7/7/26 – Two weeks ago, I reached out to Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) about the priorities of new, incoming Executive Director, Marcus Stuckett.
However – just minutes after publishing the editorial – I opened an email from HCFCD. It was about Stuckett’s priorities. I am glad to say…
There was a remarkable degree of consistency between what he said and what others said.
Stuckett’s Top Three Priorities
According to an HCFCD spokesperson, Stuckett’s immediate focus will be on:
CDBG Program (HUD Community Development Block Grant projects)
Transparency/Reporting
Responsiveness/Project Delivery.
How They Work Together
His top priority is executing the CDBG plan approved by Commissioners Court in June of 2026. That includes system and agreement updates, revised project schedules, and budget adjustments needed to put the plan into action.
The plan, approved by both Commissioners Court and the Texas General Land Office (which administers HUD grants in Texas), is designed to save $322 million in federal funding with a deadline of 2/28/27.
That involves bundling and billing all of the County’s CDBG work together for both Mitigation and Disaster Relief Grants and both HCFCD and Harris County Housing and Community Development Department (HCHCD). The totals will all then be applied against the $322 million with the rapidly approaching deadline.
The table below summarizes the starting point for Stuckett. Figures are current as of 7/6/2026.
Even with the new “bundle plan,” Harris County is only one third of its way to the goal. But that’s far better than before when HCFCD’s Disaster Relief (DR) program had its own budget and deadline.
HCFCD before Stuckett managed to bill only 4.35% of its Disaster Relief allocation in about 80% of the time allowed.
To see the latest project-by-project status report, click here.
33% is much better than 4%. But Stuckett still assumes office with a huge hurdle to overcome. He must move quickly to adjust tracking and accounting systems as he pushes contractors to accelerate.
For example, Woodridge is a CDBG-MIT program. But Woodridge billing can now be applied to CDBG-DR. So it makes sense to hurry that up if possible.
Stuckett assumed office on 6/29/26. Excavation of the Woodridge Detention Basin in Kingwood was already kicking into high gear on 7/2/26 when I photographed five trucks lined up to load.
Addressing Remaining Data Gaps
Supporting Stuckett’s effort is a push to strengthen reporting and transparency, addressing any remaining data gaps that could affect HCFCD’s ability to track and communicate progress.
Responsiveness is the third pillar of Stuckett’s focus. With many systems and initiatives in motion, Stuckett says he is working to shorten processing times and move approvals more efficiently – both internally and externally.
“Together, these priorities reflect a broader commitment to transparency and delivery that will carry the organization into its next phase,” said HCFCD.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/7/2026
3234 Days since Hurricane Harvey
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/DR-Save-Plan-as-of-26.07.06.png?fit=1556%2C1036&ssl=110361556adminadmin2026-07-07 11:58:492026-07-07 12:10:38New HCFCD Executive Director Shares His Top Three Priorities
7/6/2026 – Last month, Dr. Tina Petersen, former head of Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD), resigned under pressure. For this post, I’d like to focus on what HCFCD needs to do to get back on track. Toward that end, I interviewed more than a dozen people knowledgeable about HCFCD and its operations. Many spoke on the condition of anonymity.
The Petersen controversy had to do with the potential loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funding because of project delays.
HCFCD now has a new head: Marcus Stuckett, formerly Director of Engineering at HCFCD. Stuckett worked his way up through the organization, then left for several years while Petersen headed the department and is now returning. Here is what many would advise.
Refocus on Core Mission
One said, “Tina Pearson was running public relations campaigns and trying to play politics. The Flood Control District is a planning, engineering and construction organization. And that’s it. Period. We need to refocus on execution and delivering results.”
Other sources echoed this sentiment but phrased it as “Getting back to basics.”
For example, one source mentioned Taylor Gully in Kingwood. Five years and two months ago, the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) approved $10.1 million to widen and deepen Taylor Gully.
But according to Amy Crouser, an HCFCD spokesperson, the District is still waiting for “TWDB to approve the channel work.” Then she added, “City of Houston is working on getting this approval.”
Fill Gaps in the Org Chart
One source told me that there are still many highly qualified and motivated people at HCFCD. However, others bemoaned the brain drain that has reportedly created gaps in org charts. The gaps disrupt or delay decision making. They also cost institutional knowledge and project continuity.
