Flooding within the Halls Bayou watershed illustrates what happens when development, density, lack of detention and insufficient distance from streams put people and their property in harm’s way. Instead of protecting a strip of green space near the bayou years ago, developers built right up to the edge. As density increased and developers built further upstream without sufficient detention, people who crowded the Bayou then started to flood repeatedly.
As the images below show, once developed, the cost and time of mitigation increases exponentially.
All of that argues for better planning and the protection of green spaces that can accommodate future floods and flood mitigation projects throughout the region.
Halls Bayou Not Unique
This same scenario happened repeatedly in other Houston watersheds: Greens Bayou; Brays Bayou, White Oak Bayou, and Cypress Creek, for instance. But let’s save those for future posts. For now, let’s go back in time.
Solution Well Known for More than a Century
In 1913, recognizing the potential for continued growth, a well-known landscape architect, Arthur Comey created the first comprehensive plan for the Houston Park Commission. He observed that Houston ranked far behind other major U.S. cities in parkland. It had one acre of park for every 685 residents. Seattle was a distant second at 224 residents per acre.
For the most part, people have fixed their homes since the last big flood. These folks may be poor, but the vast majority take great pride in what they have.
The map below shows the route of Halls Bayou through surrounding mid-north neighborhoods. Homes are packed so close to the bayou that it’s hard to see it in places, so I outlined the route in red.
Route of Halls Bayou through mid-north part of Houston. Airline Drive is on left, I-45 in middle and US 59 on right.
Now, let’s superimpose floodplains over the same area.
Floodway = cross hatch, 100-year floodplain = aqua, and 500-year floodplain =tan.Map last updated in 2007 based on data from Tropical Storm Allison.
North to south along US 59 (on right), the floodplain extends almost 3 miles. And it will extend even farther when new maps based on Atlas 14 are officially released based on Harvey data. The image below shows what the area around US 59 and Halls looked like in 2002 shortly after Tropical Storm Allison.
Note subdivisions built right next to bayou.
Next, see how that area looks today where Halls Bayou crosses under US 59. Two large detention ponds exist where the subdivisions used to be.
Note the two large detention ponds, one on either side of the freeway. The one on the left was substantially completed in 2015 and the one on the right in 2018.
Each detention basin took about three years to build.
Time, Costs of Buyouts
Before HCFCD could construct the detention ponds, it had to buy out homes in adjacent subdivisions and demolish them. Buyouts near the detention areas above began in 2002 when HCFCD received a large grant from the federal government after Allison. Google Earth images show that the buyouts took at least another three years.
Then Flood Control had to get permits from the City of Houston to demolish the streets. That took additional years.
So from 2002 until the completion of construction took 13 to 16 years (2015 and 2018). But the construction itself took only 3 years.
Thus, the total project took 4-5X longer than construction.
$1 of Prevention Worth a $1000 of Flood Mitigation
This area started to develop in the 1940s. The earliest image in Google Earth (1944) shows that it was at the edge of the City then. With more wetlands and farm land to absorb rainfall, the flooding problems were probably not as bad. A few scattered subdivisions pressed against the edges of the bayou. But the lots were large. And had green space been set aside then, the story today might be different.
Halls Bayou in 1944. Note: only two subdivisions started to encroach on the bayou. Rest was rural.
Compare again the shot above with the one below for a dramatic example of infill development. The shot above is NOTHING like today’s below.
Compare the dramatic increase in density with the decrease in bayou width.
Just looking at these two maps, you can see how the dramatic increase in density limits flood mitigation possibilities and raises costs.
We no longer have any easy solutions.
To make matters worse, despite flooding, people often fight buyouts. Most people in neighborhoods like this depend on support networks of friends and family. They fear leaving those networks. Many date back generations.
Should Have Known Better
Developers and home buyers knew or should have known this area was flood prone. But still, they built or bought here at great risk to themselves, and ultimately at great cost to the community.
That raises the question: Why were people allowed to build so close to the bayou in the first place? Why wasn’t sufficient green space left along the bayou to widen it or build detention ponds?
