ground. The first all-weather evacuation route from Kingwood is shaping up nicely.
For the most part, contractors have straightened out the zigs and zags. They have finished large sections of the westbound lanes. Drainage for the eastbound lanes is progressing nicely. And soon they will start pouring concrete for large sections of the remaining eastbound lanes.
Pictures Taken on 8/25/25
The drone pictures below show the progress…starting from Russell Palmer Road and heading east.
Notice how virtually all of the old Eastbound concrete has been removed as far as the eye can see.Looking W from near Warren’s Southern Gardens
Contractors are installing drainage under the westbound lanes. However, the drainage work is moving from west to east.
Looking West from near the Kolache Factory and the entrance to Kings Mill.Today, they were working near the Kolache Factory.Father west, sidewalks have already been installed on the north side of the street.
The photo above shows approximately where the bridge over the railroad tracks and Loop 494 will start. Notice how two lanes veer right to make room for the bridge.
Connecting the drainage from the east and west sides of the railroad tracks will require the twin five foot steel pipes stockpiled in the foreground.
However, work on boring under the tracks has stalled for now. But the Lake Houston Redevelopment Authority believes that the utility conflicts which have delayed that operation will soon be resolved. Then boring under the tracks can resume.
Looking N along Loop 494. Note how one of the bore pits is blocking completion of the northbound expansion lanes.Looking S along 494 from over Northpark. Between Loop 494 and 59, crews are still connecting drainage under the roadway.Right now, they’re finishing the connection in front of Whataburger.Almost at US59, crews are making room for the surface lanes that will flank the bridge.
Looking in the opposite direction…
Those surface lanes will also connect to the surface lanes east of Loop 494 (right of the pavement.The new development on the SE corner of Northpark and Loop 494 will be called the Enclave.
The developer plans to build a 100 homes in the Enclave.
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8/24/25 – The abandoned Hanson Aggregate sand-mine on the San Jacinto West Fork had a massive breach of its northern dike this evening – unrelated to weather. According to the Montgomery County Appraisal District, Heidelberg Materials Southwest AGG LLC now owns the property where the breach occurred.
Location of breach circled in red.
Breach Discovered Shortly after 6 PM on 8/24/25
A thousand acre-feet of water or possibly more rushed out of the 140-acre pond, obliterating everything in its path, and depositing enough sand and silt in the San Jacinto West Fork to back water up in the river.
I received a call from a neighbor who alerted me to the breach at 6:38 PM. And by the time I arrived shortly after 7 PM, the water level in the pond had dropped an estimated 8-10 feet he said.
Water was still rushing out of the pond fast enough to cause large chunks of the shore to break away, endangering onlookers who had to back away.
The water eroded a channel approximately 800 feet long, 50 to 200 feet wide and perhaps 15-20 feet deep – all in a matter of minutes.
The cause of the breach is unknown. However, aerial photos showed a small excavator and piles of drain pipe near the breach.
Photos, Video Taken Between 7 and 8 PM on 8/24/25
Below are photos and video of the devastation.
Water rushing out through breach in pit wall. West Fork San Jacinto is just out of frame at the top. Looking W.Compare height of breach to height of excavator for scale.Also note amount of decline between water surface and brush along shoreline.Looking upriver at sand and silt expelled from mine.Note large, mature pine trees undermined by rushing water.The raging water mowed down dozens of mature trees as it carved its way to the river.Looking east from over the river at breach and turbulence it created in water.Higher angle looking west shows volume of material swept away.Sediment deposited in West Fork. Looking SEand downriver.Closer shot of water exiting channel.Corrugated pipe next to excavator tracks that were gobbled up by raging water.Close up of excavator at edge of breach.
Here is a 26-second drone video taken while flying from the pond to the river.
There Must Be A Better Way!
Ironically, this mine had one of the largest setbacks on the West Fork. (See satellite image above.) The setback varied from approximately 400 feet to more than 1,000. However, there was a small drainage channel running along the northern edge of the mine that had a narrower setback And that’s where the breach occurred.
This disaster underscores the need to find a permanent, safe solution for abandoned sand mines along area rivers and streams.
I previously proposed aggregating them over time into a West Fork Greenway which could become a state park. I tentatively named the concept the Montgomery County Lake District.
