Since August 1, the level of Lake Conroe has hovered around 200 feet. As of this writing, it stands at 199.95 feet, virtually at the target level of the seasonal lowering for the month. That’s three hundredths of a foot above its seasonal average for the last 46 years and five hundredths of a foot below the target level. Yet the Lake Conroe Association appears to be gearing up for another fight to end the program.
Lake Conroe level as of 8/10/20 at 4:30 pm. Source: SJRA.net.
Seasonal Averages
Lake Conroe seasonal levels by month. Source: SJRA
History of Strategy
The SJRA started seasonally lowering the level of Lake Conroe in 2018 after Governor Abbott directed the SJRA to develop strategies to help protect downstream communities from flooding. Due to a slight drought in late 2019, the lake level did not recover quickly. The Lake Conroe Association (LCA) then organized protests as the SJRA reconsidered the strategy for this year.
SJRA Seasonal Release on 4/15/2020. One tainter gate open six inches releases a slow, steady stream of 529 cfs. No one flooded downstream last Spring during the release.
Ultimately, the strategy adopted by the SJRA represented a compromise. During September/October, the lake will remain a half foot higher than in previous years (200 vs 199.5).
Here’s how the current and previous targets compare to what Mother Nature provides through rainfall and evaporation.
In August, little manual lowering should be needed. In September and October, much less lowering will be needed compared to the previous plan adopted in 2018.
SJRA’s Plan for Fall Lowering
SJRA’s current official policy reads as follows.
“Beginning August 1, release only an amount of water from Lake Conroe to create a one foot capacity to catch rainfall and storm runoff (from 201’ msl to 200’ msl). After September 1, increase capacity an additional six inches (from 200’ msl to 199.5’ msl). If a named storm is predicted to impact our region, the COH may initiate an additional release of six inches (to 199’ msl) by notifying SJRA in writing of their call for release. Recapture beginning October 1.”
Compared to the seasonal average, the plan really only amounts to lowering the lake 2 to 3 inches in September and October.
Lake Conroe Association Gearing Up for Another Fight?
Regardless, the Lake Conroe Association (LCA) is reportedly gearing up for another fight.
Community Impact newspaper reported in its August 2020 issue that LCA filed a complaint with the TCEQ on June 30 to end the seasonal lowering of Lake Conroe.
On August 7, they sent an email out to requesting Lake Conroe residents to donate money to the Lake Conroe Association so that it could “replenish the reserve funds spent to oppose the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) lake lowering program.”
In the next paragraph, they ask Lake Conroe residents to provide comments to the Sunset Commission reviewing the SJRA.
Screen Capture of LCA Communication on 9/7/2020. Links not active.
Neither of those two actions is a threat. But juxtaposing them like that is certainly walking up to the firing line … with the chamber loaded.
There sure is a lot of energy expended over two or three inches of water.
Lake Conroe people claimed last winter, when the SJRA was reconsidering the policy, that the lowering would not help Lake Houston Area residents. Lake Houston Area residents, still feeling the pain of Harvey, want all the help they can get.
Enough said.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/10/2020
1077 Days after Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Lake-Conroe-Level-8.10.20.jpg?fit=1200%2C642&ssl=16421200adminadmin2020-08-10 17:22:252020-08-10 18:39:35Lake Conroe Lowered to Target Level for August; LCA May Be Gearing Up For Another Fight
Defendants in the Elm Grove flood lawsuit have filed more than 20 new documents with the Harris County District Clerk since mid-July. The big news: The addition of Concourse Development, LLC to the lawsuit has pushed back the trial date from March to September next year. It has also triggered more victim-blaming plus claims and cross-claims among the defendants.
Background
In 2019, runoff from 268 clear-cut acres under development by Perry Homes contributed to flooding in Elm Grove, not once, but twice. Victims sued two subsidiaries of Perry Homes who were developing the property. They also sued several contractors, and LJA, the engineering company.
