TCEQ Archives - Reduce Flooding

TCEQ Cites Hallett Mine for Five Violations But Issues No Fines

9/17/25 – Update – In response to a request from ReduceFlooding.com, TCEQ has now supplied its FULL report, WITH attachments. Accordingly, I have modified the copy below to delete references to the missing attachments. I have also hyperlinked the full report where the partial report was previously. Caution though: it’s almost 20 megs. I also added some comments about the previously missing water reports.

9/13/25 – During late February, 2025, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) investigated the Hallett Sand Mine on the West Fork San Jacinto and cited it for five violations. The violations included failure to:

Prevent the unauthorized discharge of process water
Maintain structural controls
Submit a required “notice of change” (NOC) to the TCEQ when a designated contact person left the mining company
Inspect structural controls every seven calendar days
Submit a “non-compliance notification” when it learned of the unauthorized discharge.

However, the TCEQ report mentions no fines or financial penalties. The Commission simply closed the case after the violations were resolved, even though the mine’s neighbors observed the unauthorized discharge for a full year.

In my opinion, this appeared to be the equivalent of being stopped for repeated, excessive speeding in a school zone and let off with a verbal warning.

Who’s in Charge?

According to the TCEQ report, RGI Materials Inc. operates the Hallett mine, though Hallett’s website claims Hallett is hiring for positions at the mine. Confused?

It turns out that “Hallett” is an “assumed name” of RGI. RGI was incorporated by Kurt, Jim and Jeff Rasmussen of Des Moines, Iowa, in 2001. One month later, RGI filed an Assumed Name Certificate for Hallett Materials.

RGI Materials, Inc. is the company’s legal name. But Hallett Materials is the trade name (also known as “doing business as,” DBA, or brand name) by which the public knows RGI in Texas.

The Rasmussen Group in Des Moines lists 10 other companies it operates with different publicly facing brand names. But there are likely even more companies owned by the Rasmussen family.

For instance, the Montgomery County Appraisal District shows the mine property is owned by J.R. Development, Inc. Secretary of State records show that J.R. Development also leads back to Des Moines with the local address at the Hallett mine in Porter.

So, all roads lead to the Rasmussen family. The TCEQ report even lists Karl Rasmussen 17 times!

TCEQ Does Not Make Full Report Public

The TCEQ report alleges the existence of eleven attachments, none of which were attached – even though one of the investigators told a resident adjacent to the mine that this was the largest investigation he’d ever been a part of.

The attachments allegedly included maps, correspondence, a missing report, photographs and, most importantly, water sample results.

The mine is monitored for Nitrate + Nitrite N, total suspended solids, pH, and hazardous metals including Arsenic, Barium, Cadmium, Chromium, Copper, Lead, Manganese, Mercury, Nickel, Selenium, Silver, and Zinc.
TCEQ Report

However, water samples tested only for suspended and dissolved solids. Compared to control samples taken outside the mine in a nearby drainage ditch, they showed high concentrations of both. One table in the water sample report indicated that sample sizes were not sufficiently large to render valid results.

Investigators Have Trouble Accessing Site

Citizens complained about process wastewater spilling from the mine onto adjacent property and then into the West Fork San Jacinto River for more than a year. The West Fork feeds Lake Houston, the source of drinking water for more than 2 million people.

*Hallett Mine leakage photographed on February 23, 2025*. *Route to river highlighted in red.*

After meeting with the mine’s operators, the investigators tried to walk to the leak, but could not reach it because the path was inundated with process wastewater.

They then tried an alternate route. But they could not reach the leak from that direction either because the berms had not been maintained.

The investigators then tried a third approach. They left the mine and doubled back to the breach from outside of the mine. At the time of the investigation, the process wastewater discharge covered more than 5 acres.

Other Troubling Discoveries

In addition to the unauthorized discharge, when the investigators asked to speak to the person responsible for discharges from the mine, they were informed that the person whose name was on the discharge permit was no longer employed there.

Moreover, the mine could not produce its “2024 annual comprehensive site compliance evaluation report.”

Neither did the mine notify the TCEQ of the discharge which had the potential to endanger human health, safety and the environment.

The mine did not maintain its structural controls.

Nor could it produce required weekly inspection reports of those controls.

Eventual Compliance Resolves Complaints to TCEQ Satisfaction

One day after the initial site visit, an investigator noted that the unauthorized discharge had stopped and that the berm breach had been repaired. See below.

*Hallet leak plugged*. Photo by neighbor.

On 4/3/25, RGI submitted documentation that it was inspecting its structural controls every seven days.

The written notice of non-compliance (required within five days of becoming aware of the non-compliance) was submitted more than a year after the unauthorized discharge started.

On March 13, 2025, RGI updated its contact information for the TCEQ.

TCEQ dropped the complaint regarding the annual compliance report after Mr. Rasmussen indicated that the evaluation was conducted in November 2024.

The TCEQ website now shows all violations resolved and the case closed as of 9/9/2025.

Outrage from Neighbor

One neighbor told me, “Unbelievable what they allow them to get away with. That’s why they just keep doing what they do.”

Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/13/25

2937 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

TCEQ Investigates Exposed Pipelines at Porter Sand Mine, Finds More Alleged Violations

9/5/25 – The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) has completed investigating exposed pipelines carrying highly volatile liquids at a sand mine in Porter operated by Texas Frac Sand Materials Inc.

exposed HVL pipelines — *Exposed HVL pipelines in utility easement near Caney Creek* *photographed on July 24 and August 14, 2025*

TCEQ documented the pipeline issue and referred it to the Railroad Commission of Texas, which regulates pipelines in the state. As of this writing, it is unclear whether the pipelines remain exposed.

