Tag Archive for: funding

Third-Quarter Flood-Mitigation Spending Trends, Surprises

Third quarter flood-mitigation spending data is now available for Harris County Flood Control District and its partners. In some ways, the data shows a continuation of previous trends. But the data also contained some surprises. The major findings:

  • Spending continued to dip. Slower project delivery means inflation will claim an increasingly large percentage of taxpayer dollars and may force cancellation of some bond projects.
  • If the last quarter of this year is anything like the first three, we could see less than half the activity in 2023 than we saw in 2020.
  • The trend toward investing more heavily in minority areas continued and even accelerated. But there was one notable exception – Cypress Creek and its tributaries.
  • An unusual $9.7 million real-estate transaction for a stormwater detention basin near the Mercer Arboretum skewed the Cypress Creek total. That was 16.5% of all HCFCD spending for the quarter.
  • Without it, many of the numbers below would also have been skewed. For instance, total spending and average spending per watershed would vary dramatically.
  • The focus on so-called “equity” spending and the Cypress Creek watershed meant 15 watersheds saw less than a million dollars in activity during the quarter. And five of those received less than $100,000.

Let’s look at each and the implications. Everything below INCLUDES the unusual real estate transaction near Mercer. In several places, I note how things would have changed without Mercer.

Overall, Slowdown Magnifies Inflation Concerns

Overall, flood-mitigation spending dipped about 5% in the third quarter compared to the previous quarter. It declined by a little more than $3 million to $58.8 million. That may not sound like much, but it continues a 3-year downward trend and creates delays that expose residents to more flood risk.

As projects are delayed, their costs also escalate due to inflation, raising concerns about whether there will be enough money in the bond to finish all the projects promised to voters.

Spending this year will likely be a hundred million dollars less than the first full year of the 2018 flood bond – when projects were ramping up. See chart below.

Annualized estimate for 2023. 23Q4 data estimated based on average of first 3 quarters. Without Mercer, the 2023 estimate would be below $200 million.

Moreover, spending will be $200 million less than the peak year of 2020 – about half of what it was then.

Halfway through the 2018 10-year flood bond, HCFCD has spent only about a third of the funds approved by voters – $1.65 billion. However, if the present slowdown continues, this will be the third straight year of decline.

The slowdown in project delivery means inflation will increasingly raise costs and undermine the purchasing power of the dollars authorized by voters.

HCFCD acknowledges the serious impact of inflation in its latest bond update to Commissioners Court, and hopes toll-road money remaining in the Flood Resilience Trust will cover any shortfall.

Average Spending in LMI Areas Growing

Data also reveals that with one exception (Cypress Creek and its tributaries), the trend of preferentially allocating funds to Low-to-Moderate-Income (LMI) areas continued and even accelerated when measured by average spending per watershed.

On average during Q3, watersheds with a majority of LMI residents (hereinafter called “LMI watersheds”) received 2.5X more funding than more affluent watersheds – $3.1 million each vs. $1.2 million. That’s up from 1.7X over the longer period since Harvey. So, the gap is widening.

Without the Mercer real-estate transaction, the average for more affluent watersheds would have been cut in half to $600,000. That would have almost doubled the ratio. The recomputed average would created a 4.7X ratio between LMI and all other watersheds for the third quarter.

That trend will likely continue for some time as projects funded by HUD through the Texas General Land Office get approved and start construction. That pot of money will spread across the income spectrum, but projects in lower income areas will likely start first.

Cypress Creek Spending Explodes

In fifteen Harris County watersheds, more than 50% of residents make above the average income for the region.

As a group, those 15 received $18.6 million last quarter – $2 million more than the $16.6 million received by the eight LMI watersheds.

However, the first group is twice the size of the second. And looking deeper within the more affluent watersheds, we can see that Cypress Creek and its tributaries (Willow and Little Cypress) received 79% of that $18.6 million last quarter.

The three Cypress watersheds received almost 4X more funding than the 12 other watersheds in the more affluent category put together.

Cypress Creek and its tributaries consumed 79% of all HCFCD/Partner spending last quarter among watersheds without a majority of LMI residents.

Here’s how that same spending looks in a bar graph.

Only the first three watersheds on the left received more than a million dollars in Q3. The twelve on right received less than $1 million each.

The 12 other watersheds divvied up $3.8 million; they averaged just $348 thousand each.

FOIA request. Data supplied by HCFCD.

$348,000 is one ninth of the $3.1 million average for LMI watersheds. And we know that some of those, such as the San Jacinto, have huge, unmet needs.

Cypress Knocks Brays Out of First Place

Now, let’s look at ALL watersheds in both categories. When looking only at the third quarter, Cypress Creek surged into first place. It nudged out Greens, White Oak, Brays and Sims, all of which have LMI populations greater than 50%.

HCFCD and Partner spending by watershed
Includes all 23 watersheds during 23Q3.

HCFCD finished Project Brays 15 months ago, but still managed to spend $3.8 million there last quarter. That was almost 10X more than it spent during the third quarter in the San Jacinto watershed, the county’s largest, and where the flooding was deepest. HCFCD spent only $400 thousand in the entire San Jacinto watershed last quarter.

worst first
Comparison of 33 gages in Harris County during Harvey showed San Jacinto had worst flooding.

Brays Still Ranks #1 in Total Spending Since Harvey

Since Hurricane Harvey (not just last quarter), Brays still ranks #1. But Cypress now ranks second. If you added its Little Cypress and Willow Creek tributaries in the graph below to the Cypress Creek total, they would rank #1 by more than a $100 million.

Includes all 23 watersheds since Harvey

Brays even managed to increase in the last quarter by $1.5 million while the San Jacinto decreased by $55,000.

Granted, some watersheds have smaller needs than others, but the ratio between the highest and lowest spending exceeds 300X.

Impact of Equity Formula

The spending priorities shown in this post reflect the Equity formula adopted and periodically revised by Harris County Commissioners Court.

Ironically, the language approved by voters in the flood bond never mentions the word “equity.” Paragraph 14G does say that Commissioners Court shall provide for an “equitable expenditure of funds.”