Screen capture from video taken by Cogdill family during May 7th flood of 2019 shows water streaming out of Woodridge Village into Elm Grove.
Perry Homes is the parent company of subsidiaries PSWA and Figure Four Partners, who were originally sued.
Many Elm Grove Families had to be rescued.
Concourse Development bought the property now known as Woodridge Village on 1/12/2018 and sold it to Perry Homes six days later.
Five developers owned the Woodridge Property before Figure Four Partners, LTD, a Perry Homes subsidiary.Concourse owned it for six days before flipping it to Figure Four. Source: Montgomery County Appraisal District.
The addition of Concourse to the lawsuit prompted multiple requests by Concourse and other defendants to delay the trial again – until September 20, 2021. Concourse said it didn’t have enough time for discovery and preparation. Given that the case was already almost a year old, Concourse claimed it had a lot of catching up to do. In their response to the plaintiffs’ sixth amended petition, Concourse also pointed some fingers at other defendants. One then filed a cross-claim against Concourse (see below).
Concourse Blames Victims and Almost Everyone in Sight
Concourse then lists eight pages of defenses. They repeat the phrase “Pleading further, and in the alternative, if such be necessary and subject to the foregoing pleas and without waiving same…” a grand total of twenty times. That means, “If the general denial doesn’t work, we reserve the right to claim X. And if X doesn’t work, we reserve the right to claim Y. Etc.”
More Than 20 Defenses Asserted
With that as a preface, Concourse also pleaded that:
Concourse was not the immediate or sole cause of the flooding and damages.
“Acts, omissions, fault, negligence and other conduct of the Plaintiffs” were the immediate and sole cause, in whole or in part, of the flooding and their damages. (They do not explain why they believe that, though.) Said another way, the victims caused their own damages.
Other defendants caused the damages.
New and independent third parties caused the damages.
Other people caused the damages.
Concourse had no obligation to the victims.
Concourse’s conduct was reasonably prudent.
The flooding was an unavoidable accident.
Plaintiffs failed to mitigate their damages.
Their contract (presumably with Perry) gives them indemnity.
Any payments made by other parties (not a part of the litigation) to Defendants should offset any liability Concourse may have. (Presumably, they’re talking about insurance companies.)
Any award against Concourse must be reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to others, including the Plaintiffs themselves, and third parties.
Flooding was caused by an intervening, but unspecified cause.
Plaintiffs’ claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
To the extent that Plaintiffs allege lost wages or loss of earning capacity, recovery should be limited to post-tax earnings or net earnings.
Plaintiffs’ damages resulted from prior or pre-existing conditions over which Concourse had no control and did not cause.
God caused the damages.
Any punitive damages awarded in the case should be reduced in proportion to Plaintiffs’ own negligence.
Plaintiffs’ claims should be barred because Concourse acted with due care and complied with all laws and regulations.
Plaintiffs’ assumed the risk that resulted in their “alleged” damages.
Punitive damages violate the Due Process and Equal Protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the US. Constitution and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Punitive damages violate Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the Texas Constitution, and the United States Constitution.
Prejudgment interest should be limited under Texas Law.
Plaintiffs have not fulfilled all the conditions necessary to maintain the lawsuit.
The One Satisfaction Rule should govern any awards.
The last point means that a plaintiff should only recover once for a particular injury. It applies when several defendants commit the same act or when multiple defendants commit different acts that result in one injury.
Defendants Now Fighting Among Themselves
If many of those points sound contradictory, they are. But Concourse has covered all its bases.
In #3 above, Concourse pointed the finger of blame at other defendants in the case. Evidently, Double Oak Construction, Inc., one of the other defendants didn’t like that. So…
On 8/6/2020, Double Oak filed a cross-claim against Concourse. Double Oak alleges that Concourse should be held directly liable to plaintiffs for any and ALL damages they suffered. Double Oak also wants a jury to decide Concourse’s percentage of liability.