Other Alleged Violations Found

While at the mine, the TCEQ investigator noted other alleged violations that are now part of an active enforcement action. Specifically, the report notes that the operator had not stabilized the entrance. Nor had the operator installed structural controls along the bridge that crossed White Oak Creek.

In addition, the investigator noted breaches in the dikes of the mine’s southernmost pit. One came in from White Oak Creek and the other flows out to Caney Creek.

Previous Alleged Violations

The report also notes that a 2023 investigation found three previous issues at the mine. They included failure to:

Maintain vegetative controls
Maintain structural controls
Develop a Mine Plan.

A 2024 investigation noted that the vegetative control issue had been resolved. However, the other two issues remained and were referred to the TCEQ’s enforcement division.

A followup investigation in 2024 noted failure to prevent the unauthorized discharge of process wastewater into waters of the state.

For More Information

So far, no large fines. But the miners have gotten some hefty tax breaks from Montgomery County.

For the full text of the TCEQ investigation, see this TCEQ report dated 8/28/25.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/5/25

2929 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Triple PG Sand-Mine Lawsuit Slides to Year 7 as Problems Get Worse

8/14/25 – A State of Texas lawsuit against the Triple PG sand mine that began in 2019 will now be tried, at the earliest, in 2026. Meanwhile problems at the mine have gotten worse. Breaches in their dikes that triggered the lawsuit have recurred. And five pipelines carrying highly volatile liquids (HVL) are now exposed and suspended over another breach.

Trial Date Set for Feb. 2026

According to the fourth revised scheduling order issued by a Travis County district court, the lawsuit brought by the State of Texas against the Triple PG sand mine in Porter will now go to a jury no earlier than February 2026.

The State first sued Triple PG in 2019 for mining sand in a pit whose dikes had been breached in at least two places. White Oak Creek was flowing through an area being actively mined and then out through Caney Creek into the headwaters of Lake Houston, which supplies drinking water for more than 2 million people.

*Triple PG breach into Caney Creek in September 17, 2019.*

Shell Game and Other Early Delays

The judge quickly issued an injunction against the mine’s owner. Mining briefly stopped while miners repaired the dikes. But the dikes failed again. And the mine briefly became an issue in a Houston mayoral election when Tony Buzbee visited the breach for a photo op in May 2019.

*Tony Buzbee (plaid shirt) visited Triple PG breach into Caney Creek with camera crew in May 2019 during mayoral campaign*.

The judge then ordered the miners to develop an engineered solution that permanently sealed off the pit. However, the dikes failed yet again last year and have remained open for more than a year.

Between breaches they pumped water over their dikes onto adjoining properties.

Meanwhile, other hazards developed at the mine. The miners have exposed pipelines carrying natural gas and highly volatile liquids by mining near a utility easement.

On the legal front, the mine’s owner, a cardiologist from Nacogdoches, named Prabhakar R. Guniganti, transferred ownership of the mine through a series of shell companies and trust funds that he and his family controlled. This forced the attorney general’s office to sue one entity after another and name the cardiologist individually as a defendant.

Fourth Scheduling Order

Meanwhile, hundreds of miles away, the case lumbers along. See the full FOURTH Amended Scheduling Order here.

If this sticks…

In August and September this year, the parties will designate their expert witnesses.
During October and November, they will complete discovery.
In December, they will challenge each other’s expert witnesses and file remaining unheard motions.
In January, they will exchange witness and exhibit lists.
And the Jury Trial will begin on February 9, 2026.

However, the possibility exists that this could slip again as it has at least twice before. The judge originally scheduled this case for trial on October 10, 2023, and October 28, 2024.

General Reasons for Delays

Aside from specific legal maneuverings in this case, lawsuits in general can drag on for years. Many moving parts must align. And each step can take months or even longer. The main causes include:

1. Pre-trial Procedures Can Be Slow

Discovery – Both sides gather and exchange evidence, which can involve reviewing thousands of documents, deposing witnesses, and fighting over what’s admissible.
Motions and Hearings – Lawyers may file motions to dismiss, suppress evidence, or get summary judgment. Each motion needs time for responses and court rulings.
Scheduling Conflicts – Courts juggle many cases, and attorneys may have other trials or deadlines.

2. Complexity of the Case

Many Issues – Multi-defendant cases or lawsuits involving technical subjects (e.g., environmental law, patents) require more experts, more evidence, and more coordination.
Specialized Evidence – Expert reports, forensic analysis, or financial audits can take months to produce.

3. Negotiation and Settlement Efforts

Even if both sides want to settle, negotiations can stall while parties evaluate risk, await rulings on key motions, or try mediation.

4. Appeals and Interlocutory Delays

If a court rules on an important issue before trial, one side might appeal immediately. This “pause” can last a year or more before the trial even resumes.

5. Strategic Delays

Parties may deliberately slow the process to pressure the other side—by increasing costs, waiting for evidence to weaken, or banking on a change in law or circumstance.

6. Court Backlogs

In busy jurisdictions, there can be long waits simply for your turn on the docket—especially after events like the COVID-19 pandemic, which created major case backlogs.