However, most dictionaries define “equitable” as “nondiscriminatory.” Yet the current formula prioritizes projects largely on the racial composition of neighborhoods as described in the CDC’s social vulnerability index.

The theory is that poor people are financially less able to fix their homes after a flood. I accept that.

But some commissioners are using that to push the idea of fixing 500-year flooding in poor neighborhoods before fixing 2-year flooding in more affluent communities.

Therefore, I ask:

  • At what point do we do we say enough money has gone into an LMI watershed and start spending elsewhere to reduce greater flood risk?
  • Why isn’t HCFCD publishing updated flood risk maps as it completes mitigation projects so we can make objective comparisons and see what our tax dollars bought?
  • Why does Harris County’s formula for allocating flood-mitigation funds NOT consider:
    • Flood damage to homes, businesses and retirement communities?
    • Damage to infrastructure, such as bridges, schools, hospitals, grocery stores, traffic arteries, water and sewage treatment plants, etc.?
    • Height of floodwaters, i.e., the severity of flooding?
    • Deaths caused by floods?
  • Is a poor person’s carpet worth more than a rich person’s life?
  • Will there be enough money in the flood bond and flood resilience trust to finish all projects in the bond given inflation?

So many questions. So few answers. Perhaps this explains why trust in government has reached a 70-year low.

Only 20% of Americans now say they trust government “just about always or most of the time.” That’s something to think about as we near the next election.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/15/23 and updated 10/16/23 with additional info on Cypress Creek

2238 days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Where Flood-Mitigation Dollars Have Really Gone

An analysis of Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) and partner spending since 2000 reveals striking contrasts between watersheds in terms of where flood-mitigation dollars have gone.

Watersheds vary as much as 130 to 1 since 2000 and almost as much since Harvey. Most watersheds remained relatively constant in the rankings during the different time periods. However, a few have shifted up or down a few positions as land was acquired for projects or construction kicked off.

Data below includes spending by HCFCD and its partners from 1/1/2000 to 6/30/2023.

Main Takeaways from the Data

The big stories:

  • Since 2000, the top four watersheds received more flood-mitigation dollars than all 19 others put together. The top four include: Brays, Greens, and White Oak Bayous, and Cypress Creek.
  • Since Harvey the top four received 48%.
  • The distribution of funds continues to show the impact of Harris County’s Equity Prioritization framework.

Harris County’s Equity Prioritization gives weight to race and low-income areas, but not flood damage, the severity of flooding, or protection of infrastructure.

San Jacinto Gets Above Average Damage, Below Average Funding

The San Jacinto ranks below the averages (before 2000 and since Harvey) for flood-mitigation dollars – despite ranking 8th in damaged structures among all 23 watersheds. Damage totals include five major storms (Allison, Memorial Day, Tax Day, Harvey and Imelda).

Compiled from HCFCD Federal Reports

Watersheds Ranked by Funding Since 2000

Here’s how the funding looks in graphs and tables. All data was obtained from HCFCD via FOIA requests.

Data obtained from HCFCD via FOIA requests. Includes Harris County and partner spending.

Here’s the actual data if you want to see exactly how much your watershed received.

From 1/1/2000 through 6/30/23

Watersheds Ranked by Funding Since Harvey

Now let’s look at the how spending shifted after Harvey. Not much, at least relatively speaking.

Includes Harris County and partner spending. San Jacinto climbed two spots, but it is still barely above the median and far below the average.

Here are the actual totals for each watershed shown in the graph above.

Spending from 17Q3 to 23Q2 inclusive.

Feet above Flood Stage

Now let’s look at the severity of flooding. The chart below measures feet above flood stage at different Harris County gages.

Flood Stage is the level at which a river, stream or channel comes out of its banks.

I compiled this chart from data in the Harris County Flood Warning System website.

That 20+ feet above flood stage at the San Jacinto West Fork and US59 was the highest I found in the county.

Damage to Infrastructure

That 20+ feet destroyed Kingwood College, Kingwood High School, all of the businesses in Kingwood Town Center and Kings Harbor, the southbound lanes of US59, the Union Pacific Railroad Bridge, Memorial Hermann’s new Convenient Care Center, sewage treatment plants, and a senior housing complex.

Lone Star College
Harvey flooded 6 of 9 buildings at Lone Star College/Kingwood. Repairs cost a total of $60 million.
I-69 damage and repairs
I-69 Bridge replacement after Harvey. Repairs took 11 months creating massive delays and detours.
UP Bridge
Union Pacific Railroad Bridge that parallels US59 was destroyed and required complete replacement.
Alspaugh’s Hardware during Harvey
New HEB shopping center 1.5 miles from the San Jacinto West Fork was under more than 7 feet of water during Harvey.

Six years after Harvey, many of the commercial areas in Kingwood still haven’t fully recovered. Anchor stores remain empty in three of five shopping centers on Kingwood Drive between Town Center and US59.

Achieving True Equity

While I’m sympathetic to the plight of poorer neighborhoods, I cringe at the self-serving definition of equity used by a Democratic-dominated Commissioners Court to deny funding to the hardest hit area in the county.

We need a system that’s fair to all, not just some. Anything less will perpetuate racial distrust. This is a public safety issue and public safety should not be politicized.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/30/23

2223 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Funding Announced for Massive Detention-Basin Complex on Cypress Creek

9/25/23 – Approximately 425,000 people live in the 204 square mile Cypress Creek watershed which has severe repetitive flooding. At a press conference this morning, County, State and Federal officials announced $50 million in funding for a massive complex of stormwater detention basins on Cypress Creek at T.C. Jester Blvd. to help protect those people.

The basins will span approximately 150 acres on both sides of T.C. Jester and include 1200-acre feet of planned stormwater detention capacity, wet bottoms, and recreational trails.

Approximate boundaries of three detention basins – one will go west of TC Jester and two more east. White area is existing basin.

Altogether, the stormwater detention capacity in this area will increase approximately 75X.

Google Earth calculation of existing and planned ponds

The existing pond covers approximately 2 acres and the new areas will cover more than 150.

Looking E over T.C. Jester. Existing 2-acre basin in foreground was site of press conference. Wooded area beyond will become two new detention basins.