Why is that? Double Oak alleges that “…the Developer Defendants hired Concourse on May 8, 2019, the day after the extreme weather event on May 7, 2019, to inspect the Development and that Concourse did not advise the Developer Defendants to make any changes to the detention.” Nor, they claim, did Concourse advise Double Oak or the other Contractor Defendants to make any changes to their work after the inspection.
Therefore, Double Oak further alleges, Concourse is liable to Plaintiffs for damages and any award levied against Double Oak.
Double Oak Objects to Concourse Production of Documents
In its response to the Plaintiffs, Concourse also gave “notice to all parties that any and all documents produced during discovery may be used against such parties at any pre-trial proceeding and/or trial … without the necessity of authenticating the document.”
Double Oak objected to this. Double Oak claims it doesn’t know what specific documents Concourse intends to use, therefore Double Oak is handicapped in its defense.
Trying to anticipate every single document produced by any party would cause an undue hardship, claims Double Oak. Double Oak reserved its right to authenticate any and all documents that Concourse produces as part of discovery.
The Woodridge MUD claims that the Plaintiffs’ subpeona is “overly broad and seeks to inquire into matters subject to the attorney-client privilege.” They also claim that some of the requested documents involve matters discussed during executive sessions of the Woodridge MUD board.
The MUD also refuses to produce documents anywhere other than at the offices of its counsel.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/10/2020
1077 Days after Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Rescue-Truck.jpg?fit=1500%2C729&ssl=17291500adminadmin2020-08-09 18:51:242020-08-09 23:29:49More Delays, Denials, and Victim-Blaming in Elm Grove Lawsuit
Tuesday, Harris County Commissioners Court could vote on a proposal to create a Community Flood Resilience Task Force (CFRTF). The Task Force has the potential to shift billions of flood-bond dollars from Republican-controlled Precincts 3 and 4 to Democratic-controlled Precincts 1 and 2. It should be noted that resilience appears nowhere in the flood bond language that voters approved, so this may not even be legal.
County Judge Lina Hidalgo, Commissioner Rodney Ellis and Commissioner Adrian Garcia are using the committee and unusual definitions of “equity,” “equitably,” and “resilience” to justify the shift. Their efforts could kill much-needed flood-mitigation projects in areas such as Elm Grove and the wider Lake Houston Area. Mr. Ellis especially has been openly hostile toward helping Elm Grove.
Secrecy Surrounds Creation of Task Force
The CFRTF proposal has been placed on the Emergency/Supplemental portion of the agenda with no public explanation of what commissioners would actually vote on. See Item #8. It reads only: “Request by the County Judge for discussion and possible action on reconstituting the Harris County Flood Control Task Force as the Harris County Community Flood Resilience Task Force and amending the bylaws accordingly.”
The current version of the Task Force by-laws is not posted online, but I have obtained a copy via a FOIA request. The wording of the bylaws has changed from the version posted on July 24. A distinctive bias runs through the wording that’s contrary to the wording approved by Harris County voters in 2018.
2018 Flood-Bond Election Called for Equity
Because not one joint USACE/HCFCD project had ever been conducted in the area, Lake Houston Area leaders actually argued to include this language in the flood bond. It is now being turned against the area.
Harris County voters approved the flood bond in 2018 with the understanding that flood-bond dollars would be distributed “equitably.” The approved language specifically required that. Since then, however, Commissioner Rodney Ellis has led a concerted effort to redefinethe word equitably so that flood-bond dollars can be shifted disproportionately to low-income “communities of color.”
Recognized Definitions of Equitable and Equitably
Most people likely define equitably as fairly or impartially.
Webster’s Third International Dictionary defines it as equality – “without prejudice or favoritism.”
The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as “unbiased, impartial.”
Roget’s Thesaurus lists two pages of synonyms, most centered around the idea of “a level playing field.”
Black’s Law Dictionary has pages of definitions, most centered around the idea of “fairness.”