Dikes Open and Pipelines Exposed

In July, mining continued with the dikes wide open again.

triple pg breach into Caney Creek — *Triple PG dike breach in July 2025…*

sand-pit capture between White Oak and Caney Creeks — *Same breach on August 16, 2024*

Dike Regulations

The Triple PG mine received 15 citations in two years from the Mine Safety and Health Administration before the TCEQ filed its lawsuit through the Texas Attorney General. See the MSHA site for a key to the citations.

The U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration regulation §56.20010 regarding retaining dams specifies that “If failure of a water or silt retaining dam will create a hazard, it shall be of substantial construction and inspected at regular intervals.”

TCEQ also has requirements for constructing dikes and levees. Note the paragraph on page 2 about structural integrity. “Construction must be based upon sound engineering principles. Structural integrity must withstand any waters which the levee or other improvement is intended to restrain or carry, considering all topographic features, including existing levees.”

Pipeline Issues Now Added to Complaint

Breaches aren’t the only issue at the Triple PG mine (now operated under the name Texas Fracsand). The daredevils operating the mine have exposed five pipelines carrying highly volatile liquids.

I alerted the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality after discovering this, but have not yet heard of the outcome of their investigation.

*When went back today to see if the operator had addressed either the breaches or the pipeline issues, I found no changes.*

The breeches were still wide open and the pipelines unprotected.

Pray that we don’t see any more delays in the jury trial.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 8/14/25

2907 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Editorial: The Perils of Pendulum Politics

3/22/25 – Enough of the pendulum politics already! We seem to swing from the left to the right and from overregulation to no regulation, oblivious to any middle ground.

The latest agency in the Washington crosshairs: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). No doubt, most business people can cite an extreme example of EPA overregulation. And no doubt, many will welcome a relaxation of environmental regulations.

But the last 45 years have proven that businesses can make a fair profit while still protecting the environment, jobs and public health.

Those old enough to remember a time before the EPA know what I’m talking about. As I read several stories today about the gutting of the EPA, I not-so-fondly remembered scary images from my early childhood growing up in the Cleveland and Pittsburgh areas in the 1950s.

The Cuyahoga river catching on fire. Multiple times. Which led to the EPA’s formation.
Coal miners doubled over with black-lung disease, gasping for breath.
Choking, eye-watering smokestacks of the steel mills in Pittsburgh. The mills belched so much pollution that my father had to take a change of shirts to work. A white shirt would turn gray by midday.

*The Cuyahoga River caught fire a total of 13 times dating back to 1868. It was one of the most polluted rivers in America. Photo: Cleveland State University Library*.

At one time, people thought such horrors were the price of jobs and prosperity!

But the Dow Jones Industrial Average has risen fifty-fold in the 45 years after the formation of the EPA in 1970. That’s far more than the seven-fold rise in the 45 years before the EPA.

Is Changing EPA’s Mission a Wink-Wink to Polluters?

I just finished reading two articles in the New York Times about the EPA. The first began, “The Trump administration said it would repeal dozens of the nation’s most significant environmental regulations, including limits on pollution from tailpipes and smokestacks, protections for wetlands…” Yada Yada.

The second article quoted Lee Zeldrin, new head of the EPA. He reportedly said, “Those changes…would allow the agency to better focus on its core mission and powering the Great American Comeback.”

The core mission no longer seems to be environmental protection as the name of the agency implies. According to Zeldrin, the core mission is now lowering the costs of “buying a car, heating a home and running a business.”

The same article also quoted Ann E. Carlson, a professor of environmental law at the UCLA School of Law. She said the changes at EPA are “…essentially a wink, wink to…pollute with what may be close to impunity.”

Need for Consistency

No doubt, most business people in Texas can cite an example of EPA overregulation. And no doubt, many will welcome a relaxation of environmental regulations.

But consider this. In general, one of the primary needs of most businesses is consistency. What CEO would invest a billion dollars in a new plant knowing that a change in the Oval Office could cause a regulatory flip back in the opposite direction before construction of the plant even finished?

Such uncertainty slows businesses down. It makes planning, forecasting, and decision-making much more difficult as business leaders weigh political probabilities.

Opportunities Overlooked

In my opinion, rather than only trying to make government more efficient with a chainsaw, we should be trying to make it work better. And when it comes to flood mitigation, opportunities abound.

Last night, I published an article about how Montgomery County has spent an incredible eight years running the grant gauntlet to obtain money to clean logjams out of its streams. And it could still be another year or more before the work can even begin. The work will likely take only months.

But instead of focusing on such obvious opportunities, we are simply lopping off branches of government that we still need.

Why We Still Need a Strong EPA

As I not-so-fondly reminisced about those horrific images from my childhood, I received a text about Hallett’s sand mine on the West Fork San Jacinto. The text contained a video showing the mine still leaking wastewater into the public water supply – after a Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) investigation.

State, county and local government agencies, such as TCEQ, are far more susceptible to lobbying groups, such as the Texas Aggregate and Concrete Association, than a Federal agency like the EPA.

The video shows a road acting like a berm to keep wastewater from escaping. But close scrutiny shows the wastewater going under the road, rather than over it, as it used to.

Video supplied by concerned nearby resident shows wastewater now goes under road instead of over it.

Historically, different levels of government in the U.S. complement each other. When local levels fail, we need other levels to help. Without the EPA as a backstop for the TCEQ, you will likely not only experience higher flood risk, but higher health risks, too.