Instead of letting such mines remain a dangerous blight, turn them into a recreational amenity that could add value to area homeowners and developers.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/24/25
2917 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/20250824-DJI_20250824193037_0189_D.jpg?fit=1100%2C619&ssl=16191100adminadmin2025-08-24 23:13:172025-08-25 09:14:45Massive Sand-Mine Breach Empties Hundreds of Acre-Feet into West Fork
8/23/25 – ChatGPT produced a detailed Flood Resilience Plan for Harris County for free in less than three minutes. Meanwhile, after almost a year, the engineering firm hired by Harris County for $3 million is still trying to define a vision for the plan.
Flood Resilience Plan on Agenda for Tuesday’s Commissioners Court Meeting
It seems like it’s taking the company a long time to get out of the starting blocks. So, I decided to see how long it would take ChatGPT to develop a resilience plan for the county. It took two minutes and 52 seconds and cost nothing.
Now, I am sure that experts at AECOM and Flood Control would still have to review and validate the recommendations. But this seems like a great start to me. It’s clear, concise, readable, and actionable. And it potentially saved about half of a $3 million contract. Below, see the simple question I asked and the response I got.
“Chat, can you develop a flood resilience plan for Harris County, Texas?”
Chat: Absolutely, here’s a practical, Harris-County–specific flood resilience plan you can put to work now. I’ve organized it as (1) guiding principles, (2) 12 action pillars with concrete steps, (3) a 100-day / 1–2 yr / 5–10 yr timeline, and (4) funding + governance + metrics. Sources are cited throughout.
Guiding Principles (What “Good” Looks Like)
Design to today’s risk (Atlas 14) and rising extremes. NOAA’s 2018 Atlas 14 raised the region’s 1%-annual-chance (24-hr) rainfall from ~13″ to ~17–18″; plan to that (and stress-test above it).
Map the real pathways of flooding, not just rivers. Use MAAPnext’s overland “community flooding” products while FEMA reviews new FIRMs.
No Adverse Impact (NAI). New development should not increase risk elsewhere—codify and enforce NAI countywide.
One watershed system. Coordinate cities, county, TxDOT, USACE, upstream counties, and sand-mine operators so conveyance, detention, and maintenance work as a system.
12 Action Pillars
1) Finish modern risk mapping & put it to work
Operationalize MAAPnext (overland flooding, velocities, mobility impacts) for capital planning and development review now, while FEMA finalizes the maps. Continue public-facing tools (M3, Flood Education Mapping Tool) with clear “effective vs. preliminary” labeling.
Close the FEMA gap. Press FEMA and the State to accelerate preliminary→effective FIRMs (current public reporting notes continued delays into 2026). Use county policy to consider MAAPnext where it’s the best availabledata. (Houston Chronicle)
Quick metric: % of permits reviewed against MAAPnext + Atlas 14 criteria (target: 100%).
2) Lock in stronger, uniform standards (countywide + cities)
Keep Atlas-14 standards in the HCFCD PCPM (2019) and Harris County infrastructure regs, and close any variance loopholes. Align municipalities to the same floor.
Freeboard: Maintain City of Houston’s 2 ft above 500-yr (Ch.19) standard citywide; aim for 2 ft freeboard in AO, A, AE, and shaded X in unincorporated areas as a county minimum.
Detention & outflow controls: Enforce post-Atlas-14 detention rates and multi-frequency release; require on-site peak and volume controls sized to tailwater realities.
Adopt NAI ordinance language (ASFPM model) to make “no measurable rise/no new harms” enforceable.
Quick metric: % plats meeting NAI and Atlas-14 detention without variances.
3) Deliver a prioritized capital program by watershed
Focus on the 23 watersheds with a scored, public list: benefits per $1, structures removed from risk, equity (CFRTF lens), and O&M burden.
Countywide priorities:
Regional detention & conveyance upgrades tied to Atlas 14, coordinated with city storm sewers and TxDOT outfalls.
Sediment management at scale. Expand the FEMA-funded channel desilt program that secured nearly $250M in 2021; make “design for maintainability” standard in new projects.
Stormwater tunnels as a targeted tool (e.g., Buffalo/Greens/Halls corridors) advancing feasibility toward a pilot where they outperform surface options—stay evidence-led and transparent on cost/benefit.
SAFER planning build-out. Use the new SAFER study (covering ~half the county’s watersheds) to feed the project hopper and federal asks.