Thanks to County, State and Federal Governments

The $50 million will come from three primary sources:

Harris County Flood Control District Executive Director Tina Petersen also reminded everyone of the money designated for Cypress Creek in the Flood Bond, which was considerable.

The GLO/HUD money has been requested but not yet confirmed although all indications are positive at this time. GLO Commissioner Dawn Buckingham has committed to making sure that people in all parts of Harris County benefit from the $750 million.

Timetable and Project Scope

HCFCD Director Dr. Petersen addressed the next steps in the projects. “A portion of the projects on the east side of T.C. Jester will start construction in the next 6 to 9 months. The remainder should go into construction no later than the end of 2024. So we’re going to see these projects move quickly. This type of progress would not have been possible without the critical funding that our Congressman and Representative secured “

The overall project includes three stormwater detention basins within a broader footprint. Two basin compartments are on the east side of T.C. Jester Boulevard and another is on the west side.

Excavation of the west side basin (see below) has already begun under an E&R (Excavation and Removal) Contract. A private contractor is removing the dirt, almost free of charge, then selling it at market rates to recoup costs and make a profit. An estimated 120,000 cubic yards of material has already been excavated to date.

Work to date on basin west of T.C. Jester. Looking N toward Cypresswood Drive.

The contractor began removing dirt in the general area to get a head start on construction, even before final design of the basin. The final design will begin soon.

Each basin will have a wet-bottom with maintenance berms, side slopes and high banks along the outside.

Construction for all basins should begin no later than Q4 2024. They have estimated 8-month construction timelines.

Extent of Benefits

The three stormwater detention basins will work together – taking stormwater from the main stem of Cypress Creek and holding it until water levels recede on the main stem.

The projects will also have recreational benefits such as hike and bike trails.

Director Petersen stated that the projects will primarily benefit the local area, i.e., benefits will not extend very far downstream. The 1200 acre feet will likely take several thousand homes out of the floodplain.

Even though those homes will be in the Cypress Creek area, 1200 acre feet being held back upstream is 1200 acre feet that won’t be in the living rooms of Lake Houston Area residents during the next big flood.

More to Come

Ramsey also pointed to more projects to come, though he didn’t elaborate. He said, “This is $50 million of the $100 million that will be spent over the coming months in the Cypress watershed. So hold on. We’re getting started. This isn’t the end. This is the beginning.”

Speakers at T.C. Jester Detention Basin Press Conference included U.S. Representative Dan Crenshaw, State Representative Sam Harless, Harris County Precinct 3 Commissioner Tom Ramsey P.E., and HCFCD Executive Director Dr. Tina Petersen.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/25/2023

2218 Days since Hurricane Harvey

More People Live in Texas Floodplains than Live in 30 States

According to Texas Water Development Board data compiled for the first state flood plan, 5.9 million Texans live in 100- or 500-year floodplains. That means more people live in Texas floodplains than live in 30 states. Yep. Thirty entire states have populations smaller than that of Texas floodplains.

Other key observations also emerge from the data:

  • One in five Texans lives in a floodplain
  • 42% of those live in the San Jacinto watershed.
  • The number of floodplain dwellers in the San Jacinto watershed alone exceeds the population of 15 states and the District of Columbia.

Where Biggest Problems Are

No other watershed comes close to 42%. To understand where the most people live with the most flood risk, see the table below. I compiled it from reports by the 15 regional flood planning groups in Texas.

Column 3 shows people living in 100-year floodplain (1% annual chance) and Column 4 shows the 500-year (.2% annual chance) floodplain population.

When looking at all people living in floodplains, Texas has almost 5.9 million. The last column shows where the largest concentrations of those people reside:

  • Only two other watersheds, the Trinity and Lower Rio Grande, reported double-digit percentages.
  • Trinity had 11.7%. 
  • Lower Rio Grande had 17%. 
  • No other watershed even made it over 5% of the floodplain dwellers.

The pie chart below really drives home the lopsided percentage of the state’s flood-plain dwellers living in the San Jacinto basin. San Jacinto is the large green area.

Compiled from data reported by each of Texas’ Regional Flood Planning Groups.

The San Jacinto basin has more people living in floodplains than the next five watersheds put together.

Possible Reasons for San Jacinto Issues

The TWDB report does not explain why. Likely, a number of factors contribute to the high percentage: 

  • The state’s largest concentration of people, jobs, industry
  • Rapid growth and lax enforcement of development regulations
  • Insufficient upstream mitigation
  • Proximity to coast, tropical storms/hurricanes
  • High rainfall rates
  • Low, flat terrain

Floodplain Dwellers as Percent of State’s Total Population

The U.S. Census Bureau now estimates that 30,029,572 people live in Texas. With almost 5.9 million of them living in a 100- or 500-year floodplain, that means a whopping one in five live in floodplains.

Of the 20% of Texans who live in floodplains:

  • 8% live in a 100-year (1% annual chance) floodplain
  • 12% live in a 500-year (0.2% annual chance) floodplain.

So, statewide, more people prefer to live in the less risky floodplains. But that’s not the case in every watershed. See the San Antonio watershed in the table above. Three times more people live in the riskier, 100-year floodplain than the 500-year.

Coastline Concentrations

The numbers also show concentrations of floodplain dwellers near other parts of the Texas coastline. 

  • The lower Rio Grande has 13 times more people living in a floodplain than the upper Rio Grande.
  • The lower Colorado has twice as many people living in a floodplain than the upper Colorado.
  • The lower Brazos has 2.5 times more people living in a floodplain than the upper Brazos.
  • The San Jacinto, which is one of the state’s shorter rivers and mostly near the coastline has the highest number of people in floodplains by far.

This 2014 NOAA study showed that 40% of the U.S. population lives in coastal counties. Density is far higher in coastal counties compared to inland areas. Coastal counties have 40% of the population but only 10% of the land. 

Coastal areas also face different issues than inland communities. According to NOAA, “These include increased risks from high-tide flooding, hurricanes, sea level rise, erosion, and climate change.”

Cost of Making People Safe 

The San Jacinto Regional Flood Planning Group recommended $46 billion worth of studies and mitigation projects in its regional plan. And the San Jacinto is just one of 15 watersheds in the state!

