Today, at a meeting of the Harris County Flood Resilience Task Force, Vanessa Toro of the County Judge’s Office and Leah Chambers, Principal of consulting firm Outside Voices presented several slides about flooding and flood-mitigation efforts in Harris County that you might find interesting. Their presentation started with a series of slides that illuminated the history of flooding in Harris County; types of flooding; mitigation challenges, and mitigation efforts currently underway.
Historical Flooding and Mitigation
The first four slides address historical flooding and build on each other.
Selected historical milestones show dates and damage from several major storms in the last 20 years.
The next slide shows the major challenges in each epoch.
The third shows major mitigation efforts over time.
The dotted line shows spending by Harris County to help control flooding.
Different Types of Flooding Throughout County
The presentation then went into examples of the different types of flooding we experience. While river and bayou flooding are important to the Lake Houston Area, in other parts of the county, street flooding is a bigger issue. During high intensity rainfalls, water can’t get to the bayous.
Down in the southern part of the county, coastal flooding from storm surge is the main concern.
Each type of flooding requires different mitigation strategies.
For instance:
Flood professionals often address river- and bayou-flooding with detention ponds and channel widening.
Street flooding may require better maintenance of ditches, bigger storm drains and wider storm sewers.
Coastal flooding may require dikes and better building codes that elevate homes higher.
Key Challenges with Flood Mitigation
The presentation then segued into key challenges we face and how the county is trying to address them.
The first slide in this section discussed incomplete knowledge.
For instance, FEMA’s flood maps measure river, bayou, major channel and coastal flooding, but not street flooding, which is a major problem in the inner city. Hopefully, the next generation of flood maps (See MAAPNext) will help address that.
There’s a feeling that large scale infrastructure projects by themselves will not solve our flooding problems. Various groups within the county are looking at ways to supplement them. The engineer’s office is looking at subdivision drainage. Several other groups are collaborating to explore nature based solutions, flood proofing, and more.
The title of the slide above refers to difficulty of coordinating flood-control efforts across complex jurisdictional boundaries.
Different areas have different priorities, needs and timetables. No one understands that better than those who live near county lines. For instance, upstream counties often use lax regulation and enforcement as a way to entice developers – much to the detriment of those who live downstream.
Flood Resilience Efforts Now Underway
While the 2018 flood bond gets all the publicity, it’s certainly not the only Harris County effort underway to mitigate flooding. The slide below shows the variety of efforts.
They include:
The Community Flood Resilience Task Force, a group designed to give voice to communities in developing the next generation of flood mitigation efforts.
MAAPNext to update flood maps, incorporate the more data sources, and make flood-risk easier to understand.
Resilience Actions Inventory, an ongoing effort to catalog resilience initiatives, projects and programs throughout the county.
Infrastructure Resilience Team – an interdepartmental team planning resilience projects. It includes: Flood Control, Engineering, Community Services, Public Health, Emergency Management, and the Toll Road Authority.
New departments, such as the Office of Sustainability and the Deputy County Administrator for Resilience and Infrastructure.
The ongoing Capital Improvement and Maintenance budgets of HCFCD.
All these efforts may not mesh like the gears in a Swiss watch. At least not today. But it’s good to know that efforts are underway on more than one front.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 9/25/2021 based on information from the Harris County Judge’s Office
1788 Days since Hurricane Harvey
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1968 … the year that humans first traveled around the moon during the Apollo 8 mission. It was a triumphant time for America and Houston, home of the NASA “Manned Spacecraft Center,” its name at the time. We could do anything, it seemed. And we did.
1968 Plan for 1990
A reader recently sent me a preliminary plan developed in 1968 called Houston 1990. The Honorable Louis Welch was Mayor and Intercontinental Airport was still a year away from opening. And the Houston Planning Commission (which developed the plan) clearly had its eye on supporting future growth. The plan discussed new water sources, transportation corridors, green space, cultural amenities, employment centers, retail centers, housing choices and more.
Not all of ideas became reality. But most did.
Hits and Misses
For instance, the plan talks about an “emerging” office, retail and high-rise residential area near Westheimer and West Loop 610. (The Galleria?) It also mentions an emerging business area near Holcomb and Main (The Medical Center?) It predicted the continued dominance of single-family housing and the need outlying employment centers as Houston expanded so people could continue to live near where they worked.
For younger Houstonians, it will be a lesson in the value of planning. For instance, future transportation options can be taken off the table if land isn’t set aside early enough and people build homes on it. That’s why it’s interesting to see something that looks like a network of greenbelts where the Grand Parkway is now.
But people also ignored parts of the plan. For instance, the need for flood control. The plan designated wide green spaces around bayous and creeks which were largely undeveloped at the time. They could have been used for detention ponds and channel expansion as development pushed outward.
Reservoirs that Never Happened
The plan also showed large reservoirs.
One was immediately west of what is now Kingwood where Spring and Cypress Creeks come together with the San Jacinto West Fork near I-69.
Another was west of a tiny town in the hinterlands called Tomball on Spring Creek.
A third was on the Brazos River near Richmond and Rosenberg.
And the fourth was a sprawling affair north of Lake Houston that took in portions of Peach and Caney Creeks, the San Jacinto East Fork and Luce Bayou.
Not one of these reservoirs was developed. And with few exceptions, none of the land along the bayous was set aside. The land along the rivers and streams became settled. And now those areas flood significantly during heavy rains.
Olive-colored areas represent open spaces recommended as set-asides for recreation, water resources, and flood control. However, little of the land was actually set aside for those purposes. The large green ring around the City is now the Grand Parkway.
Building flood mitigation projects along these waterways now would be difficult. It often requires buyouts that can take a decade or more. This problem was foreseen. People were already building up to the edge of bayous, as you can see in the enlarged portion of the map below that shows Halls Bayou.