Ellis’ Definition of Equity
Mr. Ellis defines equity as righting the wrongs of the past, especially in regard to racial injustice. His definition relates to fairness only if you define equity, not in terms of the present, but of the past. He talks a lot about reparations for slavery. However, he ignores:
Judge Hidalgo, Commissioner Ellis and Commissioner Garcia intend to use this supposedly impartial task force to advise them on flood-control decisions. However, the flood-control experts and engineers don’t get to vote. They will only advise 17 political appointees. The appointees must have, according to the proposed bylaws, “a demonstrated knowledge of or interest in equitable approaches to flood resilience and the socioeconomic, demographic, and environmental factors that affect the relative resilience of communities in response to flooding.”
Of the 17 members:
At least two must represent low-income communities.
At least two must represent communities of color.
At least three must have expertise in flood resilience.
At least one will be a City of Houston representative with responsibilities related to resilience.
The task force will also include at least one person from each of eight competency areas, six of which are based on the idea of equity (See appendix A, page 12):
Housing equity
Health equity
Equitable infrastructure
Equitable urban planning and transportation
Environmental equity
Equity and social justice
The other two competencies are:
Flood risk mitigation
Authentic connections to local communities with “lived experience” (whatever that means).
A minimum 14 out of the 17 positions on the task force will ensure Hidalgo’s, Garcia’s and Ellis’ definitions of equity and resilience based on “social justice” are implemented.
Article II (Definitions) Paragraph 3 even spells out what’s meant by the term “equitable resilience.” It “takes into account issues of social vulnerability,” say the bylaws.
The bylaws then go on to say equitable resilience “…starts from people’s own perception of their position within their human-environmental system and accounts for their realities and their need for a change of circumstance to avoid imbalances of power into the future.”
Talk about political double speak! What does that even mean?
I think they’re saying that decisions will be made on subjective, not objective, criteria.
Also note Definition #6 – Flood Resilience Projects. The word mitigation (as in flood mitigation) appears nowhere in the definition.
In fact, the phrase “flood mitigation” appears nowhere in the entire 12-page document. Neither does the word “equal.” However, resilience appears 63 times. But “resilience” never appears once in the bond language that voters approved.
Resilience, like equity, does not apply to the entire county. Most people probably see resilience as a positive word that helps everyone. It doesn’t. The Ellis/Hidalgo/Garcia definition helps only a subset of people.
More Double Speak
A footnote on page 3 says “It is not within the scope of the CFRTF to alter or re-prioritize 2018 flood bond projects, except that the CFRTF should evaluate and provide feedback on whether those projects are being implemented in accordance with the [Harris County Commissioners] court-approved equitable prioritization framework and schedule.”
In other words, the task force can only make sure the equity priorities that Ellis, Hidalgo and Garcia approved are being implemented. These aren’t advisors; they’re enforcers.
Troubling Questions
Why are technical experts on flood mitigation being replaced by “equity” experts?
Why is the judgment of experts on flood mitigation being replaced by political appointees who don’t represent the spectrum of views in Harris County?
Why are changes that could fundamentally alter the nature of government and the allocation of tax dollars being considered on an “emergency” agenda?
Why has the voter-approved definition of “equitable” been replaced by one that’s inequitable?
Why are hundreds of millions of tax dollars moving to Precincts One and Two, denying other precincts their fair share?
If the Community Flood Resilience Task Force is so important, why is it not being put on the ballot for November?
Of all these questions, perhaps the last is the most critical. Voters deserve a say in how their $2.5 billion is spent. Not just a subset of voters. All voters.
Please email the county judge (CRTF@cjo.hctx.net) before Tuesday’s meeting and demand that creation of the resilience task force be put on the ballot for November. We need to clear up any confusion about what we approved in the flood-bond referendum of 2018 and how voters want bond dollars allocated.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/9/2020
1076 Days after Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Equitable.jpg?fit=1200%2C220&ssl=12201200adminadmin2020-08-08 22:57:592020-08-11 09:06:42Harris County Could Shift Billions of Flood-Bond Dollars Tuesday without Public Vote
Lake Conroe Lowered to Target Level for August; LCA May Be Gearing Up For Another Fight
Since August 1, the level of Lake Conroe has hovered around 200 feet. As of this writing, it stands at 199.95 feet, virtually at the target level of the seasonal lowering for the month. That’s three hundredths of a foot above its seasonal average for the last 46 years and five hundredths of a foot below the target level. Yet the Lake Conroe Association appears to be gearing up for another fight to end the program.
