1/4/26 – January 5, 2026 is the last day to file public comments on a proposed new definition of Waters of the U.S. (WOTUS). The new definition could eliminate federal protections for roughly 80% of the wetlands in the United States.
A regulatory impact analysis by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that approximately 70 – 75 million acres of wetlands would no longer be protected, including approximately three quarters of the 3.1 million acres of wetlands in Texas.
70 – 75 million acres represent an area roughly the size of Arizona, Nevada, or Colorado and almost twice the size of Florida. And it’s more than 175 times larger than Houston.
Under the new definition, only wetlands with a relatively permanent, continuous surface connection to navigable Waters of the U.S. would enjoy federal protection. That pretty much limits federal protection only to swamps that directly border major rivers and streams.
Texas does not have its own regulatory protection program for inland forested wetlands such as those common in the San Jacinto river basin.
How Wetlands Reduce Flooding
Wetlands reduce flood risk by storing, slowing, spreading, and dissipating floodwaters before those waters reach downstream channels, neighborhoods, and infrastructure. They act as natural detention basins, providing temporary storage during heavy rainfalls. They fill first, reducing the volume and rate of water entering streams.
Wetlands also contain dense vegetation that slows runoff, reduces erosion, and minimizes channel scouring downstream.
They spread floods laterally across wide areas. This directly reduces flood heights, velocities and structural damage.
Many wetlands disconnect runoff from channels; they intercept it before it ever reaches streams or bayous. But when developers fill in and pave over wetlands, runoff becomes directly connected. Floods peak higher and faster.
The loss of federal protection for wetlands will shift flood mitigation costs downstream from developers to the public, and from no-cost natural solutions to high-cost engineered solutions, such as regional detention basins, channel widening, lining channels with concrete, bridge widening, dikes, reservoirs, etc.
Flood control districts, reservoir operators, and watershed planners consistently view wetlands as critical flood-risk infrastructure, even when not labeled as such.
Bottom line:
Wetlands reduce flooding by doing four things simultaneously:
Storing water
Slowing flow
Spreading out flood waters
Delaying aggregation of floodwaters.
Lose enough wetlands in a watershed and floods become higher, faster, and more destructive, even if rainfall statistics stay the same.
How You Can Help Save Wetlands
Protest the proposed changes by cutting and pasting the text between the two lines below. Don’t forget to add your name and contact info at the end of the entry form. The deadline for filing a public comment is Monday, January 5, 2025.
Re: the proposed 2025 definition of “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) as it relates to wetlands the Lake Houston watershed.
This represents one of the most hydraulically and sediment-sensitive locations in Southeast Texas. The wetlands and floodplain features here perform essential functions that directly affect downstream flood risk, sediment transport, and the long-term storage capacity of Lake Houston. Narrowing federal jurisdiction over these wetlands would have costly consequences that the proposal does not adequately analyze.
1. Wetlands upstream function as critical flood-storage infrastructure
Wetlands upstream operate as distributed flood-storage and flow-attenuation systems. During ordinary wet-season events, these wetlands temporarily store runoff, slow overland flow, and desynchronize flood peaks arriving from multiple tributaries. This attenuation function is particularly important at confluences, where coincident peak flows dramatically increase flood stage and velocity.
Loss or fragmentation of these wetlands will not merely redistribute water locally; it will shift flood risk downstream into into the Lake Houston area. Engineered detention required at individual development sites does not replicate this basin-scale function and cannot offset cumulative wetland losses across multiple upstream parcels.
2. Wetland loss directly increases sediment delivery to Lake Houston
The wetlands upstream serve as sediment traps. During flood events, reduced velocities across wetland landscapes allow suspended sediment to settle before reaching the active channel network. This function is especially important for a lake losing storage capacity that supplies water for 2 million people.
When wetlands are filled, drained, or disconnected, sediment that was previously stored on the landscape is instead delivered downstream. The result is accelerated shoaling of channels and increased sediment deposition in Lake Houston, reducing conveyance, increasing flood stages for equivalent flows, and shortening the functional life of public infrastructure.
3. Loss of storage capacity in Lake Houston imposes real and recurring public costs
Sedimentation has already measurably reduced the effective storage and conveyance capacity of Lake Houston. Maintaining that capacity has required repeated large-scale dredging projects costing hundreds of millions of dollars, funded largely by federal and state appropriations.