Halls Bayou in 1968. Note the green areas suggested as set-asides for “open space” along the bayou where development was already crowding the stream banks, leaving few options for flood control.
Many outlying areas that were sparsely populated in 1968 would follow the Halls Bayou pattern.
People would demand flood mitigation after, not before development.
However, that can become expensive and controversial as we saw this week in Huffman. Some areas there along Luce Bayou flooded badly during Harvey and Imelda. Harris County Flood Control District commissioned a flood-mitigation study that recommended a construction of bypass channel (see sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4).
But local opposition developed from homeowners whose property would be affected. They fought the project. Harris County Precinct 2 Commissioner Adrian Garcia killed it in the 8/24/21 Commissioner’s Court meeting, citing local opposition. That left Huffman with no immediate flood-mitigation hopes after three years of study and planning.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Prelim-Plan-1968.jpg?fit=1200%2C1071&ssl=110711200adminadmin2021-08-27 14:39:352021-08-27 15:10:39The Future that Houston Envisioned for 1990 … in 1968
Today marks the 1349th day since Hurricane Harvey. That’s also how long it took the United States to win World War II. To date, we’ve studied problems, made bold plans and, in a few cases, actually started constructing flood mitigation projects. But none of the $2.1 billion allocated for Texas flood mitigation by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has yet to work its way down to the local level.
The Townsen Overpass at US59 south of the San Jacinto West Fork during Harvey on 8/30/2017. Photo courtesy of Harris County Flood Control.
In the time it took us to win World War II, we’re still trying to line up flood mitigation financing.
Imagine What That HUD Money Could Have Done By Now
The Texas General Land Office (GLO) administers HUD flood mitigation funds for Texas. However, it has yet to announce the results of a statewide grant application competition for the first half of that $2.1 billion. Hopefully, those announcements will come this month. The GLO intends to hold a second competition for the second half of the money at a later date.
Below are thoughts contributed by others. To encourage their candor, I promised them anonymity.
I. Consolidation Under One Agency
One federal official suggested that all flood mitigation funds should flow from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), not HUD.
Rationale: Disaster relief is FEMA’s core competency. FEMA’s good at it. FEMA responds quickly. They are on location after disasters. They collect immense amounts of data, manage the National Flood Insurance Program, and have resources to get the job done quickly.
Right now, HUD, the slowest agency with the most rules and regulations, is responsible for helping the poorest neighborhoods, i.e., those that often need it most. Many think that’s unfair.
Dividing responsibilities among agencies creates needless bureaucracy, complexity, overlap and “stove piping.”
Stove-piping is where people in one bureaucracy are blind to activities in another. Eliminating the stove-piping requires cross checking data between agencies and programs, for instance to eliminate duplication of benefits. But that can also slow projects down.
Rationale: Not all earmarks are meritless. In cases of exceptional need, they can send money directly to cities or counties trying to build important flood mitigation projects. With proper safeguards against bogus earmarks, this idea could shave years off construction projects designed to protect people.
III. Partner with Army Corps More
Another expert suggested directing more money to the Army Corps for “project partnership agreements.” The Corps work directly with a local entity such as a city or county to help construct projects faster.
Rationale: The Corps was originally set up more than 200 years ago as a quick-reaction force for wartime. It now has the responsibility for managing the nation’s water infrastructure. The Corps has the turnkey expertise to gauge the merit of projects and the muscle to make things happen quickly.
Previously, the Corps built the Antoine Stormwater Detention Basin in the Greens Bayou Watershed. HCFCD bought out the properties that comprised that basin and currently maintains the property.
IV. Establish a “Quick Reaction Fund”
A financial expert suggested establishing a “Quick Reaction Fund.” It would be activated by a Presidential Disaster Declaration and provide loans to get projects started quickly. The money could be used to jumpstart upfront activities, such as buyouts, environmental surveys and preliminary engineering reports. It could also be used to build entire projects that are needed quickly.
Rationale: Local entities often don’t have the money or staff to conduct these upfront activities. Buyouts can be especially problematic. They must often be completed before other flood mitigation activities, such as ditch improvements or detention ponds, can start.
“But we often have to wait 18 months or more for approval of buyouts,” said one engineer. “The vast majority of people can’t wait that long.”
So they fix up their homes and become more committed to them. Or they may just leave the area. Either way, this slows flood mitigation down even more.
A Forest Cove townhome just beyond the new Houston Parks Board San Jacinto Greenway. Harvey made the entire 80-townhome complex uninhabitable. Many residents left the area because they got tired of waiting for buyouts that are still not complete. That makes buyouts even more time consuming. Photo taken May 3, 2021.
The Quick Reaction Fund could help complete buyouts in months – instead of years – after a flood.
Loans could be paid back later by grant awards from the Feds.
V. Pass a Hazard Tax
To bypass the delays and uncertainties of competitive grant funding through state and federal levels, one local entity suggested passing a “hazard tax.”
Rationale: This would put local entities in charge of their own destinies rather than making them dependent on Washington and Austin for handouts. It would let cities and counties build up a war chest from their own tax revenues. Think of it as a savings account with a dedicated purpose – disaster mitigation. The money could be used to fund projects directly and quickly, or as the basis for matching funds when projects are less time critical.
In my opinion, we desperately need a way to resolve such issues faster. I hope this series of articles will start a public dialogue among political leaders at all levels.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 5/9/2021
1349 Days after Hurricane Harvey, the number of days in WWII
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/TS-Harvey-8-30-17-209.jpg?fit=1024%2C768&ssl=17681024adminadmin2021-05-09 14:24:502021-05-09 19:15:39How to Speed Up Flood Mitigation Funding: Part II
As June 1st rapidly approaches, Texas coastal communities are wondering what the 2021 Hurricane Season will hold. Will thousands of Texas families be spared, or will they endure hurricane-force winds and flooding with years of recovery ahead of them?
