1/7/26 – The final Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) spending numbers are in for 2025. And they show a disturbing story of deception that calls for political change. The latest numbers show that HCFCD is fixing the worst flooding last, not first, as promised. See the two graphs below.
Compare Spending to Flood Height
The first shows flood height. The San Jacinto watershed had the worst flooding in Harris County.
Yet when you look at where the money goes, the San Jacinto ranks nearly last.
HCFCD cumulative spending for each watershed since flood bond as percent of projected expenditures in 2018.
The San Jacinto Watershed has only received 13% of the money allocated to it in the flood bond. Yet almost half of the flood-related deaths in Harris County during Harvey occurred in the San Jacinto Watershed – 15 out of 36. Most of those were elderly.
Why the huge disparity between these two graphs? Unfortunately and unbelievably…
The Democratic majority on commissioners court removed flood-risk reduction as a factor in prioritizing mitigation projects in 2022.
To Change Priorities, Change Leaders
But you can change that at the ballot box this year.
In that regard, I’ve had the pleasure of meeting one of the front runners for county judge this year, Marty Lancton. As a leader of first responders, he has experienced the terrible human toll of flooding as few others have. And he has made flood mitigation one of his top priorities. Most importantly…
Lancton believes in restoring flood-risk reduction as a factor in prioritizing projects.
It’s time we put the worst flooding first, not last. We must improve fairness to restore faith in government.
The Raw Data
Live in another watershed and wonder whether you got shortchanged, too? Here’s where HCFCD spent your money to date.
Projected vs. actual spending by HCFCD since start of flood bond for each watershed.Total includes bond plus partner dollars.
Eight watersheds exceed the average percent spent, while fifteen fall below it. This isn’t accidental. It’s deliberate. And this is the year to fix that.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/7/26
3053 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Worst-Last-e1767828948303.png?fit=1100%2C661&ssl=16611100adminadmin2026-01-07 19:18:232026-01-07 19:30:10We Must Make Addressing “Worst Flooding First” a Campaign Issue
1/6/2026 – The Texas General Land Office (GLO) which manages more than $14 billion of flood mitigation funds has invested in the development of flood-prone land. But it won’t explain why, even as the agency proclaims “transparency above everything.”
Partnership with Developer of Flood-Prone Land
Since 2020, I have posted more than 40 articles about the 5,000+ flood-prone acres west of Kingwood, virtually all of it in the floodways and floodplains of Spring and Cypress Creeks where they join the San Jacinto West Fork. For many years, the property was owned by a Syrian developer called Ryko and its sister company, Pacific Indio Properties. They wanted to build 7,000 homes on it.
What wasn’t clear at the time was that the Texas General Land Office (GLO) and a state board it oversees, the School Land Board (SLB), partnered with the buyers to purchase the flood-prone land and develop it. That’s significant because the GLO also administers more than $14 billion of flood-mitigation funds for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) – an apparent conflict of interest.
As word leaked out, the GLO stonewalled public-information requests. They appealed Freedom of Information Act requests to Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s office. Paxton’s office upheld the GLO’s right to conceal the nature and extent of the GLO/SLB involvement.
I could find no mention of the State Land Board partnership with Scarborough in meeting minutes or agendas posted online. However, I did find one reference in an unaudited financial report. It said…
“Scarborough Lane Development and the School Land Board entered into a partnership in August 2025 for the development of a master planned community. The partnership acquired approximately 5,317 acres in Montgomery County.”
Page 71 of unaudited GLO Financial Annual Report dated August 31, 2025, two weeks after the purchase.
That’s it…32 words about an investment reportedly totaling close to $140 million.
So, I started digging. I wanted to know how the GLO reconciled the apparent conflict between:
Managing more than $14 billion of federal and state flood-mitigation dollars
Investing in the development of flood-prone properties.
But the deeper I dug, the deeper the GLO seemed to dig in.
Initial Response
On 12/19/25, the GLO issued this statement.