Seasonal Averages
History of Strategy
The SJRA started seasonally lowering the level of Lake Conroe in 2018 after Governor Abbott directed the SJRA to develop strategies to help protect downstream communities from flooding. Due to a slight drought in late 2019, the lake level did not recover quickly. The Lake Conroe Association (LCA) then organized protests as the SJRA reconsidered the strategy for this year.
Here’s how the current and previous targets compare to what Mother Nature provides through rainfall and evaporation.
SJRA’s Plan for Fall Lowering
SJRA’s current official policy reads as follows.
“Beginning August 1, release only an amount of water from Lake Conroe to create a one foot capacity to catch rainfall and storm runoff (from 201’ msl to 200’ msl). After September 1, increase capacity an additional six inches (from 200’ msl to 199.5’ msl). If a named storm is predicted to impact our region, the COH may initiate an additional release of six inches (to 199’ msl) by notifying SJRA in writing of their call for release. Recapture beginning October 1.”
Compared to the seasonal average, the plan really only amounts to lowering the lake 2 to 3 inches in September and October.
Lake Conroe Association Gearing Up for Another Fight?
Regardless, the Lake Conroe Association (LCA) is reportedly gearing up for another fight.
On August 7, they sent an email out to requesting Lake Conroe residents to donate money to the Lake Conroe Association so that it could “replenish the reserve funds spent to oppose the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) lake lowering program.”
In the next paragraph, they ask Lake Conroe residents to provide comments to the Sunset Commission reviewing the SJRA.
Neither of those two actions is a threat. But juxtaposing them like that is certainly walking up to the firing line … with the chamber loaded.
There sure is a lot of energy expended over two or three inches of water.
Lake Conroe people claimed last winter, when the SJRA was reconsidering the policy, that the lowering would not help Lake Houston Area residents. Lake Houston Area residents, still feeling the pain of Harvey, want all the help they can get.
Enough said.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/10/2020
1077 Days after Hurricane Harvey
More Delays, Denials, and Victim-Blaming in Elm Grove Lawsuit
Defendants in the Elm Grove flood lawsuit have filed more than 20 new documents with the Harris County District Clerk since mid-July. The big news: The addition of Concourse Development, LLC to the lawsuit has pushed back the trial date from March to September next year. It has also triggered more victim-blaming plus claims and cross-claims among the defendants.
Background
In 2019, runoff from 268 clear-cut acres under development by Perry Homes contributed to flooding in Elm Grove, not once, but twice. Victims sued two subsidiaries of Perry Homes who were developing the property. They also sued several contractors, and LJA, the engineering company.
In June 2020, lawyers for plaintiffs added Perry Homes and Concourse Development to the lawsuit.
Perry promptly responded, blaming the victims for their own damages.
Perry Homes is the parent company of subsidiaries PSWA and Figure Four Partners, who were originally sued.
Concourse Development bought the property now known as Woodridge Village on 1/12/2018 and sold it to Perry Homes six days later.
Concourse is also the developer of Woodridge Forest, immediately west of Woodridge Village. Approximately one year before the purchase and quick sale, Concourse reportedly told Woodridge Forest residents at a community meeting that the Woodridge Village property would never be developed because it was “just too wet.” USGS classified large parts of the area as wetlands and multiple streams converged there.