During the COVID pandemic, the EPA announced a pause in its enforcement operations. Air pollution surged 62% in three weeks after the announcement, according to a Texas A&M study. Such are the perils of pendulum politics.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 3/22/25

2762 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Hallett Finally Plugs Year-Long Leak in Sand Mine

2/27/25 – Hallett Materials has finally plugged a year-long leak in its Porter sand mine on the San Jacinto West Fork.

According to residents who live near the leak, an investigator from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) visited the mine yesterday. For more than six hours, he sampled water leaking from the mine.

A short time later, Hallett, a self-proclaimed environmental leader, started plugging the leak. It had created a river of sludge several hundred feet wide that led straight to the drinking water supply for 2 million people…for more than a year.

History of Leak

Photos taken on February 8, 2024, show that bulldozers created the leak. Those dozer tracks in the image below certainly don’t appear accidental.

Hallett leak — *Notice where tracked vehicle shaved* *down area between Hallett settling pond (far right) and road/woods*, *letting sediment-laden water leak out of overloaded pond.*

*Same pond, same sludge, same leaks more than a year later on 2/23/25.*

I ran a story about the year-long leak that same day. The post also took the TCEQ to task for magically overlooking the river of what I call Houdini sludge. It can escape from anything, anytime, year round, day or night – without detection by even the most eagle-eyed TCEQ investigator. Slippery stuff, that sludge!

Seriously, I’m sure Hallett will send a blind, part-time, sub-assistant foreman to some TCEQ gulag for re-education and environmental sensitivity training. That should placate the reluctant regulators.”

A note from the sacrificial sub-assistant’s ophthalmologist should also sufficiently explain the “accidental” oversight enough to get Hallett off the hook with a strongly worded apology and a ten dollar fine.

TCEQ’s Biggest Investigation Ever?

The investigator sampling the water this week wouldn’t say much except that this was “the biggest investigation he had ever been a part of.” Of course, previous TCEQ investigators couldn’t find water falling out of a rowboat with a seeing-eye dog.

Pics of Fix

Hallett reportedly parked a bulldozer near where the investigator was working. This afternoon, a resident sent pictures of a pile of dirt the bulldozer pushed against the rising tide of sludge. It was about as deep as a stack of chocolate pancakes at IHOP. See below.

*Where one of the rivers of sludge cut across the maintenance road*

*How long will it last?* *Vegas is taking odds.*

Now, there’s a beautifully engineered bandaid!

What more could a TCEQ commissioner up for reappointment ask?

Posted by Bob Rehak on 2/27/25

2739 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Only 4 Days Left To Comment on New TCEQ Sand-Mining BMPs

1/21/25 – The TCEQ is soliciting public comments on its proposed new “best management practices” (BMPs) for sand mining. The comment period closes at 11:59 PM on 1/24/25. That’s this Friday.

Regrettably, few people have submitted comments to date. Yet, when it comes to reducing downstream flood risk, few things are as important.

BMPs are Helpful Guidelines, Not Regulations

BMPs do not carry the force of regulation. Regardless, they have great value for businesses. They improve organizational effectiveness, efficiency, trust, risk management, product quality, compliance, sustainability, neighbor relations and more.

They say to employees of an organization, “Here are lessons learned from all who have come before us. This is how the best in our business operate.”

But sadly, the BMPs recommended by TCEQ for sand miners are not very instructive. They fail to address the critical issues that sand miners – and the public – in the Houston region face. Worse, instead of raising the bar, they lower it.

Confluence of West Fork with Spring/Cypress Creeks — *Confluence of Spring and Cypress Creeks (Left)with San Jacinto West Fork (right). Taken after May floods in 2024 near US59 Bridge. 20 square miles of sand mines are upstream on the right.*

We Need BMPs that Address Our Real Issues

So hungry are we to keep Texas growing with low-cost concrete that we have collectively avoided addressing the other costs of sand mining related to flood mitigation, insurance, public health, and water purification. For example:

Inundated sand mines deposit industrial waste in the drinking water supply for 2 million people.
Rivers broke through the dikes of at least six mines on the East and West Forks of the San Jacinto last year, carrying sand and silt downstream, where it reduced the drainage capacity and the storage of Lake Houston.

Costs to the public?

Houston Public Works must pay more to purify our drinking water.
The public must pay more in taxes to support dredging programs that restore conveyance and reduce flood risk.
Insurance companies must increase premiums to pay for damage to flooded homes and businesses.

Not one of the BMPs proposed by TCEQ addresses these problems. It’s as if addressing them would obligate TCEQ (which the Sunset Commission called a ‘reluctant regulator’) to enforce them.

Worse, the proposed TCEQ BMPs failed to address issues specifically mandated by the state legislature in its last two sessions. They include water use, noise, and light pollution.

In addition, the BMPs that TCEQ does propose are vague and self-evident. For instance:

“Ensure vehicles are driven at reasonable speeds to reduce dust disturbance.”
“Be sure your stockpiles are only as high as your permit allows.”

I have posted about the need for public comments on these BMPs three times in the last two months. See:

New TCEQ Sand Mining BMPs Ignore Pit Captures on 12/13/24
Better Sand-Mining BMPs Needed to Control Sediment Pollution on 1/13/25
TRAM Pans TCEQ’s Mining BMPs, Proposes Improvements on 1/14/25.

Regardless, the last time I checked, TCEQ had received only a handful of comments.