In sharp contrast to the magnitude of mitigation needs, the legislature voted only approximately $1 billion for flood prevention projects this year.

If I’ve learned one thing about flood prevention, it’s that nothing moves quickly.

Need for More Awareness 

And that gives me a sinking feeling – especially knowing how few people have flood insurance and how many more need it.

The floodplains in our area are huge. We have a lot of people. And thus, the scary numbers for the San Jacinto watershed. And also consider this. The numbers above are likely understated, because they only reflect riverine flooding and not street flooding from poorly maintained ditches.

With few affordable structural solutions in sight, TWDB should spend some of their funds on public awareness and education while we wait for projects to happen. Few people understand how much flood risk they live with…until they flood.

For the entire 63-page report, see TWDB Board Agenda/Item #8 from their July 25th meeting. (Caution: 33 meg download.)

Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/29/23

2160 Days since Hurricane Har vey

Some Projects in Flood Bond Likely Won’t Get Done While Others Not in Bond Will

While speaking to a public meeting of the Harris County Community Flood Resilience Task Force, Scott Elmer, the Flood Control District’s new Chief Partnership and Programs Officer, predicted that some projects in the 2018 flood bond likely will not get done because of a funding gap.

Elmer made this remark while discussing a list of projects proposed by Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) for funding from grants totaling $825 million from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Texas General Land Office (GLO).

The $825 million is the last large pot of money still sitting on the sidelines from Harvey. But it likely won’t stretch far enough to complete all the projects in the bond.

Despite a partner funding gap of approximately $800 million (published in 2021), the $825 million would only reduce the gap by approximately an estimated $420 million. How could that possibly be? For one thing…

Not all projects proposed to GLO were in the flood bond.

Origins of Funding Gap

To understand the funding gap, one needs to start with the structure of the 2018 flood bond. It contained a list of projects totaling almost $5 billion, but voters approved borrowing only half of that. The other half was supposed to come from partners, such as FEMA, HUD, local governments and the Texas Water Development Board.

Then COVID and inflation struck. Supply chain issues and labor shortages drove up the cost of projects approximately 20-30%, according to Elmer.

Meanwhile, not all of the hoped-for partner funding materialized. For instance, Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) was hoping for a billion dollars from HUD, added Elmer, but received only $825 million. (The County siphoned off almost a quarter billion dollars for Harris County Engineering and Community Services Departments.)

Some Projects Expand While Others May Be Excluded

Complicating the squeeze between the upward pressure of price inflation and less-than-hoped-for funding, HCFCD added (in some cases) to the scope of projects listed in the bond.

  • For instance, HCFCD originally budgeted the Greens Bayou Mid-Reach Project for $20 million in the bond. But HCFCD lists it at $90 million in the proposed GLO list – a 4.5X increase. The first figure reportedly includes the original phases of the project. The second includes those PLUS others which had been deferred for a subsequent bond.
  • Another example: The Arbor Oaks Stormwater Detention Basin in the White Oak Bayou watershed started out as a $13.3 million project in the bond, but now weighs in at $42.3 million. Its price more than tripled.

A person familiar with the Arbor Oaks project said it could easily be phased, but that it appears some phases (which had initially been deferred) were now recommended for immediate construction.

Lower part of Arbor Oaks area on bottom left. Bridge is on West Little York. Looking SE toward downtown.
Lower part of Arbor Oaks area on bottom left. Bridge is on West Little York. Looking SE toward downtown.

Those two projects alone account for an additional $100 million in scope.

“Use It or Lose It” Deadlines Place Emphasis on Shovel-Ready Projects

The projects recommended on the GLO list largely came from projects which had already been extensively studied and which are near shovel ready. That’s primarily because of two factors:

  • The county took 2-years between GLO’s announcement of a $750 million allocation for Harris County and the County’s submission of a plan for spending the money.
  • Meanwhile, the original HUD deadlines placed on using the money have not slipped. So, HCFCD now has its back up against a “use it or lose it deadline” wall.

If money isn’t spent before HUD deadlines, HUD will take the money back – not just unspent funds, but all funds allocated to incomplete projects. So, say for instance, HCFCD spent $50 million on a project, but had $10 million to go when the deadline arrived. HCFCD would have to give back the $50 million it already spent.

Obviously, the specter of having already-spent funds clawed back by the federal government made “construction readiness” a huge factor in project selection that wasn’t there almost six years ago when Harvey struck.

This means projects given priority by the Equity Prioritization Framework were closer to shovel ready. Presumably, they also helped meet Low-to-Moderate Income (LMI) requirements placed on the HUD funds.

No other large pots of aid dedicated to Harvey remain out there. So, annual programs, such as FEMA’s Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) and Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) represent HCFCD’s best hope to make up the rest of the funding gap.

But the competition for those grants is nationwide. They include all states, territories, the District of Columbia and tribal lands. And Texas applications are handicapped because Texas has not updated its building codes in almost a decade to qualify for BRIC funding – despite an 11-to-1 payback.

Updating Project Cost Estimates to Recalculate Funding Gap

Elmer says he cannot calculate an exact funding gap at this time. “We’re still working on updating all project costs with the inflation estimates,” he said.

Elmer hopes to have a firmer estimate by August when the Flood Control District expects to issue its second flood-bond update this year.

I personally hope that the District’s recent reorganization can help it track such financing issues better in the future. It appears that after years of promising residents that all projects in the bond would be completed, now some may not be…while others that were not in the bond will be.

And I suspect I know whose won’t be.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/24/23

2125 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Last-Minute Funding Breathes New Life into Lake Houston Gates Project

The project to install more flood gates on the Lake Houston Dam has resulted in more nail-biting than a Steven Spielberg movie. Perhaps no project inspired more hope among flood-weary home- and business owners in the San Jacinto watershed. Importance is high, but the costs turned out far higher than expected and dollars proved hard to come by.

This morning, however, Dr. Greg Bonnen, chair of the House Appropriations Committee filed a rider to this year’s appropriations bill that will likely get the job done. The rider contains two provisions that affect funding for the gates.