For instance, one group head has been scheduled to retire for a long time. But reportedly, Petersen did not seek a replacement. A lack of overlap will make it harder for a new hire to get up to speed.
Re-Instill Sense of Urgency and Ownership
Virtually everyone I talked to mentioned the need to re-instill a sense of urgency and project ownership. Delays under the previous director cost some projects years. For instance, the Preliminary Engineering Report for the Kingwood Diversion Ditch project was scheduled to take 300 days, but took more than 1,400.
Design work for the project will finally go on the Commissioner’s Court agenda for August this year, exactly nine years after 13 people died along Bens Branch. (The Diversion Ditch takes water out of Bens Branch, hence its name.)
Empower Employees to Make Decisions
“Empower folks to make decisions,” said one source. “Project managers and the people doing the day to day are trying very, very hard to push projects forward. The biggest issue sometimes is HCFCD’s own processes where, “Okay, we finished this stage. Now it has to go up to leadership for review and approval.”
But getting to the next stage was often problematic. Many cited Petersen’s penchant for perfectionism, consensus-style management, risk avoidance, and indecisiveness. That combination delayed projects, sometimes for years. Said another way, the organization had a bad case of paralysis through analysis.
Such managers can prefer “delays over decisions.” Stuckett must ask, “How can we make this work?” Not, “Why might this be a problem?”
Address Delays Caused by Other County Departments
Numerous sources cited delays caused by other county departments, namely Purchasing and the Department of Economic Equity and Opportunity (DEEO).
Precinct 3 Commissioner Tom Ramsey, PE admitted that DEEO had issues. He mentioned that that department head was also replaced.
“If Purchasing or DEEO are impacting our ability to get something done, we need to know about it. Then, we can work together to eliminate delays,” said Ramsey.
Return to a Metrics-Driven Approach
After Petersen took office in 2022, Bond Updates became less frequent as project progress slowed. The lack of reliable metrics made it more difficult for Commissioners, funding partners and the public to gauge progress.
When Commissioner Ramsey, the Commissioners Court, and the Texas GLO finally demanded metrics that showed the true status of projects, the depth of HCFCD’s problems became all too apparent.
“Work the Details”
Commissioner Ramsey, a veteran engineer, said, “There’s no magic formula. We have to work the details – daily – on where each project is. Some are far along. And some are just about to get started. Are we working the schedule? Is there anything we can do to mitigate problems associated with it?”
Ramsey advised, “Federal paperwork is necessary and complicated. So, be sure that you’re working the paperwork, too. All of these issues are manageable. We just have to get organized.”
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/20250401-Commissioners-Court-3.27.25.jpg?fit=1100%2C617&ssl=16171100adminadmin2026-07-06 18:39:092026-07-07 07:04:37Editorial: Getting HCFCD Back on Track
Academic research into flooding suggests that “Flood protection tends to reduce small floods, but increases the consequences of rare, large floods.” This is one of the central ideas in modern flood-risk management.
It does not mean that flood-control projects are bad. Rather, it describes an unintended sociological feedback loop that can emerge over the long term, if structural protection is not paired with prudent land-use planning.
The concept traces back to the work of Gilbert F. White in 1945 and has been expanded by researchers such as Raymond J. Burby, Gilberto Di Baldassarre, and others. It is commonly referred to as the levee effect or the safe-development paradox. Simply stated, flood-risk-reduction projects can lull people into a false sense of security.
The Basic Mechanism
The process unfolds over decades rather than years. It follows these steps:
Flood protection is built…
Frequent flooding declines…
Confidence increases…
More homes, businesses and infrastructure are built…
Property values rise…
A flood larger than the “design event” (i.e., the 100-year flood) occurs…
Communities experience much greater losses than would have occurred decades earlier.
Structural flood protection often reduces flood frequency. However, it encourages much more development behind the protection, so exposure increases dramatically. Then, when an event exceeds the design capacity, total losses can be much larger than before.
Why This Happens
Here’s an example. Imagine an area that floods every five years.
Initially, only 100 homes might occupy the area because of flood frequency.
A moderate flood might damage 50 homes.
Then, a levee is built to withstand the 100-year flood.
For the next 30 years:
No floods occur.
Confidence grows.
The area now contains:
5,000 homes
Schools
Hospitals
Shopping centers
Utilities.
Then a 500-year flood overtops the levee.
The levee did exactly what it was designed to do for decades. But because so much development accumulated behind it, the rare failure produces vastly greater losses than would have occurred before the levee existed.