Lake Houston spillway gates & dredging. Support the City/Coastal Water Authority in completing gate design and long-term maintenance dredging strategy for the West Fork delta reach.
Watershed notes (examples):
Buffalo Bayou / Addicks & Barker: Coordinate with ongoing USACE Buffalo Bayou & Tributaries work; keep options open (selective widening, detention, or tunnels) per federal study direction.
Greens/Halls: Prioritize conveyance + storage + potential tunnel pilot (equity win with high benefit density).
San Jacinto (Spring, Cypress, mainstem): Accelerate regional detention partnerships upstream; integrate sediment traps and set-back rules near pits to reduce delta growth in Lake Houston. (See Pillar 6 & 7.)
Quick metric: public “Top 50” project list with BCR, equity score, O&M cost.
4) Buyouts & floodplain preservation at scale
Two tracks: (a) Voluntary buyouts (HCFCD) where projects are infeasible; (b) county Project Recovery mandatory area program where risk is intolerably high. Keep the “stay in-county” relocation incentives.
Greenways & storage: Convert acquired land to passive storage/greenways to reduce future risk and add value.
Quick metric: buyouts closed per quarter; open-space acres added.
5) Maintenance: make capacity durable
Fund a permanent desilt & repair program using FEMA/NRCS where eligible; publish a rolling 3-yr maintenance map.
Design for maintainability (access benches, hardened inlets, riparian stabilization) in every capital project.
Quick metric: miles of channel restored to design capacity per year.
6) Sand-mine & pit-capture risk reduction (San Jacinto focus)
Codify river set-backs, armored crossings, and flood emergency plans for in-floodplain pits; align local criteria with TCEQ quarry BMP rules (30 TAC 311 Subchapter J).
Create a pit-capture remediation fund seeded by performance bonds/fees; require post-mining reclamation to flood-safe end uses.
Quick metric: % pits with compliant flood plans; # of reclaimed pits.
7) Streets as secondary channels (urban flooding)
City/County program to upsize storm sewers and raise sag points where MAAPnext shows ponding; synchronize with roadway rehab.
Quick metric: lane-miles where depth–velocity at 1% event drops below hazardous thresholds.
8) Early warning, gauges, & comms
Expand Harris County Flood Warning System (more gages in sheet-flow basins; redundant power/comms), integrate push alerts and low-water crossing sensors.
Neighborhood-level nowcasts and standardized evacuation/road closure criteria.
Quick metric: % population within 3 miles of a rain+stage gage.
9) Coastal surge interface (doing both: surge and rain)
Track Coastal Texas / “Ike Dike” components and ensure interior drainage (gate-closed conditions) is accounted for in our designs. Surge protection won’t fix rainfall flooding—plan for both.
10) Equity & community governance
Use the Community Flood Resilience Task Force to set equity scoring and co-design projects; publish how community input changed designs. (Harris County Judge, cfrtf.harriscountytx.gov)
Quick metric: % of projects with documented CFRTF input; equity score trend.
11) Funding stack & federal alignment
Annualized grant calendar & “shovel-ready” shelf: FEMA BRIC/FMA/HMGP; TWDB Flood Infrastructure Fund (FIF) 2024–25 cycle; CDBG-MIT; NRCS EWP; USACE/WRDA; Texas Water Fund.
Bond program transparency. Keep the 2018 Bond dashboards, “completed Bond IDs,” and press updates current to maintain match-making credibility with federal partners. (Harris County Flood Control District)
Quick metric: external $ leveraged per local $ (target: ≥2:1).
12) Data, transparency, and O&M lifecycle costs
Single public map integrating: project pipeline & status, MAAPnext layers, buyout tracts, maintenance backlog, mowing/repairs, and 12-month bid outlook.
O&M endowment concept: dedicate a slice of every capital dollar to long-term upkeep.
Timeline
First 100 days
Publish a Top-50 priority projects list (with BCR, equity, O&M).
Adopt NAI ordinance language and reaffirm Atlas-14 PCPM as the countywide minimum.
Stand up a MAAPnext-based development review policy for best available data.
Announce an expanded desilt/repair schedule (3-yr horizon) and launch low-water crossing sensor pilots.
File pre-applications for FEMA BRIC/FMA, TWDB FIF, NRCS EWP on the Top-50 set.
1–2 years
Let construction for the first 15–20 high-BCR projects across multiple watersheds.