There are no simple answers to that question. Residents may not have felt at risk until upstream development sent more water downstream faster. They may not have been knowledgeable enough about flooding to ask the right questions.
Some just wanted to live close to work. Some wanted to be near family and friends. Some needed the support. And some just pushed their luck because they liked the view or location and the lots were cheap. Regardless, everyone is paying the price for decisions often made decades ago.
Posted by Bob Rehak on April 28, 2021
1338 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Halls-Flood-Plains.jpg?fit=1200%2C793&ssl=17931200adminadmin2021-04-28 15:50:252021-07-29 16:01:38Halls Bayou Illustrates Cost, Difficulty of Flood Mitigation in Overdeveloped Areas
Tuesday, Harris County Commissioners Court voted 5-0 to transfer $315 million of toll road revenue, unallocated County road bonds and other county funds to accelerate the construction of certain flood-bond mitigation projects. They will allocate the funds to mitigation projects using the 2018 Flood Bond Prioritization Criteria.
The transfer will provide backstop funding for 100% of the projects in the Road & Bridge Subdivision Drainage Program of the 2018 Flood Control Bond Program, removing the risk that partner-funding shortfalls prevent projects from being completed.
Text of Motion
The final language as amended and approved reads as follows:
Create a new funding facility of $115 million, made up of County road bonds or HCTRA surplus revenue, to free up Flood Control bond capacity currently used for the Subdivision Program. The Flood Control bond capacity will be allocated by utilizing the 2018 Flood Bond prioritization criteria.
Create an additional funding facility of $200 million, comprised of HCTRA surplus revenue or other County resources, to support completion of projects that are part of the 2018 bond program with the required transportation nexus.
The Subdivision Program consists of 91 projects which, according to HCFCD estimates, reduce the risk of flooding to more than 45,000 homes.
Background
The projects benefit neighborhoods with outdated drainage infrastructure or which never had modern drainage systems in the first place. Furthermore, multiple projects are located in watersheds that have been historically disadvantaged in securing federal funds for flood control. According to the Office of the County Engineer, the Subdivision Program has a current estimated total cost of $535 million (or ~$590 million including an approximately 10% contingency).
Among the objectives:
Provide backstop funding for partnership projects in case grants don’t materialize or are delayed beyond a reasonable time
Let projects with mature or advanced partner funding opportunities pursue those opportunities for a defined (but not unlimited) period of time..
The background sheet contains a list of eligible projects in each precinct. Any Subdivision Program project costs that have not received a notice or award of partner funding by August 31, 2021, would be eligible to receive additional money from the backstop funding.
Discussion
Discussion on the motion and amendment lasted about an hour. It became clear that commissioners believe they:
Must complete all projects in the bond.
Expect not to find partnership funds for some projects, leaving those projects underfunded.
Need more money.
Must use diverted funds on flood projects that have some connection to transportation, i.e., problems created by new highway construction.
This approval will remove a cloud of uncertainty from projects that rely on partnership funding which has not yet materializedfor some projects.
Including projects from all four precincts helped ensure a unanimous vote.
Another Bond? Not So Fast
Commissioners talked about the possibility of another flood-bond offering. However, the likelihood of that passing is slim. Poor people feel the money is going to affluent neighborhoods and affluent people feel the money is going to poor neighborhoods. If no one is happy with the way the current bond money has been handled, why would anyone vote to approve more?
Flood Control will try to collapse a ten-year timeline down to five years.
It’s unclear at this time how today’s development will affect HUD grants in the pipeline, the interest costs on borrowed money, or the availability of qualified contractors.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/28/2021
1338 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210303-RJR_6475.jpg?fit=1200%2C800&ssl=18001200adminadmin2021-04-27 22:07:242021-07-29 16:21:50Harris County Commissioners Supplement Flood-Bond Funds with Highway Money to Accelerate Mitigation
If you saw the recent front page article in the Houston Chronicle about Halls Bayou, you would think that Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) relegated residents in the watershed to “the back of the bus.” Even before the bond, Halls received four floodwater retention projects, three of which are major. HCFCD is trying to expand the fourth of those. And since the flood bond, HCFCD has virtually completed four more floodwater retention projects..