Hurricane Harvey at its peak intensity as it hit Texas in August 2017. Photo courtesy of National Hurricane Center.
We cannot stop natural disasters from happening, but we can certainly speed recovery efforts. The Texas General Land Office (GLO) has administered recovery programs for seven of the 18 major declared disasters the State of Texas has experienced in the last 15 years. We know firsthand how exhausting and lengthy this process can be. After flood waters have abated and the debris has been cleared, communities face the next hurdle – navigating the arduous and overly burdensome bureaucracy shackling speedy recovery efforts.
Cutting Red Tape
My GLO team and I recognize the importance of following procedures to safeguard federal funds, but also understand bureaucracy is an obstruction to recovery and mitigation. Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) appropriated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) take years to reach disaster survivors. One of the most frequent concerns we hear—from survivors, county and local officials, and other stakeholders—is that CDBG-DR funds do not flow quickly enough to communities in need.
These dollars should be deployed as quickly and flexibly as possible to support recovery with as few additional regulations as possible.
First, we must ensure effective and efficient disaster recovery by providing the framework for programs and activities that provide disaster relief; resiliency; long-term recovery; restoration of infrastructure and housing; economic revitalization; and mitigation in areas impacted by Presidentially declared disasters. This begins with codification of CDBG-DR program rules and regulations.
Reducing Upfront Delays
For every new allocation, a new series of rules are written and published in the Federal Register. In Texas we are currently implementing CDBG supplemental funding for 8 events governed by 22 separate Federal Registers (rule books for how funding allocations may be used). A good amount of those rules, such as the national objectives imposed and the range of eligible activities, remain largely the same each time, but others are entirely new. Based on our experience, it takes between nine to sixteen months for a Federal Register Notice to be published for allocations of recovery funding after the major disaster declaration takes place. These allocations must first be granted to a state or other grantee following a special appropriation from Congress.
The Federal Register for the CDBG-MIT funds was posted two years to the day after Hurricane Harvey made its final landfall on the coast of western Louisiana.
Inspector General Recommends Codifying Rules
HUD going back to the drawing board for each appropriation consumes critical time that could be spent setting up programs at the state and local levels if the rules were codified. In July 2018, the HUD Office of Inspector General (HUD OIG) issued a report that identified 59 common rules HUD issues when drafting Federal Registers. The same report recommended HUD work to codify the CDBG-DR program.
Fund deployment speed can also be enhanced by:
Streamlining processes at the federal level and at HUD
Retaining and developing in-house knowledge
Empowering grantees to move with a purpose.
Five Specific Recommendations to Expedite Process
There are several steps the federal government can take to expedite this process. Here are the five I consider to be the most impactful:
Create Office of Disaster Relief and Recovery – HUD currently has several offices with jurisdiction over CDBG-DR funds. This creates a tangled web of bureaucracy when HUD drafts a Federal Register, approves an Action Plan, or a grantee must seek a waiver or other change to program, vastly delaying the distribution of funds. A distinct disaster recovery division headed by an Assistant Secretary with discretion over disaster recovery funds would limit stove-piped information, reduce redundancies, and expedite decision-making authority within HUD. This change alone would vastly reduce delays in program progress.
Facilitate capacity building – HUD should provide grantees an initial amount of administrative funds prior to approval of the action plan and grant agreement. This would enable grantees to hire staff to provide technical assistance for drafting the action plan and begin to build programs while the action plan is being developed so recovery efforts would not be delayed 6+ months while the process concludes. Many grantees lack the resources to essentially operate on credit until these funds are made available.
Standardize programs and only post changes – Congress should pass legislation standardizing rules so the Federal Register only includes what you cannot do versus everything you can. This would lessen the time waiting for the rules to be written and allow grantees to begin working on the general premise of what the program cannot do.
Codify data coordination between FEMA and HUD – The federal government must build a capable national data system to coordinate data sharing between federal, state, and local agencies. FEMA collects a tremendous amount of data following every disaster. This data is used to inform HUD allocations as well as to develop needs assessments by grantees. However, there is not a system in place that enables this data sharing to happen quickly, safely and effectively.
Codify allocation timeline – HUD is not currently restricted in how long it takes to allocate special appropriations of CDBG-DR and CDBG-Mitigation to grantees. Additionally, grantees cannot begin drafting hundreds of pages of state and local action plans until HUD issues the rules for use of funds in the Federal Register.
Example of Delays in Current System
For example, Congress appropriated nearly $28 billion to help disaster-affected states rebuild on February 9, 2018. Two months later, HUD allocated $4.383 billion to Texas. At the time, HUD also stated it “will issue administrative guidelines shortly for use of the funds to address grantees’ long-term recovery needs.” However, this did not happen for nearly a year and a half.
On August 30, 2019, HUD finallypublished the Federal Register notice enabling the State of Texas to proceed in drafting an action plan for the CDBG-MIT funds. The Federal Register required a robust public outreach component. The GLO went above and beyond HUD’s mandates by extending the required 45-day public-comment period to 50 days and surpassed HUD requirements by hosting eight public hearings – three public hearings prior to the completion of the draft plan and five following publication of the draft plan. Prior to finalizing the draft of the action plan, the GLO responded to thousands of comments collected from 117 meetings and 936 individuals.
While the GLO waited 16 months for rules for the action plan, it only took the GLO approximately five months to draft the nearly 500 page document, conduct a historic public outreach effort, respond to comments, make revisions, and submit the plan to HUD for approval. It then took nearly two months before the GLO received approval from HUD.
The turnaround time for announcing rules should be substantially reduced to expedite the use of disaster recovery funding for those in urgent need of assistance.
Since 2011, the GLO has worked with hundreds of communities and several thousand families to repair homes; reimburse out-of-pocket home repairs; conduct buyouts and acquire flood-prone properties; strengthen infrastructure; and conduct major planning studies to support local government mitigation efforts. The success of our programs can be attributed in part to our staff of dedicated experts as well as our streamlined grant administration.