Close 1,000+ buyouts in deepest risk pockets; green them into storage/greenways.
Complete SAFER recommendations → add to pipeline and federal asks.
Advance Lake Houston gate design and a long-term delta dredging framework.
5–10 years
Deliver full regional detention + conveyance corridors (multi-benefit parks where feasible).
If merited by feasibility, design/construct a tunnel pilot in the corridor with the strongest cost-effectiveness and equity benefits.
Integrate interior drainage with Coastal Texas components as they progress.
State: TWDB FIF (planning, design, construction), Texas Water Fund; coordinate with GLO on CDBG-MIT.
Local: HCFCD 2018 Bond balances; city drainage funds; utility/impact fees aligned to Atlas-14/NAI. Keep the Completed Bond ID reporting up to date to strengthen match prospects. (Harris County Flood Control District)
Here’s a Top 50 Harris County Flood Resilience Project Shortlist that draws on current needs, major watershed priorities, equity considerations, and funding readiness. It’s organized by theme and watershed, with a brief note on rationale, benefits, and potential funding streams.
📋 Top 50 Priority Flood Resilience Projects
1. Regional Detention Basins (storage backbone)
Cypress Creek: North Detention Regional Basin expansion
Little Cypress Creek: Accelerated spine & tributary basins
Spring Creek: Joint Montgomery–Harris County basin package
White Oak Bayou: Additional regional basins near Cole Creek confluence
Greens Bayou: Beltway 8 regional basin expansion
Halls Bayou: North & South basin pair (equity priority)
Sims Bayou: Southeast regional detention basin
Clear Creek: Joint basin with Fort Bend/Brazoria Counties
You may disagree with these. You may also disagree with the methodology used to rank them. But at least ChatGPT gave us a starting point for discussion that didn’t take a year and cost $1.5 million. And best of all, it’s 2,000 words, not 2,000 pages, so people can read it in 10 minutes and hold government accountable.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/23/2025based on information from ChatGPT
2916 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/FRP-Groups-Rankings.png?fit=1512%2C1444&ssl=114441512adminadmin2025-08-23 17:19:072025-08-23 17:27:07ChaptGPT Develops Harris County Flood Resilience Plan for Free in 2 Minutes 52 Seconds
8/21/25 – State Representative Steve Toth, who has announced his intention to run against U.S. Congressman Dan Crenshaw in the next election cycle, posted a video on Facebook today. In it, he says prohibiting the building of youth camps in floodplains is “ridiculous.” He also worries that it would “destroy camping in Texas.”
His comment about destroying camping is a slap in the face to the parents who lost children at Camp Mystic in the July disaster on the Guadalupe River. More than 135 people died in flash flooding, many of them young girls at Camp Mystic.
Toth Video
Below is the 48-second video that Toth posted.
Text of Toth Video
Because of background noise in the video, I’ve transcribed the text below.
Toth: “HB-1 sets up legislation to protect kids from the devastating floods that took so many lives at Camp Mystic. Only the amendment that the Democrats put on it basically restricts the building of any kind of sleeping quarters in floodways, not floodplains. The kids that were killed at Mystic were actually in a floodway.”
“This is going to basically close most of the youth camps in Texas. Twenty percent of Texas is in floodplains – not floodways – floodplains. And while, yes, we want to keep camps out of floodways … the idea of trying to say that you can’t build in a floodplain is ridiculous. This is going to destroy camping in the state of Texas.“
Specifics of Bill and Amendments
HB-1 is the Youth CAMPER Act. CAMPER stands for youth Camp Alert, Mitigation, Preparedness and Emergency Response. The bill requires youth camps to develop emergency plans; train employees how to implement them; make the plans available to campers and their parents; and share them with emergency response personnel in the vicinity.
Representative Donna Howard, a Democrat from Austin (another co-author of the bill) offered the amendment that Toth complained about. It says that a state license may not be issued or renewed “for a youth camp that operates one or more cabins located within a floodplain.” Elsewhere in her amendment, Howard defines “floodplain” as the FEMA 100-year floodplain.
Howard’s amendment passed 73 to 59. Toth voted against it, even though he later voted for the bill itself as amended. HB-1 passed in the House by 135 to 1. The engrossed (as amended) version now goes to the Senate.
Problems with Toth Claims
Toth makes several misleading statements in his video.