Here’s what I found by simply driving around after consulting the HCFCD website and Google Earth Pro. I wish the Chronicle writer had done the same. There’s just no substitute for laying eyeballs on the job sites before riling up millions of people. Let’s start with the flood-bond projects first. I took all the photos below on 4/25/21 and 4/26/21.
Almost Completed Stormwater Detention Basins in Halls Watershed
Basin on Little York east of US59
New basin at Hopper and US59
Third new basin north of Helms Road east of Airline Drive
Fourth new basin south of Helms Road west of Airline Drive.
Recently Completed in Halls Watershed
Hall Park Stormwater Detention Basin East of US59 at Parker. Google Earth images show this project was substantially completed in 2018.
Bretshire Stormwater Detention Basin West of US59 at Parker. Google Earth images show this project was substantially completed in 2015.
Keith Weiss Park Stormwater Detention Basin on Halls Bayou east of Aldine Westfield. Google Earth images show this project was substantially completed in 2015.
The Chronicle writer also claimed a “funding shortfall” for Halls of $272 million. Curious that he would make this statement just days before the GLO announces the winners of a statewide competition. Harris County could get some, none or all of its requests. To be clear, the competition is stiff; Harvey affected more than 40 counties. Regardless, there’s more than $2 billion up for grabs ($1 billion in this round and $1.144 billion in the next). It seems to me, the Chronicle writer could have waited a few days to publish results rather than rumors.
We Need Real Historical Data on Flood Mitigation Spending
And to imply that all the money is going to more affluent neighborhoods is simply false. That claim seems designed to inflame racial hatred. Kingwood, for instance, has NEVER received one federally funded capital improvement project from HCFCD. Yet the Chronicle’s readers evidently concluded rich neighborhoods get all the money. Again, there’s no substitute for research.
From the Chronicle writer’s Twitter feed.
Inflaming racial tensions based on false information is the last thing America needs at this time.
In my opinion, we need facts, not fiction. Asserting discrimination is not the same as proving it.
Chronicle Article Also Ignores Tax Issue, Funding Realities
The Chronicle’s “HCFCD-puts-poor-people-at-the-back-of-the-bus” narrative also ignores the mechanics of funding projects. Before the flood bond vote in 2018, I spent an hour with former County Judge Ed Emmett discussing funding needs. A high priority at that point was to make local tax dollars stretch as far as they could by leveraging partner funding.
The need to leverage partner funding was even addressed in the final flood bond language. Paragraph 14 G states “…the commissioners court shall provide a process for the equitable expenditure of funds recognizing that project selection may have been affected in the past and may continue to be affected by eligibility requirements for matching Federal, State and other local government funds.”
But there are two catches. First, you’re only eligible if at least 70% of residents that benefit from a project qualify as “low-to-moderate income” (LMI). Second, HUD is slow. To put “slow” in perspective, the Texas General Land Office just started accepting HUD grant applications from Imelda last Saturday. Imelda happened 586 days ago.
Looking at the flood bond spreadsheet (Page 6 of 10) and the expected partnership share of Halls Bayou Projects, you can see that 90/10 ratio reflected in most of the projected funding for Halls.
It’s unclear whether voters would have approved a flood bond that was 9X higher, especially when everyone, rich and poor alike, expressed concerns about not getting their fair share.
Alternative Sources of Halls Funding More Risky
Had HCFCD tried for FEMA funding instead, the low home values in Halls neighborhoods may have yielded a poor Benefit/Cost Ratio. Commissioner Ellis constantly reminds people about the perils of FEMA funding when applied to LMI neighborhoods.
So really, HCFCD had no choice but to focus on HUD for Halls projects.
The neighborhoods qualified.
The HUD match was far higher.
That minimized a tax increase.
It also maximized the number of possible Halls projects.
This was not a “gamble” as the Chronicle headline implied; it was actually the least risky option that seemed to benefit the most people.