  • Sec. 17.38 (a)(1) on page IX-22 contains $50 million for improvements to the Lake Houston Dam.
  • Sec. 17.38 (b)(1)(2)(3) on page IX-23 contains a provision that lets unexpended balances from previous grants be redeployed, so they can be spent on EITHER gates, a sediment capture pilot project, or sediment removal.
Lake Houston has four small floodgates only capable of releasing 1/15 the rate of Lake Conroe’s gates. New gates would go in the earthen embankment to the right of the old gates and spillway.

Funding Now Close to Expected Costs

According to Houston Mayor Pro Tem Dave Martin, Black & Veatch Engineering estimates the cost of an 11-gate structure to be between $125 and $225 million.

Balancing that on the income side of the ledger are:

  • The remaining Federal funds of the $50 million provided by FEMA early on for engineering, environmental surveys, permits and construction. So far the City has reportedly spent about $5 million on upfront work.
  • An $8 million earmark by US Congressman Dan Crenshaw.
  • $20 million in County funds allocated in the 2018 Flood Bond (Project CI-61).
  • $11 million from the City of Houston in capital-improvement-project (CIP) funds.
  • The possibility of additional CIP funds from this year’s budget.
  • $50 million from 17.38 (a)(1) above
  • Up to another $50 million in State funds left over from a TWDB 2021 allocation in 17.38 (b)(1)(2)(3)
  • Redeployment of some FEMA dredging funds left over from the Mouth Bar Project.

That puts available funding somewhere north of $170 million. Martin says that should be enough to lock in the original FEMA funding and get the project started.

Redeployment of Funds Important

Congressman Crenshaw’s office emphasized that even though some FEMA money will be redeployed from dredging the mouth bar, additional FEMA funds from another FEMA grant will let dredging around the lake continue.

Re: 17.38 (b) above (that second bucket of $50 million in funding from the state) Martin points out that it includes two other important projects: dredging and the sediment trap pilot study. However:

  • The pilot study should not be very expensive and has no firm deadline.
  • Congressman Dan Crenshaw has helped secure additional funding for dredging from a second FEMA grant.

Finally, Martin points out that Black & Veatch is examining options to scale back the number of gates in case construction costs exceed funding if something falls through.

Enough Funding Committed to Move Forward with Confidence

While some uncertainty remains, Martin says the key point is that enough money has now been committed to move forward with confidence. This is a huge improvement over where the project stood just 8 days ago when concerned residents launched a call-in campaign to influential senators and representatives.

Lake Houston Area residents placed thousands of calls to save the project. Two days later, funding was placed in Bonnen’s rider. Martin thanks “ALL who placed phone calls, sent text messages and emailed state officials in support of our gates project.”

Thank you’s also go to all those who played key roles in this up-against-the-center-field wall catch:

  • State Senator Brandon Creighton
  • State Representative Charles Cunningham
  • Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick
  • State Representative Armando Walle
  • State Senator Joan Huffman
  • House Speaker Dade Phelan
  • House Appropriations Chairman Greg Bonnen
  • Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner
  • US Representative Dan Crenshaw and Kaaren Cambio, his District Director

Several others deserve special thanks:

  • Mayor Pro Tem Dave Martin worked the phones relentlessly and made countless trips to Austin to raise awareness of the project and coordinate the area’s efforts.
  • City of Houston Chief Recovery Officer Stephen Costello convinced FEMA to include social benefits in the cost/benefit ratio (CBR). That raised the CBR to 3.5, making it the highest-rated project in the State of Texas.
  • City of Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner, who called in some favors among Austin influentials to make the project happen.
  • Former State Representative Dan Huberty and Ben Melson, a CoH lobbyist, lobbied extensively over the last few months, working with Martin, Costello and Bill Kelly, the City’s Director of Government Affairs.

Reason More Gates Needed

Additional gates will let the City lower lake water faster as large storms approach, thus reducing flood peaks both upstream and down. That will, in turn, reduce flood risk for thousands of homeowners and businesses, not to mention all the schools that flooded.

But lowering the lake level carries some risk. If it takes too long to lower the lake, storms can veer away before they arrive, wasting water. Narrowing the window between release and the storm’s arrival, raises certainty that the storm will refill the lake.

More gates will also help balance releases from Lake Conroe with those from Lake Houston.

Next Steps

It ain’t over till it’s over. But even though only days are left in this session, Chairman Bonnen’s office said, “The legislature has never failed to pass an appropriations bill.”

More news as the project evolves.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 5/25/2023

2095 Days since Hurricane Harvey

HCFCD Spending Slows; More Went to Buyouts than Flood Reduction

Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) released its November report on Flood-Bond progress to Commissioners Court yesterday. The report covered through October 2022. I had two major take-aways:

  • The slowdown in bond spending continues. HCFCD initiated no new construction projects during the month of October.
  • HCFCD spent more money on buyouts than flood reduction.

The major announcement: the District advertised bids for the construction of a stormwater detention basin in Inwood Forest. The project encompasses property owned by the City of Houston located both east and west of Antoine where Vogel Creek outfalls into White Oak Bayou (the old Inwood Forest Golf Course). It will eventually have a total of 12 interconnected compartments.

Funding of this project comes from the 2018 Bond, FEMA and the Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM). HCFCD hopes construction will begin in winter 2022-23. But let’s look at what has happened, instead of what will.

Overview

Since the last update, HCFCD:

  • Awarded NO construction projects
  • Awarded 9 non-construction agreements totaling $33 million
  • Paid $1.2 million for professional services.
  • Completed 28 home buyouts valued at approximately $5 million
  • Spent a total of $9.9 million since the last update.

Those last two bullet points mean…

HCFCD spent more on buyouts than flood reduction in the month of October.

HCFCD uses some buyouts for right-of-way (ROW) acquisition to build detention ponds or widen channels. But many buyouts simply avoid repetitive losses. The latest update does not specify which category October buyouts fell into.

Schedule performance indicators (the SPI index) for the month remained at .95 – behind schedule. HCFCD says the bond program is 23.8% completed – an increase of 0.3% from the previous month. That’s at 50 months out of a planned 120 month program or 41.6% of the way into the bond program.