So, for those who feel daunted by the complexity of the task or the time required, I have compiled the copy below. You can simply cut and paste the copy between the two lines into the TCEQ’s webform.

RE: APO BMP List Proposal

TCEQ’s attempt to create a helpful list of Best Management Practices for Aggregate Production Operations is an exercise in willful blindness. It completely ignores issues mandated by the legislature, as well as others that reduce water quality and increase flood risk.

The issues you do address are addressed in a vague and/or self-evident manner that render them inadequate.

In addition to more specificity, I would like to see BMPs that help mines in the Houston region avoid inundation and pit capture.

Most mines on the East and West Forks of the San Jacinto were inundated last year. Floodwaters swept industrial waste downstream into Lake Houston, the drinking water supply for two million people.

The rivers also broke through the dikes of at least six of those mines. The rivers now run through pits instead of around them. This flushes sand and sediment downstream, where it reduces conveyance, blocks drainage and contributes to flooding.

Addressing these issues requires building mines on higher ground, farther from rivers.

I recommend doubling the minimum setback from 100 to 200 feet for mines in the San Jacinto watershed. That will put the mines on higher ground, farther from the floodway.

I also recommend leaving forests undisturbed in the widened buffer zone. That will reduce the velocity of floodwater and, with it, the volume of sediment carried downstream. It will also decrease the likelihood of pit capture, by increasing the amount of time that it takes a river to migrate into a mine. The forest will also help capture sediment that may escape a mine.

Finally, the wider buffers will give rivers more room to spread out during floods. Right now, dikes are supposed to protect mines from a hundred-year flood. But when mines build tall dikes on one side of a river, they double the volume of water flooding the other side. And when they build tall dikes on both sides of a river, water has no room to spread out without invading the mines. The tall dikes effectively eliminate ALL floodplains and turn rivers into erosive firehoses.

The attached PDF shows visual proof of the need for BMPs that address our main sand-mining concerns in the San Jacinto Watershed.

I also support the concerns and list of alternative BMPs supported by Texans for Responsible Aggregate Mining.

Instructions:

To help improve the quality of life for your family and community, please:

Cut and paste the copy between the brackets above into TCEQ’s webform at: https://tceq.commentinput.com/?id=NdefHRZiG. Now. Today. Don’t wait.
Review and attach this PDF which shows visual proof of the need for BMPs that address the main sand-mining concerns in the San Jacinto Watershed.
Modify the bracketed text above as you see fit to address other concerns you may have.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/21/25

2702 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Better Sand-Mining BMPs Needed to Control Sediment Pollution

1/13/25 – The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality has proposed new Best Management Practices (BMPs) for mining in response to a mandate from the 2023 session of the Texas Legislature. However, in my opinion, the recommended BMPs will do little to nothing to help control sediment pollution from mines in the Lake Houston Area.

The BMPs feel like little more than a half-hearted attempt on the part of a reluctant regulator to create the illusion of environmental protection.

You can find the proposed BMPs at this page on the TCEQ website. You may submit comments on them electronically. To be considered, TCEQ must receive your input by 11:59 p.m. on January 24, 2025. Your email should reference “APO BMP List Proposal.”

Please let the TCEQ know what you think even if you disagree with me.

Notable Omissions

The TCEQ’s recommended BMPs do not really address the biggest mining issues we have in the upper San Jacinto watershed.

I urge you to urge TCEQ to develop BMPs that address:

Discharge of sediment-laden water
Pit capture (when a river starts flowing through a mine)
Periodic flooding.

The proposed BMPs do not cover these issues at all.

The final report of a TCEQ investigation into a West Fork pit capture last year didn’t even mention the phrase. Do they not consider it a problem? I sure wish the TCEQ could enlighten us on this issue. I documented seven instances of pit capture in the Lake Houston watershed last year alone. There may have been more; many mines are in remote, difficult-to-access locations.

Sediment Pollution Reduces Water Quality, Increases Flood Risk

All three of the bullet points above add up to a big problem called “sediment pollution.” Dredging costs for the City of Houston and Army Corps approached $200 million dollars as of October 2023. Better BMPs would likely have reduced or delayed that expenditure of public funds.

dredging cost summary — *At an October 2023 town hall meeting in Kingwood, Mayor Pro Tem Dave Martin presented this summary showing dredging costs totaling $186 million.*

But those costs paled in comparison to the damages to 13,000 homes and businesses that flooded in the Lake Houston Area behind giant sand bars that formed sediment dams at the mouths of the East and West Forks of the San Jacinto.

Nor do the costs reflect extra water filtration at the City’s Northeast Water Purification plant.

To be fair, nature causes some erosion. The question is whether local mining practices accelerate it.

Photos of Sediment Pollution Related to Discharges, Pit Capture and Flooding

See the pictures below. I will submit these as part of my comments on the draft BMPs. Feel free to submit them as part of yours, too.

*Confluence West Fork and Spring Creek near US59 Bridge. This is a frequent sight. Twenty square miles of mines are upstream on the right in a 20-mile reach of the river.*

*San Jacinto East Fork capturing a mine in Plum Grove.*

*Effluent from the Hallett Mine settling pond (white in upper right) on San Jacinto West Fork escaping into adjacent property owned by others.*

*Close up of same effluent from same pond*

*Dike of abandoned Williams Brothers Mine (upper right) eroded by the San Jacinto West Fork (lower left) about to give way…*

*…was taken out by flooding from Hurricane Beryl shortly after I took the photo above this one.*

Hallett sold the San Jacinto West Fork sand pit below to a real estate developer. Within months, the river captured the pit.