Upstream wetland loss increases the frequency and scale of these dredging needs. Each acre of wetland lost upstream effectively shifts long-term sediment-management costs from private land conversion decisions to the public. The proposed WOTUS definition does not quantify or even acknowledge this cost transfer.
4. Federal withdrawal from jurisdiction coincides with a pullback in mitigation funding
As federal jurisdiction over wetlands contracts, so too does the availability of federal mitigation and restoration funding that historically offset unavoidable impacts. This includes reduced applicability of Clean Water Act Section 404 mitigation and fewer mitigation-bank credits.
The combined effect is a double loss: fewer protected wetlands and fewer resources to restore or compensate for their loss. This creates a structural funding gap that local governments cannot realistically fill.
5. The proposed definition fails to address cumulative watershed-scale impacts
The proposal’s emphasis on parcel-level “continuous surface connection” tests ignores cumulative impacts across sub-basins. In the Lake Houston area, hundreds of small wetland losses—each individually deemed non-jurisdictional—can collectively produce measurable increases in flood peaks, sediment loads, and public costs.
The agencies should evaluate jurisdiction and impacts at the basin scale rather than relying on binary, site-specific connectivity tests that are not representative of watershed hydrology.
Requested revisions
I respectfully request that the agencies revise the proposed definition to:
Retain federal jurisdiction over wetlands that provide flood-storage and sediment-attenuation functions upstream of relatively permanent waters and reservoirs, even where surface connectivity is seasonal rather than continuous year-round.
Treat wetlands upstream of dams and reservoirs as integral components of the same hydrologic system, rather than as disconnected features.
Evaluate and disclose cumulative impacts to flood risk, sedimentation, reservoir capacity, and public dredging costs resulting from reduced wetland protection.
Address the loss of federal mitigation and restoration funding that accompanies jurisdictional withdrawal and explain how watershed-scale impacts will be managed in its absence.
Absent these changes, the proposed definition risks increasing downstream flood damages, accelerating sedimentation in Lake Houston, and shifting long-term infrastructure costs from private development to the public.
Cut and paste the text between the lines above and submit it to:
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Cypress-Swamp.jpg?fit=1100%2C1469&ssl=114691100adminadmin2026-01-04 18:16:122026-01-04 19:50:11Last Day to Save Wetlands
1/2/25 – According a Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) investigation, a massive breach of an abandoned sand mine on the West Fork San Jacinto in August 2025 was “an unforeseen incident.” The report also says that the new owner of the property wants to use the pit as a “recreational pond for livestock management.”
That conjures up this image created by ChatGPT.
However, the breach was far from a laughing matter. On 8/24/25, I documented a massive breach that clogged the San Jacinto West Fork with sediment.
So what’s going on here?
Ultimately, TCEQ issued no citations or fines.
That much is certain.
TCEQ Report Sketchy on Details
I and three readers reported the breach to TCEQ, which has responsibility for supervising sand mines. Four months later, at noon on New Year’s Eve, we each received the official report of TCEQ’s alleged investigation. As with similar breaches downstream, TCEQ noted the incident, but took no action.
Here’s a brief summary:
TCEQ sent four investigators to the site on 8/25/25. They noted no active sand mining and they issued no violations, fines, or citations.
TCEQ consulted the Montgomery County Appraisal District database. They found that a company called AGS Unlimited Montgomery, LLC had purchased the property on August 1, 2025, only weeks before the breach.
TCEQ phoned a “managing member” of AGS, Mr. Andrew Shebay IV, on September 2, 2025. Mr. Shebay reportedly described the incident as “unforeseen” and said he had conversations with the Montgomery County Floodplain Administrator and Army Corps about “managing the situation.”
According to TCEQ, Shebay says he intends to use the pond “as a recreational pond for livestock management.” (That conjured up the comical image above, which I clearly intend as parody.)
This alleged investigation is consistent with other alleged TCEQ investigations into breaches of sand-mine dikes. Alleged TCEQ investigators observe problems, but rarely recommend fines or citations.