“This investment was approved by the School Land Board (SLB) pursuant to Chapter 51 of the Texas Natural Resources Code (TNRC). The GLO’s investment in this project through the SLB as a limited partner was contingent upon Montgomery County’s approval of the drainage study, which was successfully completed in July 2025. As Land Commissioner, I am committed to preventing future flooding. We are meeting with stakeholders and have heard the local concerns regarding this project. Our agency is dedicated to serving the best interests of the community.” Commissioner Dawn Buckingham, MD
However, I learned via FOIA requests to Montgomery County that the county did NOT actually approve a full drainage study in July 2025. The county engineer’s letter listed three pages of things Ryko would have to do to get approval. At the time, the new owners were relying on a preliminary drainage study provided by the previous owners.
It had gaps, to say the least. Either no one at the SLB read the letter or they didn’t know I had it. So, I sent them the letter and asked how they could call that “successfully completed.” They never directly answered that concern.
Nor did they explain why they invested in the project! When I asked…
Second Response
On 12/30/25, I received a second statement from the GLO. It read:
“Recognizing how important Montgomery County is to Texas, the School Land Board (SLB) wanted to bring economic development and opportunity to the area with this project. The board was confident we could mitigate flooding risks. However, we have heard and want to be sensitive to the public’s concern over flooding. At this time, we have decided not to move forward with the development as planned.” — Commissioner Dawn Buckingham, MD
So…we went from “successfully completed” a drainage study (past tense) to “confident we COULD mitigate flooding risks” (future conditional tense).
But there’s another problem. The response seemed to conclude on a positive note. “We have decided not to move forward with the development…” Then I noticed “as planned.”
So, I asked what Buckingham meant by “as planned.” I specifically asked whether the GLO was pulling out of the development or modifying it to find a compromise between economic development and flood mitigation. So I asked.
Third Response
The GLO press office next emailed a statement on 1/5/26. Their legal counsel said this:
“As a limited partner, the GLO cannot halt this project altogether. The agency is in discussions with our partners to evaluate all available future options for this tract to address the raised concerns.” – NamelessGLO lawyer
Three problems:
Note the “S” on partner, making it plural. From this, I deduce that the GLO is now discussing options with Scarborough and at least one other partner. Who? Montgomery County? HUD? The Texas Water Development Board? Texas Parks & Wildlife? Someone else?
Whose concerns? The unnamed partners’ concerns? Or the public’s?
It’s unclear what kind of options are on the table.
However, it is clear the project has not been cancelled yet as the previous statement implied.
Transparency Issue
At this point, we know that a state agency charged with administering billions of dollars in flood mitigation funds has helped purchase flood-prone land for the purposes of development.
But, there’s a huge transparency issue. We still don’t know:
Whose money they used to help purchase the land
How much they invested
Why
What commitments the GLO made
What the plans are
What happens to the investment if the project fails?
Ignoring issues like these undermines trust in government. If this is such a good deal, why isn’t Commissioner Dawn Buckingham holding a press conference about it?
Why the Fuss?
I talked to one retired, highly respected developer who looked at this land decades ago. He said “development just doesn’t make economic sense.” The area is one of the most flood-prone in the region.
Ryko and its sister company, Pacific Indio Properties, tried to develop the property below for years without luck.
Within the red outline, only dark gray areas are elevated above floodplains.But blue and lighter gray areas are in floodplains or floodways.
Those floodplains and floodways will expand significantly – likely by 50% to100% – when FEMA adopts new maps based on Atlas-14 data. See FEMA’s old map below.
From FEMA’s Flood Hazard Layer Viewer. Map dated 2014. Scarborough land in center. Brown = 500-year floodplain, Aqua = 100-year, Cross-hatched = Floodway.
In addition to floodplain and floodway issues, the property has wetland issues.
From the National Wetlands Inventory. Note solid green areas – the wetlands – as well as numerous ponds and streams within the property. All raise development uncertainty and costs.