*West Fork flows into the pit at the north end*…

*The pit in question is to the right of the S-turn in the river (middle). Here you can see both the entry (lower right) and exit (upper right) breaches in the dikes.*

River Speed During Floods High Enough to Stir Up and Carry Even Largest Particles of Sand

Now, let’s discuss the speed of floodwaters and whether it’s sufficient to entrain sand in pits and carry it downstream.

*Flood inundated both sides of the West Fork during May 2024.* *My drone measured logs floating through the captured pit at 5 MPH, more than fast enough to scoop up and carry off the largest grains of sand and other sediment.* *See below.*

Industry-standard graph shows the speed necessary to erode, transport and deposit sand/sediment of different particle sizes. Blue line indicates measured speed of water. Red indicates range of typical sand sizes.

*Another West Fork pit capture at the Hallett Mine after floodwaters receded. Notice how natural channel of the river has been virtually cut off.*

*Effluent from the Hallett Mine (upstream in upper right) polluting the West Fork at the Northpark/Oakhurst Ditch (middle foreground)*. *Water flows right to left.*

*Reverse angle shows proximity of pollution to homes.*

*Same ditch blocked by sand increases flood risk for those homeowners.*

Farther downstream, the Kingwood Diversion Ditch (top middle) also became blocked by sediment. A Harris County Flood Control District study found that the Diversion Ditch was one of the two most dangerous flooding problems in Kingwood.

Broken dike at the Triple PG sand mine in Porter. Industrial waste water is flowing out of the mine into White Oak Creek which joins Caney Creek and the San Jacinto East Fork before flowing into Lake Houston.

Horrifying! Aren’t they? The truly horrifying part is that I have thousands of similar shots. These are not isolated instances.

This is THE biggest environmental problem in the Lake Houston Area. We have industrial waste polluting the drinking water supply for 2 million people and the TCEQ BMPs don’t even address the problem.

Please register your opinion with the TCEQ at: https://tceq.commentinput.com/?id=NdefHRZiG. Help improve the quality of life for your family and community.

Don’t forget to reference “APO BMP List Proposal” when you submit the web form. Greater setbacks of mines from rivers could solve all the problems discussed above.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/13/25

2694 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

New TCEQ Sand Mining BMPs Ignore Pit Captures

12/13/24 – Proposed new Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) Best Management Practices (BMPs) for sand mines ignore what miners are supposed to do in the case of pit captures. “Pit capture” happens when a river breaks through the dikes of a sand mine. It can have serious consequences including, but not limited to:

Increased erosion and river instability
Altered hydrology
Water quality degradation
Habitat loss and ecosystem disruption
Infrastructure risks
Channel realignment
Economic impacts (cost of mitigation)

Identifying Pit-Capture Pros and Cons

In some circumstances, pit capture can also produce benefits. The balance between benefits and risks depends on the specific geomorphological and ecological context of the river and the sand mine pit. To maximize benefits while mitigating risks, scientists recommend:

Performing a hydrological and ecological assessment before and after capture.
Using adaptive management strategies to guide the development of the captured pit.
Integrating the site into regional plans for flood control, habitat creation, or recreation.

However, the new TCEQ sand mine BMPs mention no such studies, despite the fact that at least six pits were captured on the East and West Forks of the San Jacinto during floods this year. Plus, consider this. The City is getting ready to spend another $34 million to dredge another million cubic yards of sand from the confluence of the two forks.

Instead, the new TCEQ BMPs emphasize concepts under headings such as “Be a Good Neighbor,” “Practice Good Housekeeping,” and “Select Appropriate Equipment.” This is stuff most guys learned in a middle school shop class. Under “Good Housekeeping,” one recommendation urges miners to adequately maintain sanitary facilities. But they forgot the “Wash hands after using a port-a-potty” requirement.

My overwhelming impression after reading the new BMPs was a yawn. Why bother?

The new BMPs are more notable for what they don’t include than what they do include.

And they don’t include anything about the B-52 sized elephant in the broom closet – pit capture.

*River now cuts through Hallett Pit on West Fork and has abandoned its original channel (right)*.

*Pit containing wastewater now has a more direct route to river when it breaches. Note repair by maintenance road.*

*The pit above is just one of many at the Hallett West Fork Mine which spans several square miles.*

I discovered the pit capture above in June of this year. It likely occurred in the May flood. And Hallett has done nothing to mitigate it since.

Perhaps they and the TCEQ feel the benefits outweigh the consequences. But of course, they aren’t footing the $34 million dredging bill.

In August of this year, TCEQ issued a report on another pit capture slightly downstream from here. It didn’t mention this pit even though it was open at the time and multiple people filed complaints. Nor did it mention the term “pit capture.” And the report made several other mistakes. For instance, Hallett claimed the expert witness TCEQ identified works for them, the but the TCEQ listed the employee as working for a Hallett competitor. No wonder the Texas Sunset Commission called TCEQ a reluctant regulator.

Leave a Public Comment

So what’s a mere citizen who enjoys clean water to do?

The TCEQ is soliciting public comment on their new BMPs for sand mines. I know what my comment will be about. If you wish to leave a public comment:

Feedback or comment must be provided to Jess Robinson, MC 175, Office of Legal Services, Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, P.O. Box 13087, Austin, Texas 78711-3087. Comments may also be submitted electronically. To be considered for this project, input must be received by 11:59 p.m. on January 24, 2025, and should reference “APO BMP List Proposal.”