Where the Money Has Gone

Only three projects out of 181 in the Bond changed stages. One went into preliminary engineering and two went from preliminary engineering into right-of-way acquisition. All are in the Cedar Bayou watershed.

The map below shows where $1.14 billion spent to date has gone.

In table form, that looks like this. I provided three months of data so you can see whether the needle is moving in your watershed. Five watersheds received no money in October.

Spending changes by watershed for the last three months.

Spending Trend Still Down

Last month I wrote about this downward trend in bond spending at a time when it should be increasing. Notice the trend in recent months:

  • July spending was $66.4 million.
  • August spending was $20.7 million.
  • September spending was only $8.1 million.
  • October’s $9.9 million was only slightly better than September.

Project Phasing Influences Spending Rates

Projects typically go through phases that comprise different percentages of the total budget. In flood control, upfront spending on studies typically comprises only 13% of the total. The big spending – 79% – happens for right-of-way acquisition and construction. Looking back at all phases of all projects since 2000…

Right-of-Way Acquisition and Construction account for almost four out of every five dollars spent by HCFCD.

Here’s how the breakdown looks:

HCFCD spending by project stage since 2000
Data compiled from FOIA Request

HCFCD typically spends six times more on Rights-of-Way and Construction, than upfront Feasibility Studies, Preliminary Engineering Reviews and Design.

More than four years into the bond, many projects should be entering the more expensive phases. So you would expect spending to increase. And July totals reflected that. But then a precipitous decline set in.

At the current spend rate, it would take 32 years to complete the bond, not 6.

Why the Slowdown?

HCFCD has not yet explained the slowdown except to say that, during the course of major programs like the Flood Bond, sometimes you hit lulls between major projects. But this slowdown has persisted for three months. No construction projects started last month. And Inwood-Forest stormwater-detention-basin construction likely won’t start for several more months.

At this point, explanations are in order. Last month, I suggested several:

Management Turnover – HCFCD recently lost its top three leaders who architected the Flood Bond: Russ Poppe, Matt Zeve, and Alan Black.

Less Experienced Management – Poppe was replaced by an academic who formerly managed the Subsidence District which has a budget one-thousandth the size of the 2018 flood bond.

More Layers of Management – There’s now a whole new department – County Administration – between Flood Control and Commissioners Court.

Delays in Other Departments – Community Services has failed to submit a plan for how to spend $750 million allocated to Harris County for flood mitigation by the Texas General Land Office and HUD.

Drawdown of Flood Resilience Trust Funds – The County is already running out of money in the Flood Resilience Trust Fund – a backup to keep projects moving in case grants, such as the $750 million, were delayed.

Yesterday HCFCD recommended pursuing a grant for Greens Bayou that would consume the current balance in the Flood Resilience Trust.

Bottom line: County Judge Lina Hidalgo needs to provide an explanation for the slowdown. This affects all Harris County residents, not just those in particular watersheds.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/30/2022

1919 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

All You Need to Know About Flooding Before You Vote

Before you vote this year, review these two graphs and a map. They should tell you everything you need to know about flooding and flood mitigation in the Lake Houston Area. They should also motivate you to vote if you are on the sidelines.

Highest Flooding

The first graph shows “feet above flood stage” during Hurricane Harvey at numerous gages on different watersheds around Harris county. It shows how high floodwater got AFTER it came “out of banks.”

The San Jacinto West Fork at US59 had THE highest flooding in Harris County during Harvey.

Lowest Funding

The second shows the amount of flood-mitigation dollars spent in each Harris County watershed on right-of-way acquisition and construction for flood-mitigation in the first half of this year. Those activities help mitigate flooding as opposed to studies which frequently never get acted upon.

The reversal is stunning.

Data obtained via FOIA Request. San Jacinto, the county’s largest watershed, received only $200,000. Only Cedar Bayou received less at $160,000.

Worst Last

The San Jacinto Watershed moves from the high side of the flooding graph to the low side of the funding graph.

But why the first six months of this year? I’ve talked ad nauseam about spending trends going back decades. This window shows us current priorities. Especially during an election year when you would think the County Judge would try to appeal to as many people as possible.

Regardless of how you feel about the equity prioritization framework, you would think that in a ten-year bond program, areas like Lake Houston would start seeing some real benefit by now. Narrowing down the range of spending helps provide better insight into the priorities of County Judge Lina Hidalgo. She’s the deciding vote on Commissioners Court.

How to Punish The Opposition

People are saying, “OK, I’ve waited patiently. When will I see some benefit from the 2018 flood bond?” That was more than four years ago already.

Unfortunately, the answer is “no time soon.” The map below shows current active Flood-Control capital-improvement construction projects and how the three Democrats on Commissioners Court have used their majority to punish Republican-leaning areas.

Maintenance projects are shown in orange. And capital-improvement projects appear purple.

Flood Control has 20 active construction projects in the capital-improvement category. Of those:

  • Republican Jack Cagle’s Precinct 4 has one.
  • Republican Tom Ramsey’s Precinct 3 has one.
  • Democrats Rodney Ellis and Adrian Garcia split the other 18 among themselves.
  • Not one is in Lake Houston Area.

And Judge Lina Hidalgo allows it.

From HCFCD.org

The only way for people in Precincts 3 and 4 to right this wrong is to replace Judge Hidalgo who is on the ballot running against Republican Alexandra Mealer.

If Hidalgo and Garcia are re-elected, we have four more years of political punishment to look forward to.

So, please vote on or before November 8.

To review your ballot choices, go to HarrisVotes.com and study who and what will be on the ballot in your area this year. Yesterday’s polls show the two candidates for judge essentially tied within the margin of error. Heavy turnout in the Lake Houston Area could swing this election.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/26/22

1884 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Chronicle, ReduceFlooding endorse Mealer over Hidalgo

The Houston Chronicle has endorsed Republican Alexandra del Moral Mealer for County Judge over incumbent Democrat Lina Hidalgo. I won’t recap the lengthy Chronicle article here; you should read it firsthand. But I will expand on it, especially vis-a-vis flood control, which the Chronicle touched only lightly.

Let me start by saying that after watching four year’s of Hidalgo’s missteps in flood mitigation, I support Mealer, too. It comes down to concerns about Hidalgo and the promise I see in Mealer. Let’s discuss Hidalgo first.