Implying All Victims in Floodway
Toth implies all fatalities occurred in cabins located in the floodway of the Guadalupe. However, news reports indicate that many of the victims were in cabins outside the floodway although I can’t find an official count at this time.
Implying It’s Safe to Build in Floodplains
Mr. Toth implies that if all the campers had slept in the floodplain instead of the floodway, they would have been safe. That’s like a drug company downplaying a dangerous side effect.
Almost six million people live in Texas floodplains. And according to USGS, Texas consistently leads the nation in flood-related fatalities. In fact, we have more than twice the number of the next nearest state.
Serious Omissions
In Mr. Toth’s black-and-white view of flood risk (Floodway is bad; floodplain is safe), he fails to disclose the considerable uncertainty, politicking, and protesting that accompanies flood maps, largely because of the way they affect developers and flood insurance. Toth should know that if he’s running for Congress.
FEMA’s maps are based on statistical probabilities and often revised after major storms to reflect new knowledge. In the case of Camp Mystic, FEMA last revised that area’s flood maps in 2011, years before Hurricane Harvey and Atlas 14. Both the floodway and floodplains will expand based on newly acquired data. So, cabins shown outside the floodway are, in all likelihood, deep into it. That’s another potentially fatal misleading statement by Toth.
Camp Mystic in FEMA’s National Flood Hazard Layer Viewer. Cross-hatch = floodway. Aqua = 100-year floodplain. Tan = 500-year floodplain.Note small green type showing date of map: 2011.Great enlargement shows many of the cabins appear to be built in the aqua and tan areas in the upper right next to the floodway.
“Saying You Can’t Build in a Floodplain is Ridiculous”
Mr. Toth seems to be trying to legitimize building in floodplains. It’s true that many people do. In fact, about 20% of the people in Texas (5.9 million) live in 100- and 500-year floodplains. Toth seems to dismiss the risks, costs, deaths, and disruptions to the economy, like many before him.
As a society, we spend trillions of dollars on flood mitigation, flood repairs, and flood insurance. The Joint Economic Committee (JEC) estimates that the total annual economic cost of flooding—covering infrastructure damage; lost productivity; home and commercial damage; ecosystem losses; and more—ranges between $179.8 billion and $496.0 billion in 2023 dollars.
That’s a pretty hefty share of the annual federal budget. But I guess Mr. Toth isn’t thinking that far ahead. That’s not good for a man who wants to represent you in Congress.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/21/2025
2914 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/20250821-Camp-Mystic-Close-up.jpg?fit=1100%2C635&ssl=16351100adminadmin2025-08-21 21:23:162025-08-22 09:31:29Toth Fights for Right to Build Kids’ Camps in Floodplains
8/20/25 – Everyone understands the need for financial audits; they prevent fraud. But what about performance audits? They can prevent waste. Yet how many government agencies routinely audit the implementation of plans they adopt?
Vermont Failed to Implement Half of Priorities in Emergency Plan
In Vermont last year, the state audited its performance in achieving its five-year hazard-mitigation plan. According to the Associated Press story, the plan is developed by Vermont Emergency Management every five years to identify natural hazards facing the state and take steps to reduce risk, including flooding risk.
But an audit released last year after a major flood found that only a third of the 96 actions, and half of the priority actions in the 2018 plan had been completed. Had flood-mitigation measures been completed in a timely manner, the audit says, communities affected by the floods would have been better able to withstand them.
State lawmakers said they were gravely concerned over the lack of progress. “The findings in this report are shocking and deeply troubling,” one said.
The director of the State’s Emergency Management Department called the plan “aspirational.”
But the audit focused on missed opportunities that could have lessened the severity of the floods, such as improved building codes, that would have helped communities recover faster. That sounds pretty practical to me.
Improved Harris County Building Codes Reduced Flood Damage 20X
A study by a former Harris County Engineer John Blount found subdivisions built to new, higher building codes before Hurricane Harvey experienced 20 times less damage than those that weren’t. Building codes are updated internationally every year, but Texas last updated its building codes in 2021.
New Floodplain Maps Years Past Due
Everyone agrees on the need for updated flood maps based on Atlas 14. But Harris County’s are years behind schedule. And some counties still base their flood maps on data acquired in the 1980s. In the meantime, people keep building and buying in floodplains based on outdated information. And one in every five Texans lives in a floodplain. Are we creating the conditions for future disasters?