No additional regulations or rules are added to our programs beyond what the federal government requires.
George P. Bush
The GLO has proven that you can expedite recovery by eliminating unnecessary regulations, pre-positioning resources and putting contracts in place before a disaster. Disaster survivors shouldn’t have to wait years for assistance. It is plain and simple – we can and should lessen the burden on families and communities by reducing redundancies and implementing common-sense reforms.
Guest Editorial by Texas General Land Office Commissioner George P. Bush on May 8, 2021
1348 Days after Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Harvey-Peak-Intensity.jpg?fit=1500%2C843&ssl=18431500adminadmin2021-05-08 06:23:432021-05-08 06:27:52“We Must Streamline Disaster Recovery Before the Next Disaster”
Sunday, May 9th will mark a special day in the history of flood mitigation. We will have spent more time responding to Hurricane Harvey – and accomplishing little – than it took us to win World War II. December 7, 1941 to VJ Day on August 15, 1945 was 1349 days. On May 9, 2021, it will have been 1349 days since Hurricane Harvey ravaged Texas and the Gulf Coast.
USS Arizona burning after forward magazine exploded, afternoon of December 7, 1941. Photo courtesy of National Park Service.
What Happened to American Determination and Unity?
After Harvey, we stood united in a sense of grief, loss and determination. We vowed to implement measures that would make us more resilient against such storms in the future.
In the Lake Houston Area, we had a three part mitigation strategy:
More upstream detention to help offset future releases from Lake Conroe.
Dredging to eliminate blockages in the rivers.
Additional flood gates on Lake Houston so we can shed water as fast as Lake Conroe sends it downstream.
We just finished a preliminary engineering study to add more flood gates to the Lake Houston dam. The second phase of the engineering study is just starting. The City hopes to finish it by September 2022 – five years after Harvey.
We’re still waiting to hear aboutgrants to study sedimentation; joint reservoir operations for Lakes Conroe and Houston; and more.
We’re still fighting with each other over which neighborhood gets its flood mitigation projects started first.
Upstream officials still turn a blind eye to violations of their own flood regulations designed to protect public safety…in order to attract new development.
The winners of a HUD Hazard Mitigation Grant competition for Hurricane Harvey have yet to be announced.
And the vast majority of money appropriated by Congress for Hurricane Harvey relief in February of 2018 has yet to work its way down to the local level.
We Need More Emphasis on Action
Imagine if we had still been studying an appropriate response to Pearl Harbor after 1349 Days. Somehow, we’ve confused studying problems with fixing them. Thought has become disconnected from action, or worse, substituted for it. This is not America’s finest hour.
It’s not that we can’t mitigate flooding problems. It’s that we’re not organized to do so in a timely way. We study these things endlessly. We value perfection more than protection.
We have compounded a natural disaster with:
“Paralysis through analysis”
Divided responses on the federal, state and local levels that have no central coordinator
Contradictory priorities between upstream and downstream interests
Complex, often contradictory, organizational requirements.
We CAN Be the Solution
We need to re-engineer business processes to focus on what matters:
Helping people rebuild their homes, businesses and infrastructure…
And reducing the risk of future disasters…
In the least amount of time possible.
That’s it. It’s that simple. The first two are clear statements of intent to unify purpose. And the third is a simple goal by which everyone involved can measure individual efforts.
In the coming days, I will publish a series of articles on how to streamline the business processes built up around flood mitigation and disaster relief. One will be authored by George P. Bush, the state’s highest disaster relief official. And another will be anonymous to allow several people to speak freely and frankly.
My goal is to stimulate a public dialog that can help us get closer to the goals listed above.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 5/7/2021
1347 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/20210507-Arizona.jpg?fit=1200%2C801&ssl=18011200adminadmin2021-05-07 14:33:182021-05-12 15:17:20It’s Official: Harvey Flood Mitigation Is Taking Longer than World War II
It’s easy sometimes to focus so much on problems, that we forget about progress. So let’s give thanks on this fourth Thanksgiving since Hurricane Harvey. We should truly take heart in what we have accomplished in flood mitigation so far.
This small strip is all that’s left of the once mighty mouth bar on the San Jacinto West Fork. Dredgers will use it as a base of operations in the next phase of dredging.
Engineers are now evaluating the benefit/cost ratios of each. They are also securing environmental permits.
Looking west across Lake Houston Spillway
Next step: FEMA will review the preliminary engineering results. Assuming the benefit/cost ratios justify the projects, FEMA and local partners will fund construction of the selected alternative. Another $47 million has already been set aside for that, but approval is not automatic.
Lake Conroe Lowering
A big thank you to the board of the SJRA which voted earlier this spring to continue its seasonal Lake Conroe lowering policy in the face of withering protests from Lake Conroe boaters. This policy provides an additional margin of safety to those in the Lake Houston Area until other mitigation projects can be completed.
Bens Branch Clean Out
During Harvey, 13 people died after Bens Branch flooded. The now complete Kingwood Drainage Analysis showed that it had been reduced to a two year level of service. That means sediment had reduced its conveyance to the point that it will flood on a two year rain.
Even before the study was completed, Harris County Flood Control started cleaning it out in phases to restore conveyance. From upstream:
HCFCD also repaired erosion in the Kingwood Diversion Ditch between Walnut Lane and Kingwood Deer Springs Drive.
HCFCD Diversion Ditch repairs in Kingwood
The City of Houston and Harris County Flood Control also cleaned out and repaired several severely clogged ditches in Forest Cove, Kings Forest, Elm Grove, and Kings Point/Fosters Mill. There may have been more than I missed.
Grants for Additional Crucial Studies Under Consideration
The Texas Water Development Board advanced for SJRA Grant Applications for consideration in the final phase.