“Like Aiming a Firehose at Kingwood and Humble”
One of the most respected hydrologists in the region said that “if this property ever got developed, it would be like aiming a firehose at Kingwood and Humble.”
You would think that would be a concern for an area where floodwaters rose 27 feet and killed 15 people. But unlike officials in neighboring areas, the GLO has never publicly discouraged development of this land. Instead, they’re investing in the development of it!
Concerns Expressed by Neighboring Officials
In addition to the physical challenges, Scarborough and the GLO face many political challenges.
Harris County unanimously approved a resolution urging Montgomery County to apply stricter Harris County floodplain standards to the development.
Houston City Council unanimously approved a strongly worded resolution OPPOSING the Scarborough Development.
Precinct 3 Commissioner Ritch Wheeler took an extension of Townsen Blvd off the 2025 Montgomery County Road Bond to make development more difficult.
The Montgomery County Engineer is demanding an alternative evacuation route.
Harris County will not permit a bridge across Spring Creek that the developer needs as an alternative evacuation route.
Even people who normally support Commissioner Dawn Buckingham are scratching their heads over this deal and the GLO’s concealment of information that should be public.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/6/2026
3052 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
1/4/26 – January 5, 2026 is the last day to file public comments on a proposed new definition of Waters of the U.S. (WOTUS). The new definition could eliminate federal protections for roughly 80% of the wetlands in the United States.
A regulatory impact analysis by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that approximately 70 – 75 million acres of wetlands would no longer be protected, including approximately three quarters of the 3.1 million acres of wetlands in Texas.
70 – 75 million acres represent an area roughly the size of Arizona, Nevada, or Colorado and almost twice the size of Florida. And it’s more than 175 times larger than Houston.
Under the new definition, only wetlands with a relatively permanent, continuous surface connection to navigable Waters of the U.S. would enjoy federal protection. That pretty much limits federal protection only to swamps that directly border major rivers and streams.
Texas does not have its own regulatory protection program for inland forested wetlands such as those common in the San Jacinto river basin.
How Wetlands Reduce Flooding
Wetlands reduce flood risk by storing, slowing, spreading, and dissipating floodwaters before those waters reach downstream channels, neighborhoods, and infrastructure. They act as natural detention basins, providing temporary storage during heavy rainfalls. They fill first, reducing the volume and rate of water entering streams.
Wetlands also contain dense vegetation that slows runoff, reduces erosion, and minimizes channel scouring downstream.
They spread floods laterally across wide areas. This directly reduces flood heights, velocities and structural damage.
Many wetlands disconnect runoff from channels; they intercept it before it ever reaches streams or bayous. But when developers fill in and pave over wetlands, runoff becomes directly connected. Floods peak higher and faster.
The loss of federal protection for wetlands will shift flood mitigation costs downstream from developers to the public, and from no-cost natural solutions to high-cost engineered solutions, such as regional detention basins, channel widening, lining channels with concrete, bridge widening, dikes, reservoirs, etc.
Flood control districts, reservoir operators, and watershed planners consistently view wetlands as critical flood-risk infrastructure, even when not labeled as such.
Bottom line:
Wetlands reduce flooding by doing four things simultaneously:
Storing water
Slowing flow
Spreading out flood waters
Delaying aggregation of floodwaters.
Lose enough wetlands in a watershed and floods become higher, faster, and more destructive, even if rainfall statistics stay the same.
How You Can Help Save Wetlands
Protest the proposed changes by cutting and pasting the text between the two lines below. Don’t forget to add your name and contact info at the end of the entry form. The deadline for filing a public comment is Monday, January 5, 2025.
Re: the proposed 2025 definition of “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) as it relates to wetlands the Lake Houston watershed.
This represents one of the most hydraulically and sediment-sensitive locations in Southeast Texas. The wetlands and floodplain features here perform essential functions that directly affect downstream flood risk, sediment transport, and the long-term storage capacity of Lake Houston. Narrowing federal jurisdiction over these wetlands would have costly consequences that the proposal does not adequately analyze.