Hidalgo Slights Area With Worst Flooding

The person in the driver’s seat has a huge influence on where flood-mitigation money goes. And more than half of all flood-bond money spent to date has gone to Brays, Greens, White Oak, Halls, and Hunting Bayous. Those five have received more than $550 million from the flood bond through May. That’s more than half of all bond money. See below.

Flood Bond Spending through May 2022. Data obtained from HCFCD via a FOIA Request.

Here’s how that looks in a graph. Keep in mind that the San Jacinto watershed is the largest in the county.

The San Jacinto also had the highest flooding in the county during Harvey – more than 20 feet above flood stage.

worst first
Chart showing feet above flood stage at 33 gages on misc. bayous in Harris County during Harvey, including the 5 LMI watersheds listed above.

And as a result, the San Jacinto was among the most heavily damaged.

Flood-loss heat map during Harvey. From MAAPnext.org.

So, you would think this would get Judge Hidalgo’s attention. Instead, she brags about her equity prioritization framework. She claims it gives preference to the “worst first.” The only thing is, she doesn’t define “worst” the way most people would. She ignores severity of flooding and damaged structures.

Hidalgo’s Definition of Worst

Hidalgo’s formula measures Low-to-Moderate Income (LMI) residents, the CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index, and population in an area. But many of those densely populated neighborhoods are crowded with apartments. So …

People who live above ground level and don’t flood get prioritized over people who live at ground level and do flood.

But Hidalgo can’t even tell how many residents in a watershed live with different degrees of flood risk. So, Hidalgo’s “worst first” mantra is clever but misleading. It intends to deceive.

While rewarding her core constituents with mitigation projects worth hundreds of millions of dollars, the entire Lake Houston Area has only $2,000 of capital-improvement flood-bond construction projects underway.

Compare that to the half billion dollars you saw above. She’s proud of that disparity. Watch the video interview embedded in the Chronicle article.

Meltdown at Universal Services

Flood-control spending is just one of the county’s “disaster areas.” Consider the County’s IT department, Universal Services, which is in meltdown. The reason you see five-month-old data above is that the county has gone through a disastrous change in its IT systems.

The department has been dogged by incompetence since Hidalgo appointed Rick Noriega to take over. He has no IT background and has pushed out people who do. The managers of every group beneath him have turned over.

Employees complain Universal Services now hires new people for their political affiliation, not professional qualifications.

The incompetence is widespread, according to multiple sources. Things have gotten so bad that many qualified staff are burning out from having to shoulder more and more of the workload. And they are quitting.

As a result, accurate, timely information is rare. And yet, Hidalgo keeps bragging about “transparency.”

Lacking Leadership, Direction on $750 Million Flood-Mitigation Allocation

Universal Services is not alone. See the org chart below.

Changes under Hidalgo. Red X’s represent changes in leadership. Green boxes represent new departments.

The Community Services Department has had three different leadership changes under Hidalgo.

So whom did she choose to develop a plan for spending $750 million in Harvey flood-mitigation funds? Community Services, not Flood Control!

Community Services may be knowledgeable about disaster relief. That’s about helping individuals recover from past floods. But flood mitigation is about lessening the severity of future floods. One requires social workers; the other requires engineers, like they have in Harris County Flood Control.

The Texas General Land Office (GLO) administers those flood-mitigation funds for the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

The GLO signaled its intention to allocate $750 million to Harris County on August 23, 2021, but Community Services hasn’t even started compiling a list of potential projects yet.

They are still waiting on “direction from leadership,” according to an internal memo obtained by ReduceFlooding. In 14 months, Community Services has only defined a “process” for determining the list.

Community Services has, however, determined that it wants to spend almost a hundred million of the $750 million on planning and administrative costs.

From CSD Planning Meeting Presentation for the $750 million.

Meanwhile, H-GAC which covers a much larger area and includes many more governmental entities received notification of a $488 million allocation – also on 8/23/21. Yet H-GAC has already submitted its project list, received approval, and is working with sub-recipients to secure and validate bids.

Brain Drain Continues

Some of the departments shown above have been gutted. For instance, Engineering lost 4-5 layers of management. They don’t even have a disaster relief capability anymore.

Also, their “Fix Flooding First” program lost its leader and has reported no progress in months. Fix Flooding First was especially important to people on the periphery of the county. Its objective was to get neighboring areas that drain into Harris County to adopt minimum drainage standards.

What you see in the org chart above is the wholesale replacement of highly credentialed professionals by political cronies. And often, the cronies have no experience or qualifications.

Many managers under Hidalgo have described the environment as “chaotic.”

And then there’s Elections Administration. Hidalgo hired a political activist who had never run an election. She missed key deadlines and lost 10,000 votes. So, Hidalgo replaced her … just weeks before early voting starts for the upcoming election.

Management Mayhem Under Hidalgo

In my opinion, Hidalgo’s biggest problem is that she’s just a bad manager. She:

  • Doesn’t attract and retain top talent
  • Pushes out those who disagree
  • Hires people based on political affiliation, not qualifications
  • Doesn’t value experience and institutional knowledge
  • Blatantly discriminates against Republican-leaning precincts.

Hidalgo repeatedly says that she’s proud of what most would consider screw-ups.

Hidalgo never “owns” her problems. She just waves them away. In my opinion, another four years of Hidalgo would leave the county in disastrous and unrecoverable shape.

County spending is up. Crime is up. Taxes are up. And virtually all the flood-mitigation money promised to the Lake Houston Area has so far gone elsewhere.

About Alexandra del Moral Mealer

Mealer comes to the job with much more life and leadership experience than Hidalgo did. She has a way of confronting the truth head on.

You would expect that from a West-Point-educated Army Captain who commanded a bomb squad in Afghanistan. Mealer understands:

  • The necessity of accurate intel
  • That peoples’ lives and livelihoods depend on the decisions she makes.
Alex Mealer
Alex Mealer spent days touring the Lake Houston area to understand local flooding issues first hand. Hidalgo has not.