Plans Without Financial Pathways
Why do we continually build plans that are not actionable? That are so long, no one can read or remember them?
We spent seven years building a state flood plan. It has a $54.5 billion price tag. But since 2019, the state legislature has allocated only $1.4 billion to the state’s Flood Infrastructure Fund.
Houston’s Resilience Plan? Just five years after its introduction, it’s now a maze of dead links and appears to have virtually disappeared from the web.
Harris County’s Flood Bond? Eight years into a ten year plan that’s 40% complete, HCFCD’s executive director claims they are $1.3 billion short already, but has been trying for months to explain why.
Ike Dike? Hurricane Ike struck Houston in 2008. Congress approved the project in 2022. The Corps estimated the cost at $57 billion in 2023. TWDB is still studying ways to break it down into bite sized chunks.
Flood Tunnels? In 2022, HCFCD produced a 1,860 page study projecting the cost for eight to be $30 billion. We’re still studying pilot projects on that one.
In the summer of 2020, the San Jacinto River Authority, City of Houston, Montgomery County and Harris County Flood Control District released a 3,600 page study about how to reduce flooding in the San Jacinto River Basin. At the time, it had a $3.3 billion price tag. So far, the partners have not constructed one recommendation.
Harvey Flood. Photo by Sally Geis.
We Need More of a Business Mentality in Government
In my opinion, we need less nonsense and more commonsense. Who would accept a position with a job description that’s 3,600 pages long? Or a monumental list of deliverables without any budget?
It’s good to dream. But we need government leaders who know how to produce results on a budget. Just like business leaders do.
I’d rather see one project in construction than a hundred sitting on a credenza.
Bob Rehak
Perhaps performance auditors can help us turn that around.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/20/25
2913 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 6183 since Ike
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/20170829-IMG_5756.jpg?fit=1200%2C800&ssl=18001200adminadmin2025-08-20 21:43:182025-08-21 08:35:12Need for Performance Audits To Ensure Timely Flood-Plan Implementation
8/18/25 – The Montgomery County (MoCo) water war has produced a number of unintended casualties in the last decade. They include:
Water ratepayers
Flood victims
Conroe’s reputation as the fastest growing large city in America
Developers
Area infrastructure
Homeowners living near fault lines
Neighbors in Harris County
Groundwater storage capacity to help the area bridge droughts
Science
Unfortunately, those who profited from excessive groundwater withdrawals aren’t the ones paying the price.
Subsidence problems in southern Montgomery County – once thought to be solved by the San Jacinto River Authority’s (SJRA) Groundwater Reduction Plan (GRP) – have recurred. And despite settlement of a long running lawsuit on 8/14/25, there’s still plenty of hurt to go around.
How It All Started
To comply with the Lone Star Groundwater Conservation District‘s (LSGCD) rules to reduce groundwater pumping in Montgomery County, the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) introduced its Groundwater Reduction Plan (GRP) in 2009. The plan addressed the need to ensure adequate water supply for the county’s rapidly growing population using surface water from Lake Conroe.
The LSGCD’s rules, adopted in 2006, mandated a 30% reduction in overall groundwater pumping. In 2010, LSGCD also capped groundwater use, starting in 2016, at 64,000 acre-feet per year.
That gave the SJRA time to sell bonds, complete a half-billion dollar surface-water-treatment plant at Lake Conroe, and build a 55-mile pipeline-distribution system.
Then, the water war erupted.
Defectors Undermine Success
When water rates went up to pay for surface water, the City of Conroe, City of Magnolia, Quadvest, and Woodlands Oaks sued to get out of their GRP contracts. That, in turn, led to:
Conroe’s nine-year legal battle that made several round trips to the Texas Supreme Court.
Rate increases on participants still in the plan to make up for shortfalls created by those who left it.
Legal and fiscal uncertainty that burdened other GRP participants left covering shortfalls caused by the non-paying entities.
Uncertainty about the ability to service debt on bonds.
Significant legal fees affecting both sides, including water ratepayers.
Subsidence: Briefly Halted
Ironically, all this happened as the groundwater reduction plan started to reduce subsidence. Areas in The Woodlands that had subsided consistently for years saw subsidence virtually level off. But the success was brief.
Subsidence in The Woodlands at the monitoring station with the longest history. When surface water became available, subsidence virtually plateaued…until political changes at the LSGCD.