That is the paradox.
Example: New Orleans and Katrina
Perhaps the world’s best-known example is New Orleans during Katrina.
For decades, extensive levees reduced frequent flooding. Large areas below sea level became heavily urbanized. And population and infrastructure expanded behind the levee system.
When Hurricane Katrina exceeded parts of the system’s design, multiple levees failed. Approximately 80% of New Orleans flooded. More than 1,800 people died. Economic losses exceeded $100 billion.
Researchers argue that the levees enabled much greater development in areas that remained vulnerable to catastrophic flooding if protection was exceeded.
The Implication for Houston and the San Jacinto Basin
This idea has direct relevance to the Lake Houston Area and the San Jacinto River Basin.
Suppose all the projects proposed after Harvey (additional upstream detention, optimized gate operations on Lake Conroe, channel conveyance improvements, more floodgates for Lake Houston, etc.) are implemented and reduce the probability of flooding from moderate storms.
However, they could create a widespread perception that “This land is now safe.” And that perception could lead to substantial new development in flood-prone portions of the basin over several decades such as the 5,300 acre Scarborough property at the confluence of the West Fork and Spring Creek.
Wetlands on Scarborough property
Exposure increases. Property values increase. Infrastructure becomes more concentrated.
Then, when an event exceeds the protection system — just as Harvey exceeded many historical design assumptions — the total losses may be larger than they otherwise would have been.
This is precisely why many modern flood-risk experts argue that structural protection must be paired with land-use management rather than viewed as a substitute for it. But “land use management” is fightin’ words in Houston.
Breaking the Cycle
The encouraging news is that the research also points to ways to avoid the paradox. The most commonly recommended strategies are:
Preserve portions of the natural floodplain instead of developing every protected acre.
Use regional detention and natural storage to reduce flood peaks.
Educate home buyers about the limits of flood protection.
Require resilient construction (elevated structures, floodproofing) even behind levees or reservoirs.
Manage development at the watershed scale, not just parcel by parcel.
Why This is Especially Relevant to the San Jacinto
This concept is particularly important for the San Jacinto basin because it reframes the objective of the SJRA’s Joint Reservoir Operations Study.
The study’s success should not be measured solely by whether it lowers flood stages by a few inches. It should also include:
Strong warnings about the safe development paradox
Education about design assumptions for flooding, i.e., the height of foundations above the 100-year flood level.
Said another way, the study should discourage development that eventually erases any gains – one of the central themes in contemporary flood-risk research.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/5/2026
3232 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
https://i0.wp.com/reduceflooding.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Scarborough-Wetlands.png?fit=1100%2C661&ssl=16611100adminadmin2026-07-05 17:35:492026-07-05 20:15:43How Flood Protection Can Increase Consequences of Large Floods
New HCFCD Executive Director Shares His Top Three Priorities
7/7/26 – Two weeks ago, I reached out to Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) about the priorities of new, incoming Executive Director, Marcus Stuckett.
When I didn’t hear back immediately, I asked other people what they thought his priorities should be and published those in an editorial yesterday titled “Getting HCFCD Back on Track.”
However – just minutes after publishing the editorial – I opened an email from HCFCD. It was about Stuckett’s priorities. I am glad to say…
Stuckett’s Top Three Priorities
According to an HCFCD spokesperson, Stuckett’s immediate focus will be on:
How They Work Together
His top priority is executing the CDBG plan approved by Commissioners Court in June of 2026. That includes system and agreement updates, revised project schedules, and budget adjustments needed to put the plan into action.
The plan, approved by both Commissioners Court and the Texas General Land Office (which administers HUD grants in Texas), is designed to save $322 million in federal funding with a deadline of 2/28/27.
That involves bundling and billing all of the County’s CDBG work together for both Mitigation and Disaster Relief Grants and both HCFCD and Harris County Housing and Community Development Department (HCHCD). The totals will all then be applied against the $322 million with the rapidly approaching deadline.
The table below summarizes the starting point for Stuckett. Figures are current as of 7/6/2026.
Even with the new “bundle plan,” Harris County is only one third of its way to the goal. But that’s far better than before when HCFCD’s Disaster Relief (DR) program had its own budget and deadline.
HCFCD before Stuckett managed to bill only 4.35% of its Disaster Relief allocation in about 80% of the time allowed.
