Rape of the West Fork: A Photo Essay

Thirteen years ago, American Rivers named the West Fork of the San Jacinto one of the ten most endangered rivers in America. It’s only gotten worse since then. Sand mines now form long strips along both shores of the river between I-45 and I-69. You can’t see them from the ground. They’re hidden by “beauty strips” of trees, berms, and “keep out” signs. So here’s a look from a helicopter I rented on 10.2.19.

I use the word “rape” in a metaphorical context. I am not alleging any illegal acts by mining companies, though I suspect there may be some going on here in terms of illegal discharges. Can you count the leaks?

Other than that, a majority of the state legislature actually encourages what you see below. So does Montgomery County. MoCo gives most of these mines tax breaks in the form of timber exemptions, which the State Comptroller says they should not get; they should be taxed as depleting assets.

Is the West Fork naturally sandy? Yes. That’s a true statement. Is it unnaturally sandy, too? Is sand mining contributing to the loss of Lake Houston capacity? Does it contribute to flooding though massive sediment plugs such as the mouth bar? You be the judge.

From I-69 to I-45 in 72 Photos

The sequence of images below starts at I-69 and goes northwest just past I-45. The first image is at the confluence of the West Fork and Spring Creek. Note the difference between the color of the two. The West Fork splits off to the left. It’s the Lake Houston tributary with virtually all the mines. Below, a small sampling of the destruction that occurs every day in the name of construction…out of sight and out of mind.

I apologize in advance if some of the photos seem repetitive. It’s important to understand how much of the West Fork that mines consume.

Warning: this post contains many photos. WIFI connection, patience, and large screen advised.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/3/2019

796 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent my opinions on matters of public policy. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the state of Texas.

Pit Capture on Caney Creek: What Happens When A Sand Mine Builds Flimsy Dikes in Floodways

This story illustrates on of the dangers of pit capture in sand mining. During the peak of Imelda, 42,000 cubic feet of floodwater per second came down Caney Creek. However, early the morning of September 19th, residents south of the Triple PG Sand Mine on Hueni Road in Porter started seeing water coming from the mine before it came up from the creek.

Escaping with Only a Minute to Spare

They started evacuating their families and animals. One Walden Woods resident told me that the water came up so fast, it covered an entire SUV within an hour. Another told me that had she waited one more minute to evacuate, she and her family would have had no way out. The force of the rushing water undermined the house and garage of a third. Farther south of the mine, residents of Dogwood Lane, Woodstream Village, Dunnam Road, and Riverchase felt the same panic.

Caney Creek Captures Triple PG Sand Pits

So what happened? A review of aerial photographs below taken on 10.2.19, almost two weeks after Imelda, showed a massive breach in the northern dike of the mine. Erosion patterns suggest the water then rushed through the mine in a north to south direction.

  • Trees laid down in a southerly direction at the entry point
  • Sand waves orient along the north-to-south direction of flow
  • East/west roads separating the ponds were blown out, by water flowing north to south
  • The mines main stockpile shows massive erosion along its western edge in a north-to-south direction
  • Sand is piled up against the mine’s main building along the northern side only (where the water came from)

Photo Tour of the Aftermath

All the photographic evidence suggests a classic case of pit capture. Peach Creek joins Caney Creek just north of this entry point.

Where water entered the mine from the north. Looking northwest from inside the mine and past the northern dike. Note the trees pushed into the mine by the force of the water, indicated the direction of flow.
Reverse shot. Looking south into the Triple PG Sand Mine.
A closer view of the same scene shows clear evidence of erosion within the mine from rushing floodwaters. The water came from directly behind the camera position. The road in the middle was blown out, but reconstructed by the time I shot this photo two weeks after Imelda. The TCEQ said they could not safely reach this part of the mine because of damaged roads.

You can see from the shot above that water barreled through this mine as if shot from a water cannon.

Close up of repairs to damaged road. Looking southwest. Sand patterns show water moving north to south.
Note the sand pushed up against the north-facing back of this building.
The eastern side of this stockpile was eroded from the bottom by water side-swiping it from a north-to-south direction.

No Effective Dike at Southern End of Mine

There really is no dike at the southern end of the pit, just a road around the perimeter. The ground level in the neighborhood to the south is virtually even with the level of the road. After water flowed through the pit, it flowed through neighborhood(s) to the south and damaged homes. It’s easy to see the damage immediately south of the pit and imagine the pit capture as the cause of the damage. The damage faces the mine, not Caney Creek to the east.

Floodwaters from the Triple PG mine partially knocked this home off its foundation. The owner had to jack it up and re-level it. The back of the house faces the mine and is not more than a hundred feet from it.
The same homeowner’s garage. Floodwaters from the mine scoured under it. Again, the back of the garage faces the mine and is not more than a 100 feet from it.

Reasons for Pit Capture

What is pit capture? It’s when a river or stream cuts through the pit of a nearby sand/gravel mine instead of following its normal course.

How does it happen? Water starts to overtop or penetrate the dike. It creates a fissure that rapidly widens and opens a hole. Pretty soon the dike collapses and the water rushes in. The water moves from areas of high pressure and elevation to areas of low pressure and elevation. After the water moves into into the pit, it fills the pit up and needs to find a way out on the other end. Like a water ballon attached to a faucet, sooner or later dikes on the other side burst.

Why does this happen?

  • The mine was built in the floodway of Caney Creek on a point bar
  • Dikes made out of sand could not withstand the force of the water
  • Dikes had previously failed in the same places and left “weak points”
  • When the water came up, it took the path of least resistance
  • Texas has no minimum setbacks from rivers for mines
  • Texas enforces no best management practices for mines

What Next for the Triple PG Mine?