1. Wetlands upstream function as critical flood-storage infrastructure
Wetlands upstream operate as distributed flood-storage and flow-attenuation systems. During ordinary wet-season events, these wetlands temporarily store runoff, slow overland flow, and desynchronize flood peaks arriving from multiple tributaries. This attenuation function is particularly important at confluences, where coincident peak flows dramatically increase flood stage and velocity.
Loss or fragmentation of these wetlands will not merely redistribute water locally; it will shift flood risk downstream into into the Lake Houston area. Engineered detention required at individual development sites does not replicate this basin-scale function and cannot offset cumulative wetland losses across multiple upstream parcels.
2. Wetland loss directly increases sediment delivery to Lake Houston
The wetlands upstream serve as sediment traps. During flood events, reduced velocities across wetland landscapes allow suspended sediment to settle before reaching the active channel network. This function is especially important for a lake losing storage capacity that supplies water for 2 million people.
When wetlands are filled, drained, or disconnected, sediment that was previously stored on the landscape is instead delivered downstream. The result is accelerated shoaling of channels and increased sediment deposition in Lake Houston, reducing conveyance, increasing flood stages for equivalent flows, and shortening the functional life of public infrastructure.
3. Loss of storage capacity in Lake Houston imposes real and recurring public costs
Sedimentation has already measurably reduced the effective storage and conveyance capacity of Lake Houston. Maintaining that capacity has required repeated large-scale dredging projects costing hundreds of millions of dollars, funded largely by federal and state appropriations.
Upstream wetland loss increases the frequency and scale of these dredging needs. Each acre of wetland lost upstream effectively shifts long-term sediment-management costs from private land conversion decisions to the public. The proposed WOTUS definition does not quantify or even acknowledge this cost transfer.
4. Federal withdrawal from jurisdiction coincides with a pullback in mitigation funding
As federal jurisdiction over wetlands contracts, so too does the availability of federal mitigation and restoration funding that historically offset unavoidable impacts. This includes reduced applicability of Clean Water Act Section 404 mitigation and fewer mitigation-bank credits.
The combined effect is a double loss: fewer protected wetlands and fewer resources to restore or compensate for their loss. This creates a structural funding gap that local governments cannot realistically fill.
5. The proposed definition fails to address cumulative watershed-scale impacts
The proposal’s emphasis on parcel-level “continuous surface connection” tests ignores cumulative impacts across sub-basins. In the Lake Houston area, hundreds of small wetland losses—each individually deemed non-jurisdictional—can collectively produce measurable increases in flood peaks, sediment loads, and public costs.
The agencies should evaluate jurisdiction and impacts at the basin scale rather than relying on binary, site-specific connectivity tests that are not representative of watershed hydrology.
Requested revisions
I respectfully request that the agencies revise the proposed definition to:
Retain federal jurisdiction over wetlands that provide flood-storage and sediment-attenuation functions upstream of relatively permanent waters and reservoirs, even where surface connectivity is seasonal rather than continuous year-round.
Treat wetlands upstream of dams and reservoirs as integral components of the same hydrologic system, rather than as disconnected features.
Evaluate and disclose cumulative impacts to flood risk, sedimentation, reservoir capacity, and public dredging costs resulting from reduced wetland protection.
Address the loss of federal mitigation and restoration funding that accompanies jurisdictional withdrawal and explain how watershed-scale impacts will be managed in its absence.
Absent these changes, the proposed definition risks increasing downstream flood damages, accelerating sedimentation in Lake Houston, and shifting long-term infrastructure costs from private development to the public.
Cut and paste the text between the lines above and submit it to:
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Cypress-Swamp.jpg?fit=1100%2C1469&ssl=114691100adminadmin2026-01-04 18:16:122026-01-04 19:50:11Last Day to Save Wetlands
We Must Make Addressing “Worst Flooding First” a Campaign Issue
1/7/26 – The final Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) spending numbers are in for 2025. And they show a disturbing story of deception that calls for political change. The latest numbers show that HCFCD is fixing the worst flooding last, not first, as promised. See the two graphs below.