Posted by Bob Rehak on 12/13/24

2663 Days since Hurricane Harvey

TCEQ Report on West Fork Pit Capture Doesn’t Mention “Pit Capture”

9/2/24 – On 8/26/24, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) issued a report on a San Jacinto West Fork pit capture. “Pit capture” happened when the river cut through an abandoned sand pit on a point bar instead of taking the long way around it. Worldwide, many environmental consequences have been linked to such pit captures. However, the TCEQ report never mentions the phrase.

Several area residents filed separate complaints with the TCEQ. Even though the report lists eight separate incident numbers, TCEQ apparently conducted one investigation (#1976402) and issued one report.

This report does not discuss other pit captures that happened elsewhere in the West and East Fork watersheds earlier this year.

Past catching up with Montgomery County — *San Jacinto West Fork entering pit and abandoning its normal channel on May 22.*

The TCEQ report, which took four months to investigate, compile and release, did not:

Refer to any water-quality measurements, even though the complaints concerned water quality.
Address other sand-mine dike beaches and emissions in the same area
Explore downstream impacts.
Result in any reprimands, letters of enforcement, or violations.

TCEQ Finds No Problems

The four-month effort resulted in no action. Apparently, the TCEQ feels that since the pit is no longer being actively mined, it is no longer a threat to the public. It simply concludes that the incident falls within their “enforcement discretion” and they chose not to take any action.

TCEQ, which the Texas Sunset Commission dubbed a “reluctant regulator,” found nothing to get upset about even though the river:

Has abandoned its normal channel
Is now running through private property
Is eroding a Native-American graveyard.

*Approximate location of entry and exit breaches relative to island with Native-American cemetery.*

Who Operated This Pit?

The report also ignores a complex web of interlocking corporations involved with West Fork sand mining. They include, but are not limited to, Hallett Materials, RGI, JR Development and the Rasmussen Group, headquartered in Des Moines, Iowa.

The first paragraph of the report states that the investigation was conducted to “evaluate compliance for RGI Materials, Inc. of the Porter Plant site located north of the West Fork San Jacinto River.” [Emphasis added.]
But the report lists GPS coordinates for a pond on the south and west sides of the river. It also shows photos of the pit on the south and west sides.
According to the Montgomery County Appraisal District (MCAD), JR Development Inc. owned that pit until January of this year. It sold the land to Riverwalk Porter LLC on January 23.

The report cites information obtained through a Jacob McCurry and identifies him as a Vice President of RGI Materials. But the Hallett Materials website lists Jacob McCurry as its Operations Manager.

The report never mentions Hallett, the largest operator on the West Fork. Hallett:

Currently operates another pit captured by the West Fork about a mile north of the pit that the TCEQ investigated.
Operates a settling pond directly across the river from the pit that TCEQ investigated. That pond has been leaking almost continuously into the river since January through another pit that RGI used to own.

The Texas Secretary of State shows that RGI is an assumed name of Hallett Materials.

It’s all very confusing. Except for the TCEQ report’s conclusion. The TCEQ is taking no action.

Erosion of Cemetery

In 2018, I met Kurt Rasmussen at the Hallett plant. Rasmussen is part of the family that controls Hallett, RGI, and JR Development.

He gave me a tour of the captured pit on the south and west sides of the river. He also told me that Hallett was prohibited from mining that island in the middle of the pit because it is a Native American burial ground.

As a result of the pit capture, dikes no longer protect that island from the river and erosion.

*Burial ground (upper left) in middle of pit captured by West Fork*. *Photo 5/13/24.*

Unmentioned Problems with Pit Captures

The TCEQ report never mentions “pit capture.” Nor does it mention any of the problems associated with pit capture discussed in academic literature.

Where a river enters a pit, erosion typically migrates upstream (headcutting). That can lead to more river bank erosion. (You can already see it happening in the photo above on the right.)

Literature about pit captures also suggests that when rivers take a direct path through a sand pit, it can shorten the river’s length. This can increase the river’s gradient (slope) downstream, leading to faster water flow and more aggressive erosion.

Captured pits can act as sediment traps when water moves slow enough for sand to drop out of suspension. But when water moves as fast as it did in the May flood, it can stir up sediment and transport it downstream.

I measured the speed of water moving through the captured Hallett/RGI/JR Development/Rasmussen/Riverwalk pit at 5 miles per hour. That’s enough to pick up and transport large grains of sand.

This can contribute to increased sedimentation in downstream reaches, affecting water quality, habitat, and the morphology of the river.

West Fork sedimentation after upstream rainfall that rivaled Hurricane Harvey — *Downstream from pit capture above at the confluence of Spring Creek and the West Fork. West Fork is on right.*

That sediment began dropping out of suspension where the water slowed as it approached the headwaters of Lake Houston.

River Grove, diversion Ditch — *Kingwood Diversion Ditch blocked at River Grove Park, downstream from confluence above.* *Dredging cost estimated at about $750,000.*

The increased flow velocity after a sand pit capture can also lead to downcutting that disconnects the river from its floodplain, reducing the ability of the floodplain to absorb floodwaters and support wetland habitats.

Scientific reports also say that such downcutting can reduce the level of the water table and destroy riparian vegetation.