Mealer also has MBA and JD degrees from Harvard. She was a VP at Wells Fargo where she helped put together billion-dollar oil-and-gas deals before deciding to run for County Judge. In flooding as with law enforcement…

Mealer’s focus is making sure the county spends money wisely.

Straight Talk Vs. the Flood-Control Fairy Tale

Before this campaign, Mealer acquired a wealth of knowledge about how the county works. And she has surrounded herself with experts on various subjects.

The Chronicle described her as a data wonk. In my opinion, that’s what the county needs: someone grounded in reality. In one commissioner’s court meeting after another, Hidalgo, Garcia and Ellis, have spun a flood-control fairly tale.

It goes something like this. “Flood control has ignored poor neighborhoods. Rich ones like Kingwood get all the flood-mitigation money.” Why? They point to institutional racism!

If we had a judge who knew where her money was actually going, she could have challenged this myth. The reality is that LMI neighborhoods have consistently received the lion’s share of flood-mitigation funding going back decades.

By ignoring reality and blaming flooding on racism, Hidalgo has divided people. Worse, she has diverted attention AWAY FROM the REAL causes of flooding.

Laser Focus on Results that Benefit All

I have discussed flooding issues with Mealer a dozen times since the primary last spring. In my opinion, she is laser focused on accurately diagnosing problems. National and state issues over which she has no control do not distract Mealer.

Mealer is determined to provide a safe and secure community with well-maintained public infrastructure that support growth and opportunity for all.

Accurately diagnosing problems is the key to fixing them quickly and cost effectively.

I, for one, don’t plan to support Hidalgo. She continually says she needs more money when she doesn’t know where billions of flood-mitigation dollars have gone. Nor does she seem eager to deploy another $750 million already in her hip pocket. I’m voting for Mealer.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/16/22

1874 Days since Hurricane Harvey

The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.

Formula for Allocating Future Flood-Mitigation Funding Deceives

How do you fairly allocate flood-mitigation funds? Voters have argued about that since the day Harris County Commissioners Court redefined the conventional meaning of “equitable” with the first equity formula in 2019. Since then the formula has changed several times to ensure low-to-moderate income (LMI) areas continue to receive the lion’s share of mitigation funding, even as some commissioners claim LMI areas get none.

On 6/28/22, the Harris County Community Resilience Flood Task Force proposed yet another formula for allocating potentially billions of dollars in future flood-mitigation funding. It purports to objectively calculate the benefits received by different areas. But it doesn’t in any conventional sense. And therefore, the results can be deceptively counter-intuitive.

Problems With Formula

The formula shows increased benefit when:

  • Risk remains unchanged.
  • Costs increase.
  • Population decreases.

The formula is…

Benefit = Total Cost/(Population X Risk)

On July 2, 2022, I posted about a variety of issues that affect the validity of this formula. Admittedly, the post got complex. So let me give you two simple examples that dramatize these problems.

In each example below, I’ll hold two of the three variables constant. That makes it easy to see whether “benefit” varies in a predictable direction. And whether that matches what people expect when they hear the word “benefit.”

Cost Example

The value of “10” applied to Risk in each case represents a 10% annual chance of flooding.

If you hold risk and population constant, while increasing cost…

  1. Population = 5000, Risk = 10 and Cost = $100,000, then Benefit = 2
  2. Population = 5000, Risk = 10, and Cost = $1,000,000, then Benefit = 20

…benefit increases by spending more without reducing risk! A taxpayer nightmare!

Population Example

If you hold cost and risk constant, while increasing population…

  1. Population = 2000, Risk = 10, and Cost = $1 million, then Benefit = 50
  2. Population = 5000, Risk = 10, and Cost = $1 million, then Benefit = 20

…benefit decreases by helping more people with the same dollars! Again, counter-intuitive.

Both takeaways are confusing. What is this formula measuring?!

I would argue that, in a flood context, most people strongly associate the word “benefit” with “risk reduction.”

But this formula doesn’t measure risk reduction. And it doesn’t measure efficiency either. It measures per capita investment associated with a certain level of flood risk and calls that “Benefit.”

So, the more people you help with any given sum, the more the benefit goes down. Voila! That makes it look as though the highly populated watersheds (that have received the overwhelming majority of prior investments) have received little benefit. And that may be the point of this formula. It will send even more money to those same areas.

In logic, they call this the fallacy of incomplete evidence – more commonly known as cherry-picking. You cherry pick data that favors your argument and ignore the rest. For instance, consider the image below.

Brays Bayou at Calhoun, photographed May 2021. Note abundance of multi-story apartments.

The total population in some areas includes many people in tall apartment buildings or high-rises. For many of them, flooding may be more inconvenient than financially devastating. Yet the formula assumes all people suffer equally.

The formula provides the appearance of objectivity and fairness. But it masks important information by lumping everything into a single number.

But the proponents of this formula don’t even want to discuss numbers. They want to render the results as heat maps, layered with Social Vulnerability Index, LMI and other data guaranteed to mask and perpetuate the lopsided distribution of flood-mitigation funds.

Omitting Benefits to Structures

By defining Benefit as the cost per person to achieve a certain level of flood risk, the formula omits any benefit to structures. That’s the traditional way to define the benefit of a flood-mitigation project. You measure “the value of damages avoided.” Whether one person lives in a house or two people live there, the cost to protect those people and that home remains the same.

For instance, widening a channel can reduce flood risk for a house. But with the proposed formula, that home and its value no longer count – only the number of people living within it. So, doubling the number of people in a representative home cuts the Benefit of a flood mitigation project in half.

Conclusions

The formula is a vast oversimplification. It omits valuable information such as avoided damages.

It’s also confusing and semantically deceptive in that results vary in counter-intuitive directions.

Finally, as I previously posted, the formula is not valid. It masks several apples-to-oranges comparisons.

Yet the majority of the Community Resilience Flood Task Force proposes using it to help guide (potentially) billions in future flood-mitigation investments. That could hurt taxpayers, flood victims, future bonds and the credibility of local government.

The formula can deceive people into making bad flood-mitigation investments. But in this case, there’s no Securities & Exchange Commission to protect investors. Only the ballot box.

Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/6/22

1772 Days since Hurricane Harvey