Compare Spending to Flood Height
The first shows flood height. The San Jacinto watershed had the worst flooding in Harris County.
Yet when you look at where the money goes, the San Jacinto ranks nearly last.
The San Jacinto Watershed has only received 13% of the money allocated to it in the flood bond. Yet almost half of the flood-related deaths in Harris County during Harvey occurred in the San Jacinto Watershed – 15 out of 36. Most of those were elderly.
Why the huge disparity between these two graphs? Unfortunately and unbelievably…
To Change Priorities, Change Leaders
But you can change that at the ballot box this year.
In that regard, I’ve had the pleasure of meeting one of the front runners for county judge this year, Marty Lancton. As a leader of first responders, he has experienced the terrible human toll of flooding as few others have. And he has made flood mitigation one of his top priorities. Most importantly…
It’s time we put the worst flooding first, not last. We must improve fairness to restore faith in government.
The Raw Data
Live in another watershed and wonder whether you got shortchanged, too? Here’s where HCFCD spent your money to date.
Eight watersheds exceed the average percent spent, while fifteen fall below it. This isn’t accidental. It’s deliberate. And this is the year to fix that.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/7/26
3053 Days since Hurricane Harvey
GLO Transparency Claim Leaves Supporters Scratching Heads
1/6/2026 – The Texas General Land Office (GLO) which manages more than $14 billion of flood mitigation funds has invested in the development of flood-prone land. But it won’t explain why, even as the agency proclaims “transparency above everything.”
Partnership with Developer of Flood-Prone Land
Since 2020, I have posted more than 40 articles about the 5,000+ flood-prone acres west of Kingwood, virtually all of it in the floodways and floodplains of Spring and Cypress Creeks where they join the San Jacinto West Fork. For many years, the property was owned by a Syrian developer called Ryko and its sister company, Pacific Indio Properties. They wanted to build 7,000 homes on it.
However, they ran into repeated physical and political development challenges having to do with floodplains, floodways, streams, wetlands, emergency access and more. On August 18, 2025, they quietly sold the property to a Dallas-based developer named Scarborough and one of its sister companies, San Jacinto Preserve, LP.
What wasn’t clear at the time was that the Texas General Land Office (GLO) and a state board it oversees, the School Land Board (SLB), partnered with the buyers to purchase the flood-prone land and develop it. That’s significant because the GLO also administers more than $14 billion of flood-mitigation funds for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) – an apparent conflict of interest.
As word leaked out, the GLO stonewalled public-information requests. They appealed Freedom of Information Act requests to Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s office. Paxton’s office upheld the GLO’s right to conceal the nature and extent of the GLO/SLB involvement.
I could find no mention of the State Land Board partnership with Scarborough in meeting minutes or agendas posted online. However, I did find one reference in an unaudited financial report. It said…
That’s it…32 words about an investment reportedly totaling close to $140 million.
So, I started digging. I wanted to know how the GLO reconciled the apparent conflict between:
But the deeper I dug, the deeper the GLO seemed to dig in.
Initial Response
On 12/19/25, the GLO issued this statement.
However, I learned via FOIA requests to Montgomery County that the county did NOT actually approve a full drainage study in July 2025. The county engineer’s letter listed three pages of things Ryko would have to do to get approval. At the time, the new owners were relying on a preliminary drainage study provided by the previous owners.
It had gaps, to say the least. Either no one at the SLB read the letter or they didn’t know I had it. So, I sent them the letter and asked how they could call that “successfully completed.” They never directly answered that concern.
Nor did they explain why they invested in the project! When I asked…
Second Response
On 12/30/25, I received a second statement from the GLO. It read:
So…we went from “successfully completed” a drainage study (past tense) to “confident we COULD mitigate flooding risks” (future conditional tense).