Owner Claims Breach was Accidental
The comical TCEQ claim – that a pond likely 60-90 feet deep – would be used as a livestock spa, made me want to investigate further. So I called the owner myself. He was cordial and open, and we talked for more than twenty minutes.
Here’s a picture of the breach as it was happening.
Breach of sand mine dike near East River Road and Walker Roadin August.
Mr. Shebay said a third-party contractor was trying to install a drain pipe and spillway to help prevent flooding of adjacent properties in the future. And in fact, I photographed both drain pipes and earthmoving equipment at the site on the day of the breach.
Corrugated pipe photographed near earthmoving equipment on day of breach.Excavator near breach (upper right)
However, Shebay claims a third-party contractor failed to follow engineering plans, causing the breach. The breach was accidental, he says. Things just got out of control.
Sand and sediment expelled through the breach clogged the West Fork.
New Owner’s Plans for Abandoned Mine Not Yet Clear
Shebay’s plans for the abandoned mine are not yet finalized. At various points in our conversation, he mentioned a boat launch, a kid’s camp, a recreational amenity for an adjacent residential community, and selling wetland-mitigation credits.
His ultimate use for the property depends on several things. Foremost among them is the routing of new high-tension electrical wires. He says Entergy will not finalize a route until the end of 2026. He also says that that has kept him from finalizing plans.
If Entergy chooses a route too near his pit, he says, that could rule out plans that involve children. He sees a safety issue.
Re: the wetland mitigation credits, an environmental expert I consulted said that the owner would need to create wetlands first before he could sell credits. That’s not likely to happen here. Why?
Wetlands are typically very shallow, i.e., swamps, bogs and marshes. However, previous owners took sand out of this pit for 20 years, sometimes with two dredges operating simultaneously. And other West Fork mine owners have told me they often dredge pits to 60-90 feet.
Yet this mine’s new owner claims he has no plans to fill the pond. So selling wetland-mitigation credits is unlikely.
Re: fixing the breach, Mr. Shebay says he’s looking for crushed concrete to help fill it and stabilize the pond wall. He also says that he’s made arrangements with a nearby residential development that’s digging a detention basin to take their clay for the same purpose.
Use of Word “Alleged”
You likely noticed my use of the world “alleged” in regard to the TCEQ investigation above. That’s out of frustration.
TCEQ used the adjective “alleged” five times in its report before the nouns “concern,” “incident,” “complaints” and “violation.” Using “alleged” before “violation” is valid; “Violation” assumes a conclusion not yet verified by investigators or a court.
However, the “complaints” are not alleged; they are real. So was the “incident”; I have photos and video to prove it, and TCEQ verified it. And to imply that someone’s “concerns” are alleged is just downright insulting.
The language in alleged TCEQ investigations insults anyone who seeks their help. No wonder the TCEQ has lost so much credibility.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/2/25
3048 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/adc7d878-af19-42b9-b4d4-a8c5b267eab9.png?fit=1024%2C1536&ssl=115361024adminadmin2026-01-02 18:50:312026-01-02 18:50:32Results of Alleged TCEQ Investigation into Massive Sand-Mine Breach
12/30/25 – Part III of the top flood-related stories of 2025 concerns a slowdown in flood-mitigation activity at Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) and how it is already becoming an issue in the election of a new Harris County Judge. Let’s look at the slowdown part first.
Spending Drops for Fifth Year
The graph below illustrates the slowdown.
HCFCD 2018 Bond spending through Q3 2025. Approximately 60% of bond/partner funds remain unspent 8.5 years after Harvey. The bond was originally sold as a 10-year program.
That slowdown means people live with higher flood risk than necessary.
Potential Loss of $322 Million in Partner Funding At Stake
The slowdown also puts 11 grants totaling $322 million at risk.
That’s the total of Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Relief (CDBG-DR) to Harris County from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Texas General Land Office (GLO) administers those grants for HUD.
All have a firm deadline of 2/28/2027, according to the GLO. But most have not even been advertised for bids yet and won’t be until the first quarter of next year.
CDBG-DRprojects highlighted in red have not yet been bid or bids have not yet been awarded.All must be completed by 2/28/27.
Only one CDBG-DR project so far is in construction: Arbor Oaks. Brookglen bidding has closed. Three others are still in bidding: Lauder, Greens Mid-Reach, and Keegans. Others highlighted above haven’t even started bidding yet.