To see the latest project-by-project status report, click here.
33% is much better than 4%. But Stuckett still assumes office with a huge hurdle to overcome. He must move quickly to adjust tracking and accounting systems as he pushes contractors to accelerate.
For example, Woodridge is a CDBG-MIT program. But Woodridge billing can now be applied to CDBG-DR. So it makes sense to hurry that up if possible.
Addressing Remaining Data Gaps
Supporting Stuckett’s effort is a push to strengthen reporting and transparency, addressing any remaining data gaps that could affect HCFCD’s ability to track and communicate progress.
Responsiveness is the third pillar of Stuckett’s focus. With many systems and initiatives in motion, Stuckett says he is working to shorten processing times and move approvals more efficiently – both internally and externally.
“Together, these priorities reflect a broader commitment to transparency and delivery that will carry the organization into its next phase,” said HCFCD.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/7/2026
3234 Days since Hurricane Harvey
Editorial: Getting HCFCD Back on Track
7/6/2026 – Last month, Dr. Tina Petersen, former head of Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD), resigned under pressure. For this post, I’d like to focus on what HCFCD needs to do to get back on track. Toward that end, I interviewed more than a dozen people knowledgeable about HCFCD and its operations. Many spoke on the condition of anonymity.
The Petersen controversy had to do with the potential loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funding because of project delays.
HCFCD now has a new head: Marcus Stuckett, formerly Director of Engineering at HCFCD. Stuckett worked his way up through the organization, then left for several years while Petersen headed the department and is now returning. Here is what many would advise.
Refocus on Core Mission
One said, “Tina Pearson was running public relations campaigns and trying to play politics. The Flood Control District is a planning, engineering and construction organization. And that’s it. Period. We need to refocus on execution and delivering results.”
Other sources echoed this sentiment but phrased it as “Getting back to basics.”
For example, one source mentioned Taylor Gully in Kingwood. Five years and two months ago, the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) approved $10.1 million to widen and deepen Taylor Gully.
But according to Amy Crouser, an HCFCD spokesperson, the District is still waiting for “TWDB to approve the channel work.” Then she added, “City of Houston is working on getting this approval.”
Fill Gaps in the Org Chart
One source told me that there are still many highly qualified and motivated people at HCFCD. However, others bemoaned the brain drain that has reportedly created gaps in org charts. The gaps disrupt or delay decision making. They also cost institutional knowledge and project continuity.
For instance, one group head has been scheduled to retire for a long time. But reportedly, Petersen did not seek a replacement. A lack of overlap will make it harder for a new hire to get up to speed.
Re-Instill Sense of Urgency and Ownership
Virtually everyone I talked to mentioned the need to re-instill a sense of urgency and project ownership. Delays under the previous director cost some projects years. For instance, the Preliminary Engineering Report for the Kingwood Diversion Ditch project was scheduled to take 300 days, but took more than 1,400.
Design work for the project will finally go on the Commissioner’s Court agenda for August this year, exactly nine years after 13 people died along Bens Branch. (The Diversion Ditch takes water out of Bens Branch, hence its name.)
Empower Employees to Make Decisions
“Empower folks to make decisions,” said one source. “Project managers and the people doing the day to day are trying very, very hard to push projects forward. The biggest issue sometimes is HCFCD’s own processes where, “Okay, we finished this stage. Now it has to go up to leadership for review and approval.”
But getting to the next stage was often problematic. Many cited Petersen’s penchant for perfectionism, consensus-style management, risk avoidance, and indecisiveness. That combination delayed projects, sometimes for years. Said another way, the organization had a bad case of paralysis through analysis.
Such managers can prefer “delays over decisions.” Stuckett must ask, “How can we make this work?” Not, “Why might this be a problem?”
Address Delays Caused by Other County Departments
Numerous sources cited delays caused by other county departments, namely Purchasing and the Department of Economic Equity and Opportunity (DEEO).
Precinct 3 Commissioner Tom Ramsey, PE admitted that DEEO had issues. He mentioned that that department head was also replaced.
“If Purchasing or DEEO are impacting our ability to get something done, we need to know about it. Then, we can work together to eliminate delays,” said Ramsey.
Return to a Metrics-Driven Approach
After Petersen took office in 2022, Bond Updates became less frequent as project progress slowed. The lack of reliable metrics made it more difficult for Commissioners, funding partners and the public to gauge progress.