But there’s another problem. The response seemed to conclude on a positive note. “We have decided not to move forward with the development…” Then I noticed “as planned.”
So, I asked what Buckingham meant by “as planned.” I specifically asked whether the GLO was pulling out of the development or modifying it to find a compromise between economic development and flood mitigation. So I asked.
Third Response
The GLO press office next emailed a statement on 1/5/26. Their legal counsel said this:
Three problems:
However, it is clear the project has not been cancelled yet as the previous statement implied.
Transparency Issue
At this point, we know that a state agency charged with administering billions of dollars in flood mitigation funds has helped purchase flood-prone land for the purposes of development.
But, there’s a huge transparency issue. We still don’t know:
Yet the GLO’s website proudly proclaims “transparency above everything”.
Ignoring issues like these undermines trust in government. If this is such a good deal, why isn’t Commissioner Dawn Buckingham holding a press conference about it?
Why the Fuss?
I talked to one retired, highly respected developer who looked at this land decades ago. He said “development just doesn’t make economic sense.” The area is one of the most flood-prone in the region.
Ryko and its sister company, Pacific Indio Properties, tried to develop the property below for years without luck.
Those floodplains and floodways will expand significantly – likely by 50% to100% – when FEMA adopts new maps based on Atlas-14 data. See FEMA’s old map below.
In addition to floodplain and floodway issues, the property has wetland issues.
“Like Aiming a Firehose at Kingwood and Humble”
One of the most respected hydrologists in the region said that “if this property ever got developed, it would be like aiming a firehose at Kingwood and Humble.”
You would think that would be a concern for an area where floodwaters rose 27 feet and killed 15 people. But unlike officials in neighboring areas, the GLO has never publicly discouraged development of this land. Instead, they’re investing in the development of it!
Concerns Expressed by Neighboring Officials
In addition to the physical challenges, Scarborough and the GLO face many political challenges.
Even people who normally support Commissioner Dawn Buckingham are scratching their heads over this deal and the GLO’s concealment of information that should be public.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/6/2026
3052 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
Last Day to Save Wetlands
1/4/26 – January 5, 2026 is the last day to file public comments on a proposed new definition of Waters of the U.S. (WOTUS). The new definition could eliminate federal protections for roughly 80% of the wetlands in the United States.
A regulatory impact analysis by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that approximately 70 – 75 million acres of wetlands would no longer be protected, including approximately three quarters of the 3.1 million acres of wetlands in Texas.
70 – 75 million acres represent an area roughly the size of Arizona, Nevada, or Colorado and almost twice the size of Florida. And it’s more than 175 times larger than Houston.
Under the new definition, only wetlands with a relatively permanent, continuous surface connection to navigable Waters of the U.S. would enjoy federal protection. That pretty much limits federal protection only to swamps that directly border major rivers and streams.
Texas does not have its own regulatory protection program for inland forested wetlands such as those common in the San Jacinto river basin.
How Wetlands Reduce Flooding
Wetlands reduce flood risk by storing, slowing, spreading, and dissipating floodwaters before those waters reach downstream channels, neighborhoods, and infrastructure. They act as natural detention basins, providing temporary storage during heavy rainfalls. They fill first, reducing the volume and rate of water entering streams.
Wetlands also contain dense vegetation that slows runoff, reduces erosion, and minimizes channel scouring downstream.
They spread floods laterally across wide areas. This directly reduces flood heights, velocities and structural damage.
Many wetlands disconnect runoff from channels; they intercept it before it ever reaches streams or bayous. But when developers fill in and pave over wetlands, runoff becomes directly connected. Floods peak higher and faster.
The loss of federal protection for wetlands will shift flood mitigation costs downstream from developers to the public, and from no-cost natural solutions to high-cost engineered solutions, such as regional detention basins, channel widening, lining channels with concrete, bridge widening, dikes, reservoirs, etc.
Flood control districts, reservoir operators, and watershed planners consistently view wetlands as critical flood-risk infrastructure, even when not labeled as such.