Would identify and create a plan for implementing potential sedimentation solutions in the Upper San Jacinto River Basin (Lake Houston watershed). It would evaluate the input, output, and storage of sediment for the entire basin as well as for sub-watersheds.
This sandbar formed overnight during Harvey and blocked the West Fork by 90% according to the Corps. Boats that drew 18 inches of water could not navigate upstream past this sandbar, which has since been removed.
Would provide for installation of rain and river/stream gages at three locations identified as critical by San Jacinto County to provide early warning information to the county during storm events.
Park Restoration
KSA restored two parks in Kingwood that were severely damaged by Harvey and Imelda. KSA repaired trails in East End Park after each storm. Some had to be relocated because of erosion of the river bank. The Eagle Point trail in East End will become a 2021 project. KSA wants to put down a geo-stabilizing system on top of approximately ten feet of sand deposited by the two storms.
Standing on five feet of sand deposited in East End Park wetlands after Harvey
At River Grove, the Army Corps of Engineers cut an opening through a massive 12-foot-high and quarter-mile-long sand bar blocking the boat ramp and the Kingwood Diversion Ditch. Then KSA excavated parts of the park out from under five feet of sand, created new playing fields, restored the boardwalk, and dredged the lagoon adjacent to the boardwalk.
Dredging of lagoon and boat dock at River Grove Park
Buyouts
Harris County Flood Control started buying out townhomes damaged beyond repair in Forest Cove. At last count, they had purchased 69 of 80. Four of the remaining 11 are in various stages of the buyout process. Owners of the rest had reportedly vanished after the storm, complicating buyouts. Those may need to be condemned before HCFCD can tear down the remaining townhomes.
Edgewater Park and Trails
Harris County Precinct 4 purchased land on the northeast corner of US59 and the West Fork to create a new park called Edgewater Park. Construction was supposed to have started more than a year ago on a park headquarters building, a boat launch, and rest rooms. The County fenced off the property, then delayed construction for unspecific reasons.
Tentative plans for a new Edgewater Park at Hamblen Road and Loop 494
As part of the project, the Houston Parks Board (a private charitable organization which works with the City Parks Department) proposed building a trail that would connect the Spring Creek Greenway with the Kingwood Trail Network. Unfortunately, the trail would have to go through the townhome-buyout area. And buyouts have been delayed.
Commercial Rebuilding
Merchants have totally restored the H-E-B shopping center at Kingwood Drive and West Lake Houston Parkway. Renovations should soon be announced at other centers. Kings Harbor has been restored and new building is underway. Kingwood Village Estates and other condo/apartment complexes have been re-built. And a whole new shopping center has gone in on the southwest corner of US59 and Northpark Drive.
A new CVS store is replacing the old Chase Bank at Kingwood Drive and West Lake Houston Parkway.
Schools Back and Better
Both Kingwood High School and the St. Martha School have been renovated and flood-proofed. Kingwood College is not only back, it’s expanding.
Woodridge Village Detention Completed
Perry Homes finally finished the detention ponds on its Woodridge Village site earlier this year. They don’t have enough capacity to hold a 100-year rain. But they sure work better than what they had in 2019 when the lack of detention contributed to flooding Elm Grove Village twice. Hopefully, they will suffice until the City and County can work out a deal to purchase the property and build enough detention to hold a 100-year rain.
Woodridge Village N2 Detention Pond, the largest of five now on the site, during a heavy rain in September.
Bridges
TxDoT replaced the southbound US59 bridge and re-opened it months ahead of schedule. Union Pacific replaced its ancient bridge over the West Fork with a modern replacement. Both bridges have supports wide enough to let trees pass through in future floods. That should hopefully avoid the logjams that back water up, flooding surrounding areas.
New Union Pacific Bridge completed in May 2020 allows trees to pass through during floods.
The City has also made several repairs to the West Lake Houston Parkway Bridge. They not only reinforced the supports, they leveled the road bed.
Community is Back and Better
More than three years after Harvey, the Humble/Kingwood Community is back and better. Because of dredging and ditch repairs alone, we are already safer than before Harvey, when we didn’t recognize many of the problems lurking around us.
Yes, some homes and businesses remain vacant. And much remains to do. But the future of the community is no longer in doubt. That’s thanks to the determination of residents to vowed to restore one of the most unique and livable communities in America.
Thanks also go to local leaders such as Congressman Dan Crenshaw, State Representative Dan Huberty, State Senator Brandon Creighton, Precinct 4 Commissioner Jack Cagle, HCFCD, and Houston Mayor Pro Tem Dave Martin. We shouldn’t forget Mark Micheletti and Kaaren Cambio, two SJRA directors from the Lake Houston Area and others on the SJRA board who voted for lake lowering. Nor should we forget the Lake Houston Chamber of Commerce. And especially Guy Sconzo who led the area’s recovery task force before succumbing to cancer.
My apologies to anyone I left out. Or for any worthy projects that I omitted.
Despite the fact that we still have much left to do, we should not lose sight of our achievements to date. Understanding how far we have come will sustain us in the battles that still lie ahead.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 11/26/2020 (Thanksgiving)
1185 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20201105-DJI_0089.jpg?fit=1200%2C900&ssl=19001200adminadmin2020-11-25 17:16:412020-11-25 17:50:20Giving Thanks for Flood Mitigation Projects Completed and Underway
Flood mitigation is a complex process with hundreds of moving parts, all dependent on each other. When you focus intensely on the pieces, periodically it helps to review how they fit together. Only when you do this can you see progress toward your goals. In that spirit, I created this presentation. It has a Kingwood slant, but really addresses the whole Lake Houston Area. Everything connects.
What Caused Flooding
First, let’s look at what caused the flooding during Harvey and other recent storms…apart from record rainfalls.
The rain fell on a landscape that was ill-prepared the handle it.
Look at flooding like a process engineer. There’s always a bottleneck in the system somewhere between the sky and Galveston Bay. Both local and regional issues contributed to the magnitude of the Harvey and Imelda disasters.