Where Case Stands Now
The addition of Concourse to the lawsuit prompted multiple requests by Concourse and other defendants to delay the trial again – until September 20, 2021. Concourse said it didn’t have enough time for discovery and preparation. Given that the case was already almost a year old, Concourse claimed it had a lot of catching up to do. In their response to the plaintiffs’ sixth amended petition, Concourse also pointed some fingers at other defendants. One then filed a cross-claim against Concourse (see below).
Concourse Blames Victims and Almost Everyone in Sight
Defendant Concourse Development LLC denied each and every claim in Plaintiff’s latest petition. This is called a General Denial.
Concourse then lists eight pages of defenses. They repeat the phrase “Pleading further, and in the alternative, if such be necessary and subject to the foregoing pleas and without waiving same…” a grand total of twenty times. That means, “If the general denial doesn’t work, we reserve the right to claim X. And if X doesn’t work, we reserve the right to claim Y. Etc.”
More Than 20 Defenses Asserted
With that as a preface, Concourse also pleaded that:
The last point means that a plaintiff should only recover once for a particular injury. It applies when several defendants commit the same act or when multiple defendants commit different acts that result in one injury.
Defendants Now Fighting Among Themselves
If many of those points sound contradictory, they are. But Concourse has covered all its bases.
In #3 above, Concourse pointed the finger of blame at other defendants in the case. Evidently, Double Oak Construction, Inc., one of the other defendants didn’t like that. So…
On 8/6/2020, Double Oak filed a cross-claim against Concourse. Double Oak alleges that Concourse should be held directly liable to plaintiffs for any and ALL damages they suffered. Double Oak also wants a jury to decide Concourse’s percentage of liability.
Why is that? Double Oak alleges that “…the Developer Defendants hired Concourse on May 8, 2019, the day after the extreme weather event on May 7, 2019, to inspect the Development and that Concourse did not advise the Developer Defendants to make any changes to the detention.” Nor, they claim, did Concourse advise Double Oak or the other Contractor Defendants to make any changes to their work after the inspection.
Therefore, Double Oak further alleges, Concourse is liable to Plaintiffs for damages and any award levied against Double Oak.
Double Oak Objects to Concourse Production of Documents
In its response to the Plaintiffs, Concourse also gave “notice to all parties that any and all documents produced during discovery may be used against such parties at any pre-trial proceeding and/or trial … without the necessity of authenticating the document.”
Double Oak objected to this. Double Oak claims it doesn’t know what specific documents Concourse intends to use, therefore Double Oak is handicapped in its defense.
Trying to anticipate every single document produced by any party would cause an undue hardship, claims Double Oak. Double Oak reserved its right to authenticate any and all documents that Concourse produces as part of discovery.
Woodridge MUD Fights Subpoena for Documents
In other news on the case, the Woodridge Municipal Utility District (MUD) is fighting production of documents that have been subpoenaed.
The Woodridge MUD claims that the Plaintiffs’ subpeona is “overly broad and seeks to inquire into matters subject to the attorney-client privilege.” They also claim that some of the requested documents involve matters discussed during executive sessions of the Woodridge MUD board.
The MUD also refuses to produce documents anywhere other than at the offices of its counsel.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/10/2020
1077 Days after Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
Harris County Could Shift Billions of Flood-Bond Dollars Tuesday without Public Vote
Tuesday, Harris County Commissioners Court could vote on a proposal to create a Community Flood Resilience Task Force (CFRTF). The Task Force has the potential to shift billions of flood-bond dollars from Republican-controlled Precincts 3 and 4 to Democratic-controlled Precincts 1 and 2. It should be noted that resilience appears nowhere in the flood bond language that voters approved, so this may not even be legal.
County Judge Lina Hidalgo, Commissioner Rodney Ellis and Commissioner Adrian Garcia are using the committee and unusual definitions of “equity,” “equitably,” and “resilience” to justify the shift. Their efforts could kill much-needed flood-mitigation projects in areas such as Elm Grove and the wider Lake Houston Area. Mr. Ellis especially has been openly hostile toward helping Elm Grove.