Bottom line:
Wetlands reduce flooding by doing four things simultaneously:
How You Can Help Save Wetlands
Protest the proposed changes by cutting and pasting the text between the two lines below. Don’t forget to add your name and contact info at the end of the entry form. The deadline for filing a public comment is Monday, January 5, 2025.
Re: the proposed 2025 definition of “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) as it relates to wetlands the Lake Houston watershed.
This represents one of the most hydraulically and sediment-sensitive locations in Southeast Texas. The wetlands and floodplain features here perform essential functions that directly affect downstream flood risk, sediment transport, and the long-term storage capacity of Lake Houston. Narrowing federal jurisdiction over these wetlands would have costly consequences that the proposal does not adequately analyze.
1. Wetlands upstream function as critical flood-storage infrastructure
Wetlands upstream operate as distributed flood-storage and flow-attenuation systems. During ordinary wet-season events, these wetlands temporarily store runoff, slow overland flow, and desynchronize flood peaks arriving from multiple tributaries. This attenuation function is particularly important at confluences, where coincident peak flows dramatically increase flood stage and velocity.
Loss or fragmentation of these wetlands will not merely redistribute water locally; it will shift flood risk downstream into into the Lake Houston area. Engineered detention required at individual development sites does not replicate this basin-scale function and cannot offset cumulative wetland losses across multiple upstream parcels.
2. Wetland loss directly increases sediment delivery to Lake Houston
The wetlands upstream serve as sediment traps. During flood events, reduced velocities across wetland landscapes allow suspended sediment to settle before reaching the active channel network. This function is especially important for a lake losing storage capacity that supplies water for 2 million people.
When wetlands are filled, drained, or disconnected, sediment that was previously stored on the landscape is instead delivered downstream. The result is accelerated shoaling of channels and increased sediment deposition in Lake Houston, reducing conveyance, increasing flood stages for equivalent flows, and shortening the functional life of public infrastructure.
3. Loss of storage capacity in Lake Houston imposes real and recurring public costs
Sedimentation has already measurably reduced the effective storage and conveyance capacity of Lake Houston. Maintaining that capacity has required repeated large-scale dredging projects costing hundreds of millions of dollars, funded largely by federal and state appropriations.
Upstream wetland loss increases the frequency and scale of these dredging needs. Each acre of wetland lost upstream effectively shifts long-term sediment-management costs from private land conversion decisions to the public. The proposed WOTUS definition does not quantify or even acknowledge this cost transfer.
4. Federal withdrawal from jurisdiction coincides with a pullback in mitigation funding
As federal jurisdiction over wetlands contracts, so too does the availability of federal mitigation and restoration funding that historically offset unavoidable impacts. This includes reduced applicability of Clean Water Act Section 404 mitigation and fewer mitigation-bank credits.
The combined effect is a double loss: fewer protected wetlands and fewer resources to restore or compensate for their loss. This creates a structural funding gap that local governments cannot realistically fill.
5. The proposed definition fails to address cumulative watershed-scale impacts
The proposal’s emphasis on parcel-level “continuous surface connection” tests ignores cumulative impacts across sub-basins. In the Lake Houston area, hundreds of small wetland losses—each individually deemed non-jurisdictional—can collectively produce measurable increases in flood peaks, sediment loads, and public costs.
The agencies should evaluate jurisdiction and impacts at the basin scale rather than relying on binary, site-specific connectivity tests that are not representative of watershed hydrology.
Requested revisions
I respectfully request that the agencies revise the proposed definition to:
Absent these changes, the proposed definition risks increasing downstream flood damages, accelerating sedimentation in Lake Houston, and shifting long-term infrastructure costs from private development to the public.
Cut and paste the text between the lines above and submit it to:
Regulations.gov to Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2025-0322.
Please DO IT NOW. DON’T DELAY.
For More Info
If you wish to compose your own letter, say for other areas, the following resources may help:
Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/4/26
3050 Days since Hurricane Harvey