Map above taken fromHUD CDBG-MIT Draft Grant Application from Halls Bayou Watershed shows that 144,000 people in the watershed qualify as LMI (low to moderate income). That’s 70.6% of the total residents.To see the complete draft, visit this page.
We all need to calm down and wait to see how much money HUD grants the Hall’s Bayou Watershed projects. Brittany Eck of the GLO told me that she expects decisions by the end of this month. That’s this Friday.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/27/2021
1337 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 586 since Imelda
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210426-DJI_0567.jpg?fit=1200%2C900&ssl=19001200adminadmin2021-04-27 01:02:252021-07-29 16:22:47Four Halls Bayou Detention Ponds Recently Completed; Four More Virtually Done
Halls Bayou Illustrates Cost, Difficulty of Flood Mitigation in Overdeveloped Areas
Flooding within the Halls Bayou watershed illustrates what happens when development, density, lack of detention and insufficient distance from streams put people and their property in harm’s way. Instead of protecting a strip of green space near the bayou years ago, developers built right up to the edge. As density increased and developers built further upstream without sufficient detention, people who crowded the Bayou then started to flood repeatedly.
As the images below show, once developed, the cost and time of mitigation increases exponentially.
Halls Bayou Not Unique
This same scenario happened repeatedly in other Houston watersheds: Greens Bayou; Brays Bayou, White Oak Bayou, and Cypress Creek, for instance. But let’s save those for future posts. For now, let’s go back in time.
Solution Well Known for More than a Century
In 1913, recognizing the potential for continued growth, a well-known landscape architect, Arthur Comey created the first comprehensive plan for the Houston Park Commission. He observed that Houston ranked far behind other major U.S. cities in parkland. It had one acre of park for every 685 residents. Seattle was a distant second at 224 residents per acre.
To address this inequity, Comey’s plan included a visionary idea. Noting that the city’s network of bayous were already “natural parks,” he proposed a series of linear and large parks along their lengths.
As he wrote, the “bayous and creek valleys readily lend themselves to trails and parks and cannot so advantageously be used for any other purpose.”…
Unfortunately, developers ignored him.
About Halls Bayou
The Halls Bayou Watershed comprises a city within a city.
Frankly, as I drove through it last weekend to photograph flood mitigation projects, it felt much more vibrant than more affluent neighborhoods father to the north or south.
For the most part, people have fixed their homes since the last big flood. These folks may be poor, but the vast majority take great pride in what they have.
The map below shows the route of Halls Bayou through surrounding mid-north neighborhoods. Homes are packed so close to the bayou that it’s hard to see it in places, so I outlined the route in red.
Now, let’s superimpose floodplains over the same area.
North to south along US 59 (on right), the floodplain extends almost 3 miles. And it will extend even farther when new maps based on Atlas 14 are officially released based on Harvey data. The image below shows what the area around US 59 and Halls looked like in 2002 shortly after Tropical Storm Allison.
Next, see how that area looks today where Halls Bayou crosses under US 59. Two large detention ponds exist where the subdivisions used to be.
Each detention basin took about three years to build.
Time, Costs of Buyouts
Before HCFCD could construct the detention ponds, it had to buy out homes in adjacent subdivisions and demolish them. Buyouts near the detention areas above began in 2002 when HCFCD received a large grant from the federal government after Allison. Google Earth images show that the buyouts took at least another three years.
Then Flood Control had to get permits from the City of Houston to demolish the streets. That took additional years.
So from 2002 until the completion of construction took 13 to 16 years (2015 and 2018). But the construction itself took only 3 years.
$1 of Prevention Worth a $1000 of Flood Mitigation
This area started to develop in the 1940s. The earliest image in Google Earth (1944) shows that it was at the edge of the City then. With more wetlands and farm land to absorb rainfall, the flooding problems were probably not as bad. A few scattered subdivisions pressed against the edges of the bayou. But the lots were large. And had green space been set aside then, the story today might be different.
Compare again the shot above with the one below for a dramatic example of infill development. The shot above is NOTHING like today’s below.