When Commissioner Ramsey, the Commissioners Court, and the Texas GLO finally demanded metrics that showed the true status of projects, the depth of HCFCD’s problems became all too apparent.
“Work the Details”
Commissioner Ramsey, a veteran engineer, said, “There’s no magic formula. We have to work the details – daily – on where each project is. Some are far along. And some are just about to get started. Are we working the schedule? Is there anything we can do to mitigate problems associated with it?”
Ramsey advised, “Federal paperwork is necessary and complicated. So, be sure that you’re working the paperwork, too. All of these issues are manageable. We just have to get organized.”
Focus on CDBG
With $322 million of US Department of Housing and Urban Development CDBG Grants (Community Development Block Grants) projects facing a deadline of 2/28/27 – less than eight months away – obviously the immediate focus needs to be on those.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/6/2026
3233 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.
How Flood Protection Can Increase Consequences of Large Floods
Academic research into flooding suggests that “Flood protection tends to reduce small floods, but increases the consequences of rare, large floods.” This is one of the central ideas in modern flood-risk management.
It does not mean that flood-control projects are bad. Rather, it describes an unintended sociological feedback loop that can emerge over the long term, if structural protection is not paired with prudent land-use planning.
The concept traces back to the work of Gilbert F. White in 1945 and has been expanded by researchers such as Raymond J. Burby, Gilberto Di Baldassarre, and others. It is commonly referred to as the levee effect or the safe-development paradox. Simply stated, flood-risk-reduction projects can lull people into a false sense of security.
The Basic Mechanism
The process unfolds over decades rather than years. It follows these steps:
Structural flood protection often reduces flood frequency. However, it encourages much more development behind the protection, so exposure increases dramatically. Then, when an event exceeds the design capacity, total losses can be much larger than before.
Why This Happens
Here’s an example. Imagine an area that floods every five years.
Initially, only 100 homes might occupy the area because of flood frequency.
For the next 30 years:
Then a 500-year flood overtops the levee.
The levee did exactly what it was designed to do for decades. But because so much development accumulated behind it, the rare failure produces vastly greater losses than would have occurred before the levee existed.
That is the paradox.
Example: New Orleans and Katrina
Perhaps the world’s best-known example is New Orleans during Katrina.
For decades, extensive levees reduced frequent flooding. Large areas below sea level became heavily urbanized. And population and infrastructure expanded behind the levee system.
When Hurricane Katrina exceeded parts of the system’s design, multiple levees failed. Approximately 80% of New Orleans flooded. More than 1,800 people died. Economic losses exceeded $100 billion.
Researchers argue that the levees enabled much greater development in areas that remained vulnerable to catastrophic flooding if protection was exceeded.
The Implication for Houston and the San Jacinto Basin
This idea has direct relevance to the Lake Houston Area and the San Jacinto River Basin.
Suppose all the projects proposed after Harvey (additional upstream detention, optimized gate operations on Lake Conroe, channel conveyance improvements, more floodgates for Lake Houston, etc.) are implemented and reduce the probability of flooding from moderate storms.
However, they could create a widespread perception that “This land is now safe.” And that perception could lead to substantial new development in flood-prone portions of the basin over several decades such as the 5,300 acre Scarborough property at the confluence of the West Fork and Spring Creek.
Exposure increases. Property values increase. Infrastructure becomes more concentrated.
Then, when an event exceeds the protection system — just as Harvey exceeded many historical design assumptions — the total losses may be larger than they otherwise would have been.
This is precisely why many modern flood-risk experts argue that structural protection must be paired with land-use management rather than viewed as a substitute for it. But “land use management” is fightin’ words in Houston.
Breaking the Cycle
The encouraging news is that the research also points to ways to avoid the paradox. The most commonly recommended strategies are:
Why This is Especially Relevant to the San Jacinto
This concept is particularly important for the San Jacinto basin because it reframes the objective of the SJRA’s Joint Reservoir Operations Study.
The study’s success should not be measured solely by whether it lowers flood stages by a few inches. It should also include:
Said another way, the study should discourage development that eventually erases any gains – one of the central themes in contemporary flood-risk research.
Posted by Bob Rehak on 7/5/2026
3232 Days since Hurricane Harvey
The thoughts expressed in this post represent opinions on matters of public concern and safety. They are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the Anti-SLAPP Statute of the Great State of Texas.