Underestimating Rainfall Meant Underpreparing
When we built communities, such as Kingwood, we underestimated the amount of rainfall we could get. After four so-called 500 year rains in five years, we’re now working with higher rainfall precipitation frequency estimates (called Atlas 14). For this area, the 100-year rain is about 30-40% higher than the previous standard. That means floodplains will soon expand when new flood maps are released. Some people in the 500-year floodplain will find themselves in the 100-year. And people in the 100-year may find themselves in the floodway of rivers and streams. Unless we do something.
Lake Conroe Release Coincided with Downstream Peaks
On top of record rainfalls, during Harvey, the SJRA released water from Lake Conroe at a time that coincided with downstream peaks from other tributaries. The release by itself would have created the ninth largest flood in West Fork history. It comprised about one third of all the water coming down the West Fork.
Population Growth in MoCo
On top of that, Montgomery County has seen tremendous population growth in the last decade. Conroe was the fastest growing city in America in 2017 and is still #6. The county itself is the second fastest growing in the region.
To pave the way for all that development, we’ve seen a huge increase in sand mining upstream in the last 25 years. Before 2011, unregistered, bootleg operators went unregulated. But even those who are registered don’t follow common-sense regulations common in other states, which protect the environment and downstream residents. For instance, they mine so close to the river that dikes frequently fail. As a result, they have contributed to a greater than than natural buildup of sediment in our rivers. After Harvey, the US Army Corps of Engineers found that the West Fork was 90% blocked just downstream from River Grove Park.
Another factor contributing to flooding: Lake Conroe can release water 15 times faster than Lake Houston. That makes it difficult to lower lake levels in advance of a major storm. Storms have a nasty habit of veering away at the last minute. The small gates on Lake Houston mean you have to start lowering the lake far in advance. That raises the risk of wasting precious water. Larger gates would make managing lake levels easier.
Ditches, Streams Filling In
Finally, sediment built up in more places than the San Jacinto. It has also built up in the ditches and streams that lead to the river. This reduces convenance within neighborhoods. There’s less room to store water in streams, so it backs up into storm sewers and streets, and can eventually flood homes.
But what can we do to remedy the damage already done? Leaders in the Lake Houston Area identified a four-part strategy and are working with the SJRA, City of Houston, Montgomery County and Harris County Flood Control to implement it. Elements include:
Increasing upstream detention to reduce the volume of water coming downstream during floods
Dredging the river to remove sediment dams that back water up
Increasing the number of gates on the Lake Houston Spillway to release water faster
Restoring or expanding ditches to handle more water
Let’s look at each of those in a little more detail.
Upstream Detention
The Humble/Kingwood area sits at the tip of a funnel. 535 square miles in a seven-county region drain into Lake Houston.
The San Jacinto River Basin Master Drainage Study identified 16 potential detention projects to hold water back during major storms. However, they would cost roughly $3 billion to reduce damage by less than $1 billion. So that’s a stretch. FEMA evaluates projects based on their benefit/cost ratio.
The SJRA has already applied for a grant for a detention project on Caney Creek which empties into the east fork. But we also need something that can help offset releases from the Lake Conroe Dam on the West Fork. Next step: figure out the funding piece of the puzzle.
The slide below shows why we need additional dredging.
An 18-foot high underwater plateau exists between where the Army Corps stopped dredging on the West Fork and the FM1960 Bridge where scouring during Harvey reduced the channel depth.
The chart above shows the deepest part of the channel between those two areas. If left in place, this plateau will force flood water out of banks during floods. It will also trap sediment, negating the value of previous dredging efforts.
More Gates for Lake Houston
FEMA has conditionally approved up to approximately $50 million to increase the outflow capacity of Lake Houston. During Havey, the flow of water over the spillway was estimated at 11-13 feet. That’s reportedly higher than the flow over Niagra Falls.
In Kingwood, they identified nine projects and recommended two for immediate implementation that should improve drainage on a third tributary, Ben’s Branch.
Recommendations include expanding:
Kingwood Diversion Ditch to take water out of the Ben’s Branch watershed and also improve drainage from surrounding subdivisions from Woodland Hills down to the West Fork.
Taylor Gully – if a deal cannot be reached to purchase Woodridge Village and build a regional detention basin on it.
In addition, Flood Control and the City are looking at minor improvements to other ditches that back water up in places, for instance, at culverts under Kingwood Drive.
Goal: Restore 100-Year Level of Service
Engineers solving all these problems have a goal: to restore your home to what they call a 100-year level of service. That means if your home was built above the 100-year floodplain, it should not flood in a 100-year rain – based on new Atlas 14 standards. In places, sedimentation and upstream development have reduced the level of service to 2 years over time.
We need to restore the capacity of ditches, streams, the river and lake to handle 100-year rains. So we can get water from the sky to the Bay without it going through your living room.
While progress may feel painfully slow, many improvements have already been made.
For instance, in addition to dredging, Flood Control has divided Ben’s Branch up into five projects. Three are already complete:
You can help by remaining engaged. Without public pressure, it’s easy for elected officials to ignore these problems and defer expensive solutions. Keep flood mitigation a high priority. Floods can strike at any time. We had four tropical systems barely miss us this year.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 10/27/2020
1155 Days since Hurricane Harvey and 404 since Imelda
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
On January 10, Mayor Sylvester Turner wrote the SJRA Board to support continued lowering of Lake Conroe. “This temporary measure,” said the Mayor, “will help mitigate against future flooding until permanent flood gates can be installed and dredging of the San Jacinto’s West Fork can be completed.”
Reminding LCA Who Owns the Water
The Mayor also reminded the Lake Conroe Association (LCA) that the City of Houston owns two thirds of the water in Lake Conroe.