The Texas Attorney General is currently suing the mine for allowing its process water to pollute Lake Houston. The mine left its dikes open for weeks after multiple breaches in multiple storms. The TCEQ also found that the mine was breached from east to west between White Oak and Caney Creeks.

Potential fines could reach well past a million dollars. That raises the question, “What can be done with this mine to protect residents below the mine and to protect the City of Houston’s water supply?”

Over the years, Triple PG’s owners have removed 800 acres of forest and an unknown volume of sand from the mine. The risk of pit capture is greatest were mines are deeper than the adjacent river bed and close to the river/stream. Both conditions apply in this case.

The dike between Caney Creek and the Triple PG pit is a narrow strip of unvegetated dirt, just wide enough to support a vehicle…and not compacted very well as you can see below.

This shows repairs to an exit breach to Caney Creek farther south. No geotextile fabrics or rip rap are holding the repair together. Photo courtesy of Josh Alberson. Taken 11.2.2019.
This closer shot shows the same breach filled with sand and clay. You can see how flimsy the repair is. The uncompacted and unprotected soil is already eroding after two inches of rain last week. Photo courtesy of Josh Alberson. Taken on 11.2.2019.

It will be interesting to see whether a professional engineer will certify this repair, as a restraining order demands.

If the courts should shut this mine down, sealing it off permanently will be difficult and costly.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11.3.2019 with images from Josh Alberson

796 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 45 since Imelda

The thoughts in this post reflect my opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Woodridge Village Detention Calculations Off by More Than 40% According to New Standard

Developers in Montgomery County try to avoid building detention ponds by beating the peak. They also have attempted to minimize the amount of detention ponds they must build by beating the clock.

Woodridge Plans Approved One Month Before NOAA Updates Flood Data

A year to the day after the peak of Hurricane Harvey on August 28, LJA Engineering submitted a hydrology report to Montgomery County. A table buried on page 32 of the PDF shows that they based their analysis on a 100-year storm that dropped 12.17 inches of rain in 24 hours.

From Page 2.1 of LJA Hydrology Report Addendum, 8/28/2018 (page 32 of pdf.)

Two weeks earlier, USGS had issued its report on peak streamflows and high water marks for Hurricane Harvey.

At this point, the world knew that flood maps would soon change radically. But the LJA report contains no mention of Harvey, USGS, or NOAA’s new Atlas 14 data. And in fact…

Less than one month after the LJA Engineering hydrology report, on September 27, NOAA issued new rainfall frequency values for Texas. Called Atlas 14, the NOAA analysis established significantly higher rainfall frequency values for this part of Texas.

New updated NOAA Atlas 14 data shows that a hundred-year rain for the Lake Houston area is now defined as 17.3 inches in 24 hours, up from 12.17 inches by the old standards.

NOAA redefined the amount of rainfall it takes to qualify as a 100-year or 1000-year event. They defined the new 100-year rain as 17.3 inches in 24-hours – a 42% increase. That means that to meet new 100-year standards, Perry would have had to increase its detention capacity by 42%. Instead of 271 acre feet, it would have needed 385.

Using Atlas 14 would have reduced the number of salable lots and the economic projections for the development to a substantial degree.

The one flood map in the 59-page LJA Engineering hydrology report shows flood plains magically stopping at the county line.

The one flood map that the LJA hydrology report does include (page 51 of PDF and above) shows flood zones stopping at the county line (the black diagonal) and the boundary of the Perry property (the maroon-bordered polygons). Pretty odd for a site partially covered by wetlands!

National Wetlands Inventory Map shows both sections of Woodridge Village contain wetlands.

Woodridge Plans Approved Even Before LJA Submitted Hydrology Report

Now here’s where it gets even more interesting. City of Houston approved the detention plans on 8/12/18 – two weeks BEFORE the LJA hydrology report on 8/28/18 and only a month BEFORE NOAA released the new Atlas 14 data. Hmmmm! Think they were in a hurry to get these approved? (Note: The approval date for MoCo is unreadable).

Signature block for City of Houston from Woodridge Village detention plans.

Perry Homes played a game of beat the clock and was winning … until May 7, 2019.

Future Flood Risk Remains Even with Planned Detention Ponds

Until now, I have been posting about the lack of detention ponds. Closer analysis reveals that this is only part of the problem. Even if Perry builds the remainder of the detention ponds as planned, they will be insufficient to meet the new NOAA standards and will pose a flood risk to people downstream.

After contributing to two floods in Elm Grove and North Kingwood Forest, the engineers and owners of Woodridge Village surely must realize how dangerous trying to Beat the Clock was.

Forty-two percent of a 100-year flood as defined by the new Atlas-14 data will overflow the banks of the detention ponds and add to the load on Taylor Gully or go into the streets of Elm Grove and North Kingwood Forest.

Facing west. This panoramic drone image by Chris Betz takes in most of the Woodridge Village constructions site. Note the ponding water 3.5 days after a two-inch rain.

This image taken Friday night at Sunset shows how impervious the Woodridge soil is. Water is still ponding three and a half days after a two-inch rain (October 28, 2019).

I wonder if the LJA engineers calculated the runoff coefficient accurately. Given some of the other problems in this report, perhaps an engineer would care to comment on their calculations.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/2/2019

795 Days after Hurricane Harvey and 45 after Imelda

The thoughts expressed in this post represent my opinions on matters of public policy and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the great State of Texas.