Just looking at these two maps, you can see how the dramatic increase in density limits flood mitigation possibilities and raises costs.
To make matters worse, despite flooding, people often fight buyouts. Most people in neighborhoods like this depend on support networks of friends and family. They fear leaving those networks. Many date back generations.
Should Have Known Better
Developers and home buyers knew or should have known this area was flood prone. But still, they built or bought here at great risk to themselves, and ultimately at great cost to the community.
That raises the question: Why were people allowed to build so close to the bayou in the first place? Why wasn’t sufficient green space left along the bayou to widen it or build detention ponds?
There are no simple answers to that question. Residents may not have felt at risk until upstream development sent more water downstream faster. They may not have been knowledgeable enough about flooding to ask the right questions.
Some just wanted to live close to work. Some wanted to be near family and friends. Some needed the support. And some just pushed their luck because they liked the view or location and the lots were cheap. Regardless, everyone is paying the price for decisions often made decades ago.
Posted by Bob Rehak on April 28, 2021
1338 Days since Hurricane Harvey
Harris County Commissioners Supplement Flood-Bond Funds with Highway Money to Accelerate Mitigation
Tuesday, Harris County Commissioners Court voted 5-0 to transfer $315 million of toll road revenue, unallocated County road bonds and other county funds to accelerate the construction of certain flood-bond mitigation projects. They will allocate the funds to mitigation projects using the 2018 Flood Bond Prioritization Criteria.
The transfer will provide backstop funding for 100% of the projects in the Road & Bridge Subdivision Drainage Program of the 2018 Flood Control Bond Program, removing the risk that partner-funding shortfalls prevent projects from being completed.
Text of Motion
The final language as amended and approved reads as follows:
Create a new funding facility of $115 million, made up of County road bonds or HCTRA surplus revenue, to free up Flood Control bond capacity currently used for the Subdivision Program. The Flood Control bond capacity will be allocated by utilizing the 2018 Flood Bond prioritization criteria.
Create an additional funding facility of $200 million, comprised of HCTRA surplus revenue or other County resources, to support completion of projects that are part of the 2018 bond program with the required transportation nexus.
Here is a background sheet from the county’s budget management department that explains the switch.
Background
The projects benefit neighborhoods with outdated drainage infrastructure or which never had modern drainage systems in the first place. Furthermore, multiple projects are located in watersheds that have been historically disadvantaged in securing federal funds for flood control. According to the Office of the County Engineer, the Subdivision Program has a current estimated total cost of $535 million (or ~$590 million including an approximately 10% contingency).
Among the objectives:
The background sheet contains a list of eligible projects in each precinct. Any Subdivision Program project costs that have not received a notice or award of partner funding by August 31, 2021, would be eligible to receive additional money from the backstop funding.
Discussion
Discussion on the motion and amendment lasted about an hour. It became clear that commissioners believe they:
Including projects from all four precincts helped ensure a unanimous vote.
Another Bond? Not So Fast
Commissioners talked about the possibility of another flood-bond offering. However, the likelihood of that passing is slim. Poor people feel the money is going to affluent neighborhoods and affluent people feel the money is going to poor neighborhoods. If no one is happy with the way the current bond money has been handled, why would anyone vote to approve more?
Commissioners have grappled for more than a month with how to handle a possible shortfall in partner funding. Precinct 1 Commissioner Rodney Ellis threatened to slow down or halt all flood-bond projects until Flood Control found a way to fully fund projects in Halls and Greens Bayous. Today’s development, seemed to avoid that showdown.
It’s unclear at this time how today’s development will affect HUD grants in the pipeline, the interest costs on borrowed money, or the availability of qualified contractors.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/28/2021
1338 Days since Hurricane Harvey
Four Halls Bayou Detention Ponds Recently Completed; Four More Virtually Done
If you saw the recent front page article in the Houston Chronicle about Halls Bayou, you would think that Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) relegated residents in the watershed to “the back of the bus.” Even before the bond, Halls received four floodwater retention projects, three of which are major. HCFCD is trying to expand the fourth of those. And since the flood bond, HCFCD has virtually completed four more floodwater retention projects..