Changing the LCA Narrative
Turner also addressed an LCA narrative that claims Lake Conroe was not built for flood control. It was built for drinking water, they say. But the letter changes that narrative. It says, “While the lake was originally constructed as a reservoir for drinking water, the Houston region has become increasingly prone to flooding due to population growth, development and more frequent storms with record rainfall. Both the City of Houston and the State of Texas recognize that flood control must be a consideration. The proactive release water is an effective measure until more permanent solutions can be completed.” See the full text of the Mayor’s letter below.
I have not always agreed with Mayor Turner, but I support him wholeheartedly on this.
Clash of Political Titans
Tuesday, Montgomery County Commissioners will vote on a resolution recommending to END the seasonal lowering of Lake Conroe.
I suspect Harris County Commissioners and the governor may enter this fray before the final vote.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 1/14/2019
868 Days after Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/1.10.2020-Lake-Conroe-Water-Level-NA.doc.jpg?fit=1700%2C2200&ssl=122001700adminadmin2020-01-13 23:31:352020-01-17 08:54:29Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner Supports Continuing to Lower Lake Conroe Seasonally to Help Mitigate Flooding
Since Harvey, the Lake Houston Area has seen some huge changes for the better in the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA). When the Governor visited Kingwood and took a helicopter tour of the San Jacinto River basin after Harvey, he directed the SJRA to establish a flood mitigation division. He also appointed two directors from the Lake Houston area to ensure downstream representation on the SJRA board.
Many Improvements Since March 2018
Since then, Kaaren Cambio and Mark Micheletti, the two new directors from the Lake Houston area, have led the charge to lower Lake Conroe seasonally. This ensures a greater buffer against floods.
The effort paid off this year when heavy back-to-back-to-back rains in early May would have forced a large release from Lake Conroe had it not already been lowered. That release, added to already swollen tributaries, would almost certainly have threatened low lying homes and businesses.
The SJRA will again lower Lake Conroe during the peak of Hurricane season. Starting August 1, it will take Lake Conroe down one foot. Beginning August 15, they will take it down another foot until October 1.
The SJRA is also working with Harris County Flood Control to install more upstream gages and turn the Harris County Flood Warning System into a Regional Flood Warning System with customizable alerts. The goals: create more awareness of upstream dangers to give people more time to evacuate and save valuables in the event of a flood. Said another way, avoid middle-of-the-night surprises like we had during Harvey.
Finally, the SJRA is leading a joint river basin study that hopefully will lay the groundwork for additional upstream detention, more flood gates for Lake Houston, and an ongoing maintenance dredging program. So, many good things are happening.
Cambio’s Term Expiring
However, Cambio’s term on the board expires this year. She wants to stay in the position and I hope she does. Cambio has worked tirelessly to mitigate flooding on so many levels. Her position as a key staffer for Congressman Dan Crenshaw also makes her uniquely qualified to help coordinate efforts from Federal, State and local agencies. She deserves reappointment.
The answer is, “In the short term, no.” Cambio’s seat on the board is the only one up for renewal this year.
SJRA Sunset Review Coming Up
However, in two years, the entire SJRA will come under close scrutiny as part of a sunset review. A sunset review is an evaluation of the need for the continued existence of a program or an agency. It assesses their effectiveness and performance, and recommends either retaining, modifying, or terminating them.
No one expects the SJRA to be terminated. But many other river authorities that have gone through the sunset review process, have had a complete overhaul, said one source who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The Sunset Commission has been brutal at times. For instance, between 2016 and 2017, the Commission reviewed four river authorities and noted:
“Sulpher River Basin Authority Board has not built the trust needed to effectively carry out its mission.”
“Central Colorado River Authority no longer serves a necessary public purpose.”
“Upper Colorado River Authority has not set priorities to ensure its operations meet changing local watershed needs.”
“Palo Duro River Authority of Texas lacks flexibility to adapt to changed local circumstances.”
Their report makes fascinating reading. One thing that became clear in scanning it is that, like most good performance reviews, the Commission judges performance against objectives. In the case of these Authorities, enabling legislation spells out the objectives.
Enabling Legislation Established SJRA Goals
That prompted me to review the enabling legislation for the SJRA. The sections discussing goals begin on page 2 of this PDF. I have summarized them below.
The state created the SJRA (originally called the San Jacinto River Conservation and Reclamation District) to “conserve, control, and utilize to beneficial service the storm and flood waters of the rivers and streams of the State.” Section 2 of the enabling legislation mentions floodwaters three times.
Prevent the devastation of land from recurrent overflows.
Protect life and property.
Regulate the waters of the San Jacinto River and its tributaries.
Build dams and distribution networks that provide waters for cities, towns, irrigation, agriculture, commercial, industrial, mining and other beneficial uses.
Develop drainage systems that enable profitable agricultural production.
Conserve “soils against destructive erosion and thereby preventing the increased flood menace incident thereto.”
Forest and reforest the watershed to aid in the prevention of soil erosion and floods.
Encourage, aid, and protect navigation and harbor improvements.
Acquire land for parks and recreation, and to build park and recreational facilities thereon.
Dispose of sewage and industrial waste.
Construct, improve, maintain, operate and repair water and sewage plants and distribution networks.
How Would You Rate Performance against These Goals?
It seems to me that the SJRA does a great job at its basic mission. And they’re improving at flood mitigation. However, for decades, the SJRA ignored other crucial parts of its job description, including flood and erosion prevention; reforestation; parks and recreation; and navigation protection. In fairness, the Legislature never funded those mandates. The SJRA’s only income comes from the sale of water which it impounds.
Still, you would think somebody could pick up a phone and call the TCEQ for help with some of these things. For instance, sand mines along the banks of the river dump effluent and sediment directly into the drinking water supply for millions of people. It will be interesting to see what kind of changes the Texas Sunset Commission recommends when the SJRA comes up for review.