It typically takes three to four months from advertising a project for bids until a winner is selected, Commissioners Court approves the award, contracts are signed and a notice to proceed is issued. That leaves less than a year for construction on most of these projects. And many could take longer than a year to build, if history is any guide.
T.C. Jester Project Illustrates Problem
For instance, HCFCD has issued a press release saying that construction of the T.C. Jester East Basin (partially funded by CDBG-DR dollars) will not finish until Q4 of 2028. HCFCD finished the preliminary engineering review in 2021.
T.C. Jester project area on Cypress Creek. The small basin (r) will expand to cover most of the forested area in center.
It’s all part of a bigger story about the slowdown and complacency. Collectively…
“We have lost the sense of urgency that once fueled our flood mitigation crusade after Hurricane Harvey.”
Bob Rehak
According to an HCFCD press release, $20 million HUD CDBG-DR dollars are at risk for one of the three detention basin compartments that will be built on the site above. But the project also involves funding from other sources. State Rep Sam Harless secured $12 million for the project through the Texas Water Development Board.
If the HUD funding falls through, what will happen to the state money? There likely wouldn’t be enough money to complete the project.
Two additional stormwater detention basin compartments on the east side of TC Jester have longer deadlines, but are scheduled to finish earlier in 2028 – ten years after the flood bond and eleven years after Harvey! They involve funding from FEMA (via Congressman Dan Crenshaw).
Any time you get two departments of the federal government (each with their own rules), the state government (with its own rules), and county government (with its rules), things get complicated. And the current leadership in Harris County has added bureaucracy that has contributed to the slowdown.
Lancton Makes Slowdown an Election Issue
The potential loss of funding has already become a campaign issue in the Harris County Judge election year.
Candidate Marty Lancton, now endorsed by Governor Abbott, has jumped on it. He issued this statement.
“The implementation of CDBG funds has taken an unacceptably long amount of time. As County Judge, I will ensure that every Harris County department is thoroughly evaluated to identify and implement process improvements. The Harris County Flood Control District will be among the first departments reviewed.”
Lancton continued, “In developing the current funding priorities, three commissioners and the current County Judge established a project list that did not adequately prioritize initiatives with the greatest potential impact, nor did it sufficiently account for whether projects could realistically be completed within the required timelines.
“As County Judge, I will ensure that taxpayer dollars are invested responsibly and that funding priorities are established based on effectiveness, feasibility, and measurable benefit to Harris County residents. Finally, I will work closely with HUD and the Texas General Land Office to improve coordination and accelerate the implementation of projects that protect and serve the people of Harris County.”
Lancton is a long time leader of first responders and is extremely aware of flood risk.
In major storms, Cypress Creek is usually one of the hardest hit areas in the County. For people who live in that area as well as downstream areas, such as Lake Houston, flood-risk reduction can’t come fast enough.
In the last 125 years, we’ve been hit with major floods 48 times. We were lucky this year. But it’s only a matter of time before one strikes again. We must be prepared.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/30/2025
3045 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/HCFCD-spending-through-Q3-2025-e1762554426251.png?fit=1100%2C430&ssl=14301100adminadmin2025-12-30 14:50:412025-12-30 19:59:44Top Flood-Related Stories of 2025: Part III – Mitigation Slowdown Becomes Election Issue
Last Day to Save Wetlands
1/4/26 – January 5, 2026 is the last day to file public comments on a proposed new definition of Waters of the U.S. (WOTUS). The new definition could eliminate federal protections for roughly 80% of the wetlands in the United States.
A regulatory impact analysis by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that approximately 70 – 75 million acres of wetlands would no longer be protected, including approximately three quarters of the 3.1 million acres of wetlands in Texas.
70 – 75 million acres represent an area roughly the size of Arizona, Nevada, or Colorado and almost twice the size of Florida. And it’s more than 175 times larger than Houston.
Under the new definition, only wetlands with a relatively permanent, continuous surface connection to navigable Waters of the U.S. would enjoy federal protection. That pretty much limits federal protection only to swamps that directly border major rivers and streams.
Texas does not have its own regulatory protection program for inland forested wetlands such as those common in the San Jacinto river basin.