Here’s what I found by simply driving around after consulting the HCFCD website and Google Earth Pro. I wish the Chronicle writer had done the same. There’s just no substitute for laying eyeballs on the job sites before riling up millions of people. Let’s start with the flood-bond projects first. I took all the photos below on 4/25/21 and 4/26/21.
Almost Completed Stormwater Detention Basins in Halls Watershed
Recently Completed in Halls Watershed
Funding “Shortfall” Not Yet Known
The Chronicle writer also claimed a “funding shortfall” for Halls of $272 million. Curious that he would make this statement just days before the GLO announces the winners of a statewide competition. Harris County could get some, none or all of its requests. To be clear, the competition is stiff; Harvey affected more than 40 counties. Regardless, there’s more than $2 billion up for grabs ($1 billion in this round and $1.144 billion in the next). It seems to me, the Chronicle writer could have waited a few days to publish results rather than rumors.
We Need Real Historical Data on Flood Mitigation Spending
Whether you agree with Rodney Ellis, Adrian Garcia and Lina Hidalgo or not, they have fought tenaciously for their constituents. They succeeded in reordering the priorities in flood-bond spending to serve low-to-moderate income neighborhoods first. For the Chronicle to imply that they failed their constituents is an insult to the Judge and Commissioners.
And to imply that all the money is going to more affluent neighborhoods is simply false. That claim seems designed to inflame racial hatred. Kingwood, for instance, has NEVER received one federally funded capital improvement project from HCFCD. Yet the Chronicle’s readers evidently concluded rich neighborhoods get all the money. Again, there’s no substitute for research.
Inflaming racial tensions based on false information is the last thing America needs at this time.
In my opinion, we need facts, not fiction. Asserting discrimination is not the same as proving it.
Chronicle Article Also Ignores Tax Issue, Funding Realities
The Chronicle’s “HCFCD-puts-poor-people-at-the-back-of-the-bus” narrative also ignores the mechanics of funding projects. Before the flood bond vote in 2018, I spent an hour with former County Judge Ed Emmett discussing funding needs. A high priority at that point was to make local tax dollars stretch as far as they could by leveraging partner funding.
The need to leverage partner funding was even addressed in the final flood bond language. Paragraph 14 G states “…the commissioners court shall provide a process for the equitable expenditure of funds recognizing that project selection may have been affected in the past and may continue to be affected by eligibility requirements for matching Federal, State and other local government funds.”
Nobody stretches local tax dollars like the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD is one of the main sources for funding projects in low-to-moderate income neighborhoods. Why?
But there are two catches. First, you’re only eligible if at least 70% of residents that benefit from a project qualify as “low-to-moderate income” (LMI). Second, HUD is slow. To put “slow” in perspective, the Texas General Land Office just started accepting HUD grant applications from Imelda last Saturday. Imelda happened 586 days ago.
Looking at the flood bond spreadsheet (Page 6 of 10) and the expected partnership share of Halls Bayou Projects, you can see that 90/10 ratio reflected in most of the projected funding for Halls.
It’s unclear whether voters would have approved a flood bond that was 9X higher, especially when everyone, rich and poor alike, expressed concerns about not getting their fair share.
Alternative Sources of Halls Funding More Risky
Had HCFCD tried for FEMA funding instead, the low home values in Halls neighborhoods may have yielded a poor Benefit/Cost Ratio. Commissioner Ellis constantly reminds people about the perils of FEMA funding when applied to LMI neighborhoods.
So really, HCFCD had no choice but to focus on HUD for Halls projects.
This was not a “gamble” as the Chronicle headline implied; it was actually the least risky option that seemed to benefit the most people.
We all need to calm down and wait to see how much money HUD grants the Hall’s Bayou Watershed projects. Brittany Eck of the GLO told me that she expects decisions by the end of this month. That’s this Friday.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 4/27/2021
1337 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 586 since Imelda
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.