For an interesting history of the SJRA, see Chapter 4 of this doctoral dissertation by Andrew C. Baker at Rice University. It paints a fascinating picture of the problems the SJRA had in originally fulfilling its basic mission and how the SJRA overcame them with help from the City of Houston.
Note: For future reference, the SJRA enabling legislation has been added to the Reports page under the SJRA tab.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 6/23/2019
663 Days after Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Untitled-1.jpg?fit=260%2C279&ssl=1279260adminadmin2019-06-23 00:22:542024-05-09 20:16:47SJRA Update, Upcoming Sunset Review and Enabling Legislation
Looking back at the 2019 Texas Legislature, we have cause for both celebration and soul searching. The good news: A multi-billion-dollar flood-mitigation bill that will do a lot of good for a lot of people. The bad news: death in various committees of any serious legislation to reign in the out-of-control abuses of sand miners. They openly flaunt environmental laws and resist every attempt at reasonable regulation while pretending to be the good guys who fuel growth.
TACA even managed to kill a bill that would have defined best practices for sand mining (HB 909), without even creating any penalties for violation. You can read the entire rundown on the Legislation page of this site. Below is a brief summary of the bills I followed closely.
Flood Mitigation Scorecard
HB 13 would have created a flood infrastructure fund of $3.26 billion taken from the Economic Stabilization (Rainy Day) fund for flood planning, mitigation, and infrastructure projects. This bill had many of the same objectives as SB 7, but also contained some differences. SB 7 survived. HB13 didn’t.
SB7 could help pay for additional flood gates on Lake Houstonand speed up the process of designing, permitting, and constructing them.
SB500 is an omnibus appropriations bill that includes funding for SB7. It also dedicates $30 million for dredging of the West Fork Mouth Bar in Lake Houston. It passed both Houses and is also on the Governor’s desk, awaiting his signature.
HB 911 would have created a Lake Houston Watershed Commission. Its purpose: to provide the public with streamlined communication and cooperation in flood control planning. It passed the House, but died in the Senate Water and Rural Affairs committee.
Sand Mining Scorecard
People all over the state rose up against the aggregate industry during this legislature, but legislation the industry opposed made it out of committee. Suddenly, TACA’s reason for making large donations to every committee chair in both the House and Senate became clear. There was one small win.
A Small Win
HB 907 Doubled the penalties for not registering a sand mining operation. New penalties can range from $10,000 to $20,000 per year with the total not to exceed $50,000. It passed both Houses and went to the Governor on 5/29. TACA backed this bill because the openly illegal sand mining is bad for their business. It creates low-priced competition.
Bigger Losses
Below is a short list of other sand-mining bills I followed:
HB509 would have allowed the Texas Railroad Commission to regulate APOs with TCEQ. It would have required a hydrologic impact study especially for large clusters of mines in a small area. It also would have required public notice, public hearings, and provided fines up to $10,000 and 1-year in jail for false statements made on permits. It died in committee.
HB 908 would have provided penalties up to $50,000 for water code violations and every-other-year inspections. Died in Committee. No testimony even heard.
HB 909 would have directed the TCEQ to adopt and publish best management practices for sand mines (aggregate production operations). Testimony was taken on 5/1, but no further action was taken. The bill died in committee.
HB 1671 would have extended water quality protections to the West Fork of the San Jacinto currently enjoyed by the John Graves District on the Brazos as part of a pilot program. It would have attached penalties for non-compliance with best practices defined under HB909. It died in the House Natural Resources Committee.
HB 2871 would required sand mines and other aggregate production operations to acquire a reclamation permit and to file a performance bond ensuring reclamation. Significantly, they would have had to do both of these things before they could have acquired a production permit. It also attached civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance. This bill died in the Energy Resources committee.
SB2123. Companion bill identical to HB907. Died in committee.
SB2124. Companion bill, identical to HB909. Died in committee.
SB2125. Companion bill, identical to HB908. Died in committee.
The most potentially dangerous bill of 2019 was CSSB2126. It was pitched under the guise of creating sand traps in the San Jacinto. The theory: keep sand from migrating downstream where it creates sediment dams, such as the mouth bar. Proponents (including TACA) pitched it as a way to get free dredging.
It would have allowed the SJRA and Harris County Flood Control District to dredge the San Jacinto River to restore conveyance without a permit – if they place the spoils on private land. It died in the House, but was reincarnated as HB1824. That bill passed both houses and is on the Governor’s desk.
I feared that this bill would have opened the door to river mining in the San Jacinto. The reason I feared this? Proponents of the bill said they wanted to create “sand traps.” But no one could agree on what they were or where they would be. Language in the bill was EXTREMELY vague and open ended, a practice that can lead to abuses. It doesn’t even mention sand traps. Meanwhile…
River mining is outlawed in many countries because it is so environmentally destructive.
Environmental groups, such as the Bayou Land Conservancy, tried to add language that would have called for independent studies, before allowing miners in the river.
Time Will Tell: Vigilance Required
A major focus of my efforts since Harvey was to increase setbacks from the river for mines. This bill went in the other direction. It allows miners in the river under the guise of “helping” reduce the sedimentation that they “helped” create.
In reality it also reduces their costs by giving them access to land (the river) without paying leasehold fees or taxes. It also gives developers a way to get free fill that can be dumped in the floodplain without permits. And that could put powerful pressure on politically sensitive, appointed boards, such the SJRA’s.
Only time will tell whether the intentions of the drafters of this legislation were pure, or whether this is yet another sly and crafty grab by TACA. One thing is certain: it will require constant vigilance on the part of residents and environmental groups.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 5/30/2019
639 Days since Hurricane Harvey
All thoughts expressed in this post are my opinions on matters of public policy. They are protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/WestFork.jpg?fit=1200%2C1572&ssl=115721200adminadmin2019-05-30 14:32:402019-05-30 15:10:472019 Legislative Scorecard: Flood Mitigation a Win, Sand Mining a Loss