How Wetlands Reduce Flooding
Wetlands reduce flood risk by storing, slowing, spreading, and dissipating floodwaters before those waters reach downstream channels, neighborhoods, and infrastructure. They act as natural detention basins, providing temporary storage during heavy rainfalls. They fill first, reducing the volume and rate of water entering streams.
Wetlands also contain dense vegetation that slows runoff, reduces erosion, and minimizes channel scouring downstream.
They spread floods laterally across wide areas. This directly reduces flood heights, velocities and structural damage.
Many wetlands disconnect runoff from channels; they intercept it before it ever reaches streams or bayous. But when developers fill in and pave over wetlands, runoff becomes directly connected. Floods peak higher and faster.
The loss of federal protection for wetlands will shift flood mitigation costs downstream from developers to the public, and from no-cost natural solutions to high-cost engineered solutions, such as regional detention basins, channel widening, lining channels with concrete, bridge widening, dikes, reservoirs, etc.
Flood control districts, reservoir operators, and watershed planners consistently view wetlands as critical flood-risk infrastructure, even when not labeled as such.
Bottom line:
Wetlands reduce flooding by doing four things simultaneously:
How You Can Help Save Wetlands
Protest the proposed changes by cutting and pasting the text between the two lines below. Don’t forget to add your name and contact info at the end of the entry form. The deadline for filing a public comment is Monday, January 5, 2025.
Re: the proposed 2025 definition of “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) as it relates to wetlands the Lake Houston watershed.
This represents one of the most hydraulically and sediment-sensitive locations in Southeast Texas. The wetlands and floodplain features here perform essential functions that directly affect downstream flood risk, sediment transport, and the long-term storage capacity of Lake Houston. Narrowing federal jurisdiction over these wetlands would have costly consequences that the proposal does not adequately analyze.
1. Wetlands upstream function as critical flood-storage infrastructure
Wetlands upstream operate as distributed flood-storage and flow-attenuation systems. During ordinary wet-season events, these wetlands temporarily store runoff, slow overland flow, and desynchronize flood peaks arriving from multiple tributaries. This attenuation function is particularly important at confluences, where coincident peak flows dramatically increase flood stage and velocity.
Loss or fragmentation of these wetlands will not merely redistribute water locally; it will shift flood risk downstream into into the Lake Houston area. Engineered detention required at individual development sites does not replicate this basin-scale function and cannot offset cumulative wetland losses across multiple upstream parcels.
2. Wetland loss directly increases sediment delivery to Lake Houston
The wetlands upstream serve as sediment traps. During flood events, reduced velocities across wetland landscapes allow suspended sediment to settle before reaching the active channel network. This function is especially important for a lake losing storage capacity that supplies water for 2 million people.
When wetlands are filled, drained, or disconnected, sediment that was previously stored on the landscape is instead delivered downstream. The result is accelerated shoaling of channels and increased sediment deposition in Lake Houston, reducing conveyance, increasing flood stages for equivalent flows, and shortening the functional life of public infrastructure.
3. Loss of storage capacity in Lake Houston imposes real and recurring public costs
Sedimentation has already measurably reduced the effective storage and conveyance capacity of Lake Houston. Maintaining that capacity has required repeated large-scale dredging projects costing hundreds of millions of dollars, funded largely by federal and state appropriations.
Upstream wetland loss increases the frequency and scale of these dredging needs. Each acre of wetland lost upstream effectively shifts long-term sediment-management costs from private land conversion decisions to the public. The proposed WOTUS definition does not quantify or even acknowledge this cost transfer.
4. Federal withdrawal from jurisdiction coincides with a pullback in mitigation funding
As federal jurisdiction over wetlands contracts, so too does the availability of federal mitigation and restoration funding that historically offset unavoidable impacts. This includes reduced applicability of Clean Water Act Section 404 mitigation and fewer mitigation-bank credits.
The combined effect is a double loss: fewer protected wetlands and fewer resources to restore or compensate for their loss. This creates a structural funding gap that local governments cannot realistically fill.