The leveling off lasted between three and four years. Then subsidence accelerated again. The trigger this time: politics.
The newly elected board was sworn in during November, 2018, shortly before the graph above turned down again.
Groundwater Levels Decline with Changes in Groundwater Regulations
The newly elected LSGCD board removed conservation rules from their regulatory plan, leading to a rejection of the plan by the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB). This introduced uncertainty regarding the regulatory framework for groundwater management and the GRP’s role within it.
Several cities disputed the SJRA’s ability to raise rates for surface water. Conroe initially refused to pay a rate increase implemented in 2016, and Magnolia followed suit. The SJRA responded by suing the cities for breach of contract.
These legal challenges created significant financial strain for the SJRA and its other customers. Unpaid fees caused shortfalls that had to be covered by other GRP plan participants. The recent settlement has resolved the dispute between SJRA and Conroe. But legal battles may still continue with others.
Meanwhile, southern Montgomery County has experienced the steepest well declines in the entire region.
From 1977 to 2025, maximum water level decline in the Chicot-Evangeline (undifferentiated) aquifer occurred in The Woodlands where water levels fell more than 400 feet. Likewise, water levels in the Jasper aquifer declined more than 250 feet near The Woodlands during the same time period.
Every water well drilled into those aquifers that USGS monitors in Montgomery County with the exception of two experienced significant water-level declines since the LSGCD board became elected. See below.
As subsidence worsened, so did flooding in many parts of The Woodlands, especially those near streams whose gradients changed and those who lived near down-thrust faults that created bowls in the landscape.
Water Capacity Crunch Led to Development Moratorium
The U.S. Census Bureau rated Conroe the fastest‑growing large city in America for the period from July 1, 2015, to July 1, 2016. However, within several years, Conroe experienced a water-capacity shortfall and imposed a development moratorium (Aug 29, 2024).
TCEQ later approved a temporary reduction in the required water-supply allocation per connection—from 0.60 to 0.46 gpm—so projects could restart under tighter per-lot assumptions. For a year, that pause reportedly stalled plats, permits, and site work citywide.
It even affected large commercial projects. The Conroe Courier reported that Kelsey-Seybold was considering pulling a $24 million medical facility. Construction could not move forward because of concerns about water infrastructure capability.
With the settlement announced last Friday, Conroe has ended the development moratorium for now, but projects must use the TCEQ-approved 0.46 gpm through Feb. 2029. But the City’s plan reviewers will reportedly press for conservation fixtures/phasing until new supply is online.
The Greater Houston Homebuilders Association said the moratorium had had “detrimental effects on every facet of our industry from concrete to roofers, to pools to developers and builders.”
Under the terms of last week’s settlement, SJRA will provide additional water to Conroe. Heather Ramsey of the SJRA said that, “The additional surface water should keep them from using additional groundwater to accommodate their growth.” But in the meantime…
Homes Near Fault Lines Damaged
Deregulation of aquifer groundwater withdrawal in Montgomery County by the LSGCD led to declines in area water wells.
As Conroe and surrounding areas pumped more and more groundwater, subsidence continued. That triggered geologic faults in The Woodlands, which damaged homes.
Woodlands home split in half when groundwater extraction led to subsidence that activated a fault-line.Steps in front of same house dropped so far, they had to be replaced and are now twice their original height.
It also damaged infrastructure.
Faulting damage exacerbated by subsidence due to excessive groundwater extraction at The Woodlands High School.
Two subsidence experts in The Woodlands gave me a tour of three fault lines. Street after street showed dips, cracks, and storm sewer damage aligned precisely with the fault lines. Some of the repairs reportedly cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Many Paid the Price
Excessive groundwater withdrawals are also tilting Lake Houston. The area near the dam is subsiding much slower than the area in the headwaters of the Lake near the Montgomery County Line.
I listed science as the last victim in the water war. At some point during this skirmish, subsidence deniers started trotting out their own studies claiming huge volumes of water from the aquifers above could be produced without adverse consequences.
The loss of groundwater storage capacity due to subsidence will also leave Montgomery County more vulnerable to future droughts. Groundwater backs up surface water supplies. And now there will be less groundwater storage volume.
Someday, this will become a cautionary case study for other areas that think of groundwater as an unlimited resource.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/19/25
2912 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
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