Secrecy Surrounds Creation of Task Force
The CFRTF proposal has been placed on the Emergency/Supplemental portion of the agenda with no public explanation of what commissioners would actually vote on. See Item #8. It reads only: “Request by the County Judge for discussion and possible action on reconstituting the Harris County Flood Control Task Force as the Harris County Community Flood Resilience Task Force and amending the bylaws accordingly.”
The current version of the Task Force by-laws is not posted online, but I have obtained a copy via a FOIA request. The wording of the bylaws has changed from the version posted on July 24. A distinctive bias runs through the wording that’s contrary to the wording approved by Harris County voters in 2018.
2018 Flood-Bond Election Called for Equity
Harris County voters approved the flood bond in 2018 with the understanding that flood-bond dollars would be distributed “equitably.” The approved language specifically required that. Since then, however, Commissioner Rodney Ellis has led a concerted effort to redefine the word equitably so that flood-bond dollars can be shifted disproportionately to low-income “communities of color.”
Recognized Definitions of Equitable and Equitably
Most people likely define equitably as fairly or impartially.
Ellis’ Definition of Equity
Mr. Ellis defines equity as righting the wrongs of the past, especially in regard to racial injustice. His definition relates to fairness only if you define equity, not in terms of the present, but of the past. He talks a lot about reparations for slavery. However, he ignores:
They more likely felt they would see their fair share of flood-bond projects going to their neighborhoods, not making up for social injustices.
Making up for for social injustices is NOT how the bond was sold. HCFCD identified projects in every watershed based on 22 community input meetings.
Task Force To Ensure “Equitable Resilience”
Judge Hidalgo, Commissioner Ellis and Commissioner Garcia intend to use this supposedly impartial task force to advise them on flood-control decisions. However, the flood-control experts and engineers don’t get to vote. They will only advise 17 political appointees. The appointees must have, according to the proposed bylaws, “a demonstrated knowledge of or interest in equitable approaches to flood resilience and the socioeconomic, demographic, and environmental factors that affect the relative resilience of communities in response to flooding.”
Of the 17 members:
The task force will also include at least one person from each of eight competency areas, six of which are based on the idea of equity (See appendix A, page 12):
The other two competencies are:
Note that resilience, like equity, has become political code for programs that benefit primarily the socially vulnerable. (See the resilience study produced by the City of Houston.)
Double-Speak Definitions Enshrined in Bylaws
Article II (Definitions) Paragraph 3 even spells out what’s meant by the term “equitable resilience.” It “takes into account issues of social vulnerability,” say the bylaws.
The bylaws then go on to say equitable resilience “…starts from people’s own perception of their position within their human-environmental system and accounts for their realities and their need for a change of circumstance to avoid imbalances of power into the future.”
Talk about political double speak! What does that even mean?
Also note Definition #6 – Flood Resilience Projects. The word mitigation (as in flood mitigation) appears nowhere in the definition.
Resilience, like equity, does not apply to the entire county. Most people probably see resilience as a positive word that helps everyone. It doesn’t. The Ellis/Hidalgo/Garcia definition helps only a subset of people.
More Double Speak
A footnote on page 3 says “It is not within the scope of the CFRTF to alter or re-prioritize 2018 flood bond projects, except that the CFRTF should evaluate and provide feedback on whether those projects are being implemented in accordance with the [Harris County Commissioners] court-approved equitable prioritization framework and schedule.”
In other words, the task force can only make sure the equity priorities that Ellis, Hidalgo and Garcia approved are being implemented. These aren’t advisors; they’re enforcers.
Troubling Questions
Of all these questions, perhaps the last is the most critical. Voters deserve a say in how their $2.5 billion is spent. Not just a subset of voters. All voters.
Please email the county judge (CRTF@cjo.hctx.net) before Tuesday’s meeting and demand that creation of the resilience task force be put on the ballot for November. We need to clear up any confusion about what we approved in the flood-bond referendum of 2018 and how voters want bond dollars allocated.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/9/2020
1076 Days after Hurricane Harvey