5. The proposed definition fails to address cumulative watershed-scale impacts
The proposal’s emphasis on parcel-level “continuous surface connection” tests ignores cumulative impacts across sub-basins. In the Lake Houston area, hundreds of small wetland losses—each individually deemed non-jurisdictional—can collectively produce measurable increases in flood peaks, sediment loads, and public costs.
The agencies should evaluate jurisdiction and impacts at the basin scale rather than relying on binary, site-specific connectivity tests that are not representative of watershed hydrology.
Requested revisions
I respectfully request that the agencies revise the proposed definition to:
Absent these changes, the proposed definition risks increasing downstream flood damages, accelerating sedimentation in Lake Houston, and shifting long-term infrastructure costs from private development to the public.
Cut and paste the text between the lines above and submit it to:
Regulations.gov to Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2025-0322.
Please DO IT NOW. DON’T DELAY.
For More Info
If you wish to compose your own letter, say for other areas, the following resources may help:
Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/4/26
3050 Days since Hurricane Harvey
Results of Alleged TCEQ Investigation into Massive Sand-Mine Breach
1/2/25 – According a Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) investigation, a massive breach of an abandoned sand mine on the West Fork San Jacinto in August 2025 was “an unforeseen incident.” The report also says that the new owner of the property wants to use the pit as a “recreational pond for livestock management.”
However, the breach was far from a laughing matter. On 8/24/25, I documented a massive breach that clogged the San Jacinto West Fork with sediment.
So what’s going on here?
That much is certain.
TCEQ Report Sketchy on Details
I and three readers reported the breach to TCEQ, which has responsibility for supervising sand mines. Four months later, at noon on New Year’s Eve, we each received the official report of TCEQ’s alleged investigation. As with similar breaches downstream, TCEQ noted the incident, but took no action.
Here’s a brief summary:
To see TCEQ’s full report, click: https://reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2091112-Compl-Letter-4_Redacted.pdf.
This alleged investigation is consistent with other alleged TCEQ investigations into breaches of sand-mine dikes. Alleged TCEQ investigators observe problems, but rarely recommend fines or citations.
Owner Claims Breach was Accidental
The comical TCEQ claim – that a pond likely 60-90 feet deep – would be used as a livestock spa, made me want to investigate further. So I called the owner myself. He was cordial and open, and we talked for more than twenty minutes.
Here’s a picture of the breach as it was happening.
Mr. Shebay said a third-party contractor was trying to install a drain pipe and spillway to help prevent flooding of adjacent properties in the future. And in fact, I photographed both drain pipes and earthmoving equipment at the site on the day of the breach.
However, Shebay claims a third-party contractor failed to follow engineering plans, causing the breach. The breach was accidental, he says. Things just got out of control.
New Owner’s Plans for Abandoned Mine Not Yet Clear
Shebay’s plans for the abandoned mine are not yet finalized. At various points in our conversation, he mentioned a boat launch, a kid’s camp, a recreational amenity for an adjacent residential community, and selling wetland-mitigation credits.
His ultimate use for the property depends on several things. Foremost among them is the routing of new high-tension electrical wires. He says Entergy will not finalize a route until the end of 2026. He also says that that has kept him from finalizing plans.
If Entergy chooses a route too near his pit, he says, that could rule out plans that involve children. He sees a safety issue.
Re: the wetland mitigation credits, an environmental expert I consulted said that the owner would need to create wetlands first before he could sell credits. That’s not likely to happen here. Why?
Wetlands are typically very shallow, i.e., swamps, bogs and marshes. However, previous owners took sand out of this pit for 20 years, sometimes with two dredges operating simultaneously. And other West Fork mine owners have told me they often dredge pits to 60-90 feet.
Yet this mine’s new owner claims he has no plans to fill the pond. So selling wetland-mitigation credits is unlikely.
Re: fixing the breach, Mr. Shebay says he’s looking for crushed concrete to help fill it and stabilize the pond wall. He also says that he’s made arrangements with a nearby residential development that’s digging a detention basin to take their clay for the same purpose.
Use of Word “Alleged”
You likely noticed my use of the world “alleged” in regard to the TCEQ investigation above. That’s out of frustration.
TCEQ used the adjective “alleged” five times in its report before the nouns “concern,” “incident,” “complaints” and “violation.” Using “alleged” before “violation” is valid; “Violation” assumes a conclusion not yet verified by investigators or a court.