TCEQ Ignores Downstream Consequences

TCEQ concluded with the words: “the discharge from this pond has been granted enforcement discretion.” TCEQ chose not to issue any violations.

Their decision apparently stems from the fact that the pit is no longer actively used for mining. According to the report, the current owner, Riverwalk Porter LLC, claims it intends to use the property (and presumably the graveyard within it) for “recreational purposes such as hunting and camping.”

It’s unclear how TCEQ’s ruling will affect boating on the river. The public waterway now cuts through private property. Will boaters be trespassers?

So many questions! And the biggest one: Why did TCEQ not investigate other San Jacinto River Basin pit captures in active mines when its investigators were in the air?

To read the entire TCEQ report, click here.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/2/24

2561 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Another Sand Pit Captured, More Breached by San Jacinto West Fork

6/8/24 – Today, I discovered another sand pit captured by the San Jacinto West Fork. I also discovered two more pits with breached dikes. That makes at least four San Jacinto West Fork sand pits seriously damaged by the last storm.

The West Fork has now captured a pit that Hallett owned until earlier this year and another that it still owns.

Let’s look at each. See the photos below.

Photos Taken on 6/8/24

Pit Capture #1

I discovered the first pit capture in mid-May and photographed it again today.

*Looking from over West Fork at blocked channel and former Hallett pit. River now runs through the pit.*

Hallett sold this mile-long,, half-mile-wide pit to a real estate company called Riverwalk Porter LLC in January, just days before the first breach at the downstream end. The breach at the northern end, in the foreground above, happened in May.

Pit capture is a phenomenon where the river cuts through one side of a mine and out the other. Watch it happen in this table top experiment.

Pit Capture #2

I discovered a second pit capture today. The river punched through one side of the pit and now flows out the other. It’s taking a shortcut through the pit, rather than going around like it used to.

Note how the river curves way out to the upper left in the photo. The inside of that curve used to be what geologists call a point bar. Such areas usually contain finely sorted sand. And indeed, historical images in Google Earth show trucks pulling sand from river banks before Hallett started mining here.

*Hallett pit on another point bar, also captured by West Fork* *River flows from top to bottom.*

Ironically, this area was being considered by the SJRA for its sand trap study. They may have to reconsider that now.

Breach #1

Another pit purchased from Hallett by Riverwalk Porter LLC also drains directly into the West Fork. Nothing holds it back now.

*Looking West. Note* *breach in dike on far side of river. If you look closely, you can see a pipe at the bottom of the breach. The pipe dates back to the days Hallett owned this pit.*

The area around the pipe has expanded into a chasm.

Breach #2

Farther north, Heidelberg Materials Southwest Agg LLC owns another pit that now drains into the West Fork.

*Looking S from over West Fork (bottom left) toward Heidelberg Property.*

Historical satellite images of the Heidelberg property show that they started mining it decades ago. Then they sold the mine to another company and recently repurchased it. While this particular area is recovering, the company appears to be mining other areas around it.

And look what’s happening downstream from the breach above. Could this be a third pit capture in the making?

*Downstream at the same pond, the river looks as though it could soon punch through another narrow dike. Photo taken 5/22/24.*

If and when this happens, the river could then route itself through the pit above. That would make at least three pits captured on the West Fork.

There may be more breaches and pit captures that I have not yet found.

Geomorphic Processes Accelerated to a Human Time Scale

It’s interesting to watch geomorphic processes at work on a human time scale. It’s also disconcerting to know that without help from miners and the TCEQ – which did not establish setbacks of mines from rivers until 2021 – the West Fork would have much less sediment pollution.

See below.

If you wish to lodge a complaint with the TCEQ, go to this web page. Last time I heard, they only inspect the river once every three years unless citizens file complaints.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/8/24

2475 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Tag Archive for: TCEQ

Who’s in Charge?

TCEQ Does Not Make Full Report Public

Investigators Have Trouble Accessing Site

Other Troubling Discoveries

Eventual Compliance Resolves Complaints to TCEQ Satisfaction

Outrage from Neighbor

Other Alleged Violations Found

Previous Alleged Violations

Other Problems Dating Back Before Harvey

For More Information

Trial Date Set for Feb. 2026

Shell Game and Other Early Delays

Fourth Scheduling Order

General Reasons for Delays

Dikes Open and Pipelines Exposed

Dike Regulations

Pipeline Issues Now Added to Complaint

Is Changing EPA’s Mission a Wink-Wink to Polluters?

Need for Consistency

Opportunities Overlooked

Why We Still Need a Strong EPA

History of Leak

TCEQ’s Biggest Investigation Ever?

Pics of Fix

BMPs are Helpful Guidelines, Not Regulations

We Need BMPs that Address Our Real Issues

RE: APO BMP List Proposal

Instructions:

Notable Omissions

Sediment Pollution Reduces Water Quality, Increases Flood Risk

Photos of Sediment Pollution Related to Discharges, Pit Capture and Flooding

River Speed During Floods High Enough to Stir Up and Carry Even Largest Particles of Sand

Identifying Pit-Capture Pros and Cons

Leave a Public Comment

TCEQ Finds No Problems

Who Operated This Pit?

Erosion of Cemetery

Unmentioned Problems with Pit Captures

TCEQ Ignores Downstream Consequences

Photos Taken on 6/8/24

Pit Capture #1

Pit Capture #2

Breach #1

Breach #2

Geomorphic Processes Accelerated to a Human Time Scale