However, the “complaints” are not alleged; they are real. So was the “incident”; I have photos and video to prove it, and TCEQ verified it. And to imply that someone’s “concerns” are alleged is just downright insulting.
The language in alleged TCEQ investigations insults anyone who seeks their help. No wonder the TCEQ has lost so much credibility.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/2/25
3048 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
Top Flood-Related Stories of 2025: Part III – Mitigation Slowdown Becomes Election Issue
12/30/25 – Part III of the top flood-related stories of 2025 concerns a slowdown in flood-mitigation activity at Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) and how it is already becoming an issue in the election of a new Harris County Judge. Let’s look at the slowdown part first.
Spending Drops for Fifth Year
The graph below illustrates the slowdown.
That slowdown means people live with higher flood risk than necessary.
Potential Loss of $322 Million in Partner Funding At Stake
The slowdown also puts 11 grants totaling $322 million at risk.
That’s the total of Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Relief (CDBG-DR) to Harris County from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Texas General Land Office (GLO) administers those grants for HUD.
All have a firm deadline of 2/28/2027, according to the GLO. But most have not even been advertised for bids yet and won’t be until the first quarter of next year.
Only one CDBG-DR project so far is in construction: Arbor Oaks. Brookglen bidding has closed. Three others are still in bidding: Lauder, Greens Mid-Reach, and Keegans. Others highlighted above haven’t even started bidding yet.
It typically takes three to four months from advertising a project for bids until a winner is selected, Commissioners Court approves the award, contracts are signed and a notice to proceed is issued. That leaves less than a year for construction on most of these projects. And many could take longer than a year to build, if history is any guide.
T.C. Jester Project Illustrates Problem
For instance, HCFCD has issued a press release saying that construction of the T.C. Jester East Basin (partially funded by CDBG-DR dollars) will not finish until Q4 of 2028. HCFCD finished the preliminary engineering review in 2021.
It’s all part of a bigger story about the slowdown and complacency. Collectively…
According to an HCFCD press release, $20 million HUD CDBG-DR dollars are at risk for one of the three detention basin compartments that will be built on the site above. But the project also involves funding from other sources. State Rep Sam Harless secured $12 million for the project through the Texas Water Development Board.
If the HUD funding falls through, what will happen to the state money? There likely wouldn’t be enough money to complete the project.
Two additional stormwater detention basin compartments on the east side of TC Jester have longer deadlines, but are scheduled to finish earlier in 2028 – ten years after the flood bond and eleven years after Harvey! They involve funding from FEMA (via Congressman Dan Crenshaw).
Any time you get two departments of the federal government (each with their own rules), the state government (with its own rules), and county government (with its rules), things get complicated. And the current leadership in Harris County has added bureaucracy that has contributed to the slowdown.
Lancton Makes Slowdown an Election Issue
The potential loss of funding has already become a campaign issue in the Harris County Judge election year.
Candidate Marty Lancton, now endorsed by Governor Abbott, has jumped on it. He issued this statement.
“The implementation of CDBG funds has taken an unacceptably long amount of time. As County Judge, I will ensure that every Harris County department is thoroughly evaluated to identify and implement process improvements. The Harris County Flood Control District will be among the first departments reviewed.”
Lancton continued, “In developing the current funding priorities, three commissioners and the current County Judge established a project list that did not adequately prioritize initiatives with the greatest potential impact, nor did it sufficiently account for whether projects could realistically be completed within the required timelines.
“As County Judge, I will ensure that taxpayer dollars are invested responsibly and that funding priorities are established based on effectiveness, feasibility, and measurable benefit to Harris County residents. Finally, I will work closely with HUD and the Texas General Land Office to improve coordination and accelerate the implementation of projects that protect and serve the people of Harris County.”
Lancton is a long time leader of first responders and is extremely aware of flood risk.
In major storms, Cypress Creek is usually one of the hardest hit areas in the County. For people who live in that area as well as downstream areas, such as Lake Houston, flood-risk reduction can’t come fast enough.
In the last 125 years, we’ve been hit with major floods 48 times. We were lucky this year. But it’s only a matter of time before one strikes again. We must be prepared.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/30/2025
3045 Days since Hurricane Harvey